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Foreword 
The main purpose of the British Documents on the End of Empire Project (BDEEP) 
is to publish documents from British official archives on the ending of colonial and 
associated rule and on the context in which this took place. In 1945, aside from the 
countries of present-day India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Burma, Britain had over 
fifty formal dependencies; by the end of 1965 the total had been almost halved and by 
1985 only a handful remained. The ending of Britain's position in these formal 
dependencies was paralleled by changes in relations with states in an informal 
empire. The end of empire in the period at least since 1945 involved a change also in 
the empire as something that was more than the sum of its parts and as such formed 
an integral part of Britain's domestic affairs and international relations. In pub-
lishing official British documents on the end of empire this project is, to a degree, 
the successor to the two earlier series of published documents concerning the end of 
British rule in India and Burma which were edited by Professors Mansergh and 
Tinker respectively. 1 The successful completion of The transfer of power and The 
struggle for independence, both of which were based on British records, emphasised 
the need for similar published collections of documents important to the history of 
the final stages of Britain's association with other dependencies in Africa, the Middle 
East, the Caribbean, South-East Asia and the Pacific. In their absence, scholars both 
from sovereign independent states which emerged from colonial rule, as well as from 
Britain itself, lack an important tool for understanding and teaching their respective 
histories. But BDEEP is also set in the much wider context of the efforts made by 
successive British governments to locate Britain's position in an international order. 
Here the empire, both in its formal and informal senses, is viewed as an instrument 
of the domestic, foreign and defence policies of successive British governments. The 
project is therefore concerned with the ending of colonial rule in individual 
territories as seen from the British side at one level, and the broader political, 
economic and strategic considerations involved in that at another. 
BDEEP is a sequel, not only to the India and Burma series but also to the still 
earlier series of published Foreign Office documents which continues as Documents 
on British Policy Overseas (DBPO). The contemporary volumes in DBPO appear in 
two parallel series covering the years 1945 to 1955. In certain respects the 
documents published in the BDEEP volumes will complement those published in 
DBPO. On issues where there is, or is likely to be, direct overlap, BDEEP will not 
provide detailed coverage. The most notable examples concern the post-Second 
World War international settlements in the Far East and the Pacific, and the 
immediate events of the Suez crisis of 1956. 
1 Nicholas Mansergh et al, eds, Constitutional relations between Britain and India: the transfer of power 
1942-47, 12 vols, (London, 1970-1983); Hugh Tinker, ed, Constitutional relations between Britain and 
Burma: the struggle for independence 1944-1948, 2 vols, (London, 1983-1984)., 
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Despite the similarities, however, BDEEP differs in significant ways from its 
predecessors in terms both of presentation and content. The project is of greater 
magnitude than that undertaken by Professor Mansergh for India. Four major 
differences can be identified. First, the ending of colonial rule within a dependent 
empire took place over a much longer period of time, extending into the final years of 
the twentieth century, while having its roots in the Second World War and before. 
Secondly, the empire consisted of a large number of territories, varying in area, 
population, wealth and in many other ways, each with its own individual problems, 
but often with their futures linked to those of neighbouring territories and the 
growing complexity surrounding the colonial empire. Thirdly, while for India the 
documentary record for certain matters of high policy could be encapsulated within a 
relatively straightforward 'country' study, in the case of the colonial empire the 
documentary record is more diffuse because of the plethora of territories and their 
scattered location. Finally, the documents relating to the ending of colonial rule are 
not conveniently located within one leading department of state but rather are to be 
found in several of them. As the purpose of the project is to publish documents 
relating to the end of empire from the extensive range and quantity of official British 
records, private collections and other categories of non-official material are not 
regarded as principal documentary sources. In BDEEP, selections from non-official 
material will be used only in exceptional cases to fill gaps where they exist in the 
available official record. 
In recognition of these differences, and also of the fact that the end of empire 
involves consideration of a range of issues which operated at a much wider level than 
that normally associated with the ending of colonial rule in a single country, BDEEP 
is structured in two main series along with a third support series. Series A represents 
the general volumes in which, for successive British governments, documents 
relating to the empire as a whole will be published. Series B represents the country 
or territory volumes and provides territorial studies of how, from a British 
government perspective, former colonies and dependencies achieved their independ-
ence, and countries which were part of an informal empire regained their autonomy. 
In addition to the two main documentary series, a third series - series C - will be 
published in the form of handbooks to the records of the former colonial empire 
which are deposited at the Public Record Office (PRO). The handbooks will be 
published in two volumes as an integral part of BDEEP and also as PRO guides to the 
records. They will enable scholars and others wishing to follow the record of the 
ending of colonial rule and empire to pursue their inquiries beyond the published 
record provided by the general studies in series A and the country studies in series B. 
Volume One of the handbooks, a revised and updated version of The records of the 
Colonial and Dominions Offices (by R B Pugh) which was first published in 1964, is 
entitled Records of the Colonial Office, Dominions Office, Commonwealth Relations 
Office and Commonwealth Office. It covers over two hundred years of activity down 
to 1968 when the Commonwealth Office merged with the Foreign Office to form the 
Foreign and Commonwealth Office. Volume Two, entitled Cabinet, Foreign Office, 
Treasury and other records, focuses more specifically on twentieth-century depart-
mental records and also includes references to the records of inter-departmental 
committees, commissions of inquiry and international organisations. These two 
volumes have been prepared under the direction and supervision of Dr Anne 
Thurston, honorary research fellow at the Institute of Commonwealth Studies in the 
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University of London. 
The criteria which have been used in selecting documents for inclusion in 
individual volumes will be explained in the introductions written by the specialist 
editors. These introductions are more substantial and contextual than those in 
previous series. Each volume will also list the PRO sources which have been 
searched. However, it may be helpful to outline the more general guiding principles 
which have been employed. BDEEP editors pursue several lines of inquiry. There is 
first the end of empire in a broad high policy sense, in which the empire is viewed in 
terms of Britain's position as a world power, and of the inter-relationship between 
what derives from this position and developments within the colonial dependencies. 
Here Britain's relations with the dependencies of the empire are set in the wider 
context of Britain's relations with the United -States, with Europe, and with the 
Commonwealth and United Nations. The central themes are the political constraints, 
both domestic and international, to which British governments were subject, the 
economic requirements of the sterling area, the geopolitical and strategic questions 
associated with priorities in foreign policy and in defence planning, and the 
interaction between these various constraints and concerns and the imperatives 
imposed by developments in colonial territories. Secondly, there is investigation into 
colonial policy in its strict sense. Here the emphasis is on those areas which were 
specifically - but not exclusively - the concern of the leading department. In the 
period before the administrative amalgamations of the 1960s,2 the leading depart-
ment of the British government for most of the dependencies was the Colonial Office; 
for a minority it was either the Dominions Office and its successor, the Common-
wealth Relations Office, or the Foreign Office. Colonial policy included questions of 
economic and social development, questions of governmental institutions and 
constitutional structures, and administrative questions concerning the future of the 
civil and public services and of the defence forces in a period of transition from 
European to indigenous control. Finally there is inquiry into the development of 
political and social forces within colonies, the response to these and the transfer of 
governmental authority and of legal sovereignty from Britain to its colonial 
dependencies as these processes were understood and interpreted by the British 
government. Here it should be emphasised that the purpose of BDEEP is not to 
document the history of colony politics or nationalist movements in any particular 
territory. Given the purpose of the project and the nature of much of the source 
material, the place of colony politics in BDEEP is conditioned by the extent to which 
an awareness of local political situations played an overt part in influencing major 
policy decisions made in Britain. 
Although in varying degrees and from different perspectives, elements of these 
various lines of inquiry appear in both the general and the country series. The aim in 
both is to concentrate on the British record by selecting documents which illustrate 
those policy issues which were deemed important by ministers and officials at the 
time. General volumes do not normally treat in any detail of matters which will be 
fully documented in the country volumes, but some especially significant documents 
do appear in both series. The process of selection involves an inevitable degree of 
2 The Colonial Office merged with the Commonwealth Relations Office in 1966 to form the Common-
wealth Office. The Commonwealth Office merged with the Foreign Office in 1968 to form the Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office. 
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sifting and subtraction. Issues which in retrospect appear to be of lesser significance 
or to be ephemeral have been omitted. The main example concerns the extensive 
quantity of material devoted to appointments and terms of service - salaries, 
gradings, allowances, pension rights and compensation - within the colonial and 
related services. It is equally important to stress certain negative aspects of the 
official documentary record. Officials in London were sometimes not in a position to 
address potentially significant issues because the information was not available. 
Much in this respect depended on the extent of the documentation sent to London by 
the different colonial administrations. Once the stage of internal self-government 
had been reached, or where there was a dyarchy, the flow of detailed local 
information to London began to diminish. 
Selection policy has been influenced by one further factor, namely access to the 
records at the PRO. Unlike the India and Burma series and DBPO, BDEEP is not an 
official project. In practice this means that while editors have privileged access (in 
the form of research facilities and requisitioning procedures) to the records at the 
PRO, they do not have unrestricted access. For tiles which at the time a volume is in 
preparation are either subject to extended closures beyond the statutory thirty years, 
or retained in the originating department under section 3(4) of the Public Records 
Act of 1958, editors are subject to the same restrictions as all other researchers. 
Where necessary, volume editors will provide details of potentially significant tiles or 
individual documents of which they are aware and which they have not been able to 
consult. 
A thematic arrangement of the documents has been adopted for the general 
volumes in series A. The country volumes in series B follow a chronological 
arrangement; in this respect they adopt the same approach as was used in the India 
and Burma series. For each volume in both series A and B a summary list of the 
documents included is provided. The headings to BDEEP documents, which have 
been editorially standardised, present the essential information. Together with the 
sequence number, the tile reference (in the form of the PRO call-up number and any 
internal pagination or numeration) and the date of the document appear on the first 
line.3 The second and subsequent lines record the subject of the document, the type 
of document (letter, memorandum, telegram etc), the originator (person or persons, 
committee, department) and the recipient (if any). In headings, a subject entry in 
single quotation marks denotes the title of a document as it appears in the original. 
An entry in square brackets denotes a subject indicator devised by the editor. This 
latter device has been employed in -cases where no title is given in the original or 
where the original title is too unwieldly to reproduce in its entirety. Security 
classifications and, in the case of telegrams, times of despatch and receipt, have 
generally been omitted as confusing and needlessly complicating, and are retained 
only where they are necessary to a full understanding. In the headings to documents 
and the summary lists, ministers are identified by the name of the office-holder, not 
the title of the office (ie, Mr Lyttelton, not secretary of state for the colonies).4 In the 
same contexts, officials are identified by their initials and surname. In general 
3 The PRO call-up number precedes the comma in the references cited. In the case of documents from FO 
371 , the major Foreign Office political class, the internal numeration refers to the jacket number of the 
file. 
4 This is an editorial convention, following DBPO practice. Very few memoranda issued in their name were 
actually written by ministers themselves, but normally drafted by officials. 
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volumes in series A, ambassadors, governors, high commissiOners and other 
embassy or high commission staff are given in the form 'Sir E Baring (Kenya)'. 
Footnotes to documents appearing below the rule are editorial; those above the rule, 
or where no rule is printed, are part of the original document. Each part of a volume 
provides a select list of which principal offices were held by whom, with a separate 
series of biographical notes (at the end) for major figures who appear in the 
documents. Minor figures are identified in editorial footnotes on the occasion of first 
appearance. Link-notes, written by the volume editor and indented in square 
brackets between the heading and the beginning of a document, are sometimes used 
to explain the context of a document. Technical detail or extraneous material has 
been extracted from a number of documents. In such cases omission dots have been 
inserted in the text and the document is identified in the heading as an extract. 
Occasional omission dots have also been used to excise purely mechanical chain-of-
command executive instructions, and some redundant internal referencing has been 
removed, though much of it remains in place, for the benefit of researchers. No 
substantive material relating to policy-making has been excised from the documents. 
In general the aim has been to reproduce docum,ents in their entirety. The footnote 
reference 'not printed' has been used only in cases where a specified enclosure or an 
annex to a document has notbeen included. Unless a specific cross-reference or note 
of explanation is provided, however, it can be assumed that other documents referred 
to in the text of the documents included have not been reproduced. Each part of a 
volume has a list of abbreviations occurring in it. A consolidated index for the whole 
volume appears at the end of each part. 
One radical innovation, compared with previous Foreign Office or India and 
Burma series, is that BDEEP will reproduce many more minutes by ministers and 
officials. 
All government documents are reproduced and quoted by permission of the 
Controller of HMSO. All references and dates are given in the form recommended in 
PRO guidelines. 
* * * * 
BDEEP has received assistance and support from many quarters. The project was 
first discussed at a one-day workshop attended by over thirty interested scholars 
which, supported by a small grant from the Smuts Memorial Fund, was held at 
Churchill College, Cambridge, in May 1985. At that stage the obstacles looked 
daunting. It seemed unlikely that public money would be made available along the 
lines provided for the India and Burma projects. The complexities of the task looked 
substantial, partly because there was more financial and economic data with which 
to deal, still more because there were so many more territories to cover. It was not at 
all clear, moreover, who could take institutional responsibility for the project as the 
India Office Records had for the earlier ones; and in view of the escalating price of the 
successive India and Burma volumes, it seemed unlikely that publication in book 
form would be feasible; for some while a choice was being discussed between 
microfilm, microfiche and facsimile. 
A small group nevertheless undertook to explore matters further, and in a quite 
remarkable way found itself able to make substantial progress. The British Academy 
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adopted BDEEP as one of its major projects, and thus provided critical support. The 
Institute of Commonwealth Studies served as a crucial institutional anchor in taking 
responsibility for the project. The Institute also made office space available, and 
negotiated an administrative nexus within the University of London. Dr Anne 
Thurston put at the disposal of the project her unique knowledge of the relevant 
archival sources; while the keeper of the Public Records undertook to provide all the 
support that he could. It then proved possible to appoint Professor Michael Crowder 
as project director on a part-time basis, and he approached the Leverhulme Trust, 
who made a munificent grant which was to make the whole project viable. Almost all 
those approached to be volume editors accepted and, after consultation with a 
number of publishers, Her Majesty's Stationery Office undertook to publish the 
project in book form. There can be few projects that after so faltering a start found 
itself quite so blessed. 
Formally launched in 1987, BDEEP has been based since its inception at the 
Institute of Commonwealth Studies. The work of the project is supervised by a 
Project Committee chaired by Professor Anthony Low, Smuts professor of the history 
of the British Commonwealth in the University of Cambridge. Professor Michael 
Crowder became general editor while holding a visiting professorship in the 
University of London and a part-time position at Amherst College, Massachusetts. 
Following his untimely death in 1988, Professor Crowder was replaced as general 
editor by Professor David Murray, pro vice-chancellor and professor of government at 
the Open University. Mrs Anita Burdett was appointed as project secretary and 
research assistant. She was succeeded in September 1989 by Dr Ashton who had 
previously worked with Professors Mansergh and Tinker during the final stages of the 
India and Burma series. Dr Ashton replaced Professor Murray as project director and 
general editor in 1993. When BDEEP was launched in 1987, eight volumes in series 
A and B were approved by the Project Committee and specialist scholars were 
commissioned to research and select documents for inclusion in each. Collectively, 
these eight volumes (three general and five country)5 represent the first stage of the 
project which begins with an introductory general volume covering the years 
between 1925 and 1945 but which concentrates on the period from the Second World 
War to 1957 when Ghana and Malaya became independent.6 
It is fitting that the present general editor should begin his acknowledgements 
with an appreciation of the contributions made by his predecessors. The late 
Professor Crowder supervised the launch of the project and planned the volumes 
included in stage one. The volumes already published bear lasting testimony to his 
resolve and dedication during the project's formative phase. Professor Murray played 
a no less crucial role in establishing a secure financial base for the project and in 
negotiating contracts with the volume editors and HMSO. His invaluable advice and 
expertise during the early stages of editing are acknowledged with particular 
gratitude. 
5 Series A general volumes: vol1 Colonial policy and practice 1924-1945; vol 2 The Labour government 
and the end of empire 1945-1951 (published 1992); vol 3 The Conservative government and the end of 
empire 1951-1957 (published 1994). 
Series B country volumes: vol 1 Ghana (published 1992); vol 2 Sri Lanka; vol 3 Malaya (published 
1995); vol 4 Egypt and the defence of the Middle East; vol 5 Sudan. 
6 Plans are currently in preparation to commission new research for a second stage covering the period 
1957-1964. 
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The project benefited from an initial pump-priming grant from the British 
Academy. Thanks are due to the secretary and Board of the Academy for this grant 
and for the decision of the British Academy to adopt BDEEP as one of its major 
projects. The principal funding for the project has been provided by the Leverhulme 
Trust and the volumes are a tribute to the support provided by the Trustees. A major 
debt of gratitude is owed to the Trustees. In addition to their generous grant to cover 
the costs of the first stage, the Trustees agreed to a subsequent request to extend the 
duration of the grant, and also provided a supplementary grant which enabled the 
project to secure Dr Ashton's appointment. 
Members of the Project Committee, who meet annually at the Institute of 
Commonwealth Studies, have provided valuable advice and much needed encourage-
ment. Professor Low, chairman of the Committee, has made a singular contribution, 
initiating the first exploratory meeting at Cambridge in 1985 and presiding over 
subsequent developments in his customary constructive but unobtrusive manner. 7 
In addition to the annual meeting of the Project Committee, the project holds an 
annual seminar to discuss issues arising from the research of the volume editors. 
Valuable comments have been received from academic colleagues attending the 
seminars by invitation. The director and staff of the Institute of Commonwealth 
Studies have provided administrative support and the congenial surroundings within 
which the general editor works. The editors of volumes in Stage One have profited 
considerably from the researches undertaken by Dr Anne Thurston and her assistants 
during the preparation of the records handbooks. Although BDEEP is not an official 
project, the general editor wishes to acknowledge the support and co-operation 
received from the Historical Section of the Cabinet Office and the Records 
Department of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. He wishes also to record his 
appreciation of the spirit of friendly co-operation emanating from the editors of 
DBPO. Dr Ronald Hyam, editor of the volume in series A on The Labour government 
and the end of empire 1945-1951, played an important role in the compilation of the 
house-style adopted by BDEEP and his contribution is acknowledged with gratitude. 
Thanks also are due to HMSO for assuming publishing responsibility and for their 
expert advice on matters of design and production. Last, but by no means least, the 
contribution of the keeper of the records and the staff, both curatorial and 
administrative, at the PRO must be emphasised. Without the facilities and privileges 
afforded to BDEEP editors at Kew, the project would not be viable. 
S R Ashton 
Institute of Commonwealth Studies 
November 1994 
7 Professor Low retired in November 1994 and has been suc·ceeded as chairman of the Project Committee 
by Professor Andrew Porter, Rhodes Professor of Imperial History in the University of London. 
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Principal Holders of Offices 1942-1948: 
Part I 
UNITED KINGDOM 
1. Ministers 
(a) Wartime coalition (10 May 1940-23 May 1945) and Conservative caretaker 
government (23 May -26 July 1945): prime minister Mr W L S Churchill 
S of S colonies 
S of S foreign affairs 
S of S dominions 
S of S India & Burma 
S of Swar 
Viscount Cranborne (23 Feb 1942) 
Mr 0 F G Stanley (24 Nov 1942) 
Mr RA Eden (22 Dec 1940) 
Mr C RAttlee (Lab) (19 Feb 1942)1 
Viscount Cranborne (24 Sept 1943) 
Mr L S Amery (13 May 1940) 
Sir J Grigg (Nat) (22 Feb 1942) 
(b) War Cabinet Committee on Malaya and Borneo 
The Committee sat between Mar and Dec 1944. Lord president of the Council (Mr 
Attlee, chairman), S of S colonies, S of S dominions, S of S India and Burma, S of S 
war, attorney-general (Sir D Somervell), parliamentary under-secretary of state, FO 
(Mr G H Hall (Lab)). 
(c) Labour government (from 26 July 1945): prime minister Mr C R Attlee2 
S of S colonies 
Parliamentary under-secretary 
of state for colonies 
(junior minister) 
Mr G H Hall (3 Aug 1945) 
Mr A Creech Jones (4 Oct 1946) 
Mr A Creech Jones (4 Aug 1945) 
Mr I B Thomas (4 Oct 1946) _, 
Mr D R Rees-Williams (7 Oct 1947) 
1 Attlee was also deputy prime minister, 1942-1945, and lord president of the Council, Sept 1943- July 
1945. 
2 Details to Feb 1948, the concluding date for part I of this volume. In part I of this volume, ministers 
outside the CO in the Labour government are identified where necessary in editorial link notes and 
footnotes to the documents. 
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2. Civil servants 
Colonial Office 
Permanent under-secretary 
of state 
Sir George Gater (1942-1947) 
Sir Thomas Lloyd (1947-1956) 
Deputy under-secretary 
of state 
Sir William Battershill (1942-1945) 
Sir Arthur Dawe (1945-1947) 
Assistant under-secretary of state, 
with superintending responsibility 
for Eastern Department 
Assistant secretary, head of 
Eastern Department 
Sir Sydney Caine (1947-1948) 
Sir Charles Jeffries (1947-1956) 
G E J Gent (1942-1946) 
T I K Lloyd (1946-1947) 
G F See! (1947-1948) 
J J Pas kin ( 1942-194 7) 
HT Bourdillon (1947-1948) 
SOUTH-EAST ASIA 
(a) Supreme Allied Command, South-East Asia 
Supreme Allied Commander 
Chief political adviser to SACS EA 
(b) British territories in South-East Asia 
Governor -general 
Commissioner -general 
Special commissioner 
Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten 
(1943-1946) 
ME Dening (1943-1946) 
Mr M J MacDonald (1946-1948) 
Mr M J MacDonald (1948-1955) 
Baron Killearn (1946-1948) 
MALAYA 
(a) British Military Administration Malaya ( Oct 1945-Mar 1946) 
Chief civil affairs officer 
Deputy chief civil affairs officer, 
Mainland (Malay Peninsula) 
Division3 
Maj-gen HR Hone 
Brig H C Willan (1945) 
Brig AT Newboult (1945-1946) 
} joint 
3 The BMA Malaya was divided into two divisions, the other being the Settlement of Singapore, the deputy 
chief civil affairs officer for which was Brig P A B McKerron. 
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(b) Malayan Union (Apr 1946 -fan 1948) 
Governor Sir Edward Gent 
Chief secretary A TNewboult 
(c) Federation of Malaya (from 1 Feb 1948) 
High commissioner 
Chief secretary 
(d) Rulers of Malay States4 
Johore 
Pahang 
Negri Sembilan 
Selangor 
Perak 
Kedah 
Per! is 
Kelantan 
Trengganu 
Sir Edward Gent 
AT Newboult 
HH Ibrahim (1873-1959) 
Accession 7 Sept 1895 
HHAbu Bakar (1904-1974) 
Accession 23 June 1932 
HH Abdul Rahman (1895-1959) 
Accession 3 Aug 1933 
HH Alam Shah (1898--1960) 
Accession 4 Apr 1938 
HHAbdulAziz (1886-1948) 
Accession 1938 
HH Badlishah (1894-1958) 
Accession 15 May 1943 (position 
confirmed by British in 1945) 
HH Syed Putra (b 1920) 
Accession 4 Dec 1945 
HH lbrahim (1897-1960) 
Accession 21 June 1944 (position 
confirmed by British in 1945) 
HH Ismail (b 1907) 
Accession 16 Dec 1945 
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4 Rulers are listed in order of seniority, not with their full titles but with the name by which they are 
normally referred to. 
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SINGAPORE (from Apr 1946) 
Governor Sir Franklin Gimson 
Colonial secretary P A B McKerron 
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Chronological Table of Principal Events: 
Parts 1-111 
1942 
Feb General Percival surrenders to General Yamashita in Singapore (15 
Feb) 
Feb Lord Cranborne appointed S of S for colonies 
Nov Oliver Stanley appointed S of S for colonies 
1943 
July Malayan Planning Unit established 
Aug Mountbatten appointed SACSEA 
1944 
Jan Cabinet Committee on Malaya and Borneo set up (6 Jan) 
May Rangoon falls to 14th Army; draft directive for Malaya approved by War 
Cabinet (31 May) 
May 
July 
Aug 
Aug 
Sept 
Oct 
Oct-Dec 
Jan 
Mar 
Apr 
May 
Aug-Nov 
Oct 
Dec 
1945 
Allied defeat of Germany 
General election in Britain; Labour Party victory under Clement Attlee 
George Hall appointed S of S for colonies 
Japanese surrender (15 Aug) 
British Military Administration set up in Malaya 
Malayan Union announced in parliament (10 Oct) 
Sir Harold MacMichael's mission to the Malay rulers 
1946 
White Paper on Malayan Union published (22 Jan) 
Pan-Malayan Malay Congress meets in Kuala Ltimpur (1-4 Mar) 
Sir Edward Gent sworn in as gov of Malayan Union (1 Apr) 
UMNO formed (11-12 May); Malcolm MacDonald sworn in as gov-gen of 
Malaya, Singapore and British Borneo (21 May) 
Constitutional discussions of Anglo-Malay Working Committee 
Arthur Creech Jones appointed S of S for colonies 
Constitutional proposals for Malayan federation approved by Cabinet (5 
Dec) and published (24 Dec); Council of Joint Action formed; Consulta-
tive Committee (under Cheeseman) appointed 
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1947 
July White Paper on Federation of Malaya published (21 July) 
Aug India and Pakistan become independent (14-15 Aug) 
Oct Malaya-wide 'hartal' held (20 Oct) 
Jan 
Feb 
May 
June 
July 
Oct 
Oct-Nov 
1948 
Burma becomes independent (4 Jan) 
Federation of Malaya inaugurated with Gent as high commissioner (1 
Feb); MacDonald appointed commissioner-general of SE Asia; Ceylon 
becomes independent (4 Feb); communist coup in Czechoslovakia; US 
Congress approves Marshall aid proposals; rioting in Accra, Gold Coast 
(28 Feb) 
Britain withdraws from Palestine 
State of Emergency declared (16-18 June); Gent recalled for consulta-
tions (29 June) 
Gent killed in air crash (4 July); MCP proscribed (19 July) 
Sir Henry Gurney sworn in as high commissioner 
Dato Onn visits London for talks 
1949 
Jan Communities Liaison Committee formed 
Feb MCA launched 
Apr NATO set up; Attlee makes parliamentary statement of British inten-
tions in Malaya (13 Apr) 
Sept Stafford Cripps announces devaluation of the pound from US$4.03 to 
US$2.80 (18 Sept) 
Oct Chinese communists proclaim People's Republic in Peking 
1950 
Jan Britain recognises communist China; Colombo Plan proposed 
Feb General election in Britain; Labour Party returned with narrow major-
ity; James Griffiths appointed S of S for colonies 
Apr Cabinet Malaya Committee appointed; Gurney proposes member sys-
tem 
May General Briggs draws up Briggs Plan 
June James Griffiths and John Strachey visit Malaya; Korean war breaks out 
Nov China enters Korean war 
Feb 
Feb-Mar 
Apr 
Aug 
Sept 
1951 
General election in Gold Coast; Nkrumah released from prison and 
becomes leader of government business 
London meetings to consider slow progress of counter-insurgency 
Member system inaugurated with Dato Onn as member for home affairs 
Tunku Abdul Rahman replaces Dato Onn as leader of UMNO 
IMP launched by Dato Onn (16 Sept) 
CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE OF PRINCIPAL EVENTS: PARTS I-III xxix 
Oct Assassination of Gurney (6 Oct); Conservative victory under Winston 
Churchill in general election; Oliver Lyttelton appointed S of S for 
colonies 
Dec Lyttelton visits Malaya; first municipal elections held in Georgetown 
(Penang); Libya becomes independent 
1952 
Jan Alliance of UMNO and MCA formed in Selangor to fight municipal 
elections in Kuala Lumpur 
Feb Sir Gerald Templer sworn in as high commissioner; Alliance wins Kuala 
Lumpur elections; legislation passed enlarging federal citizenship 
Mar Nkrumah becomes prime minister of the Gold Coast 
Oct State of emergency declared in Kenya 
1953 
Feb Anglo-Egyptian agreement on self-government and self-determination 
for the Sudan sets target date for independence of Sudan 
Apr Malayan 'National Conference' meets for first time 
Aug Alliance's 'National Convention' meets for first time 
Sept Templer declares part of Malacca a 'white area'; Templer appoints lsmail 
bin Dato Abdul Rahman and H S Lee members of the Executive Council 
Oct Cheddi Jagan and his Progressive Party (elected Apr 1953) dismissed 
and constitution suspended in British Guiana 
1954 
Feb Federal elections committee publishes its report 
May Dien Bien Phu falls to Vietminh; Alliance delegation comes to London 
to meet Lyttelton; Alliance launches boycott of government 
May-July Geneva conference on Korea and Indochina 
June Sir Donald MacGillivray sworn in as high commissioner; general 
election in Gold Coast and an all African Cabinet appointed 
July Alan Lennox-Boyd appointed S of S for colonies 
Sept Britain signs Manila Treaty setting up SEATO 
Oct MIC starts negotiations to join the Alliance 
1955 
Apr Sir Anthony Eden replaces Churchill as prime minister in UK 
May Warsaw Pact signed by USSR and seven East European states; Conserva-
tives increase their majority in the general election in the UK 
June MCP makes first 'peace offer' 
July Alliance landslide victory in first federal elections (27 July) 
Aug Tunku Abdul Rahman becomes chief minister; Lennox-Boyd visits 
Malaya 
Sept Alliance government announces amnesty and MCP proposes talks with 
Alliance leaders 
Nov State of emergency declared in Cyprus 
XXX CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE OF PRINCIPAL EVENTS: PARTS I-III 
Dec Tunku Abdul Rahman meets Chin Peng at Baling talks (28-29 Dec) 
Jan 
Jan-Feb 
June-Oct 
July 
Sept 
Oct-Nov 
Dec-Jan 
Jan 
Mar 
Mar-May 
May 
Apr 
Aug 
1956 
Sudan becomes independent (1 Jan) 
Federation of Malaya constitutional conference in London; date of 
independence set for 'August, 1957; if possible' 
Reid commission visits Malaya 
Nasser nationalises Suez canal (26 July) 
Date of Gold Coast independence set for 6 Mar 1957 
Suez crisis 
Alliance leaders visit London to discuss defence and financial arrange-
ments 
1957 
Harold Macmillan replaces Eden as prime minister in UK 
Gold Coast becomes independent as Ghana (6 Mar) 
Working committee in Malaya reviews Reid report 
Federation of Malaya constitutional talks in London 
British defence White Paper ends national service in 1960 but sustains 
British presence east of Suez 
Federation of Malaya becomes independent (31 Aug) 
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Introduction 
Editors of BDEEP's 'country volumes' were set the task of presenting 'the key 
documents which illustrate how various British governments arrived at their 
decision to grant self-government and ultimately independence to their former 
dependencies when they did and in the form they did' .1 This collection is the 
outcome of the exercise with respect to end of empire in Malaya. Many years of 
research have gone into its production and the first object of this introduction is to 
describe the records from which the documents have been chosen and to discuss the 
editorial problems encountered, together with the criteria employed and the 
judgments formed, in making the final selection. The second purpose is to situate 
the documents in the context of government policy by considering official thinking 
and the ways in which decisions were reached and presented. Thirdly, in an historical 
account of the last phase of British rule in Malaya, events are narrated and arranged 
so as to identify turning-points and a coherent periodisation. While it is accepted that 
the documents should stand with minimum support in the form of editorial 
interpolation and interpretation, during the course of this introduction we shall 
consider the extent to which the collection sheds light on the questions raised in the 
editor's terms of reference. 
Documents and their selection 
BDEEP editors did not embark on their journey with a free hand and full room for 
manoeuvre. On the contrary, given that history is not what happened but what 
historians think happened, BDEEP editors are as much the prisoners of their sources 
and children of their own time as are other scholars. Of the factors affecting the 
selection, probably the most significant was the decision taken at the outset of the 
project to confine the collection to government papers held at the Public Record 
Office, Kew. Given the focus of the project upon British policy, this decision made 
sense; it also made the operation more manageable. On the other hand, it threw up a 
number of editorial problems and it also determined the perspective of the final 
collection. Before discussing these issues of editorial policy and practice, however, 
we should consider the nature of the record from which the documents have been 
chosen. 
The first feature of the sources is their vastness and complexity. The sheer quantity 
of material on individual colonial territories during the 1940s and 1950s, which is 
not only spread across a number of documentary classes emanating from the 
Colonial Office but also involves a range of other Whitehall departments, means that 
there is no easily distinguishable cache of papers on transfer of power. Whereas India 
and Burma were covered almost entirely (though not exclusively) from the archives 
of the India and Burma Offices and the files of the Cabinet Committee on India and 
Burma, a similarly stark identification and demarcation of papers is not possible in 
the case of the territories of the colonial empire. Despite the fact that PRO class lists 
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and call-up numbers differ from those originally employed in the registries of 
Whitehall, it is not possible to find one's way round the archives without some 
knowledge of the administrative machinery that created them, and we shall briefly 
survey the organisation of the Colonial Office and its position in government. 
Until the Second World War, the Colonial Office was largely organised on a 
territorial basis. The Eastern Department, which dealt inter alia with the affairs of 
British Malaya, was one of four geographical sections dating from the early 
nineteenth century. Since then these sections had grown, multiplied and had been 
reorganised in conformity with the expansion of colonial responsibilities. The last 
reform to take place before our period gets underway was in 1932 when the Eastern 
Department took charge of the following territories: Hong Kong, Straits Settle-
ments, Malay States, Mauritius, Seychelles and Ceylon. In addition it supervised 
British relations with Sarawak and North Borneo. In 1949 the Eastern Department 
was renamed the South-East Asian Department and its remit included the Federation 
of Malaya, Singapore, Sarawak, North Borneo, Brunei and the colonial aspects of the 
office of the commissioner-general in South-East Asia. In 1954 its title changed to 
Far Eastern Department and its portfolio once more included Hong Kong. 
The arrangement of CO records was shaped by alterations in office management. 
For the pre-war period metropolitan papers on British policy towards Malaya are 
more or less embraced within two PRO tile series generated by the Eastern 
Department: CO 273 (Straits Settlements Original Correspondence) and CO 717 
(Federated Malay States Original Correspondence). For the years covered by this 
volume, however, it is not possible to restrict examination to these two runs of 
papers. Although CO 273 continues until 1946 and CO 717 until 1951, other 
territorial classes bulk larger and their existence is a reflection of developments in 
official attitudes as well as office organisation. CO 825 (Eastern) is a regional class for 
South-East Asia as a whole, as distinct from a more narrowly defined territorial 
category; it contains most of the Colonial Office papers on wartime planning for 
post-war Malaya. Another major series is CO 537; beginning as 'General Sup-
plementary' this took on a new lease of life in 1944 when it became the depository for 
the tiles of the CO secret registry. CO 537 has turned out to be a crucial source for 
the immediate post-war period for Malaya as it is for other CO dependencies. 
Between 1935 and 1951 tiles were registered with standard numbers to facilitate 
cross-referencing and the pursuit of issues over time. Thus, for example, 50823 for 
1945 on 'Policy - Malaya' was continued at 50823 for 1946. These original tile 
numbers or internal references (which are not reproduced in the BDEEP collection) 
are not the same as the PRO call-up numbers. What is more, cognate tiles are not 
always held in the same PRO class but often straddle a number of them: for example 
the tile, containing memoranda submitted by the Malay rulers to Sir Harold 
MacMichael during his mission to acquire their agreement to new treaties in 1945, 
was originally registered as 50823/7/3 for 1945--46 and now bears the PRO call-up 
mark of CO 273/675/18, whereas the immediately following and complementary tiles 
(50823/7/4 and 50823/7/5) are to be found at CO 537/1540 and CO 537/1541 
respectively. In 1951 the various regional and territorial series were amalgamated in 
a single South-East Asia category (CO 1022), in which individual tiles include papers 
for the three-year stretch of 1951-1953. Another reordering of the records occurred 
in 1954 with the formation of the Far Eastern Department, whose papers (CO 1030) 
were similarly tiled (and subsequently released according to the 'thirty year rule') in 
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three-year batches, viz 1954-1956 and 1957-1959. 
One way into British policy-making might be by examining the exchanges between 
secretary of state and governor, but it should be noted that none of the changes in 
tiling systems and record keeping during this period brought together in sequence 
and within a single class the complete run of correspondence between the secretary 
of state for the colonies and the high commissioner of Malaya. The despatches, 
telegrams and letters that passed between them - and this is the case for other 
colonial territories too - crop up instead at appropriate places interspersed 
throughout the relevant territorial tiles and sometimes, depending on the topic in 
question, are to be found in 'subject' classes as distinct from 'geographical' runs. 
Although the main lines of the story can be most easily and comprehensively 
traced through the papers of the 'geographical' sections of the Colonial Office, the 
editor of a country volume has not been able to confine inquiry to country or 
geographical classes but has been obliged, in addition, to examine series ranging 
over a number of 'subject' sections. These increased from the 1930s and particularly 
during the Second World War as the Colonial Office became more and more involved 
in economic and welfare planning common to the empire as a whole, and as officials 
tended to consider the affairs of individual territories in the wider context of regions 
such as West Africa (CO 554), East Africa (CO 822), Africa (CO 847), and, as has been 
already mentioned, South-East Asia (CO 825) . Notable subject series including 
Malayan material are: economic (CO 852), defence (CO 968), personnel (CO 850 and 
CO 877), and the private office of the secretary of state (CO 967). 
Furthermore, the study of colonial policy necessitates examination of government 
archives other than those of the Colonial Office. Since the parameters within which 
colonial policy was devised were often laid down by non-CO personnel and in arenas 
outside the Colonial Office- in, say, Cabinet, the Treasury and the Foreign Office, or 
by the Chiefs of Staff or by the Bank of England - and since the details and 
implementation of that policy were worked out by the Colonial Office in conjunction 
with other Whitehall departments by means of inter-departmental correspondence, 
working parties and committees, the BDEEP editor has been obliged to trawl the 
records of the Foreign Office, Treasury, Cabinet (and its committees) and so on. 
Thus, in addition to the conclusions and memoranda of the full Cabinet (CAB 65 and 
CAB 66 for the war years and CAB 128 and CAB 129 for the post-war period), papers 
of Cabinet committees covering various aspects of South-East Asian policy have been 
consulted in the following series: CAB 21, CAB 98, CAB 104, CAB 130, CAB 134, etc. 
Of the departmental tiles (other than those of the CO), extensive use has been made 
of the unwieldy FO 371 series (with respect to British policy towards South-East 
Asia), T 220 (the Treasury's imperial and foreign division, particularly on the subject 
of Treasury assistance to Malaya during the Emergency), WO 203 (in connection 
with the British Military Administration and South-East Asia Command in 1945--46) 
and DEFE 4 and DEFE 7 (the chiefs of staff papers on the Anglo-Malayan defence 
negotiations in 1956-1957). Although prime ministerial interventions in Malayan 
affairs were infrequent, appropriate PREM tiles are valuable sources because they 
often contain, for the prime minister's easy edification, copies of the major 
high-policy papers on the subject in question. 
Not only do the documents in this collection range across the spectrum of 
government departments, they also vary in type from the scribbled minute to the 
printed memorandum. In reproducing the documents every effort has been made to 
' 
' 
' 
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present each item as faithfully as possible to its original, butBDEEP's printed format 
may yet mask some of the differences between them, differences which can be 
gauged, for example, in terms of origin and objective, of author and audience, of the 
mood in which they were written and the amount of time taken to compose them. A 
few, like Gurney's offer of resignation (235), are in manuscript and intended for one 
pair of eyes only, while one or two- perhaps MacDonald's assessment of great power 
relations in the Far East following the Geneva Conference (336) is one of these-
were composed with a view to the wider sweep of history. Again, while not personal 
in tone, some were intended to be read by a small coterie of CO officials, while others 
were printed for wider circulation within Whitehall. Some, like the telegrams 
between Malaya and London at the height of the Malayan Union crisis (82, 83, 86-89, 
92, 96, 97) or at dramatic moments leading up to and during the emergency (147, 
148, 151, 152, 154-157, 246, 247, 350, 371, 373- 375, 377, 378) or, again, at the time 
of the Alliance boycott in 1954 (327, 328, 333, 334) were composed in haste and 
occasionally became garbled in transmission. Others, such as Cabinet memoranda 
(21 , 31, 76, 153, 257, 356, 356) are the smoothly honed products of a lengthy process 
of drafting and revision by several hands. Documents also varied in authority 
according to the rank of the authors; some were written by relatively junior senior 
civil servants (to adapt George Orwell on class to categories within Whitehall's 
hierarchy), while others bore the signature of the secretary of state. 
The PRO contains, therefore, a veritable embarrassment of riches, but, vast 
though its holdings are, it has its lacunae and limitations which have inevitably 
contributed to the shape of this collection. We should note, first of all, that losses and 
the destruction of documents 'under statute' have made inroads into the historical 
record at Kew. Survival of material even from the recent past can be haphazard and 
capricious, as is revealed in dicussions that took place in 1958-1959 about the 
disposal of the archives of the governor-general in South-East Asia. Hard-pressed for 
office space, A M MacKintosh of the commissioner-general's secretariat, asked the 
Colonial Office to reconsider an earlier decision not to house its papers in London. 
CO officials had previously stated the orthodoxy that the records should remain the 
property of dependent (or formerly dependent) territories , but they now relented on 
the ground that, despite his title, the governor-general had never enjoyed executive 
responsibility in any British dependency. In elaborating the case for retrieving the 
files from Singapore, John Hennings developed a less legalistic line and one that had 
implications for the preservation of records on decolonisation. He wrote: 
I can't see that we can justify any reluctance over this, when on other papers we are 
exhorting the Governor to withdraw a mass of material from Singapore records which we 
don't want Ministers under the new [self-governing] constitution to see, and either burn 
it or hand it over to the UK Commission [successor to the commission-general]. We did 
the same in Kuala Lumpur before independence, and recently received from Singapore a 
mass of records of the old Chinese secretariat there.2 
32 boxes of papers were consequently despatched to Britain, but when the first 
consignment of 14 boxes arrived, D Gregory discovered large gaps in the archive. His 
report betrays, however, not so much a concern that the record was seriously 
incomplete but more an irritation that his time should have been wasted in dealing 
with such scraps. 
These tiles were weeded in 1956 and I find that in a great number of cases all that remains 
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are either file covers or, as in a few instances, covers plus minute sheets. I am at a loss to 
understand why Singapore took the trouble to forward so much rubbish (of a total of 
some 567 files listed ... only 124 remained after destroying the file covers etc) . In a 
further 19 cases I have destroyed the files as the contents contain only minor 
correspondence or corres. [sic] with the C.O. The 14 boxes have now been reduced- as 
Singapore could well have done- to a total of 8 boxes.3 
These CO minutes have been quoted at some length since they provide a rare 
glimpse into the vagaries that can beset even the most systematic arrangements for 
preserving the official record. This exchange might also shed light on the absence at 
the PRO of a series of files devoted specifically to the governor-general (subsequently 
the commissioner-general) in South-East Asia, who played a major part in the 
formulation of regional policy with respect to foreign, colonial and defence matters. 
Communications with Malcolm MacDonald and Robert Scott (and with their 
deputies) are, like those with individual governors and the high commissioner, 
distributed across the runs of files in territorial series. 
Another area where the record seems to be uneven is the correspondence between 
Templer and Lyttelton. Telegrams to and from King's House and the Colonial Office 
are frequent and abundant but letters and despatches between the high commission-
er and secretary of state are in shorter supply. The reason for this may be that 
Templer left his deputy to draft the formal despatches on many issues relating to 
political and constitutional developments, and, indeed, there is a regular flow of 
correspondence between MacGillivray and senior civil servants in the CO, and 
particularly with Sir John Martin. Perhaps also the speed of developments in the 
post -war period and the ease of communications through telegram and personal 
visits reduced the time and the need for the measured correspondence that was a 
feature of pre-war days, and resulted in near-redundancy for the gubernatorial 
despatch. Nonetheless, we do know that Templer maintained a routine and 
demi-official correspondence with Lyttelton. Copies of these letters were used by his 
biographer and are deposited in the Templer Papers at the National Army Museum.4 
The originals, therefore, should be at the PRO but they may lie in files which still 
remain closed to public examination. 
As regards inaccessible material, it should be remembered that BDEEP, not being 
an official project, is bound by the rules that apply to the public, notably the 'thirty 
year rule' regulating access to government papers. In general terms this means that 
files relating to the British period in Malaya are open, with the exception of those 
that are embargoed for 50 or 75 or even 100 years and those that have been retained 
under section 3(4) of the 1958 Public Records Act. The term 'retained' means that 
the originating department or its successor (in our case this usually means the 
Foreign and Commonwealth Office) has decided against transferring material to the 
PRO, but government departments regularly review the classification of papers 
which have been withheld for longer than thirty years. Although restricted access has 
affected the research for this volume, it has not presented an insuperable obstacle to 
the presentation of the continuities and changes of policy-making and decision-
taking. From time to time, however, policy files do sfip out of reach behind the 
thickets of 50-year, 75-year or 'retained' restrictions. Examples of closed files which 
probably have a significant bearing on contemporary official thinking are the 
following: CO 967/81 and CO 967/83 on the recall of Gent and the appointment of 
Gurney; CO 967/50 containing minutes from the secretary of state to the prime 
'I 
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minister in 1950; CAB 1301118, GEN 538/3 being a letter by RH Scott probably 
written in 1956 and containing an assessment of Britain's role in South-East Asia; 
and CAB 129/79, CP(56)12 for January 1956, being Lennox-Boyd's Cabinet memor-
andum on policy at the forthcoming constitutional conference. 
Occasionally it happens that papers which are unobtainable in one quarter crop up 
in another. For example, internal evidence, including a reference by Sir Charles 
Arden-Clarke (governor of the Gold Coast) to Gurney's despatch of 30 May 1949 
about the federal government's response to the communist insurrection, would 
suggest that this important document should be held somewhere in the group of files 
between CO 537/6403 and CO 537/6406, all of which remain closed.5 This might have 
been an occasion to resort to the printed version, which had been made available 
from a Malaysian source, had not a copy been unexpectedly discovered in the file 
entitled 'Federation of Malaya: implications of possible imposition of martial law' (CO 
537/4773) (189). Again, although the Cabinet memorandum CP(49)207 (on UK 
policy in South-East Asia and the Far East, October 1949) is withheld from CAB 
129/3711, a version is to be found in the collection of ministerial briefs at CO 967/84 
(196), while a version of Lennox-Boyd's paper on the forthcoming Malayan 
constitutional talks (January 1956), referred to in the previous paragraph, is available 
amongst the papers of the Cabinet Committee on Colonial Policy (CAB 134/1202, 
CA(56)3) and has been printed in this volume (394) . 
In addition to gaps in the record arising from destruction or retention of papers, 
the PRO perspective has moulded the shape of this volume. Since documents have 
been deliberately chosen to reveal the thinking of the British government and since 
they have been selected from the metropolitan archives, we should anticipate and 
attempt to answer criticism from those who may be tempted to dismiss the volume 
on the grounds that it presents Malayan affairs largely from the point of view of the 
government in London, and that, in so doing, it exaggerates the part played by 
British decisions in ending the empire. Victor Purcell once scathingly referred to CO 
attitudes as 'the Wimbledon view of Malaya', and Harry Miller, a journalist with The 
Straits Times during the emergency, voiced the local viewpoint when he asserted 
that 'Whitehall had no conception of the problem, nor any idea of the growing 
dangers'.6 Although the enormous and complex archive of central government does 
not comprehensively embrace the imperial periphery, nonetheless communications 
from Malaya bulk large in this collection, a major feature of which is the constant 
interchange of views and information between Kuala Lumpur, Singapore and 
London. 
It should be noted, however, that the Malayan papers found in PRO holdings (and, 
therefore, in this volume) differ in kind from the metropolitan record. Whereas we 
can trace the evolution of official thinking and continuing policy discussions in 
London through internal departmental minutes, memoranda and reports, the views 
of the Malayan authorities on any matter are confined to the papers which reached 
London and these tend to be the final assessment made by the high commissioner 
plus documentation in support of the locallycpreferred option. What we have from 
the Malayan government are largely documents generated at the highest level of the 
local administration, in, for example, the offices of the high commissioner, 
commissioner-general, chief secretary or director of operations. Those Malayan 
documents which reached Whitehall from other levels of local administration or 
from outside official circles altogether, did so because they were selected by the most 
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senior colonial servants on the spot. Differences of opmwn, say between the 
commissioner-general and the high commissioner appear only when one or other 
felt the need to seek London's arbitration. 
Furthermore, Malayans themselves are presented here through British eyes. The 
activities of nationalist politicians, their inter-relations and the extent of their 
support are recorded by British observers. UMNO and the campaign against the 
Malayan Union, the Malayan Communist Party and the outbreak of armed violence, 
the Alliance and the electoral landslide - these developments are documented here 
but in records compiled by British officials. When Dato Onn or Tunku Abdul Rahman 
visited London, a civil servant made notes of the meetings that took place with 
officials and ministers; only rarely do we hear Malayan leaders at first hand in, say, a 
brief letter forwarded to London by the high commissioner (114) or in an exchange 
of correspondence with the secretary of state (313, 314, 319, 321, 365, 369). By 
focusing on ministers and mandarins cocooned in Church House, this collection of 
documents, it might be claimed, deflects attention from nationalism and popular 
movements to the safe havens of offices and committee rooms, where cultivated 
minds constructed patterns from the puzzles of human affairs on the fragile 
assumption that 'quiet calm deliberation disentangles every knot'.7 Thus it may 
tempt the reader to accept not only that government decisions always mattered but 
also that what mattered was invariably committed to paper, which was clearly not 
always the case, even in the highly literate environment of Whitehall, owing to the 
increasing pace of events and widespread use of the telephone. In responding to such 
criticisms we would say in this introduction, which is not a substitute for 
scrutinising the documents themselves, that no documentary collection can or 
should ever claim to be definitively comprehensive. This volume, being the product 
of years of intense research and rigorous selection, is reasonably representative of the 
vast and wide-ranging official documentation on the end of British rule in Malaya 
and fairly reflects the circumstances and considerations which the archive reveals as 
having influenced the making of policy and decisions at this time. 
So far we have discussed the extent, complexity, accessibility and perspective of 
PRO material, and we have noted the constraints that it has placed upon selection 
and ways in which the record has fashioned this volume. The shape of the collection 
has also been affected by editorial judgment and one of the most significant of these 
was the decision taken at the start of the project to fix the size of BDEEP volumes. 
Consequently, the editor of a country volume has had the remit to present within a 
preordained number of pages a continuous record of decision-making culminating in 
the achievement of independence by the territory concerned. The limitations of 
space, however, are demonstrably so tight as to make this more difficult for Malaya 
than it was for India and even for Burma. Mansergh's Transfer of Power series on 
India was not limited at the outset to a specific number of volumes. Tinker, by 
contrast, was restricted to two volumes totalling approximately 1,800 pages.8 He 
admitted to encountering difficulties arising from this limitation. Even so, Burma's 
page allowance was more than that allocated to BDEEP Malaya, although the period 
covered in the former (1942 - January 1948) is less than half the length of the 
Malayan story (1942 -August 1957). Pressure of more documents upon less space 
has forced the editor into hard decisions about what to put in and what to leave out. 
Just as in other forms of scholarship documents rarely speak for themselves but 
frequently become the dummies of ventriloqual historians, so in enterprises of this 
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kind the key documents did not select themselves but were judged by the editor for 
their historical significance. In the process of sifting material, some were more 
eye-catching than others for the light they shed on events and on policy but it is 
accepted that the final selection is unlikely to be to everyone's taste. 
In this trek through the record, the route taken by the editor has been influenced 
by his perception of the goal, his interpretation of his task and the glosses he has 
placed upon 'end of empire' and 'British policy'. The very title of the project perhaps 
suggests agreement on definitions that does not yet exist amongst historians, while 
the terms of reference presume a similar consensus about what precisely was being 
transferred by the British or seized by the Malayans: was it power or authority or 
sovereignty or merely status? Another implication here is that the thrust of 'policy' 
was towards ending the empire, whereas much of it was demonstrably directed 
towards the maintenance of empire, to the achievement of a 'new imperialism' or 'a 
second occupation' immediately after the Second World War, and, as time went on, 
to the conversion of 'formal empire' into 'informal empire' or the pursuit of what has 
been variously called 'neo-colonialism', 'damage limitation' and the 'management of 
decline'. The very term 'policy' is itself open to interpretation. Is it a guide to action 
or the justification for inertia? Is it strategy devised in the anticipation of events or 
rationalisation drawn up in reaction to them? Is it confined to general statements or 
must it include detailed schemes and the techniques essential to their execution? Is 
it the reflection of party ideology or rather the expression of state interests? Is it the 
pursuit of national needs or retreat before nationalist pressures? Is policy pro-
nounced in public or contrived behind closed doors? Is it what ministers instruct 
their civil servants to carry out or what the latter advise the former to approve? The 
editor's position on each of these issues clearly has a bearing on the way he handles 
the sources. 
Policy and policymaking 
Public statements claiming that 'the central purpose of British colonial policy is 
simple'9 were often pitched in terms so general as to encourage rather than snuff out 
speculation. In themselves such pronouncements amounted to little more than 
reiterations of, and variations upon, Stanley's 1943 theme: 'we are pledged to guide 
Colonial people along the road to self-government within the framework of the 
British Empire'.10 Moreover, these delphic utterances had a political rather than an 
administrative intent; they were, after all, primarily designed to please as many 
different groups as possible, to parade fresh goals without reneging on existing 
commitments, to win new friends while nurturing vested interests, to take the heat 
out of cross-party conflict or to accommodate intra-party differences, to satisfy 
conservatives that the empire remained at least half-full and at the same time 
convince progressives that it had become half-empty . When, in April 1949, Attlee 
declared Britain's ultimate goal to be Malayan self-government, his object was to 
revive business confidence by promising that there would not be a premature 
withdrawal; 11 when, in December 1951, Lyttelton sought to restore British morale by 
stressing the need for law and order in Malaya, government assured liberals that this 
did not mark an abandonment of goals but merely a realistic assessment of 
immediate priorities.12 
The authoritative statements made by ministers in parliament or included in 
Command Papers were certainly logged by civil servants (they had, after all, drafted 
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them in the first place) and subsequently used as navigational aids when discussion 
was in danger of foundering upon details, technicalities and contradictions. But, like 
their political masters, administrators fought shy of precise public commitments. It 
was Templer, a high commissioner who had not been schooled in colonial traditions, 
who startled officials with brusque demands for instructions on the policy he was to 
carry out (286). In doing so Templer was perhaps the exception proving the rule that 
civil servants were prone to seek refuge in jungles of jargon and swamps of semantics 
rather than give hostages to fortune by defining sovereignty and self-government or 
issuing timetables for constitutional change. Forthright declarations of policy from 
London were generally held to be counterproductive. For example, in November 
1947 Trafford Smith felt that J S Bennett's memorandum on 'The future of Cyprus in 
relation to the withdrawal from Palestine' tended 'to speculate far beyond what is 
legitimate for us in the Colonial Office' and he went on to warn colleagues of the 
dangers of considering 'policy from the outside as a whole with an analytical "Latin" 
point of view' or of attempting 'to shape it on a procrustean bed of logic and 
coherence'P On another occasion the Colonial Office legal adviser recommended 
the advantages of obfuscation. 'I think we can, and should, avoid saying anything 
which would imply an answer to this problem', he wrote with respect to the vexed 
question of the sovereignty of the Malay rulers. 14 
Indeed, just as in the hey-day of colonial rule, Pope's aphorism - 'For forms of 
government let fools contest, what e'er is best administered is best'- had struck a 
chord with those who administered the empire, so in the era of decolonisation 
ministers and officials perceived prudence in constitutional imprecision. 'May there 
not be wisdom in not laying down any general Constitutional rules?', asked Sir 
Gilbert Laithwaite in February 1953 with reference to Commonwealth membership, 
and he went on to refer to the 'infinite trouble' that had arisen over the previous 
thirty years from terms such as 'Dominion status', 'full Dominion status', 'the 
Whitehall form of Dominion status', 'independence' and 'full self-government'. 15 On 
1 December 1955 'independence' became a taboo word by order of the Cabinet which 
laid down that as a general rule its use was to be discontinued in all references to 
colonial constitutional development in order to avoid a climate of secession and 
disintegration, and that the alternative 'full self-government' was to be preferred.16 It 
would appear, therefore, that 'policy' was open to interpretation at the time and that 
its identification has since become a matter for historical judgment. 
We decided early on that the original security classification of a document (that is 
to say whether it was rated 'top secret', 'secret', 'confidential' and so on) was an 
unreliable guide to a document's historical significance. Secrets have an ephemeral 
quality and some of the high security ratings were amended and down-graded as time 
passed; for example, many intelligence reports on Malayan political developments, 
which were assigned high security ratings at the time, reflected current perceptions 
of immediate dangers and exhibited the anxieties of a particular group of intelligence 
officers whose business was to unearth threats to which, rightly or wrongly, 
policymakers may not have given much attention anyway. Moreover, it is often the 
case that these reports contain little more than that which was appearing in the press 
and which has long since been in the public domain. For these reasons little heed 
was paid to the original security grade in the process of selection and we decided to 
dispense with security ratings in the. presentation of documents here. We have, 
nonetheless, included several intelligence reports in this collection to indicate the 
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atmosphere in which decisions were taken, to illustrate contemporary assessments of 
political problems and security issues, and also to provide the reportage of events 
necessary to the narrative content of this collection (72, 90, 94, 162). 
A document's 'importance' has to be assessed, therefore, by reference to bench-
marks other than security classification, for example those indicating British 
interests, Malayan demands and the changing nature of Anglo-Malayan relations. In 
sifting through documents which (to take examples of each of these areas) dealt with 
the dollar-earnings of Malaya or her place in the Cold War, with rural development or 
federal elections, with the member system or negotiations for an Anglo-Malayan 
defence treaty, each item was considered in the context of four overlapping circles of 
policymaking. 
The first of these was 'colonial policy' and took into account issues which ran in 
parallel and bore comparison with developments in other colonial dependencies. 
Examples of such issues are local government, elections and member or ministerial 
systems, policing and the localisation (or 'Malayanisation') of administration, 
development programmes and welfare measures. General parallels were sometimes 
drawn by officials as by the press with Britain's withdrawal from India and 
particularly Palestine whence personnel, notably Gurney and W N Gray, were 
transferred to Malayan service after May 1948. Since the Gold Coast was jumping its 
fences just ahead of Malaya, the West African experience was kept in mind and 
sometimes explicitly cited, as with respect to responsibility for internal security, and 
East African models were also referred to in the construction of the member system 
or closer association (sometimes referred to as union) with Singapore. Given the 
transfer of officials from territory to territory and the extent of consultation between 
the CO territorial departments with the General and Legal Departments frequently 
acting as brokers, there was a shared experience on the problems of local 
government, elections, citizenship and nationality, and ready-made formulae were 
held up against the Malayan body-politic to see whether a certain amount of tailoring 
might bring about a match. 
On the other hand, an enduring article of faith subscribed to in the Colonial Office 
and Colonial Service alike, was that, as Cranborne pointed out to the Chinese 
ambassador in October 1942 (10), general theories of government and models of 
administration were of limited value because the conditions of each dependency were 
sui generis. The second circle, therefore, concerned issues which were peculiar to 
Malaya or, while consonant with developments elsewhere, were applied in a manner 
appropriate to Malayan circumstances, and included all aspects of Malayan com-
munalism and politics. With respect to both these circles, the CO territorial classes 
are the leading sources, revealing Malayan developments through communications 
from Kuala Lumpur and British reactions and proposals. One Malayan issue which is 
a theme in this collection is the very identity of Malaya. A term of art encompassing 
the Straits Settlements, Federated Malay States and Unfederated Malay States before 
the war, from 1942 onwards 'Malaya' was applied sometimes to the peninsula 
together with Singapore and sometimes to the peninsula without Singapore. The 
meaning of this geographical expression fluctuated with the British commitment to 
create a 'Dominion of South-East Asia' embracing the peninsula and Singapore and, 
ultimately, the Borneo dependencies as well. Malaya should certainly be examined 
from the perspective of South-East Asia and regional issues form the third of our 
circles of policymaking. In this context the documents reveal Malaya (with Singa-
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pore) as the fulcrum of British power in South-East Asia and the Far East, as a 
country standing in the front line in the containment of world communism and as a 
platform from which to project British influence into emergent Asia. Malayan affairs 
cannot, therefore, be treated in isolation from Britain's relations with the indepen-
dent Asian states or with her dealings with other Powers, especially the USA, in 
South-East Asia and the Far East, nor can they be adequately comprehended without 
reference to Foreign Office and Defence papers. 
This brings us to the final circle, that of 'imperial policy'. Here Malaya is 
considered in relation to British domestic and global interests, and its significance is 
assessed as, on the one hand, a British asset earning dollars, supplying vital 
commodities and providing a link in the chain of imperial defence, and, on the other 
hand, as a liability consuming taxpayers' money, draining limited military resources 
and straining Commonwealth relations. To explore these issues thoroughly one must 
supplement CO material with the papers of other Whitehall departments and the 
Cabinet. 
Most documents in this collection were written both to inform and to persuade, 
although they do not achieve both objects in equal measure. In doing the first, a 
document contributes to the narrative of events; in performing the second it assists 
in the illumination of policy. The more persuasive its case, the more effective a 
document was likely to be iri shaping the course of decision-making at the time and 
of beguiling subsequent historians. The clarity of Cabinet memoranda, scarcely 
dimmed by the passage of years, is evidence of the care that was taken over their 
composition. But there were occasions when compelling arguments went unheeded, 
as happened when Sydney Caine put the economic argument against the separation 
of Singapore from the Malayan Union (19). Negative thinking may be a characteristic 
commonly associated with the bureaucratic mind, but obstructionism stood little 
chance of stopping a scheme once it had gathered sufficient momentum; alternative-
ly, if a civil servant was felt to be leaping far ahead of his colleagues or if he was 
wanting in 'bottom', his views may not have commanded the attention they 
otherwise deserved. Those coming to the record thirty years on must be on the look 
out for prophetic yet ineffectual papers, and should be ever circumspect lest a 
document be given a prominence out of proportion with its influence on contempor-
ary policy. 
In making this selection particular account has been taken of the readability as 
well as the content and authorship of a document. Readability is by no means a 
frivolous consideration. A barely legible minute, except, of course, one in the 
minister's hand, was not likely to gain much notice at the time, and poorly 
composed, semi-coherent pieces, which are dense with minutiae and clouded by 
allusion and obscure references, would need to have strongly redeeming features to 
merit consideration for inclusion here. Stylish items have obvious attractions and 
ministerial intercessions, whose quips and barbs can have the effect of lightening the 
tone and switching the direction of discussions, are particularly tempting. Briefs 
prepared for the information of ministers can be similarly arresting, not so much 
because they advanced debate at the time - this was generally not the function of a 
brief - but because they provided coherent summaries of developments to date, 
clarifying issues and identifying contemporary priorities. 
Another strong candidate for inclusion on grounds of readability was the 
principal's minute. It should be explained that assistant principal was the point 
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where entrants (who were generally graduates from Oxford or Cambridge) joined the 
administrative grade (the 'heaven-born') of the Home Civil Service, and that 
principal was a senior civil servant, usually in his early thirties and looking forward 
to promotion to at least assistant secretary. It was customary for the appropriate 
principal in the department to offer the first comment on communications coming 
in from the 'man on the spot' or from another department in Whitehall. Likewise, it 
was usual for the principal to compose the early drafts of plans being Gontemplated in 
the section. It was, for example, Manson's memorandum on 'Plans for the 
constitutional reconstruction in Far East' which became the foundation document 
for the Malayan Union scheme (12), and it was Bourdillon who summarised the 
reports of Malay reactions to the Malayan Union White Paper (73) . Such papers did 
not, however, amount to decisions, nor do they necessarily indicate that the 
principal was himself seizing the initiative with respect to policy. On the contrary, it 
was rare for principals to take decisions on anything other than routine matters, and 
the departmental papers which they drafted were likely to have been roughed out on 
the basis of what the author understood to have been current office thinking. Again, 
we should not be deluded into measuring the authority of an official according to the 
number of words in his submissions, since it generally happened that the higher a 
matter rose in the. government hierarchy the more succinct the comments became. 
These reservations aside, however, the historical value of the principal's contribu-
tions lies in his lucid and comprehensive exposition of the problem in hand, 
identifying the issues, relating them to existing policy and suggesting alternative 
responses. Since the principal did not make policy but set out the stall for his 
masters to pick over the possibilities, this would appear the appropriate moment for 
us to turn from the question of policy to the manner in which it was made. 
In addition to its content, another yardstick by which to judge the significance of a 
document is the significance of its author. Ranking in the government hierarchy is 
certainly a helpful guide to discovering those who took the initiative, who 
commanded attention during discussions and who took decisions in the end, 
although status alone is not an infallible index of a person's importance to Malayan 
policymaking. It might be instructive, therefore, to identify the procedures and 
personalities involved in the formulation of policy. 
Within the Colonial Office, as we have already noted, the geographical department 
that had prime responsibility for Malayan affairs was the Eastern Department and its 
successors. It consisted of a small team of no more than half a dozen senior civil 
servants including an assistant secretary as head of department. The head of 
department reported to an assistant under-secretary, who supervised a number of 
departments, and he in turn was answerable to the permanent under-secretary or his 
deputy. During the period covered by this volume the departmental heads were G E J 
Gent (1939-1942), J J Paskin (1942-1947), HT Bourdillon (1947-1948), J D Higham 
(1948-1953), A M MacKintosh (1953-1956) and J B Johnston (1956-1957). Its 
supervising assistant under-secretaries were Gent (1942-1946), T I K Lloyd (1946-
1947), G F See! (1947-1948), Paskin (1948-1954), J M Martin (1954-1956) and E 
Melville (1956-1957). The principal on the Malayan desk usually got first sight of 
in-coming correspondence, composed the first departmental reactions to Malayan 
developments and minuted meetings that took place in the CO. It was his superiors 
(assistant secretary and upwards) who decided which matters warranted consultation 
with other Whitehall departments and who communicated directly with the high 
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commissioner and chief secretary in Kuala Lumpur, and with the commissioner-
general based first in Johore Bahru and later in Singapore (about whose organisation 
more is said below). Amongst these Gent and Martin stand out. Gent, who had 
accompanied the parliamentary under-secretary of state (Ormsby-Gore) on his visit 
to Malaya, Ceylon and Java in 1928, was the principal architect of the Malayan Union 
and later its governor. Martin, who had been seconded to the MCS in 1931-1934, 
performed a major role in setting up the Lancaster House constitutional conference 
of January-February 1956. , 
Many routine issues were dealt with entirely within the Eastern Department but 
few of the items selected here fall in this category. Contentious matters were at some 
stage referred up to the supervising assistant under-secretary or through him to the 
permanent under-secretary (PUS), and maybe to a minister. Sir George Cater was 
PUS during the Malayan Union experiment (1942-1947) and Sir Thomas Lloyd (PUS, 
1947-1956) was head during the worst of the emergency and the major constitution-
al advances. Despite his experience as a Malayan civil servant between 1921 and 1937, 
Sir John Macpherson, who succeeded Lloyd as PUS in 1956 had little part to play in 
the last days of British rule in Malaya. 
The ministerial team consisted of the secretary of state, the parliamentary 
under-secretary of state and, from January 1948 onwards, the minister of state. 
Oliver Lyttelton (secretary of state, 1951-1954) had been involved in the Malayan tin 
industry before the war while David Rees-Williams (parliamentary under-secretary, 
1947-1950) had been a lawyer in Penang during the early 1930s and maintained 
close links with Tunku Abdul Rahman in the 1950s. Civil servants disturbed the 
secretary of state with Malayan matters only when burning matters arose principally 
in connection with government finance, internal security, notable political develop-
ments and constitutional changes. Although rank obviously carried authority when 
policy was shaped, as a rule little congruence obtains between the status of 
decision-makers and the contributions they made to the written record of decision-
making. Indeed, the higher an issue rose in government the more cryptic written 
comments became, and, whenever major decisions were taken at higher levels, they 
tended to rest on the cogent yet comprehensive expositions of alternative courses of 
action submitted from below. Nonetheless, ministers were involved at key moments: 
the approaches to Cabinet with respect to the Malayan Union policy; the conduct of 
the emergency; the appointments of Gurney and Templer as high commissioner and 
the reorganisation of Malayan administration in 1951-1952; the conduct of constitu-
tional talks in 1955-1957. The secretary of state also met leading Malayan 
personalities in London (Dato Onn, Tunku Abdul Rahman, the Sultan of Johore), 
and, in contrast with the pre-war period, visited Malaya, Griffiths going out in 1950, 
Lyttelton in 1951 and Lennox-Boyd in 1955. 1 
Colonial policy-making in London did not, however, invariably remain the 
preserve of the secretary of state for the colonies and his officials. Since the Colonial 
Office hovered in the middle order of the Whitehall league and since the prime 
minister, chancellor of the Exchequer, foreign secretary, minister of defence and 
other ministers (acting either separately as masters of departments or collectively in 
Cabinet) not infrequently took an interest in Malayan affairs, the locus of policy-
making sometimes shifted outside the CO to inter-departmental committees of 
officials or ministers. Moreover, it should be remembered that at all times Malayan 
policy was devised within guidelines set by the Treasury as regards sterling, by the 
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Foreign Office with respect to international relations in South-East Asia, and by the 
Ministry of Defence in connection with Britain's military capabilities in the Far East. 
Might it not be the case, therefore, that the papers of the prime minister, of senior 
ministers and of the Cabinet as a whole are more fruitful sources of Malayan policy 
than series of files generated by the Colonial Office? The answer, of course, very 
largely depends on the subject that was under review at any given time. 
As regards prime ministerial involvement in Malayan affairs, Attlee was kept 
informed about the growing crisis over the Malayan Union in the spring and early 
summer of 1946 (80, 93) and also about the conduct of the emergency (185, 230, 
238), agreeing to the appointment of General Briggs as director of operations and to 
Shinwell's request for a Cabinet Committee on Malaya in March 1950 (206, 207, 209, 
210) and chairing crisis meetings in connection with the slow progress of the Briggs 
Plan in the following February and March (232- 234). His own minutes, written in 
blunt crayon, were terse and generally unrevealing directions to action. Churchill 
was concerned about Malaya in his capacity as minister of defence as well as prime 
minister in the first months of the Conservative government from October 1951 to 
the appointment of Templer in January 1952. He considered the problem in 
swashbuckling style, scribbling brief but nonetheless grandiloquent minutes, ex-
changing telegrams with Oliver Lyttelton in mid-Atlantic when he was bound for 
New York on board the Queen Mary, and summoning Templer to Ottawa for 
appraisal over dinner (259-263). The directive to Templer was sent to Churchill for 
final approval on 1 February (268), and he was also consulted about the appointment 
of MacGillivray as his successor (308) . As foreign secretary, Eden took a somewhat 
petulant interest in Malaya as part of the wider problem of regional security 
(338-340), and, on becoming prime minister in April 1955, he was kept informed 
about insurgency, communist entryism and political changes both in Malaya and 
elsewhere in South-East Asia by Lennox-Boyd (351, 353) and Sir Robert Scott, who, 
under the revised terms of his appointment as commissioner-general, communi-
cated directly with 10 Downing Street (374, 375) . Chairing the Cabinet Colonial 
Policy Committee, Eden was particularly anxious to block the communists' resump-
tion of legitimate politics (380). By the time Macmillan became premier in January 
1957, all was over bar some shouting about the final form of the independence 
constitution, financial arrangements, the defence agreement and internal security 
after the end of British rule . Macmillan steered Malaya's application for Common-
wealth membership through the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Meeting (457, 
458) and approved the final touches to the defence agreement (462). Macmillan also 
penned some memorable asides on the trivia of transfer of power, such as: presents 
for the Malayan people (455); the composition of the British delegation to the 
independence celebrations and whether the wives of British dignitaries attending 
these festivities should do so at taxpayers' expense; his radio broadcast to Malaya 
(463) and his message of greeting to Tunku Abdul Rahman (467). 
Every minister jealously guarded his prerogatives and on the whole respected 
those of his colleagues; as Eden wrote to the secretary of state for war, Antony Head, 
'I shall not comment upon your estimate of educated opinion in Malaya as this is a 
matter for the Colonial Secretary' (340). There were occasions, however, when 
ministers felt that Malaya was too important a matter to be left to the secretary of 
state for the colonies and made it their business to be sure he minded his business. 
Defence was clearly one such issue. Wartime planning for reoccupation and 
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emergency operations necessitated close liaison between Colonial, Foreign and War 
Offices. After the fall of Malaya in 1942, the Colonial Office and Foreign Office 
approached the question of reoccupation from markedly different angles, the Foreign 
Office being more inclined, at least initially, to contemplate the abandonment of 
claims to lost colonies in deference to American opinion (4-9). When the South-East 
Asia Command was established in April1943, Dening was seconded from the Foreign 
Office as political adviser to Mountbatten and thereafter the FO strove to ensure the 
co-ordination of British policies in the region (39--42, 81) . It was this concern which 
eventually led to the appointment of regional authorities in the shape of the special 
commissioner (1946-1948) (71, 118, 119) whose functions were merged with those 
of the governor-general (1946-1948) to become the UK commissioner-general in 
South-East Asia in 1948. Between 1950 and 1953, and at a critical time in Malayan 
affairs, Robert Scott was instrumental in fashioning the FO view on Malaya. 
Respected for his vast experience of East and South-East Asia and occupying the 
positions of assistant under-secretary with responsibility for the Far East and 
chairman of the inter-departmental Far East (Official) Committee, Scott did not 
conceal his doubts about certain aspects of colonial policy. He attacked the CO 
tendency to blame Malayan unrest on non-Malayan forces, notably the supposed 
interference of communist China, and he expressed concern about the conduct and 
organisation of civil administration, not least the workings of the office of 
commissioner-general in South-East Asia (249) . 
The co-ordination of colonial and military interests during the war and its 
immediate aftermath was effected firstly through the Malayan Planning Unit, which 
was led by Major-General Hone formerly of the Colonial Legal Service (16) and 
which, after a year in London, was attached to the headquarters of Mountbatten's 
South-East Asia Command (23, 26-30). On the Japanese surrender, liaison con-
tinued via the British Military Administration in Malaya (44, 45, 53, 62, 70). When 
stalemate appeared to have been reached during the emergency, Shinwell (minister 
of defence) and Strachey (secretary of state for war) grew increasingly impatient with 
the civil authorities which, in their eyes, were ineffective in the pursuit of 
counter-insurgency operations (226, 230). Indeed, the plan whereby Templer 
combined the functions of high commissioner and director of operations had its 
origins in anxieties which long predated the assassination of Gurney and the visit of 
Lyttelton to Malaya. 
The Treasury became involved in Malayan affairs firstly in connection with its 
post-war economic rehabilitation and subsequent development plans (32-35, 37, 38, 
201). The Treasury, of course, appreciated the extent of British economic interests in 
South-East Asia (421, 440) and especially the dollar-earning capacity of Malayan 
commodities (214) and were sympathetic, though not over-generous in their 
response, to requests from the Malayan government for assistance in financing 
emergency operations (200, 223-225, 228, 229, 302, 305, 306). As Malaya advanced 
towards 'full self-government', the Treasury was consulted over the financial 
implications of constitutional change (396, 403, 441) . 
Colonial policy towards Malaya 'Was clearly entwined with Britain's foreign, 
defence and economic policies in South-East Asia and the Far East, and co-
ordination was facilitated in London via a number of official and ministerial 
committees of Cabinet. The highest level was, of course, the full Cabinet itself. There 
is not space enough to incorporate in this collection every Cabinet paper relevant to 
< 
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Malaya, and, indeed, not all of them are central to an understanding of British 
decision-making as regards end of empire. Matters that reached full Cabinet fall into 
a number of categories which can be detailed as follows . First of all Cabinet 
considered proposals involving significant changes of policy, either departing from a 
previously agreed line or making a marked advance upon a position already approved 
by Cabinet, for example: the Malayan Union plan and its subsequent abandonment in 
the face of Malay protests (20, 25, 48, 56, 69); plans for constitutional advance 
following the federal elections (356-358); and the line to be taken at the 1956 
Lancaster House conference (400, 404-406). Secretaries of state were, on the whole, 
prepared to seek Cabinet endorsement of a policy; it reassured the hesitant and 
protected them from criticism. Secondly, issues over which there was inter-
departmental disagreement might well reach Cabinet; one of these was the question 
of Britain's recognition of communist China in 1949-1950 (on which the FO and CO 
had distinctly different views) and its implications for Britain's position in Malaya 
(197). Thirdly, questions relating to the security of Malaya and, indeed, the progress 
of counter-insurgency operations were discussed, notably the declaration of the 
emergency and the proscription of the Malayan Communist Party (158-160), 
contingency plans for the defence of Malaya in the event of the fall of Thailand to 
communists, authorisation of the use of a new tear gas, and the Baling Talks between 
Tunku Abdul Rahman and Chin Peng at the end of 1955 (379). The visits to Malaya of 
Griffiths and Strachey (June 1950) and Lyttelton (December 1951) were made 
primarily in connection with emergency operations, and each minister reported to 
Cabinet on his return (219-221, 257). Fourthly, matters which had potential for 
repercussions at home or abroad but which were not in themselves central to 
Malayan policymaking might reach Cabinet: one of these was the politically 
embarrassing incident of the publication in The Daily Worker of a photograph 
showing a Royal Marine holding the severed head of communist insurgent. 17 
Another was the proposal to exchange Lee Meng, who had been sentenced to death 
for being in possession of a hand grenade, for Edgar Sanders who had been held in 
Hungary as an alleged spy .18 Neither of these issues is documented in this collection. 
Finally, Malaya would come up in connection with the wider problems of sterling 
balances, the Colombo Plan, British policy in the Far East and South-East Asia, 
imperial defence and colonial security, and colonial policy and the future of the 
Commonwealth. 
In constitutional terms the most important forum where policy was discussed and 
shaped was parliament yet its debates hover in the wings of this collection. The 
reason for this is not because ministers and civil servants took little account of the 
legislature or held the democratic process in disdain - this was patently not the case 
as is revealed in the official papers preparing parliamentary questions and parliamen-
tary statements (notably that made by Attlee on 13 April 1949)19 - but because its 
proceedings passed immediately into the public domain through the columns of 
Hansard and, given the pressure upon space, it has been decided not to include 
material which has long been readily accessible there or in the form of Command 
Papers. Out of sight should not be out of mind, however, and we need to remember 
the parliamentary dimension to government policymaking during end of empire in 
Malaya. Although there was, as has already been noted, a fundamental bipartisanship 
on imperial and colonial policies for much of this period, ministers were not above 
adding lustre to their own conduct by ridiculing the record of their opponents, and 
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they always kept their guard up to parry thrusts from their shadows across the floor 
of the House or from those amongst their own backbenchers who were sufficiently 
independent-minded to be critical or were engaged in lobbying on behalf of a 
particular cause. Stanley Awbery, sometimes Tom Driberg and, of course, Fenner 
Brockway were vigilant on the Labour side while Leonard Gammans ('the honour-
able member for Malaya') and Waiter Fletcher were the watchdogs of the right. In the 
House of Lords, Elibank and Marchwood were particularly vocal during the Malayan 
Union dispute. Although Malayan affairs took up comparatively little parliamentary 
time, at a few key points debates in Westminster turned the course of Whitehall 
planning. One of these was the Commons debate on the Malayan Union proposals, 
which took place on 8 March 1946 and led to a government concession on the 
citizenship scheme (80).20 
So far we have considered pblicymaking in London, but what about the Malayan 
imput? In considering this question we need to deal in turn with the government of 
Malaya, its position in the region and, thirdly, the relations between metropolitan 
and local authorities. With regard to the first of these dimensions, as has been 
already noted, the PRO documents provide a sketchy record of its workings. For an 
understanding of the context in which policy was formulated certain features of the 
Malayan Union and Federation constitutions should be noted. Although intended to 
unite the peninsula and provide strong central government for the first time, the 
Malayan Union scheme was hamstrung from the moment it was announced by 
political protest and, as a result, was never fully implemented. Its replacement, the 
Federation of Malaya, retained many of the features of the Union, but it represented a 
major concession to Malay vested interests with the result that administration from 
1948 onwards was uneasily shared between state governments, which lay in the 
hands of Malay chief ministers (the mentri mentri besar or mentris besar) and their 
staff, and the British-dominated central government. Malay mistrust of centralism 
and British frustration with state obstructionism thwarted efficiency and, in 
addition, aggravated the schisms between the administration, police and military 
during the emergency. It was largely in order to correct these faults in the federal 
structure that Gurney pressed ahead with his proposal for a member system, 
whereby leading Malayans held portfolios in the Federal Executive Council (212, 
237), andBriggs planned a chain of war executive committees linking districts, states 
and the centre of operations (216). 
In Kuala Lumpur itself, the federal secretariat threatened to succumb to 
increasing pressures and burdens caused by political change, economic development 
and internal security in the post-war period. The key official, managing the business 
of the Federal Executive and Legislative Councils and liaising with heads of federal 
departments and British advisers in the states, was the chief secretary. The strain of 
this job took its toll of Newboult, who was chief secretary of the Malayan Union and 
Federation from 1946 to 1950 and acting high commissioner in the three months 
between Gent's death and Gurney's installation, while his successor, del Tufo, was 
. handicapped by the paralysis that gripped Malayan government on the assassination 
of Gurney. The office was, however, placed on a far more effective footing by 
Watherston, who came in as chief secretary as part ofLyttelton's reforms in 1952 and 
remained in that post until independence. Indeed,· the changes· of 1952 broke the 
deadlock in government in major ways: Templer acquired unprecedented powers, 
combining the offices of high commissioner and director of operations; MacGillivray, 
xlviii INTRODUCTION 
in the new post of deputy high commissioner, had special responsibility for political 
and constitutional matters; and General Sir Robert Lockhart was appointed deputy 
director of operations. The power which Templer commanded locally was matched, 
as we shall discuss further below, by the trust placed in him by the secretary of state, 
something which neither Gent nor Gurney had enjoyed to the same degree. 
Britain's avowed and ultimate intention after the Second World War was to create 
a 'Dominion of Southeast Asia', and consequently Malayan affairs were supervised 
regionally by the governor-general (1946-1948) and later by the colonial branch of 
the office of the commissioner-general. A measure of the importance placed on the 
need for the liaison between departments and co-ordination of policies in South-East 
Asia, even though they were not always able to achieve it, is Britai~'s concern with 
regional organisations. Beginning in 1941 with the short-lived and ill-fated appoint-
ment of Duff Cooper as minister in Singapore, British 'supremos' appeared in 
succession and with differing functions and powers. Mountbatten as supreme allied 
commander South-East Asia (1943-1946) was charged with military objectives and 
the reoccupation of Dutch and French colonial territories as well as British 
possessions. For two years following the end of military administration, Lord 
Killearn, as special commissioner, and Malcolm MacDonald, as governor-general, 
acted on behalf of the Foreign Office and Colonial Office respectively. In 1948 their 
functions were amalgamated in a single office; Killearn retired and MacDonald stayed 
on as commissioner-general in South-East Asia, a position which he occupied for 
seven years until he was replaced by Sir Robert Scott in 1955. The commissioner-
general had a supervisory rather than an executive role in the fields of colonial and 
foreign affairs (with respect to which he was answerable to the appropriate 
secretaries of state) and he also chaired the British Defence Co-ordinating Commit-
tee, Far East. 
MacDonald dealt with South-East Asian governors both individually, as problems 
arose in different dependencies, and in concert, when long-term issues such as closer 
association were discussed. Although he was not responsible for Malaya's internal 
affairs, he became involved in its government and politics, particularly during the 
1946-1952 period, and his views carried immense authority locally and commanded 
the respect of the Colonial Office and of ministers. In mid-1946, for example, 
MacDonald endorsed Gent's doubts about the Malayan Union's feasibility and he 
convinced London of the wisdom of entering into negotiations with Malay leaders for 
its replacement (92, 96). Thereafter, however, his relations with Gent deteriorated: 
MacDonald increasingly expressed unease about Gent's approach to Britain's friends 
and enemies, arguing that the high commissioner needlessly antagonised Dato Onn 
and UMNO but was insufficiently vigorous in meeting the communist threat. The 
commissioner-general was instrumental in persuading London to recall Gent, 
although his recommendations regarding his successor were not accepted by Creech 
Jones (151, 152, 154, 156, 157, 164--166). Nevertheless, despite his initial reserva-
tions about the appointment of Gurney, MacDonald worked well with him and 
admired his pursuit of co-operation between communal leaders and closer associa-
tion between the federation and Singapore. As Malayan government was scrutinised 
by so many departments in addition to the Colonial Office, one senses that Gurney 
resented the fact that he was not given a chance to defend his corner but that it was 
MacDonald who was consulted at the highest level. Certainly Gurney made his 
exclusion from Downing Street talks in March 1951 a resigning matter (235, 236). 
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MacDonald fruitlessly advised against the appointment of a soldier after Gurney's 
assassination (250) and, with the arrival of Templer, he became less prominent in 
Malayan affairs. The commissioner-general's functions in Malayan defence were 
reduced and Whitehall came to value the office more and more for the role it played 
in British foreign rather than colonial policy in the region (324, 335, 338, 348). 
Turning to the relationship between metropolitan and local authorities, we should 
note that the history of colonial administration is peppered with disputes between 
secretaries of state and governors. While it was usual for the secretary of state to 
choose the menu and the governor to prepare the dishes, the former did not shrink 
. from interfering below stairs and occasionally caused consternation in the kitchen 
and the cook to flounce out; nor was it unknown for a governor to get above himself 
and try to dictate his own terms. They approached the task from complementary but 
different angles, of course, for whereas the secretary of state had the dual function of 
presenting British requirements to Malaya and Malayan needs to Cabinet, so the high 
commissioner was both the agent of British policy and the defender of Malayan 
interests. Precise instructions or even general guidelines issued from on high were 
not always easily implemented on the spot; at every twist and turn of events London 
clung to its good intentions while deferring to the high commissioner with respect to 
the timing and manner of their implementation. Successive secretaries of state 
accepted, for example, that 'the initiative for a closer association of Malaya and 
Singapore must come from the two territories and there should be no question of 
imposing unification from Whitehall'.21 There were moments, however, when good 
intentions seemed to be inadequate to the situation: London was seen to eat humble 
pie over the Malayan Union, and four years later at the nadir of Britain's fortunes in 
the emergency, the main doubt related 'not to our intentions in Malaya, but to our 
physical capacity for carrying them out'.22 
Opportunities for spanning the gulf between London and Kuala Lumpur increased 
with improved contact between the metropole and periphery after 1945. No serving 
secretary of state for the colonies had visited Malaya during the seventy-year history 
of Britain's relations with the Malay states between 1874 and 1942. In the post-war 
period, by contrast, James Griffiths went out in June 1950 (218-222), Oliver 
Lyttelton in December 1951 (248, 252-257), and Lennox-Boyd in August-September 
1955 (359, 363, 365-370, 372) . MacDonald, Templer and MacGillivray, for their part, 
regularly flew to London for consultations (232-234, 283, 286, 299, 300, 307, 402, 
450). Contacts between London and Kuala Lumpur increased after 1945 at other 
levels, too: Bourdillon assisted MacMichael in his mission in 1945; Paskin accompa-
nied Lyttelton to Malaya in 1951; and Higham was seconded to the Singapore 
government between 1953 and 1957. In addition, experts were invited out from 
Britain to examine policing, housing, local government, trade unions, and so on.23 
What turned out to be the most rickety bridge crossing the London-local divide was 
the appointment of Gent as governor of the Malayan Union and later high 
commissioner of the Federation. Because he had spent the previous quarter-century 
in the Colonial Office, he never settled into his new role and, like his contemporary 
Gerald Greasy in the Gold Coast, Gent failed either to win the confidence of local 
leaders or retain that of the British. 
Both Gent and his successor, Gurney, were career officers and team players, they 
knew their place and were prepared to be overruled, as, indeed, they occasionally 
were not only by the commissioner-general but also by the Colonial Office. A~ 
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MacDonald's colonial role faded from early 1952, however, so the importance of the 
high commissioner rose. Having been head-hunted for a new job, Templer was far 
better placed vis a vis both the commissioner-general and the Colonial Office, and, 
like Mountbatten in India, enjoyed greater powers and trust than had his predeces-
sors. Scrupulous in seeking instructions before he embarked on his two-year stint as 
high commissioner and director of operations, Templer was unfettered by precedent 
and revelled in the unorthodox when it came to carrying them out. 'In short, he 
dominated the scene', Lyttelton later recalled, and '[i]n a few months I had almost 
dismissed Malaya from its place in my mind amongst the danger spots. My role had 
become simple: it was to back him up and support him'.24 
In MacGillivray the high commission reverted to an orthodox colonial servant with 
twenty-five years' experience of overseas administration. Like Templer, however, 
though for different reasons, MacGillivray was strongly placed in relation to the 
Coloniaf Office. His importance lay not so much in his local power as in his local 
knowledge and influence. Gurney's member or quasi-ministerial system had marked 
a shift in the seat of decision-making and by the time MacGillivray became high 
commissioner more and more of the decisions for Malaya's government and 
economic development were being taken in Kuala Lumpur rather than London. 
From August 1955, following the first federal elections, the high commissioner was 
obliged to work in co-operation with a Malay chief minister in a relationship not 
unlike that binding Arden-Clarke with Nkrumah in the Gold Coast. Pointing the way 
across the quicksands of Malayan politics, he tutored the Colonial Office in the art of 
the possible. 
This survey of policymaking indicates that the roles and relative importance of the 
London and local authorities changed over time. During their wartime exile from 
Malaya, planners in London were not only given the opportunity, but were also 
forced by circumstances, to seize the initiative, with the result that the British 
returned in the autumn of 1945 with a blueprint for post-war rehabilitation and 
eventual progress towards self-government. During the next five and a half years the 
centre of decision-taking oscillated between London and Kuala Lumpur as Malayan 
conditions - the aftermath of war, the Malayan Union crisis and the communist 
insurrection - affected the pace of political development, altered the course of 
metropolitan plans, provoked local initiatives and required continuous consultation 
between metropole and periphery. From early 1952 the locus of policymaking 
switched to Malaya in response, firstly, to the commanding presence of the high 
commissioner and, secondly and more importantly in the end, the Malayanisation of 
government. That said, however, a feature of the last phase of British rule was the 
constant exchange of views between London and Kuala Lumpur illustrated by the 
two-way flow of high-level personnel between the two capitals. Moreover, it should 
be noted that the principles upon which the details of transfer of power were 
subsequently worked out were agreed at a conference in London (January- February 
1956) over which the secretary of state presided and about which the Cabinet was 
kept informed (400--406), while the final arrangements for independence were 
approved in May 1957 at a conference chaired by Lennox-Boyd and again held in 
London (450). 
Events and the chronology of the three parts 
The documents in this collection have been chosen from a wide range of Whitehall 
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departments and also represent a variety of types, including telegrams and despatch-
es, manuscript minutes and printed memoranda. During the course of selection 
their value has been assessed according to their readability, authorship and content, 
and especially with a view to the light they shed on policy and policymaking. In 
making these judgments, we have borne in mind how British policy was shaped by 
different personalities, at a number of levels of government and with respect to 
various dimensions ranging from the specifically Malayan to the generally imperial. 
It has already been suggested in this introduction, however, that a collection which 
focuses solely upon British decision-taking runs the risk of exaggerating the grip 
which the official mind exerted over developments to the neglect of the unexpected, 
the irrational and events outside British control. For this reason a deliberate effort 
has been made to document unsettling incidents which disturbed rather than 
assisted the fluency of policymaking. 
Drama abounds in the Malayan story: the fall of Singapore on 15 February 1942; 
the turbulent interregnum between the Japanese surrender and the establishment of 
the British Military Administration in August- September 1945; the Malay campaign 
against the Malayan Union in 1946; the outbreak of insurrection and the declaration 
of the emergency and subsequent recall and death of Gent in June-July 1948; the 
assassination of Gurney in October 1951; the non-co-operation campaign mounted 
by the Alliance in May-July 1954; the talks between Tunku Abdul Rahman and Chin 
Peng at Baling in December 1955; and so on. It can happen, of course, that some 
occurrences are inadequately documented at the Public Record Office, perhaps 
because London remained in the dark about what was going on 7,000 miles away or 
because the import of cataclysmic happenings, about which civil servants might first 
have been informed by the press rather than through official channels, took time to 
sink in and elicit a considered reaction on paper. In so far as it is possible to 
document crises, the editor has tried to strike a balance between items demonstrat-
ing continuity and those showing change, between the development of policy over a 
number of years and the shocks which interrupted it. Whereas concentration upon 
the evolution of official thinking could result in a documentary collection with few 
contours, a preoccupation with crises and turning-points would tempt us to regard 
these as exciting ports of call in an otherwise featureless voyage and warranting 
many more snapshots than the miles of intervening sea. 
And so we come to the question of periodisation and the chronological arrange-
ment of the collection. Not only has this volume been subject to the nature of the 
sources and the editor's assessment of them, it has also been moulded by the artifice 
of presentation. Thus, although the editor has not been obliged to collate the 
documents under thematic heads, he has yet applied his judgment, and some may 
think a degree of arbitrariness, with regard to the periodisation of the narrative and 
the identification of breaks in its flow. 
The volume starts on 15 February 1942 with the conquest of British Malaya by the 
Japanese and ends on 31 August 1957, the day when the Federation of Malaya 
achieved formal independence from Britain. The end date needs no justification but 
the starting-point calls for comment. It is generally held that the fall of Malaya 
marked the beginning of the end of British imperialism in South-East Asia, if not 
elsewhere. Indeed, the military disaster provoked wide-ranging criticism of Britain's 
conduct as an imperial power. This sea-change is not easily spotted in the official 
documents which tend to deal in the ebb and flow of the daily round rather than 
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turns in the tide in the affairs of men. The record does reveal, however, a shift in 
public opinion on colonial issues and a reappraisal in official attitudes to Britain's 
future role in Malaya; it gradually sank in that there was no returning to the status 
quo ante bellum (1, 2). 1942 is the clearest turning-point in the history of British 
Malaya: before that date policy was based on the belief in indefinite rule; afterwards 
the premise became that of eventual self-government. 
The years between 1942 and 1957 are presented in three parts. This sectionalisa-
tion suits the preordained format of the volume. Each part also represents a more or 
less coherent period. The first, called 'The Malayan Union experiment', covers the 
following episodes: wartime planning for the restoration of colonial control; the 
Allied reoccupation of Malaya and the British Military Administration (September 
1945 - March 1946); the return to civil rule on 1 April 1946 in the shape of the 
radical but short-lived Malayan Union; the formation of the United Malays National 
Organisation and the Malay campaign against the new constitution; and the 
negotiations which led to its replacement by the Federation of Malaya. It ends with 
the inauguration of the Federation in February 1948. Part 11 covers the communist 
insurrection to the establishment of the first 'white area' in early September 1953. 
During these years successive high commissioners in Malaya (Gent, Gurney and 
Templer) and successive governments in Britain sought ways of successfully 
combating armed violence and latent communal conflict. The third part, called 'The 
Alliance route to independence', gets underway in September 1953 when Templer 
invited two Alliance leaders onto his Executive Council. In 1953-1955 preparations 
were made for state and federal elections which culminated in the Alliance landslide 
victory in July 1955. With the appointment of Tunku Abdul Rahman as chief 
minister, political and constitutional developments moved at an increasingly 
breathless pace and were marked by the Tunku's talks with Chin Peng at the end of 
1955, the Lancaster House Conference in January-February 1956, the Constitutional 
Commission chaired by Lord Reid, and the final arrangements relating to continuing 
Anglo-Malayan relations with respect to defence, finance and Commonwealth 
membership. Each part is itself subdivided into a number of chapters also on 
chronological lines. 25 
* * * * 
I The Malayan Union experiment 1942-1948 
Acquired as East India Company bases, Penang (1786), Singapore (1819) and Malacca 
(1824) were known as the Straits Settlements from 1826 and together became a 
single Crown Colony in 1867. Singapore in particular was increasingly valued as a 
commercial centre and a strategic base. Between 1874 and 1914 further British 
expansion led to the appointment of residents and advisers to the courts of the Malay 
rulers of each of nine Protected States on the peninsula, four of which formed the 
Federated Malay States (FMS) in 1896. According to treaties and engagements 
concluded at various times with the rulers, the British recognised the sovereignty of 
the sultans, the autonomy of their states and the special position of their people as 
'princes of the soil'. The extraction of tin from circa 1850 and the cultivation of 
rubber from the 1890s, added to the revenues and profitability of these dependencies 
and also led to the emergence of a 'plural society' where the communal differences 
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between Malays and immigrants from China and India were reinforced by their 
economic functions and the places assigned to them in Malayan society. As British 
administration expanded and the economy developed, so the power of Malays and 
their position in 'modern Malaya' receded. Yet the principles underlying the British 
presence remained the same and became ingrained through reiteration. The high 
commissioner, Sir Hugh Clifford, declared in 1927 that the Malay states 'were, they 
are, and they must remain- unless our duties, our obligations and our engagements 
to the Rajas, the Chiefs and to the people of these countries are to be wholly ignored 
or forgotten - M a lay States'. 26 
In the interwar period, however, officials were struck by the inadequacies of the 
system of government for fulfilling British obligations to Malays and accommodating 
the growing proportion of non-Malays who had settled permanently in the country, 
quite apart from the fact that territorial fragmentation stood in the way of 
administrative and economic efficiency. Various attempts were made, notably by Sir 
Lawrence Guillemard (governor and high commissioner, 1920-1927) and Sir Cecil 
Clementi (governor and high commissioner, 1930- 1934), to decentralise the FMS 
with a view to placing all Malay states on a uniform footing preparatory to the 
ultimate recentralisation of British Malaya. Such experiments foundered on vested 
interests, not least the suspicions of the sovereign rulers, with the result that a 
number of officials, such as G E J Gent, head of the CO's Eastern Department, 
became impatient with the 'barren policy' which, by simply respecting 'the 
traditional apprehensions of the Malay Sultans', prevented their Malay subjects from 
standing 'on their own feet', ignored 'the undoubted interests' of other races and 
obstructed 'a right and orderly relationship between the different Empire territories 
in the East'.27 
During the night of 7-8 December 1941 Japanese forces attacked Pearl Harbor, 
Malaya, the Philippines and Hong Kong. The US Pacific Fleet was crippled, half the 
American air force in the Far East was destroyed at Clark airfield and British naval 
power in Asia was wiped out when HMS Repulse and HMS Prince of Wales were sunk 
off the Pahang coast on 10 December. Having achieved supremacy in the air and at 
sea, Japan pushed into the territories of colonial South-East Asia on several fronts. In 
Malaya, British and Commonwealth troops failed to halt the advance through the 
peninsula; Kuala Lumpur was captured on 11 January, and on 31 January the British 
withdrew to Singapore destroying the causeway between Johore Bahru as they 
retreated. They held out until 15 February 1942 when General Percival surrendered 
to General Yamashita. 
Although the British government did not hold an official or public enquiry into the 
loss of Singapore, debate over the reasons for Britain's defeat started immediately 
after the loss of Malaya and has been going on ever since.28 Inadequate resources to 
defend a two-hemisphere empire, failure to reinforce the naval presence and provide 
air-cover, the costly demands of other military fronts nearer home, British 
under-estimation of Japanese fighting skills, fifth column activities, lack of prepara-
tion for a land attack launched from the north, poor leadership, inter-service 
disputes, complacency in the civil service and the administrative disunity of British 
possessions - all these factors have been cited singly or together in various 
post-mortems on the military debacle and shaped the attitudes of men planning for 
the restoration of British rule (1, 11). 
The effects of defeat were keenly felt and plainly seen. 130,000 British and 
liv INTRODUCTION 
Commonwealth troops were lost as either casualties or prisoners of war, Britain 
surrendered a supposedly impregnable naval base and valuable dependencies, and the 
rest of the eastern empire was exposed to attack as the Japanese advanced south to 
the Coral Sea and east to the gates of India itself. As well as being materially 
damaging, the military disasters of 1941- 1942 profoundly humiliated Britain in 
Asian eyes. Moreover, her self-esteem suffered another blow when it became clear 
that world war had eroded Britain's imperial capacities to such an extent that the 
restoration of lost territories would depend upon assistance from the USA whose 
president and people were imno mood to save England's Asian colonies. 
Anglo-American differences affected joint-operations in the field and also joint-
planning for post-war South-East Asia. For a time it was feared by some ministers as 
well as the CO's Eastern Department that the Foreign Office might succumb to 
American anti-imperialism, accept the case for international supervision of Euro-
pean colonies in the region and sacrifice British territorial claims in the Far East and 
South-East Asia for the greater good of the wartime alliance (4-9). Cranborne, for 
one, put up stout resistance on this point and the Colonial Office boldly set out the 
arguments favouring the post-war restitution of former dependencies, but it turned 
out that the hostility of the US towards the British empire diminished as the war 
went on and as Americans themselves assumed an imperial role in Asia and the 
Pacific. 
Almost as soon as they had lost their South-East Asian empire, Colonial Office 
officials accepted that a new deal was required for the region (2) . They were 
encouraged in this belief in part by the wartime opportunity of correcting pre-war 
problems, in part by the demands of war itself and in part by their assessment of 
Britain's post-war interests in the area. Although, in contrast to the significance of 
the Netherlands East Indies to Holland and Indochina to France, Britain's South-
East Asian dependencies were on the fringes of an imperial system which centred 
upon India, their actual and perceived value grew with the prospect of the loss of 
India, Britain's need for dollars and the great power rivalry in the region. Specific 
preparations for post -war Malaya were initiated by a request for guidance on 
long-term policy from those preoccupied with the invasion, reoccupation and 
military administration· of South-East Asian territories. Unlike Burma, whose 
governor in exile at Simla presided over planning for a return to British rule, the 
Colonial Office in London directed arrangements for post-war Malaya and Borneo, 
principally because so few British officials from these territories had escaped 
Japanese detention. By the summer of 1943 a Malayan Planning Unit (MPU) had been 
set up (there was a separate unit for British Borneo) (3, 10, 12-16). With 
Major-General Hone at its head, the MPU was composed of colonial officials holding 
military rank. It was attached to the Directorate of Civil Affairs in the War Office but 
it followed long-term policies simultaneously being devised in the CO. The result was 
a fresh departure designed to consolidate the administration of British territories, 
facilitate their economic development and eventually transform the 'plural societies' 
of the 'Malaysian' region into a self-governing nation. The assumption of direct rule 
was planned for each British dependency (including Sarawak and North Borneo 
which had hitherto been under the jurisdiction of the Brooke family and a Chartered 
Company respectively) and the new post of governor-general would be established to 
supervise and co-ordinate British colonial policies throughout the region. 
Whereas planning for post-war Burma rested on principles enshrined in the 1937 
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constitution, wartime thinking in Malaya encouraged a radical departure. The 
resulting Malayan Union scheme amounted to new imperialism in two senses: it 
envisaged unprecedented direct rule in the short term and it committed Britain to 
Malayan self-determination in the long term. Because it intended to break with the 
past, the CO took pains to consult other Whitehall departments and, in conjunction 
with the War Office, to seek Cabinet authority for the new course (17, 18, 20). In the 
spring of 1944 the Cabinet Committee on Malaya and Borneo, which was chaired by 
Attlee, scrutinised and endorsed the proposals (21, 22, 24, 25). The full Cabinet 
accepted the CO's contention that the 'restoration of the pre-war constitutional and 
administrative system will be undesirable in the intersts of efficiency and security 
and of our declared purpose of promoting self-government in Colonial territories', 
and on 31 May 1944 approved the new principles which would underwrite 
subsequent military planning and long-term colonial policy. 
The Malayan Union had three novel features: first, a peninsular union (including 
the nine Malay states, Penang and Malacca but not Singapore) with a strong central 
government; second, a common citizenship scheme for all who regarded Malaya as 
home; and, third, fresh treaties whereby the Crown would acquire from the Malay 
rulers full power in their states. From the end of May 1944 the detailed directives 
were worked out both for the military administration, which would be set up after 
liberation, and for the civil government which would succeed it. Because they 
departed from the traditions and ideology that had determined British policy in 
Malaya since the late 1870s and because they anticipated opposition from vested 
interests and 'old Malayan' hands, the Colonial Office insisted that the Malayan Union 
be planned in secret (23, 26-31, 36). Despite its progressive thrust which, as 
Mountbatten pointed out, would have appealed to emergent Asia and sugared the pill 
of imperial restoration, the outlines of the scheme were not announced until October 
1945 and even then another three months were to pass before its details were 
published (56, 69). Not only was policy kept under wraps but it was also drawn up in 
ignorance of current circumstances in Malaya. Up to a point planners were correct in 
assuming that the Japanese invasion, occupation and eventual defeat vitiated those 
conditions which had been fundamental to the viability of the old-style colonial 
regimes, and that British over-rule would be necessary for the rehabilitation of the 
country. But if the infrastructure had been damaged, the economic equilibrium 
upset and the administrative fabric eroded by war, then social and political relations 
had also become more volatile, and, apart from the links which Force 136 (or Special 
Operations Executive, Far East) established with the communist-dominated resist-
ance force (Malayan Peoples' Anti-Japanese Army, MPAJA), the British remained 
largely in ignorance of these developments until their return. 
Meanwhile on the field of battle, the appointment of Mountbatten as supreme 
allied commander South-East Asia (SACSEA) in August 1943 had breathed new life 
into this theatre. Although plan 'Culverin' for the reconquest of Sumatra in 1944 was 
not proceeded with owing to Anglo-American disagreements, Slim's 14th Army 
withstood Japanese offensives at lmphal and Kohima in March-June 1944, and then 
advanced to retake Rangoon early in May 1945. South-East Asia Command (SEAC), 
whose headquarters had moved from New Delhi to Kandy in April 1944, now set 
about preparing operation 'Zipper', the seaborne invasion of Malaya which was to be 
assisted from within the peninsula by Force 136. The war came to an end, however, 
before 'Zipper' was mounted. Air-raids upon Japan from November 1944 onwards 
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reached a crescendo in the massive offensive on Tokyo and other cities in 
May-August 1945. On 6 August the first atomic bomb was dropped upon Hiroshima 
and this was followed by the second on 9 August on Nagasaki, and on 15 August the 
Emperor announced his surrender. 
It had been decided at the Potsdam Conference in July 1945 to divide the 
responsibilities for the military administration of Japan's empire between American, 
British and Chinese commands. According to these arrangements the Philippines, 
Korea and Japan itself fell to the US, which also assisted Chiang Kai-shek in China, 
while the British-led SEAC assumed charge of 'colonial' South-East Asia (apart from 
North Vietnam which was to be occupied by Chinese troops as far south as the 
sixteenth parallel). Thus, on Hirohito's surrender, SEAC's frontier was extended to 
embrace Thailand, southern lndochina and the greater part of Indonesia as well as 
Burma, Malaya and Sumatra, and Mountbatten's headquarters were transferred from 
Kandy to Singapore. SEAC's remit was to accept the Japanese surrender and 
repatriate Japanese personnel, to evacuate allied prisoners of war and others in 
detention, to maintain law and order, and, finally, to prepare for the restoration of 
colonial rule. 
The problems facing Europeans in South-East Asia after 15 August 1945 were 
enormous (81). The restoration of colonial rule would be impossible without the 
deployment of men, materials and military power on a scale far larger than 
Europeans had ever found the need to wield before, yet their homelands were bled 
white, their old possessions were broken-backed and their problems provided 
nationalists with opportunities to assert themselves, particularly in Indonesia and 
Vietnam. The assumption by SEAC of sole responsibility for the reoccupation of 
'colonial South-East Asia', therefore, saddled Britain with heavy burdens and 
obligations some of which she would be hard-pressed to fulfil. SEAC's resources were 
inadequate to its tasks. The Americans were not willing to make substantial 
contributions to it and Britain was already stretched by military commitments in 
Europe, the Middle East and India. Loss of initiative in India meant that Britain 
could no longer freely deploy Indian troops in patrolling imperial territories 
elsewhere in the world. Moreover, the Labour government was under domestic 
pressure to demobilise Britain's conscript army as soon as possible, and was facing 
bankruptcy and 'starvation corner' at a time when it was committed to a programme 
of massive expenditure on social welfare. 
Nonetheless, while it would be misleading to underrate their difficulties, we 
should not underestimate the determination of the British, Dutch and French to 
restore their colonial power. On the contrary, in the immediate post-war period the 
region experienced a 'new imperialism' or, to borrow a concept from African 
historiography, a 'second colonial occupation'.29 This was particularly the case in 
Malaya where the British were eager to reorganise the government and rehabilitate 
the economy in order to be in a position once more to tap its dollar-earning 
commodities. Indeed, Malaya is sometimes cited as the exception to the rule that in 
South-East Asia colonialism died in 1942 and nationalism came of age in 1945, but 
even in Malaya the British faced a post-war imperial crisis since the collapse of the 
old colonial system under the Japanese led to near anarchy in August-September 
1945, and, as is discussed below, Britain's pursuit of new policies provoked Malay 
opposition in the first half of 1946. 
Despite the contemporary reports of joyous welcomes accorded to the returning 
INTRODUCTION lvii 
Allies, SEAC's reoccupation of the region was something of a shabby scramble. From 
the outset SEAC was wrong-footed by the unexpected swiftness of the war's end. Its 
troops were deprived of the chance to redeem their military reputation in the eyes of 
locals by force of arms; its administrators were called upon to set up military 
governments over the whole region immediately instead of step by step (43-46). An 
understandable lack of preparedness largely accounted for that anarchic hiatus 
between the Japanese surrender and the Allied return. The landings at Morib on the 
Selangor coast (ope_ration Zipper for the reoccupation of the Malayan peninsula) 
could easily have turned into a military debacle had SEAC met with resistance, and 
when British troops eventually arrived in Java they encountered armed opposition 
and lawlessness on a large scale. 
SEAC's position did not improve significantly after headquarters and a framework 
of military administration had been established in each territory. Throughout the 
region food shortages, worthless currency, political uncertainty and administrative 
collapse meant that SEAC found few foot-holds from which to assert itself over 
profiteering and banditry, vigilantes and kangaroo courts, communal conflict and 
competing bids for power of various nationalist groups. The army of occupation was 
unable, therefore, to confine itself to military administration tout court; it became 
increasingly involved in loc;al politics, in say Java and Cochin-China, and in 
international difficulties with', for example, the Dutch and French (81). It was a relief 
when in March 1946 General Gracey handed over to the French in Indochina and 
when the last British troops withdrew from Indonesia by the end of November 1946. 
As regards British South-East Asia, Singapore resumed its role as the seat of 
British military power - it was in Singapore where Mountbatten received the 
Japanese surrender on 12 September (54) - and it resumed its position as the centre 
for the diffusion of Britain's political, economic and cultural influence throughout 
the region (58, 71). Territory by territory, military administrations were set up in 
British Malaya and British Borneo (44); Major-General Hone was the chief civil 
affairs officer for Malaya and his deputies, Brigadiers Willan and McKerron estab-
lished their headquarters in Kuala Lumpur and Singapore respectively. The tasks of 
the BMA were to assume political control, repair the rudiments of an infrastructure 
for the provision of essentials and prepare for the return of civil government (61). 
Presented as 'liberation', the period of British Military Administration was in fact 
tarnished by administrative cack-handedness on a scale to cause grievous damage to 
both Anglo-Malayan relations and relations between Malayan communities (65).30 It 
was a tense and confused few months punctuated by outbreaks of Sino-Malay 
fighting and enveloped in uncertainty with respect to the intentions of either the 
British or the communists. 
The communist-dominated MPAJA had come out of the jungle to establish control 
in villages and some towns, and to put collaborators on trial. The BMA were at first 
obliged to collaborate with the MPAJA while making plans for their disarmament and 
supersession (43, 46). Just as he was identified with liberal colonialism in Burma, so 
with regard to Malaya, Mountbatten was anxious that the British should command 
the moral high ground by giving full publicity to the progressive aspects of the 
Malayan Union scheme which appeared to meet the eight-point programme of the 
Malayan Communist Party on every count (47, 51, 52). Advance publicity was 
embargoed, however, until the foundations of the Malayan Union had been laid, chief 
amongst which were the new treaties to be signed by the rulers and HMG's special 
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representative, Sir Harold MacMichael (53). 
From the moment MacMichael was provisionally appointed for this task after his 
return from Palestine and Trans-Jordan in 1944, he was anxious to know how far he 
could go in making it clear to the sultans that they would have no option but to sign 
the new treaties. The CO consulted the India Office which advised against strongarm 
tactics and MacMichael's terms of reference with respect to the resort to coercion 
remained unresolved until the eve of his departure from London in September 1945 
when he was authorised to check the credentials of the rulers and to telegraph to the 
secretary of state for the colonies (through SEAC) the names of any deemed 
unworthy of the throne and the credentials of any he recommended in their place 
(50, 55, 56).31 Preparatory to the arrival of Sir Harold MacMichael, Willan visited the 
Malay rulers in turn (8-29 September), deposing the Japanese placemen in Selangor, 
Trengganu and Perlis, gauging the loyalty of newcomers elsewhere and examining 
the records of the others (57). On 10 October MacMichael disembarked at Port 
Swettenham and, starting with lbrahim of Johore, by the end of the year he had 
concluded new agreements whereby Their Highnesses effectively surrendered to the 
Crown that sovereignty enabling the imposition of the Union constitution by 
Order-in-Council (59, 60, 64, 66) . The MacMichael mission was intended to be the 
harbinger of an efficient and democratic Malaya; in fact, it became a symbol of 
misplaced good intentions and, worse, arbitrary imperialism. A newcomer to Malaya, 
MacMichael obeyed his instructions to a fault: he delivered the new agreements but 
in such an overbearing manner as to unite the rulers in opposition to the British and 
as unlikely figureheads of unprecedented protest on the part of the mass of Malays 
who feared for their future in a Malaya dominated by non~Malays. At a stroke, the 
mission alienated Britain's traditional collaborators, yet the new policy (which was 
not fully revealed until the White Paper was published on 22 January 1946)32 
singularly failed to attract support from the non-Malays it was supposed to benefit. 
Consultation was brushed aside in the headlong rush to get the new structure in 
place (67, 68). 
In the pursuit of constructive colonialism, the Malayan Union amounted to direct 
and centralised British rule, although it was also intended to pave the way for an 
eventually self-governing Malayan nation. Because this constitution was a radical 
departure from pre-war principles, it had always been held that the key to the success 
of the Malayan Union lay in secret planning and swift implementation. In fact, it was 
these very methods as much as the content of the policy that provoked the anger of 
'old Malayans' in Britain, cast the Labour government in the role of reactionaries and 
aroused Malay protest culminating in the convention of the Pan-Malayan Malay 
Congress on 1 March (72-75, 78, 79). In Britain opponents of the scheme mounted 
an impressive parliamentary and extra-parliamentary campaign. Businessmen had 
little time for political progressivism (63) and retired Malayan civil servants objected 
to the wholesale abnegation of past principles and practices. They wrote to the press 
and lobbied MPs, such as Leonard Gammans in the Commons and Elibank and 
Marchwood in the Lords. Led by Sir George Maxwell, a former chief secretary of the 
FMS, a proconsular delegation including two former high commissioners, Sir Cecil 
Clementi and Sir Frank Swettenham, confronted the secretary of state at a meeting 
in the CO on 26 February, but they came away empty-handed. On 8 March in the 
House of Commons, letters from aggrieved sultans were read out and Arthur Creech 
Jones (who was standing in for George Hall) was forced into a significant concession 
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with respect to the citizenship scheme, promising to consult Malayan opinion before 
proceeding further with it (80). As we have seen, the CO had expected a certain 
amount of hostility from these quarters, but what took everyone, including the 'old 
Malayans', by surprise was the extent and vigour of protest coming from the so-called 
'quiescent' Malays. Of course, the Malayan Union policy and the MacMichael mission 
did not by themselves create Malay nationalism. Its origins can be traced to the 
previous century33 and it is clear that the disruption of 1941-1945 had so sharpened 
political consciousness and aspirations that the Malay community and their leaders 
were ready to assert their claims to be 'princes of the soil'. The Malayan Union, 
however, provided a target upon which hitherto diffuse activities could be focused. 
Nonetheless, the Colonial Office was not yet shaken from its chosen course. Cabinet 
had endorsed the policy (69, 76) and Gent prepared to leave London for his 
installation as governor of the Malayan Union when the military bowed out to the 
civil government on 1 April 1946. 
For long regarded as figureheads, the Malay rulers played a pivotal role in the 
mounting crisis over the Malayan Union. The constitution hinged on the new 
agreements, and the rulers' individual and initial doubts about the legitimacy of 
these treaties grew into vigorous repudiation in a spate of telegrams to London and 
the United Nations. Even Ibrahim of Johore, who had signed so promptly before 
departing for London, questioned the legality of the treaty when he was informed of a 
conspiracy of Johore Malays to dethrone him on the ground that he had contravened 
the state constitution and betrayed Malay rights. For their subjects (raayat), the 
sovereignty of the rulers was a bastion against non-Malays; expressions of fervent 
loyalty to what progressives took to be unlovable autocrats may have seemed out of 
keeping with the age of nationalism, democracy and the common man (84), but it 
was explicable by reference, not merely to Malay atavism, but also to their very real 
fear that, once sovereignty was wrested from the rulers, Malays would have no 
defence against an eventual Chinese take-over through the gaping portals of Malayan 
Union citizenship (77). 
On 1 April 1946 the Malay rulers, who had gathered in Kuala Lumpur to attend 
Gent's installation, were persuaded by Dato Onn bin Jaafar, the president of the Pan 
Malayan Malay Congress, to boycott the ceremony and, instead, to acknowledge the 
support of a crowd demonstrating in support of sultans' sovereignty and against 
British imperialism (82, 83). It was a highly charged moment. Never before had 
rulers acted in concert, nor had they aroused such displays of popular support. Aware 
of revolutionaries toppling royal houses in parts of Indonesia, the rulers were 
unnerved; so, too, were some British officials who appreciated that Malay collabora-
tion had traditionally underpinned the British position in the peninsula (85). 
Meanwhile the Pan-Malayan Malay Congress of some forty associations formalised 
its objectives and organisation, even though it would, for several years to come, still 
retain its loose and disparate character. Meeting in Johore Bahru on 11-13 May the 
Congress converted itself into the United Malays National Organisation (UMNO) with 
Dato Onn as president and the Dato Panglima Bukit Gantang as secretary-general 
(90). Committed to the immediate defeat of the Malayan Union and the long-term 
improvement of the Malay position in the country, UMNO was from the outset a 
communal party whose leaders insisted that Malaya was not yet ready (belum layak) 
for independence. Led by Malays with government experience and run like a 
government department, UMNO did not pose a fundamental challenge to the 
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continued British presence, but only to specific British policies, and the authorities 
swiftly recognised that an accommodation should be reached with this new party.34 
Indeed, they turned a blind eye to the involvement of Malay government servants in 
its activities and MacDonald, for one, was soon advocating conciliation of UMNO, 
which he saw as a genuine nationalist movement whose co-operation it would be in 
British interests to cultivate (92, 96). 
The first indication the CO received that Gent was wavering in his support for the 
Union came in early May (86, 88). Anxious lest the governor should cave in to 
protests, George Hall reaffirmed fundamental principles and briefed Malcolm 
MacDonald, governor-general designate, on the government's commitment to the 
Union constitution, to common citizenship and to the treaties (91). In London the 
secretary of state and his officials could not contemplate ditching a scheme that had 
consumed much of the Eastern Department's time since 1943 and had received 
Cabinet authorisation at several junctures during its construction. Moreover, they 
believed that the policy was in the best interests of both Britain and Malaya, despite 
the opposition it had aroused in parliament and the press. Within days of his arrival 
in Malaya, however, MacDonald was supporting Gent's call for compromise, and by 
the end of May the secretary of state had been persuaded to countenance exploratory 
talks with Malay leaders (92, 93). So began a process of constitutional negotiations in 
which an Anglo-Malay twelve-man working party, reporting at intervals to plenary 
sessions of officials, rulers and UMNO leaders, drafted an alternative constitution. In 
the Anglo-Malay discussions both sides gave ground; the British used their 
'fundamental principles' as bargaining counters, the secretary of state clinging to the 
MacMichael treaties until he was sure that the Malay side had agreed to a strong 
central government (albeit in federal form) and a common (though more restrictive) 
citizenship (97, 99-106). The proposals were brought to London towards the end of 
November, discussed by the Cabinet's Colonial Affairs Committee on 2 December and 
approved three days later by the Cabinet subject to the resolution of a few points to 
be referred back to Kuala Lumpur and consultations with non-Malays (107-110). On 
Christmas Eve the Constitutional Proposals were published35 and a consultative 
committee was appointed. 
The reasons for the British volte-face are open to debate. At first sight, it would 
appear that unprecedented direct rule met and was overturned by unprecedented 
Malay resistance. But further exploration of the documents suggests that it was not 
so much direct confrontation with the Malays as the wider repercussions of their 
campaign that convinced firstly the colonial government and then the Colonial 
Office that conciliation was essential. On 11 May Gent reported 'that almost universal 
Malay political opinion here gives no basis for expecting effective operation of 
consitution' on the basis of the Orders-in-Council, that the strength and depth of 
Malay feeling had surprised all and that there were worrying signs of Malay 
non-co-operation 'in practical ways, such as police rank and file resignations' though 
these were 'on very small scale at present'. The governor then drew attention to the 
assessments of his security advisers who, given the 'growing scale of Malay 
non-co-operation', apprehended that 'substantial Indonesian elements in West coast 
states may develop acts of violence against non-Malay communities'. Gent empha-
sised that it was generally agreed 'that Malay leaders will not come to accept "Union" 
and the situation will deteriorate with consequent frustration in every essential 
object of unity and political progress' (88). In a subsequent telegram despatched on 
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the same day, Gent also drew attention to the problem of the Malayan Communist 
Party which exploits 'opportunities at any time to disturb the peace' in order to 
overthrow British government in Malaya through the methods of 'intimidation, 
violence and extortion'. One of the MCP's weapons, continued Gent, was 'infiltration 
into any Malay Indonesian groups or organisations', hence the importance of 
ensuring 'that Malay opinion is sufficiently met' (89). 
MacDonald deployed similar arguments, though from a wider, regional perspec-
tive and, given his quasi-ministerial status, with more telling effect: 
If we can get agreement now, we can retain full trust in British leadership in this region 
which is the main base of the British position in the Far East. If we do not, we shall begin 
to lose acceptance of our leadership by local peoples and process of our being at each 
stage bit behind local political opinions (such as has been so unfortunate in the history of 
the Indian problem) will start. We must, of course, keep in mind that there are powerful 
political groupings in Asia which are ready to exploit any weakening of our position i.e. 
Indian nationalists and Imperialism, Chinese Imperialism and especially Pan Malayan 
Movement led by Indonesians. (92) 
Towards the end of June MacDonald remained adamant that the priority lay in 
appeasing Malay opposition. 'Malay opinion is roused as never before.' While he 
recognised that 'it is highly desirable that Malays become politically conscious so as 
to prepare themselves to play appropriate part in developing self Governing 
insitutions', he stressed that 'it will be extremely unfortunate if this awakened 
political consciousness and interest gets rail-roaded into extremist and anti-British 
channels'. Compromise would restore Malay confidence in the British and ensure 
their co-operation but refusal to meet Malay objections would sweep Malay 
nationalism 'into Indonesian anti-European currents' and the 'opposition and 
bitterness which has led to such damaging situations elsewhere' (96). 
The documents reproduced here suggest two conclusions: the first is that 
arguments based upon security assessments proved decisive in changing the course 
of policy, and the second is that the British already perceived the uses of their 
adversary, UMNO. Concern lest non-co-operation should permeate and corrode the 
fabric of government - it had, for example, already resulted in Malay resignations 
from the police force - together with fear of the unruliness that might flourish as a 
consequence caused the British to think again. In deciding to appease UMNO and the 
rulers they were not surrendering to violence or conceding to enemies; rather they 
were anxious to regain their assistance in anticipation of the possibility of violence 
arising from other quarters. Their particular dread was that an essentially conserva-
tive movement might be hijacked by militant Malays eager to provide Indonesian 
activists (and possibly Chinese communists too) with the opportunity of destabilising 
the regime at a time of bloody communalism (94). Now it is possible that intelligence 
reports may have derived from an exaggerated assessment of the threat to Malaya 
posed by Indonesian nationalist and revolutionary groups of one kind or another; 
certainly, by January 1948 MacDonald no longer regarded the Indonesian republican 
movement to be a grave danger to Malayan security (137). Nonetheless,at this time 
both governor and governor-general took very seriously signals of political extrem-
ism and subversion (116). 
The outline for a federation having been agreed between British officials and Malay 
leaders and approved by Cabinet, on the constitutional front 1947 saw, not merely 
detailed drafting, but more especially further consultations (111). The Consultative 
,. 
i,. 
':~-
I'' 
lxii INTRODUCTION 
Committee, chaired by HR Cheeseman (director of education), sounded the 
opinions of leaders of non-Malay communities and others who had not been 
represented in the earlier discussions. This committee reported to the governor at 
the end of March and its recommendations were discussed first by the Anglo-Malay 
Working Committee in April and finally by a plenary session of representatives of the 
Malayan Union government, the rulers and UMNO. On 11 May, Gent forwarded the 
agreed scheme to the Colonial Office (123, 124), and, after further exchanges 
between London and Malaya (126, 127), Creech Jones submitted them to Cabinet 
(128). Cabinet approved the revised constitutional proposals on 3 July, and on 21 
July a parliamentary paper announced a federation substantially the same as that 
outlined in the Anglo-Malay Constitutional Proposals for Malaya which had been 
published in the previous December.36 It had been hoped to inaugurate the 
Federation on 1 January 1948 but more fine tuning was required to the elaborate 
written constitutions for the federation and the states, and there was a late hitch over 
British control of defence and external affairs. At last on 21 January the Federation of 
Malaya Agreement, which contained the written constitution for the federation, was 
signed by the governor and the rulers and inaugurated on 1 February (136, 138). 
It was a long-drawn out and increasingly irritable process. In December 1946 the 
Pan-Malayan Council of Joint Action was formed by non-Malay groups and Malay 
radicals who had withdrawn from UMNO to protest against the Anglo-Malay 
concordat, and it later split on communal lines into the All-Malaya Council of Joint 
Action and PUTERA (Pusat Tenaga Raayat, centre of people's strength). Acting in 
tandem they boycotted the Cheeseman committee and produced The People's 
Constitutional Proposals for Malaya.37 Published in English, Malay and Chinese, this 
pamphlet advocated a common nationality and democratic self-government. When 
ignored, the coalition resolved on 17 August to mount a hartal (or peaceful stoppage 
of work) and this took place on 20 October. MacDonald was more sympathetic to the 
Chinese demands for a constitutional review than was Gent, whose priority was now 
to restore good relations with Malay leaders as soon as possible by pushing ahead 
with a federal constitution (131-134) . 
At the same time, the UMNO leadership fretted at the delay in replacing the Union 
constitution and grew suspicious that the British might succumb to Chinese 
demands or revert to the Malayan Union. Dato Onn's reputation as a political leader 
in large measure rested on his resistance to the scheme: the longer negotiations 
dragged on, the greater the risk to UMNO integrity; once the negotiations were 
complete, however, there would be a danger of his stock declining. Thus it was that 
in his communications with British officials and in speeches to his own supporters, 
Dato Onn embroidered the theme of British perfidy which the Malayan Union 
epitomised (114, 135). Although MacDonald accepted Onn's nationalist credentials 
from the start and continued to believe in them long after they had waned, Gent's 
relations with the charismatic though mercurial leader of UMNO were never better 
than correct, principally because Onn continued to mistrust Gent as the original 
architect of the Malayan Union who yet remained committed to restoring some of its 
features . 
Indeed, although the replacement of the Union by Federation was seen at the time, 
and has been interpreted since, as a defeat for British policymakers because it 
restored sovereignty to the Malay rulers, reinforced the position of the Malay 
traditional elite in state government and subordinated non-Malay political preten-
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sions to those of the Malay community, it is clear from the documents that the 
British never lost sight of the principles and objectives of Malayan Union policy, 
either during the constitutional talks or after the Federation was inaugurated. 
Strong central government, multi-racial citizenship and closer association with 
Singapore leading to the emergence of a 'British Dominion in South-East Asia' were 
aims that distinguished postwar from prewar policy and survived the Malayan Union 
crisis (98, 112, 115, 121). When they appeased the Malays over the Malayan Union, 
the British government changed tack instead of altering course. They adopted a more 
circuitous route towards the goals of strong government for the peninsula and 
common citizenship for all peoples, goals which continued to guide British policy for 
the next decade. If British intentions were not in doubt, however, their capacity for 
carrying them out had been affected by the marginalisation of the Chinese and the 
elevation of Malays in the government of the country. The powers and functions of 
the Federation were now divided between the Malays, who assumed control of state 
governments, and the British, who were dominant at the centre. This was an 
arrangement that obstructed the promised advance to elections, alienated the 
Chinese and, from mid-June 1948, hampered the authorities' approach to insurrec-
tion. 
11 The Communist insurrection 1948-1953 
Following the murders of three European planters and their Chinese assistants in 
Sungei Siput on 16 June 1948, Gent declared a state of emergency in Perak and parts 
of Johore which he extended to the whole peninsula two days later (148). Criticism of 
his handling of the crisis, however, led to his recall but he was killed in an air crash 
as his plane approached London on 4 July. A fortnight later the Cabinet decided to 
proscribe the Malayan Communist Party (160) and a month after that the Cabinet 
Defence Committee agreed on military reinforcements for Malaya (161). So began an 
armed struggle which lasted beyond the achievement of independence in August 
1957 and even beyond August 1960, when the emergency was officially called off. It 
was not until 2 December 1989 that the communist leader, Chin Peng, formally laid 
down his arms in separate agreements with Malaysian and Thai authorities .38 
Since the declaration of emergency, questions have been raised and discussed 
relating to the origins, nature and outcome of this conflict in Malaya.39 Was it 
communist insurrection or nationalist rising? Was it war or civil disturbance? Did it 
hasten or retard the pace of decolonisation and in what ways did it affect the manner 
of British withdrawal? With respect to the origins of the upheaval, historical enquiry 
has focused, firstly, on the relative significance of local and international factors in 
determining the course of events, and, secondly, the extent to which either the 
Malayan communists or the British authorities were prepared for the outbreak of 
armed violence. Some have argued in favour of a conjuncture of Malayan develop-
ments and those elsewhere in the communist world and have ~mphasised the 
importance of the Cominform's switch from the 'united front' to Zhdanov's 'two 
camp' doctrine in bringing cold war in Asia. According to this last interpretation, the 
call to action, which was voiced at conferences in Calcutta early in February 1948, 
signalled the launch later that year of uprisings by the Burma Communist Party, the 
Indonesian Communist Party, the Hukbalahap in the Philippines and the MCP, while 
the Vietminh were given new heart. Others, by contrast, have concluded that 
Malayan circumstances were the principal determinants of the MCP's decision to 
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take to the jungle and resort to violence. Amongst these have been cited changes in 
MCP leadership, when Lai Tek was replaced by Chin Peng as secretary-general, and 
the socially dislocating effects of post-war colonialism, in particular the high prices 
and low wages suffered by labourers and squatters, which prepared a fertile field for 
insurrection. Some commentators have suggested that the outbreak was neither 
premeditated nor the culmination of exact planning on the part of the MCP, and they 
have drawn attention to the almost accidental manner in which the Sungei Siput 
murders committed the MCP to 'armed struggle', tipped the scales against British 
toleration of the party and triggered a twelve-year emergency. 
Whether the British authorities caused or in any way contributed to the outbreak, 
or, conyersely, whether they could have prevented or prepared for it, are also 
questions that continue to divide historians of the emergency and on which the 
available documents unfortunately shed little new light. It has been suggested, for 
instance, that the regime deliberately provoked violence in order to identify and 
isolate communist activists and coerce and subdue fellow travellers . An alternative 
view is that armed violence was the result, less of a colonial conspiracy and more of a 
successful counter-revolutionary strategy to block 'entryism' in trade unions and 
political parties.40 Some of these explanations presuppose a degree of knowledge 
which the authorities did not possess, for the documents reveal that accurate 
intelligence, which was to prove a key to the eventual success of counter-insurgency, 
was not available to the high commissioner. Gent was furnished with neither 
sufficiently precise warnings as to MCP intentions nor information which could be 
relied upon as the basis for appropriate action. Thus, although the US State 
Department was given to understand by the American consul that Gent was recalled 
because of 'his failure to take action on intelligence reports reaching him',41 on 13 
July 1948 the British Cabinet concluded that the Malayan disturbances necessitated a 
comprehensive review of colonial police 'with a view particularly to improving their 
intelligence work' (158).42 
We should note, however, that the causes of Malayan violence, the reasons for 
declaring an emergency and the decision to proscribe the MCP a month later had 
their own dynamics, as may be noted from chronological discrepancies between 
them. Violence did not simply erupt in June 1948; it had been a constant factor in 
post-war Malaya, sometimes waxing and sometimes waning but never disappearing 
altogether. Since labour unrest and 'brutal outrages' had been reported regularly for 
well over a year (122, 125, 129, 130), why did the federal government choose 
mid-June for a declaration? Indeed, there was little prospect of massive support from 
a united nationalist movement (139, 140) and in late May 1948 officials in the 
Colonial Office believed that Malaya was, if anything, more stable than it had been for 
some time (146). A number of equally plausible explanations come to mind for the 
timing of the emergency: that it was, for example, the culmination of steadily 
growing unrest and frustration; that it was provoked by changes in the nature and 
scale of violence; that it indicated a British reappraisal of a festering problem; or, as 
in the review of the Malayan Union policy two years before, that it occurred because 
concern over Malayan unrest was heightened by other anxieties. One interpretation 
resembles Corfield's explanation for the delay in declaring an emergency in Kenya in 
1952,43 namely: the post-war Malayan regime, being intrinsically progressive and 
sensitive to liberal opinion at home and internationally, was naturally unwilling to 
infringe civil liberties and resort to coercive measures until alternative courses had 
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been explored and exhausted. Similarly, but more pragmatically, it might be held 
that Gent was loth to introduce draconian measures which would have had the effect 
of driving subversives underground, out of sight and beyond reach. 
The high commissioner has usually been presented as weak and vacillating at this 
time, lacking a grasp of the problem, suggesting few ideas for its solution and having 
little stomach for tough action. The particularly shocking murders at Sungei Siput 
were the last straw for his critics. Gent, losing popularity within the administration, 
criticised by the military, hounded by the British business community (149, 150) and 
abandoned by his superiors, was a desperate man driven to desperate measures and 
in the end he clutched at the declaration as at straw. And yet there was little 
consensus amongst his critics about the nature of Malayan violence. The security 
services failed to penetrate the MCP, identify their plans and anticipate the crisis 
(162). MPs, even ministers, also disagreed in their assessments, and it would appear 
that Gent, who had lacked credibility as high commissioner since the Malayan Union 
debacle, was finally sacrificed by his masters as a scapegoat for their own confusion 
and as a gesture to restore confidence in government (151-157). It is perhaps 
significant that Gent had lost the backing of Malcolm MacDonald at least a month 
before he declared the emergency (for it was agreed to re-post him during talks 
which the commissioner-general had in London in May), and that MacDonald 
seemed to be as much dismayed by the way Gent had antagonised Dato Onn, the 
leader of UMNO, as he was by his handling of Malayan communists (144, 164). 
When the crisis was debated in Parliament on 8 July some MPs pointed out 
connections between Malayan unrest, the advent of Cold War and the spread of 
subversion to British colonies.44 From the outset the Labour government, keen to 
preserve its progressive credentials, scotched any suggestion that the Malayan 
problem was connected with Asian nationalism. Creech Jones maintained: 
Malaya, after all, is the only colonial area in South-East Asia where no genuinely 
anti-European movement has emerged since the war. ... I would say emphatically, 
particularly in view of the vilification of Britain - the wilful lies in regard to the Malayan 
situation which have been put across from Moscow - that we have not here at all the 
emergence of a nationalist movement which Britain is engaged in putting down. This is 
not a movement of the people in Malaya. It is the conduct of gangsters who are out to 
destroy the very foundations of human society - orderly life. 
On this point there was cross-party agreement, with Gammans (Conservative MP for 
Hornsey) asserting that 'this is not a nationalistic uprising in any sense of the word'. 
Beyond that, however, opinions differed: gangsters, bandits and criminals in the eyes 
of some, the perpetrators of violence were seen by others as agents of international 
and revolutionary communism. Oliver Stanley claimed that the outrages were part of 
'a widespread and long concocted plot to overthrow government in Malaya'. 
Gammans identified the source of the problem to be 'primarily a terrorist organisa-
tion, Moscow-inspired, Communist in origin ' and he pressed ministers to admit, 
'considering that Mr. Malcolm MacDonald has said it', that '[t]his is part of a 
worldwide attack against Great Britain, of which another part is going on in Berlin at 
this moment'. Waiter Fletcher, by contrast, insisted that '(w]hat we are seeing now is 
not due to the Communists, although they are a large element in the situation and 
will certainly use it to their own purposes' but 'we are throwing dust in our own eyes 
to use the word "Communist"'. He urged the government not to 'deceive themselves 
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by saying this is Communism; it is not. This is lawlessness due to a disrespect of the 
law which is not being sufficiently firmly or effectively administered, and the cause of 
that I place fairly and squarely on the shoulders of the Government'. During this 
debate ministers were unwilling publicly to shift the blame for Malayan unrest upon . 
Moscow and world communism. Moreover, while there was a temptation to play up 
the evils of terrorism in order to legitimise British counter-measures, they also 
recognised the need to play down the extent of violence in order to repair confidence 
in the colonial government. Rees-Williams, for example, suggested that Malayan 
violence was a revival of the gangsterism with which he had been fap1iliar in pre-war 
Penang. ' 
By late June both Gent and MacDonald were convinced that communists were 
behind the violence but the Colonial Office and Cabinet remained sceptical. On 13 
July Cabinet concluded that whatever the origins of unrest, '[t)here was little doubt 
that the situation in Malaya had been exploited by Communists, and similar attempts 
to foment disorder must be expected in other parts of the Colonial Empire' (158) . But 
it refrained from banning the MCP and it was not until 19 July, a month after the 
start of the emergency and a fortnight after the death of Gent, that the Cabinet 
decided to outlaw the party (159, 160). This delay does not indicate that the Labour 
government was soft on communism; on the contrary, the foreign secretary, Ernest 
Bevin, was in the vanguard of the Cold War in 1948. Ministers held back, we would 
suggest, possibly because they feared that extension of the Cold War to Malaya might 
dilute efforts being made to contain communism in western Europe and the Middle 
East, probably because they did not wish emerging states of Asia (notably newly 
independent India) to identify Britain with intolerance and authoritarianism, partly 
because they lacked watertight evidence that the MCP was indeed the perpetrator of 
violence and certainly because they were reluctant to drive the communists 
underground. Notwithstanding the coincidence, if not conjuncture, of Malayan 
violence and Cold War and notwithstanding the Labour government's belief that 
colonies would fall prey to worldwide subversion, what eventually persuaded the 
Cabinet to follow MacDonald's advice was not so much wider international consid-
erations but rather the specific predicament of the colonial government in Malaya. 
Although ministers did not welcome his recommendation, they were in the end 
willing to accept it both because they trusted the commissioner-general's judgment 
and because they hoped that the smack of firm government would go a long way to 
restoring confidence in the Malayan regime. Nearly two years later, in May 1950, a 
captured MCP pamphlet, which was entitled Present day situation and duties and 
had been produced in June 1949, satisfied at least some members of the Cabinet 
Malaya Committee that the Malayan troubles had been fomented by the MCP rather 
than bandits (215). By the time the Labour government gave way to the Conserva-
tives, it had become axiomatic that Britain was confronted by 'communist terrorism 
in Malaya' and that the 'enemy is the Malayan Communist Party, which is almost 
exclusively Chinese'.45 
The declaration of the emergency in mid-June and the proscription of the MCP a 
month later by no means initiated masterful government in Malaya. On the contrary, 
this episode suggested the inadequacy of the colonial regime in a number of areas -
policing, economic development, labour relations and constitutional engineering. 
Although the first set of emergency regulations (they were considerably reinforced 
later) empowered the authorities to impose the death penalty for unlawful possession 
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of arms, to detain any persons, to search persons and premises without warrant and 
to occupy properties, many regarded them as too little and too late. Moreover, there 
was continuing confusion in the official mind about the nature of the problem and 
the identity of the enemy. Furthermore, the longer it lasted and the more it cost, the 
emergency increasingly threatened to make the British position untenable and 
jeopardised their plans for Malaya: it saddled Britain with a war it could ill afford; it 
damaged the Malayan economy; and it arrested advance towards devolution of power. 
However, although the declaration of emergency had the immediate effect of putting 
constitutional concessions on ice, it marked neither the abandonment nor a 
significant turning-point in Britain's long-term Malayan policy. Alongside, albeit 
subordinate to, the conduct of counter-insurgency operations, the British doggedly 
and unspectacularly pursued those Malayan Union goals of regional consolidation 
and nation-building (141, 143) . Of course, the restitution of law and order was now 
their principal priority, yet in this area the next three and half years were punctuated 
by false dawns and dashed hopes. 
After Gent's death, MacDonald, who seemed to waver in his assessment of the 
gravity of the security problem, suggested that the inauguration of the next high 
commissioner be delayed until law and order had been restored (166). As it was, 
despite an interregnum of three months, when Gurney arrived in October the 
disorders were still the government's top priority. Cold War and the government's 
commitment to contain communism, imperial prestige and memories of the 
1941-1942 disaster, Britain's economic needs and its interests in the region (196, 
198, 201), all meant that there could be no thought of withdrawing under pressure. 
The Chiefs of Staff supplied military reinforcements and the Treasury accepted the 
need to provide financial assistance for emergency operations (175, 200). 
Until the end of 1949, Gurney's period as high commissioner was marked by 
diagnoses of the problem, recommendations for its solution and optimism that 
success was round the corner. Gurney's first despatches on what became known as 
'the Chinese problem' largely developed out of his briefing before leaving London. 
Already the authorities were aware not only of the need to enlist Chinese support but 
of their own ignorance of the Chinese community (163). Lamenting the lack of 
Chinese commitment to Malaya (which had, after all, been a reason why the Malayan 
Union had failed to win popular endorsement), Gurney identified two objectives: the 
first was to deprive the communists of assistance from squatters and the other was to 
encourage the formation of a Malayan Chinese Association (168-172, 176, 179). 
Gurney insisted, and the military accepted, that counter-insurgency was first and 
foremost a matter for a multi-racial police force (188, 189, 199). Even at this stage in 
the emergency, therefore, the immediate problems of law and order were being 
examined in the context of nation-building, and, although not yet enunciated in so 
many words, 'winning the hearts and minds' of the Malayan people was already 
regarded as an essential ingredient of counter-insurgency. 
What exactly longer-term policy was and just how it was to be achieved were, 
nonetheless, vexed issues. However committed they remained to the nostrums of the 
Malayan Union, if they were going to win the support of all communities in Malaya 
and, at the same time, reassure businessmen and allies in the region, the authorities 
needed to do something other than try to re-activate that burnt -out model ( 17 4). 
That the Malayan Union wounds proved slow to heal was revealed during Onn's visit 
to London towards the end of the year (173). That Gurney required the crutch of a 
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firm ministerial statement of intent was shown in what the CO regarded as his 
unprofessional complaint to the deputy leader of the opposition (177, 181, 183--186) 
- a complaint which, together with others, contributed to Attlee's balanced 
assurance to Parliament on 13 April 1949 that, while it was Britain's policy to lead. 
Malaya to self-government within the Commonwealth, there would be no premature 
withdrawal from responsibilities. 
Meanwhile, initiatives were launched in Malaya to build bridges across a number 
of communal, geographical and constitutional divides. MacDonald persuaded com-
munity leaders to form the Communities Liaison Committee in order to foster 
multi-racialism in a number of practical ways related to the extension of citizenship 
to non-Malays and the improvement of the Malays' economic position (192, 195); the 
prospect of closer association between British dependencies and particularly between 
Malaya and Singapore was cautiously explored; and on 31 December 1949 Gurney 
proposed a member system, whereby leading local members of the Federal Legisla-
tive Council might be appointed members of the Executive Council with responsibil-
ity for certain federal departments (205). At the end of the year, despite anxieties 
about the repercussions of British recognition of communist China (197, 202), the 
Malayan authorities were hopeful, though not complacent, concerning their mea-
sured approach to communism and communalism. 
Although Gurney's plans for a member system came to fruition in 1951 (212, 217, 
237), optimism with regard to the central issue of internal security was eroded 
during 1950-1951 by operational disorganisation and the lack of lasting success 
against terrorism. Following the British general election of February 1950, which 
returned a Labour government but with a drastically · reduced parliamentary 
majority, Emanuel Shinweii was appointed minister of defence. His prime responsi-
bility was the direction and co-ordination of the armed services according to policy 
devised by the Defence Committee of the Cabinet, and, turning to Malaya, Shinwell 
proposed the appointment of General Briggs as director of operations and, in 
addition, a Cabinet Committee on Malaya (206, 207, 209, 210). 
By the end of May, Briggs had presented his plan to resettle squatters in New 
Villages and erect a chain of War Executive Committees for the co-ordination of 
activities across the various services and throughout the Federation (216). Early in 
June, and before there had been time to implement the Briggs Plan let alone allow it 
to take effect, James Griffiths (secretary of state for the colonies) and John Strachey 
(secretary of state for war) visited Malaya. They were informed by MacDonald that the 
pace of constitutional change would have to accelerate if Britain were to retain both 
the initiative in Malaya and influence in the region beyond, though it is clear that the 
Labour government still maintained that the ending of the emergency was a 
prerequisite for significant constitutional concessions (218-221) . Dreams of political 
progress were yet overshadowed by operational nightmares, and the outbreak of the 
Korean War in June 1950 aggravated problems: on the one hand, the galloping 
defence budget stretched resources that might otherwise have been available for the 
Federation (223--225, 228, 229); on the other hand, Malaya, being a front-line state 
in the Cold War, appeared threatened not only by subversion from within but also by 
invasion from the north (231). 
On 11 December 1950, the day Attlee returned from talks with Truman about the 
Korean War, he received a letter from Strachey, in which the secretary of state for 
war demanded radical changes in personnel and the structure of administration in 
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South-East Asia (230). Service chiefs had for some time been urging the appoint-
ment of a supremo who would have overriding powers in the direction of affairs at 
least in Malaya, if not in the wider area. The Foreign Office also doubted whether the 
current regional arrangements adequately safeguarded British interests in South-
East Asia and the Far East. One ground for anxiety lay with the high commissioner, 
who appeared hamstrung by the federal constitution and disputes between adminis-
trators, policemen and soldiers; another was the commissioner-general whose 
temperament and responsibilities were more appropriate to a conciliator than a 
director of contentious men. Malayan problems were back on the prime minister's 
agenda and MacDonald and Sir John Harding (commander-in-chief, Far East Land 
Forces) were called to London in February for three meetings at 10 Downing Street 
(232-234). 
Gurney, who had a reputation for touchiness, boiled over in frustration when he 
heard from MacDonald that Malaya had been discussed at the highest level but in the 
absence of its high commissioner. His letter of resignation, which was courteously 
declined by Griffiths, reveals his mounting despair (235, 236). Malaya was getting on 
top of Gurney, just as it had got on top of Gent. Not only had operations reached 
deadlock, but Malayan politics were hopelessly entangled. Dato Ono, possibly in 
response to suggestions from .both MacDonald and Gurney to convert UMNO into a 
multi-racial party, was unable to shake its communal orientation, and left the 
movement he had founded to inaugurate (with Tan Cheng Lock, amongst others) the 
non-communal Independence of Malaya Party in September 1951 (240, 241, 244). 
Gurney was not deluded by the celebrations accompanying the launch of the IMP: 
Ono without UMNO might be a broken reed and UMNO without Ono could be a 
rudderless ship. Anyway, the high commissioner was by this time despairing of a 
genuine commitment on the part of the Chinese to a multi-racial Malaya. Gurney's 
so-called 'political will', known to have been written two days before his death, is a 
bitterly pessimistic document, and the meetings which the acting high commission-
er held with Malay and Chinese leaders after Gurney's assassination confirmed that 
communal antagonism was as ingrained as it had ever been (245, 247). 
The murder of Gurney on 6 October 1951 (246) marked the lowest point in British 
morale in Malaya. It occurred at the start of the general election campaign in Britain 
and to the Conservatives, who won with a slender majority, it was symptomatic of 
Labour drift. Their supporters, and particularly business interests, expected a more 
obviously determined approach from Churchill's colonial secretary ,(251) and Oliver 
Lyttelton did, indeed, identify Malaya as his first task (248, 252, 253). Having visited 
the country in December, he recommended a major overhaul of government and the 
appointment of General Templer as Malayan supremo (254-260). Like General de 
Lattre de Tassigny in Indochina,46 Templer was put in charge of both military 
matters and civil administration. Like de Lattre, he might appeal to American 
opinion which was reported favourably disposed to strong action in Malaya as part 
of what was seen to be a general war against communist aggression. Again like de 
Lattre, Templer had an immediately electrifying impact upon the military campaign. 
In contrast to the French experience, however, the arrival of the new supremo in 
Kuala Lumpur coincided with a lasting improvement in British fortunes, and 
Lyttelton later presented the advent of Templer in the manner it has generally come 
to be regarded, that is as the turning-point in both military operations and 
nation-building.47 
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Clearly personalities played their parts in the ebb and flow of the Malayan 
emergency and the eventual failure of the communists' armed struggle, but this 
familiar assessment makes too much of the impact of Gurney's death upon Britain's 
approach to Malayan problems. One does not need to swallow Disraeli's dictum that 
'assassination has never changed the history of the world' to recognise many areas of 
continuity between the policies of Labour and the Conservatives and between the 
regimes of Gurney and Templer. Although Lyttelton's statement to the Malayan press 
insisting that the priority lay with the restoration of law and order caused something 
of a furore (254, 255), it was held not to have breached the bipartisan pledge 'to guide 
Colonial people along the road to self-government within the framework of the 
British Empire'. Lyttelton himself publicly reiterated the broad principles of Labour's 
colonial policy.48 We also know from the official papers that the appointment of a 
Malayan supremo had been in the air for a year before the advent of the 
Conservatives; it originated neither with the new secretary of state nor, indeed, with 
Montgomery, for all the field marshal's huffing and puffing (258, 260). Moreover, 
although MacDonald was overruled when he advised against the appointment of a 
soldier on the grounds that it would alienate local opinion (250), Templer functioned 
as a civil (not a military) high commissioner who was directed to assist the peoples of 
Malaya to achieve self-government (268). Continuity is further demonstrated by the 
Gurney legacy: Templer inherited both the Briggs Plan for the resettlement of 
Chinese squatters and a number of political and constitutional initiatives, notably 
the quasi-ministerial member system and proposals to enlarge federal citizenship. 
Indeed, the events bracketed by the death of Gurney and advent of Templer did not 
deflect the British from their pursuit of those Malayan Union objectives of a strong 
central government and a multi-racial nation. If anything, violence reinforced the 
pattern of British policy, placing a premium on effective direction from the top, 
reinforcing Angl~Malay collaboration and focusing effort on winning Chinese 
co-operation in counter-insurgency and their active participation in legitimate 
Malayan politics. 
Quite as significant for the outcome of the emergency as the British reorganisa-
tion of government in 1951-1952 was the more-or-less simultaneous review 
undertaken by the MCP of its strategy, about which the authorities later learned from 
captured documents.49 Despite the prize of Gurney's death, which, like the Sungei 
Siput murders in June 1948, seems to have occurred by chance rather than in 
fulfilment of a directive, communist leaders were deeply perturbed by the failure of 
terrorism to wreck the economy and administration or suborn the majority of the 
population. Consequently, the MCP's central committee decided in October to 
abandon indiscriminate violence, though not all violence, and to mount a political 
campaign in order to build up their popular base. But just as the launch of the armed 
struggle in 1948 may have been criticised in certain radical quarters on the ground 
that its timing had been premature, so the decision to temper terrorism may have 
struck some cadres as odd when violence appeared to have been secretly vindicated 
by the assassination of the high commissioner. 
If the aims of British policy were not in doubt (268, 292, 293), the timing, manner 
and very chances of their achievement were by no means certain. Templer went 
about his task with a will, however: government was reorganised and monitored at 
every level (269, 291); the police force was reformed under Colonel Arthur Young, 
commissioner of police in the City of London;50 the intelligence and information 
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services were overhauled; and the direction of military operations was tightened up. 
His methods, like the collective punishment imposed upon Tanjong Malim, were 
often high-handed and provoked questions in parliament and liberal fury (as in his 
particularly vitriolic quarrel with Victor Purcell), but Lyttelton stood by him (272, 
285, 309). 'To the New Statesman I shall never be liberal', Lyttelton once 
commented, 'but that fact will not keep me awake at night or when reading the 
journal.'51 More to the point, Templer brought about results and by September 1953 
he was confident enough to relax the emergency regulations in the first 'white area' 
of Malacca (303). Not that he believed the war was won; on the contrary, mopping-up 
was to demand prolonged and costly campaigning. It was complicated, too, by the 
precariousness of regional dominoes and by the Malayan Communist Party's renewed 
interest in 'entryism' and political subversion (284, 301, 311). The latter placed a 
premium on the authorities' bid to win the 'hearts and minds' of the people and to 
involve all communities in the running of the country. 
'Hearts and minds' had several dimensions: the Malayanisation of the administra-
tion (287) and the federal armed forces (281); economic and especially rural 
development (273-275, 278, 282, 289); social provision, particularly education; 
elections to representative institutions (270, 277, 280, 283, 290, 298, 307, 310, 312); 
and the extension of executive responsibilities to Malayan members (294, 304). The 
Korean war boom in commodity prices temporarily alleviated the Federation's 
financial problems and assisted in paying for 'hearts and minds' programmes, but in 
the second half of 1953 fiscal difficulties returned and once again the Colonial Office 
went cap in hand to the Treasury on Malaya's behalf (302, 305, 306). 
The Federal Agreement of 1948 had looked forward to the introduction of elections 
at some unspecified date in the future. 52 The rudimentary state of party political 
development together with the emergency had dampened enthusiasm for democratic 
experiments but in December 1951 the first municipal elections were held in 
Georgetown (Penang) and were followed by elections in Kuala Lumpur in February. 
In his first speech to the Legislative Council in March, Templer publicly committed 
the government to further advance along the road of local elections (270) and his 
deputy, MacGillivray, shouldered the responsibility for overseeing these develop-
ments (280). 'Nation-building' involved the cultivation of multi-racial as well as 
popular politics, and a British precondition for the transfer of power was the 
emergence of a responsibly-led and democratically-endorsed multi-racial party of 
government. In the run-up to the Kuala Lumpur elections the local branches of 
UMNO and the MCA formed an alliance effectively to scotch the challenge of Dato 
Onn's IMP. This ad hoc arrangement proved to be a significant portent, and in March 
1953 the central leadership of both parties formalised their Alliance (the Malayan 
Indian Congress joining in 1954). But, since UMNO and the MCA strenuously 
retained their communal identities, objectives and constituencies, the Alliance in its 
early days struck the British as fundamentally flawed. They had little confidence in 
either Tunku Abdul Rahman or Tan Cheng Lock, and, casting around for a platform 
for a genuinely multi-racial movement, Templer and MacDonald held secret talks 
with a number of Malay notables in the hope of using them either to oust the Tunku 
from the UMNO presidency or to set up an alternative to the UMNO-MCA Alliance 
(244, 295, 296, 297). Herein lay the beginnings of the National Conference, which 
was composed largely of mentris besar (state chief ministers) and other conserva-
tives, and also of Dato Onn's Party Negara which succeeded the ill-fated IMP and, 
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unlike the latter, appealed to Malay communalism. 
The pursuit of closer relations with Singapore was another postwar goal which 
acquired a new urgency under Templer. The high commissioner was anxious to 
amalgamate the administrations of peninsula and island for the sake of internal 
security and external defence (286, 288, 300). Closer association was, as we have 
seen, an issue which MacDonald particularly took to heart (276) and, while he was by 
this time effectively on the margins of much other Malayan business, in June 1953 
Lyttelton authorised the commissioner-general to set up the Joint Co-ordination 
Committee to examine ways of bringing about closer association. 
During Templer's first year the authorities did not feel under pressure to make 
constitutional concessions (277). On the contrary, they remained doubtful about the 
abilities of Malayan politicians and the capacities of their parties to respond to 
electoral opportunities. They nonetheless pressed ahead with preparations for 
elections in the hope that, in so doing, they would encourage the democratic process 
to take root and national leaders to flower. In 1952 the British saw themselves as 
determining the pace of constitutional advance and, during his visit to London at the 
end of the year, Templer outlined a tentative time-table which placed 'the earliest 
possible date for self-government at 1960' (283). As Templer rolled back the 
insurrection, so in 1953 the Alliance began to press for self-government, producing a 
blue-print for a federal constitution with a legislative council of which the majority 
of members would be elected (297). Alliance leaders also embarked upon a campaign 
to persuade the British to hold federal elections in 1954. The authorities were still 
eager to train Asian politicians to assume government responsibilities (294) and a 
noticeable note of anxiety now crept into the exchanges between Kuala Lumpur and 
London lest the political initiative should slip from British hands. It was in order to 
prevent this happening that, on 1 May, Templer recommended an early announce-
ment of a working party to examine the question of federal elections, and later in the 
month MacGillivray and Hogan (attorney-general and chairman designate of the 
working party) were planning its proceedings with CO officials (298). In July 1953 
the high commissioner formally appointed a Legislative Council committee to 
examine the issue of federal elections. Meanwhile, the Alliance's 'National Conven-
tion' and the 'National Conference' of Dato Onn and the mentris besar squared up to 
each other; both Dato Onn and Tunku Abdul Rahman were members of the elections 
committee but Onn's supporters, favouring a measured march to independence, 
outnumbered the Alliance representatives who demanded a sixty per cent popularly 
elected council and elections in 1954. 
Ill The Alliance route to independence 1953-1957 
At the end of September 1953 Templer appointed to the Executive Council Dr Ismail 
and Colonel H S Lee as member for lands, mines and communications and member 
for railways and ports respectively. This move marked a new appreciation on the part 
of the British of the political significance of the Alliance. The two Malayans 
reluctantly agreed to serve, since they did not wish to appear compromised by the 
colonial regime, and they placed political conditions upon their co-operation; for 
example, they made it clear that they represented UMNO and the MCA, and that they 
would resign if general elections were not held by the end of 1954.53 
The report produced in February 1954 by the Federal Elections Committee 
contained two Malayan viewpoints: the majority report of 'National Conference' 
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members favoured an official majority and elections at a 'proper' date; the minority 
report of the Alliance, however, proposed a three-fifths elected majority (or 60 seats) 
and laid down November 1954 as the date for elections. 54 A compromise was worked 
out in two meetings which MacGillivray had with the rulers (whose approval was 
required before the federal constitution could be amended), whereby elections would 
be held in 1955 and 52 seats (a bare majority) would be filled by elected 
representatives. 
For the Alliance this provision of elected seats was inadequate, and in April a 
delegation flew to London to lobby Lyttelton (313-321). It was largely due to the 
intercession of Lord Ogmore (formerly Rees-Williams) that the Tunku and his 
colleagues secured a meeting with the secretary of state on 14 May (315, 316). That 
Malaya was to proceed at one bound from a fully-nominated Legislative Council to 
one that would have a majority of elected members was unprecedented and, since he 
regarded the advance as both generous and stretching the limits of expediency, 
Lyttelton was not able to accede to the Alliance's demand for a larger proportion of 
elected members. The Alliance leaders were now under pressure to court danger; 
with radical elements in UMNO led by Abdul Aziz bin lshak and Sardon Jubir baying 
for success, the Tunku, for one, could not risk being labelled a 'colonial stooge', as 
Sir Dato Onn bin Jaafar was being called, and, with Gandhian non-co-operation and 
Ghanaian 'positive action' very much in their minds, on their return from London 
the Alliance leaders launched a nation-wide boycott of the federal elections and 
public service (322, 323, 325).55 
MacGillivray was installed as high commissioner on 1 June 1954 at an unpropi-
tious moment in Anglo-Malayan relations. Eager to avoid confrontation of Malayan 
Union proportions, he presented the dispute as one between Malayans (329-332). 
MacGillivray was at the same time anxious to reach an accommodation with the 
Alliance (328, 329). Neither side wished to lose face but a way out of the deadlock was 
negotiated on board HMS Alert on 2 July (333, 334). The successful formula was a 
variation of the proposal emanating from a group of Labour MPs that, once the 
results of a general election were known, the high commissioner should consult with 
the leader of the party commanding majority support in the new council before 
filling the nominated seats. On 7 July, following the exchange of letters summarising 
the Alert agreement (334), the Alliance called off its boycott and, in the words of a 
Straits Times journalist, there opened a period of 'friendly and cordial discussions' 
between Tunku Abdul Rahman and Sir Donald MacGillivray.56 
The Alliance boycott took place against the backdrop of end of empire in French 
Indochina. Between mid-March and early May the Vietminh besieged General de 
Castries at Dien Bien Phu, and at the Geneva Conference (May-July) a settlement 
was devised for the temporary partition of Vietnam along the 17th parallel. There is 
no firm evidence that British actions in Malaya at this time were directly affected by 
what was going on in Indochina or that the authorities were scrambling to do a deal 
with the Alliance lest the Malayan communists were spurred into action by the 
successes of the Vietminh, but that there is some connection between regional 
developments and British approaches to Malayan issues is revealed in the documents. 
For example, throughout these months ministers referred to Britain's Malayan 
commitments as a reason for not participating in any international military strike 
against the Vietminh,57 and they also scrutinised Malaya for any signs of a 
reinvigoration of insurgency or a recrudescence of administrative ineptitude. Taking 
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stock of colonial responsibilities and military operations in the context of the Geneva 
agreements and the subsequent formation of the South-East Asia Treaty 
Organisation, 58 provided an opportunity for a reaffirmation of UK aims and policy in 
Malaya as well as a reappraisal of the role of the commissioner-general in the region 
(335-343, 348) and the likelihood of his bringing about the union of the Federation 
and Singapore in the foreseeable future (346, 349). 
Meanwhile, as guerrilla fighters surrendered in increasing numbers and as the 
federal elections drew closer, the Malayan Communist Party further shifted its 
attention to entryism and infiltration and made a bid to re-enter legitimate politics. 
Their penetration of Chinese schools was giving the Federation particular cause for 
concern (342, 345, 347, 355, 364). Then, in June 1955, the British authorities in 
Malaya were startled by an MCP peace offer. Their first priority was to verify its 
authenticity; their second was to decide how far to proceed with it. After rapid 
consultations between Kuala Lumpur and London, the government agreed to reject 
the MCP initiative. The British saw it as a poisoned chalice, not an olive branch. They 
were on their guard against falling into the trap of giving the communists a share in 
the political settlement or providing them with a stage upon which they might replay 
the 'united front' strategy of 1945- 1947 (350-353). Although, the importance of 
tying the allegiance of Malayans to Malaya was a reason for accelerating the 
localisation of public services (344, 354) and for expanding the areas of self-
government, the British were adamant that power should be transferred to 'safe 
nationalists' and when 'conditions were right'. It was with this end in mind that, even 
before the first federal elections had been held, their results assessed and the new 
councils put into operation, the Colonial Office was making preparations for further 
constitutional concessions and Cabinet was being briefed accordingly (356--358) . At 
this stage, however, the prerequisite for full self-government was the restoration of 
law and order and the end of the emergency. 
From the start of the emergency it had been axiomatic that Malaya was , too 
valuable to fall into enemy hands. While this remained central to British thinking, 
official perceptions of Malaya's value to Britain may have been changing during the 
period. In the late 1940s Malayan rubber, and to a lesser extent its tin, had been 
major dollar-earners. HMG continued to insist on the importance of retaining 
Malaya within the sterling area, but, from 1955, however, one senses that the 
significance of natural rubber declined as Britain began to compete with the USA in 
the manufacture of synthetic rubber. On the other hand, while alterations in 
Malaya's economic importance may have reduced British reluctance to relax direct 
control over the country, its continued strategic significance following the Geneva 
settlement and the creation of SEATO seems to have hardened the resolve of those 
who wished to retain control over the Federation, not least the defence planners and 
Robert Scott, MacDonald's successor as commissioner-general. 
In order that the credibility of politicians and their parties should be tested and 
that the authority of the new Legislative Council enhanced, the British took pains to 
ensure a large turn-out on polling-day, 27 July, and were gratified when approx-
imately one million of an electorate of 1,280,000 voted. Although they expected the 
Alliance to win a majority, the authorities were surprised by the size of a landslide in 
which the Alliance polled about 80 per cent of the votes cast and won 51 of the 52 
electable seats. The six other parties fielding candidates collapsed completely, 
including Dato Onn's Party Negara. The single opposition member was returned 
INTRODUCTION lxxv 
from the Pan-Malayan Islamic Party. The Alliance had clearly established their 
nationalist credentials and, since fifteen MCA candidates were returned by a 
predominantly Malay electorate, they also claimed to have demonstrated their 
multi-racialism. Good organisation together with the slogan of 'Independence within 
Four Years' had secured them a popular following (360-362). 
While encouraged by the full turn-out, convincing result and the degree of racial 
co-operation within the Alliance, the British were under no illusion that the election 
guaranteed the future harmony of intra-Malayan and Anglo--Malayan relations. First 
of all, although the Malays accounted for just less than half the total population of 
the federation, they comprised 84 per cent of the electorate because many of the 
adult non-Malays were not yet federal citizens or, if they were, had failed to register 
on the electoral roll. The Chinese, for example, amounted to 37 per cent of the 
population but only 11 .2 per cent of the electorate. In effect, the first federal election 
was a triumph for Tunku Abdul Rahman's UMNO over Dato Onn's Party Negara, Dr 
Burhanuddin's PMIP and Ahmad Boestamam's secular radicalism -in the contest for 
Malay (as distinct from Malayan) support. Secondly, officials felt that the landslide 
might lead to tension between the Alliance and the British or between branches of 
the Alliance, particularly in the event of Alliance leaders attempting 'to jump their 
fences too fast' or falling out with each other over the spoils of victory. On balance, 
however, the British authorities in Malaya looked forward to 'responsible and 
co-operative' conduct from Alliance members and ministers. 
Following the announcement of the election results, MacGillivray and the Tunku 
had a series of meetings to discuss nominations to reserved seats (according to their 
agreement on board HMS Alert the previous year) and the appointment of ministers. 
The Tunku insisted on, and the high commissioner did not object to, the title of chief 
minister, and, after some haggling with colleagues, the Tunku produced a slate of 
nine other names for his government (360) . The new Federal Executive Council, 
consisting of ten Alliance ministers and five British officials (high commissioner, 
chief secretary, attorney general, minister for econqmic affairs and secretary for 
defence) was inaugurated on 9 August. Now that Mala~a enjoyed a large measure of 
internal self-government, the stage was set for a visit from the secretary of state to 
discuss further constitutional advance and future relations between the Federation 
and Britain with respect to the external defence, internal security and finance of the 
country (359, 365-370). 
Lennox-Boyd established a good rapport with the Tunku and was generally 
encouraged by his visit (372), but, with preparations in swing for a full-scale 
constitutional conference in London, best-laid plans threatened to come unstuck. 
First of all, the ever-fragile relations between princes and politicians showed signs of 
crumbling with the approach of independence, and Sultan lbrahim attempted to 
retain his British adviser in order to safeguard Johore from Alliance pretensions 
(388, 435). Secondly, pressed by radicals from within UMNO, the Tunku raised the 
stakes to demand immediate transfer of power in matters of internal security, the 
achievement of full independence by August 1957 and the appointment of an 
independent (possibly Commonwealth) commission to draft the independence 
constitution (384, 387, 390, 392). Thirdly, and most alarmingly, the Tunku was 
eager to respond to a second peace initiative from the communists and to meet Chin 
Peng in order to discuss surrender terms (371, 373-382, 385, 386, 391). The first 
development threatened Malay solidarity, the second jeopardised relations between 
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the British and Alliance and, the British feared, the third endangered the very future 
of the country. 
The prospect of peace talks with the MCP revived those fears of communist 
entryism which the British had expressed in May-June 1955. Once again the 
authorities were on their guard against a return by the MCP from the underground 
of terrorism to the open arena of national politics. The timing of the communists' 
second initiative, however, made it far more menacing than the first, since Tunku 
Abdul Rahman was now chief minister and preparing to lead the Malayan delegation 
at the forthcoming constitutional talks in London. The authorities did not for one 
moment believe that the Tunku was a fellow-traveller but they recognised that, 
because the continuing emergency stood in the way of advance to independence, the 
Tunku would be tempted to respond to the radical demands of his own supporters by 
seeking a short -cut and negotiating the end of the emergency in peace talks with the 
communists. Constitutionally and in practical terms, of course, the British were still 
responsible for internal security and counter-insurgency operations, but to stand in 
the Tunku's way now that he was leader of a popularly elected government would be 
to court massive opposition in Malaya. The second peace initiative and the British 
response to it were a pivotal moment in the events leading to Malayan independence 
and the documents reveal how the episode shaped both the timing and manner of 
end of empire. One way of reining in the Tunku, MacGillivray suggested, might be to 
assure the chief minister that the British would no longer insist on the end of the 
emergency preceding the achievement of independence (378). Eden and Lennox-Boyd 
at first felt that such a message, by reversing Britain's commitment to 'law and order 
first', would be a sign of weakness. Towards the end of November, and at a time when 
the British were anxious to remove in advance as many potential hazards to the 
London talks as they could anticipate, the Cabinet Colonial Policy Committee 
authorised the high commissioner to announce publicly that the continuation of war 
would not stand in the way of advance to full self-government (380). The talks went 
ahead in the Kedah village of Baling at the end of December 1955. The Tunku was 
accompanied by Tan Cheng Lock and David Marshall (chief minister of Singapore) 
and had previously been instructed on communist negotiating techniques.59 Tunku 
Abdul Rahman refused to discuss surrender terms; he simply insisted on surrender 
(391) . For Chin Peng it proved an abortive attempt to re-enter open politics as leader 
of a lawful party; for the Tunku it completed his transfiguration from agitator to 
statesman. 
The Tunku's firm handling of Chin Peng, together with the popular mandate he 
had won at the federal elections, persuaded the British to advance rapidly to merdeka 
(independence) and, if need be, to compromise their principle of multi-racialism in 
order to satisfy the politically dominant Malays. Indeed, when in January 1956 the 
Malayan delegation arrived in London for constitutional talks, Sir John Martin 
welcomed them with the promise of independence 'on a golden platter'.60 It would 
appear, therefore, that the pace of decolonisation quickened and the nature of the 
successor state was modified in 1955-1957 as a result of both the improved security 
situation and also the growing reliability of the Alliance. There are, indeed, strong 
grounds for concluding that the Tunku got what he wanted at Lancaster House 
because he was trusted by the British as a conservative force and as an anglophile 
who would keep Malaya in the Commonwealth and the sterling area. 
There is, on the other hand, compelling documentary evidence indicating that the 
INTRODUCTION lxxvii 
Tunku got what he wanted because the British feared what he might do if he were 
thwarted at the conference. Before the talks got underway, the Alliance was publicly 
committed to achieving independence by 31 August 1957. Moreover, Chin Peng's 
undertaking (made at Baling) to end hostilities 'as soon as the elected Government of 
the Federation obtain complete control of internal security and local armed forces'61 
put pressure on the Tunku to wrest responsibility for these matters as soon as he 
could. For two reasons therefore- to take the wind out of the sails of the MCP and to 
demonstrate his nationalist credentials- the Tunku could not afford defeat on either 
issue. The Alliance was also on record as demanding an independent, as opposed to a 
British, commission to draft the independence constitution. Were the talks to break 
down on any of these matters, but particularly over the issues of the date and 
responsibility for internal security, and were the Tunku to return to Malaya 
empty-handed, it was believed he might turn his back on a negotiated settlement and 
adopt the stance of a radical nationalist, possibly re-opening discussions with Chin 
Peng or probably launching a non-co-operation campaign. British officials in Kuala 
Lumpur and London convinced the secretary of state, and in turn he persuaded the 
Cabinet, that nothing should be done to antagonise the Alliance at the conference 
(387, 389, 390, 394, 399, 400). So it was that, in order to avoid a confrontation which 
might precipitate the wholesale resignation of Alliance ministers, the British 
government decided to depart from precedent set in the case of the Gold Coast and 
transfer control over internal security in advance of the achievement of 'full 
self-government'. The government also accepted the Malayan demands for independ-
ence by August 1957 and the appointment of a commission of Commonwealth jurists 
to draft the independence constitution (401, 404-406) .62 
The British side had gone into the conference fully aware 'from past experience 
and from the very nature of things alike' that in matters of. constitutional change no 
line could be held for long, but they had expected, nonetheless, that the 'stage of full 
self-government would not be reached before 1959' (394, 399, 400). Moreover, their 
public protestations notwithstanding, Alliance leaders were reported to acknowledge 
in private that the target date of 31 August 1957 was not feasible . Both sides covered 
themselves against future accusations of insincerity, therefore, by resorting to the 
following form of words: 'self-government and independence within the Common-
wealth should be proclaimed by August, 1957, if possible' .63 However hedged about 
with qualifications, this date, once stated, became the target to which both sides 
worked. The mass of business to complete before that day included the following: 
drawing up the independence constitution and defining citizenship and nationality; 
negotiating the defence agreement; working out financial provisions; settling the 
peculiar problems of Penang and Malacca; reaching a decision on the question of 
appeals to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council; reaching terms for 
expatriates, pushing ahead with Malayanisation and establishing the public services 
commission; selecting Malaya's head of state and designating Malayan governors for 
Penang and Malacca; submitting an application for Commonwealth membership; 
and preparing for independence celebrations. The pace of business was breathtaking. 
Nor was it without controversy, tension and dispute. 
The constitutional commission was appointed jointly by the Queen and Malay 
rulers, and it reported to them. Chaired by Lord Reid and composed of nominees 
from the UK (Sir Ivor Jennings), Australia (Sir William McKell), India (Mr B Malik), 
and Pakistan (Mr Justice Abdul Hamid), it was charged to make recommendations 
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for a federal constitution for Malaya as a parliamentary democracy with the following 
features: firstly, a strong central government; secondly, safeguards for the position 
and prestige of the rulers as constitutional monarchs of their respective States; 
thirdly, a head of state for the Federation to be chosen from among the rulers and to 
be called the Yang di-Pertuan Besar (later Yang di-Pertuan Agong); fourthly, a 
common nationality for the whole Federation; and, fifthly, guarantees for 'the special 
position of the Malays and the legitimate interests of other communities'. They took 
evidence in Malaya between late June and October; and they repaired to Rome to 
write up the Report which was published in February 1957 (423-430, 438, 439, 442, 
443).64 
The commission had to strike a number of balances between establishing a strong 
central government and guaranteeing state autonomy, between safeguards for the 
rulers and the provision of democratic institutions, between the special position of 
Malays and the interests of all. Particular tension built up over the question of 
nationality and citizenship even before the Reid Commission had arrived in the 
Federation (409, 411, 412), and, although of the 131 memoranda received in Malaya 
the commissioners inevitably followed that of the Alliance as closely as possible (426, 
427, 429), the Alliance parties fell out with each other when the commission's report 
was published. Members of the commission themselves also disagreed on some 
issues and Mr Justice Abdul Hamid in the end could not be dissuaded from 
submitting a minority report (439). Its proceedings seemed to have been marred, and 
at times jeopardised, by insensitive chairmanship as well as the arrogant behaviour of 
Lord and Lady Reid (443). 
Discussions on defence matters, including the role of British troops in Malaya after 
independence (413, 422, 437, 461, 464-466) and Britain's use of Malayan bases for 
regional security, revolved round negotiations for the Anglo-Malayan Defence 
Agreement. A working party, chaired by Sir Robert Scott (commissioner-general), 
composed of a British delegation (led by Sir Harold Parker, permanent secretary at 
the Ministry of Defence) and a Malayan delegation (with the Tunku at its head) and 
attended by observers from Australia and New Zealand, met in Kuala Lumpur 
between 16 April and 5 June 1956 (402, 407, 408, 410, 414, 417). Similarly, 
Lennox-Boyd later discussed the draft agreement with Commonwealth representa-
tives in London (431, 432). Although broad agreement was reached on the need for 
such a treaty, the Alliance side was understandably fastidious about the implications 
of British bases for Malaya's sovereignty, and, in particular, the duration of the 
agreement and the terms of clause 6 setting out the conditions in which the two 
countries would come to each other's assistance. Although they sensed a neutralistic 
streak in Malayan attitudes - and, indeed, Malaya would stay clear of SEATO 
membership - the British did not doubt the Tunku's anglophilia which the Suez 
crisis did nothing to shake (433, 434). The location of talks shifted to London in 
mid-December when all but minor points were settled (441). The treaty was finalised 
before independence but, since it was to be an international agreement between 
sovereign states, it was not signed until 12 October 1957 (462).65 
Another issue that was settled in the second round of talks in London (December 
1956 - January 1957) was the extent of Britain's financial assistance to Malaya. 
Starting from the premise that 'political independence connoted financial self-
sufficiency', the British argued that 'it would be incompatible with this doctrine for 
the United Kingdom to grant exchequer assistance towards the development ) 
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programme of an independent country'. Nonetheless, in addition to the unspent 
balances remaining from allocations for the expansion of Malaya's armed forces and 
for colonial development and welfare, the British government agreed to give 
assistance towards the cost of the emergency (besides, of course, paying for the UK 
forces engaged in those operations) since it 'was a part of the struggle against 
Communism in which the whole of the free world was engaged' (440). The amount 
fell short of the sum desired by the Alliance, but the Colonial Office felt it was a 
generous grant, maintaining that the 'reason why Malayan requests were not met in 
full was not, as Tunku ingenuously said in Dublin, because "Britain is broke", but 
because Federation could not prove the need for more'.66 
The final substantive issue to settle was Malaya's membership of the Common-
wealth . Since 1951, when Dr D F Malan, prime minister of South Africa, had insisted 
that the admission of an independent territory to Commonwealth membership 
required the assent of existing members, British governments had been on their 
guard against South African attempts to sabotage the emergence of a multi-racial 
Commonwealth. In 1953 the Cabinet began to address the possibility of the Gold 
Coast's future membership and the following year discussed, but rejected, the 
creation of a two-tiered association of old (or 'first class') and new (or 'second class') 
members.67 When J G Strijdom replaced Malan in November 1954, the attitude of 
the South African government hardened and the British expected trouble as the Gold 
Coast approached the goal of 'independence within the Commonwealth'. Since 
Strijdom accepted Ghana as a member with some reluctance, 68 CO and CRO officials 
anticipated his obduracy when Malayan membership came up for consideration. 
Although they conceded that Malayan membership was likely to be less provocative 
than that of Ghana, they took no chances and prepared careful arguments in 
anticipation of any objections Strijdom might raise (444, 445, 447). ~In the event, 
South Africa did not impede Malaya's advance to 'independence within the Common-
wealth' to which all heads of government gave their assent at the Commonwealth 
prime ministers' meeting in July (457, 458). 
Whereas, between 1945 and 1948 Dato Onn had repeatedly declared that Malays 
were belum layak (not yet ready) for independence, from 1954 onwards Tunku Abdul 
Rahman eagerly demanded merdeka. He did so for a number of reasons: one was the 
improving security position which permitted the revival of politics; another was the 
fact that he was under pressure from radicals within his own party to seek an early 
date for independence; a third was the need felt by UMNO members to win control of 
the country before the Chinese managed to add political strength to their existing 
economic dominance; a fourth was the example set by Ghana; and a fifth was the fact 
the British appeared willing to make concessions. 
Indeed, the close collaboration between the British and Alliance and the contiguity 
of their essential interests, which are revealed by the documentary record, may 
suggest a number of conclusions about the reasons for, and the manner and timing 
of, the end of formal British rule in Malaya: that, for example, it was a stratagem to 
beat the communists or that it was the pursuit of imperialism by other means. 
Certainly, as Malaya slid down the slipway to be launched with eclat as an 
independent state within the Commonwealth, the air reverberated with congratula-
tory messages (467). As much by judgment as by luck, it seemed, a peaceful and 
mutually beneficial transfer of power was taking place, with Britain deftly shedding 
an empire to assume a new role in South-East Asia (421), while Malaya continued to 
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provide her with essential raw materials, dollars for the sterling area, a base for 
regional defence and 'a symbol for British influence in the area' (454). 
Yet, it would have been imprudent to declare the ship unsinkable. The Chinese 
were anxious about their future in a Malay-dominated state (451 , 452) , and in the 
British camp there was a last minute panic that their troops might be called in to 
keep the races apart on independence day (461, 464-466). Moreover, although the 
Tunku was at present 'firmly in the saddle', a medium-term forecast prepared in the 
office of the commissioner-general reckoned that, after the euphoria generated by 
merdeka (independence) had subsided, the problems of communism, communalism 
and economic development would crowd in on Britain's friends in Malaya. 'Time is 
thus not on the side of the Tunku ' (454). Furthermore, what the record also reveals 
is that the Malayan Alliance was neither a British creature nor a British stooge. 
Initially the authorities mistrusted this marriage of convenience and placed little 
faith in its leaders. They feared it would institutionalise communalism and divide the 
country on Palestinian lines. Hoping instead for the emergence of a genuinely 
multi-racial movement, they were taken aback by the size of the Alliance's electoral 
majority in 1955. As independence approached they were not altogether confident 
about the future of Malaya under an Alliance regime. 
Indeed, what the documents also show is that the British did not have it all their 
own way in the run-up to independence. Not only did the crisis over the Malayan 
Union and the outbreak of the communist insurrection knock them off course, but 
also the Alliance moved them further and faster than they would otherwise have gone 
in the period from 1954. At key moments the British and Alliance disagreed and the 
former made significant concessions to the latter over, for example, the following: 
the composition of the Federal Council, the response to the communists' peace 
initiative, the timing of independence, local responsibility for internal security, the 
appointment of the constitutional commission and the provisions of the defence 
agreement. Most significantly, Malaya became independent before three oft-stated 
preconditions were in place: firstly, the war against communist insurgents was not 
over; secondly, a genuine multi-racial movement and sense of nationhood had yet to 
be created; and, thirdly, fusion with Singapore and Britain's Borneo territories 
remained to be accomplished. 
It is conceivable that the British might have stood their ground and slowed up 
Malaya's advance to independence. That they chose not to was, one can surmise from 
the documentary record, due to their pragmatic appreciation of the possible. Since 
1945 it had been declared British policy to withdraw from Malaya sooner or later. By 
the mid-1950s it was clear that this moment would come sooner rather than later. 
Time was running out on colonial empires in South-East Asia. After July 1954 the 
British were, to all intents and purposes, the last European colonial power left in the 
region, and, after the federal elections a year later, the Alliance emerged as their 
obvious successor in Malaya. From this point onwards the British recognised the 
Alliance as their best bet. 'Any possible alternative to the present Alliance Govern-
ment at present in sight would certainly be less well disposed to the United Kingdom' 
(454). Moreover, as they demonstrated by their willingness to meet Alliance deman-ds 
at the London conference in January-February 1956, the British realised that any 
attempt to retard the pace of political change would only undermine the Alliance's 
credentials and encourage challenges to its leadership. In many respects the British 
were simply lucky in Malaya. At any rate by 1957 they had managed to lay the spectre 
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of chaos and shabby scuttle that had dogged them since the humiliating retreat and 
defeat of 1941-1942. In contrast to their experiences in Burma and Palestine, it 
appeared that formal empire came to an end in Malaya with British interests, even 
their honour, intact. Not everyone, however, shared this bland assessment of end of 
empire in Malaya. Some felt that it took little account of the yet unfinished business 
of nation-building, while others, including the British prime minister himself, knew 
in their hearts that it amounted to putting a brave face on the management of British 
decline. Pleased though he professed to be with the final outcome, it is clear from his 
refusal to make a radio and television broadcast on the BBC to welcome the birth of 
independent Malaya that Macmillan was reluctant to 'celebrate what many people 
may think to be a weakening of the United Kingdom' (463). 
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Summary of Documents: Part I 
Chapter 1 
Wartime planning, Mar 1942- Aug 1945 
NUMBER SUBJECT PAGE 
1942 
1 N J B Sabine (CO) 18 Mar Memo on criticisms of colonial policy 1 
in light of Malayan campaign 
2 CO Committee on 2 Apr Minutes on question of restoration of 7 
Post-War Problems government in Malaya, Hong Kong etc 
meeting 
3 Lord Cranborne (CO) 12 June Minute of discussion with Dr Van 8 
Mook on post-war colonial restoration, 
+ Minute by G E J Gent 
4 G E J Gent (CO) 29 June Minute on forthcoming talks at FO on 10 
post-war colonial restoration & US 
anti-imperialism 
5 G E J Gent 1 July Minute on talks at FO on post-war 12 
colonial restoration & us anti-
imperialism 
6 G E J Gent & [July) Memo on future policy in Far East, + 13 
D M MacDougall (CO) Minute by Lord Cranborne (CO) 
7 G E J Gent 20 Aug Minute of meeting between Lord Cran- 16 
borne (CO) & Mr Law (FO) on British 
post-war policy in Far East 
8 CO & FO [Aug] Joint memo on post-war settlement in 18 
Far East; need for definite policy 
[Extract) 
9 G E J Gent (CO) 11 Sept Minute of ministerial meeting to dis- 25 
cuss 8 
10 Lord Cranborne (CO) 1 Oct Minute of conversation with Chinese 27 
ambassador about post-war colonial 
policy 
11 Sir W Battershill, 4 Dec Report on lessons from Malaya & Hong 29 
G E J Gent (CO) & Kong 
W L Rolleston 
(Royal Engineers) 
lxxxvi 
NUMBER 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
SUMMARY OF DOCUMENTS [12-25) 
W B L Monson (CO) 
Lord Hailey (chairman, 
Colonial Research 
Committee) 
CO 
G E J Gent (CO) 
Maj-Gen H R Hone 
(MPU) 
G E J Gent & 
Sir G Cater (CO) 
W B L Monson (CO) 
S Caine & G E J 
Gent (CO) 
Mr Stanley (CO) 
& Sir J Grigg (War Office) 
Mr Stanley (CO) 
for War Cabinet 
Committee on Malaya 
and Borneo 
Mr Stanley 
for War Cabinet 
Committee on Malaya 
and Borneo 
Admiral Mountbatten 
(SACS EA) 
to Maj-Gen H R Hone 
(MPU) 
War Cabinet Committee 
on Malaya and Borneo 
meeting 
Mr Attlee (lord 
president of Council) 
SUBJECT PAGE 
1943 
20 Mar Memo on plans for reconstruction in 40. 
Far East 
19 Apr Memo on 12 44 
14 May Conclusions of departmental discus- 50 
sion on constitutional reconstruction 
in Far East 
18 May Revised memo on constitutional re-
construction in Far East: Malaya, 
North Borneo & Sarawak [Extract] 
51 
28 July Memo on post-war constitutional 52 
arrangement for mainland of Malaya 
30 Aug Minutes on future policy in Malaya & 57 
-2 Sept Borneo in preparation for Cabinet 
memoranda 
18 Nov Minute on Whitehall reactions to draft 59 
Cabinet memoranda on future policy 
in Malaya & Borneo 
30 Nov Minutes on future links between 61 
-1 Dec Malaya & Singapore 
1944 
3 Jan Joint War Cabinet memo, 'Directive on 63 
constitutional policy in Malaya and 
Borneo' 
14 Jan Memo, 'Future constitutional policy 64 
for British colonial territories in 
South-East Asia' 
15 Jan Memo, 'Draft of a directive on Malaya' 70 
4 Feb Letter on publicity for post-war policy 71 
22 Mar Minutes on future policy 73 
18 May War Cabinet memo, 'Policy in regard 
to Malaya and Borneo', +Appendices 
76 
[26--42] WARTIME PLANNING lxxxvii 
NUMBER SUBJECT PAGE 
1944 
26 Mr Stanley (CO) 13 June Letter on future policy in Malaya 80 
to Admiral 
Mountbatten (SACSEA) 
27 Admiral Mountbatten 29 July Letter (reply to 26) 82 
to Mr Stanley 
28 Mr Stanley 21 Aug Letter (reply to 27) 84 
to Admiral Mountbatten 
29 Admiral Mountbatten 6 Sept Letter (reply to 28) 85 
to Mr Stanley 
30 Mr Stanley 17 Oct Letter (reply to 29) 88 
to Admiral Mountbatten 
31 Mr Attlee (lord 22 Dec War Cabinet memo, 'Constitutional 89 
president of Council) policy in Malaya' 
1945 
32 S Caine (CO) 29 Mar Letter on Malaya reconstruction 90 
to Lord Keynes finance 
(Treasury) 
33 A J D Winnifrith 19 Apr Memo on Malaya reconstruction 91 
(Treasury) finance 
34 Lord Keynes (Treasury) 23 Apr Letter (reply to 32) 95 
to S Caine (CO) 
35 S Caine 28 Apr Letter (reply to 34) 95 
to Lord Keynes 
(Treasury) 
36 Mr Stanley (CO) 7 May War Cabinet memo, 'Constitutional 97 
policy in Malaya',+ Aimex: draft state-
ment of fundamental problems 
37 Lord Keynes 18 May Minute on Malaya reconstruction 99 
to A J D Winnifrith finance 
(Treasury) 
38 A J D Winnifrith [June] Minute on Malaya reconstruction 101 
to A F B fforde programme 
(Treasury) 
39 ME Dening (chief 26 June Memo on political co-ordination in S E 103 
political adviser to Asia 
SACSEA) 
40 Sir 0 Sargent (FO) 2 Aug Letter on political co-ordination in S E 106 
to Sir G Cater (CO) Asia 
41 G E J Gent (CO) 7 Aug Minute on FO proposals in 39 & 40 108 
42 Sir G Cater (CO) 13 Aug Letter (reply to 40) 109 
to Sir 0 Sargent (FO) 
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NUMBER 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
SUMMARY OF DOCUMENTS [43-58] 
Chapter 2 
British Military Administration, Aug 1945 -Mar 1946 
B A C Sweet-Escott 
(Force 136) 
Admiral Mountbatten 
(SACS EA) 
Mr Lawson (War Office) 
to Admiral 
Mountbatten 
BA C Sweet-Escott 
(Force 136) 
C MacKenzie 
(Force 136) 
Mr Hall (CO) 
Sir G Cater (CO) 
to Sir H Wilson 
Smith (Treasury) 
Cabinet meeting 
CM 27(45)3 
ME Dening (chief 
political adviser to 
SACS EA) 
HT Bourdillon (CO) 
Admiral Mountbatten 
(SACS EA) 
to Gen Sir M 
Dempsey (c-in-c, 
14th Army) 
ME Dening (chief 
political adviser to 
SACS EA) 
HT Bourdillon (CO) 
Mr Hall (CO) 
Brig H C Willan 
(DCCAO, Malaya) 
J C Sterndale Bennett (FO) 
SUBJECT PAGE 
1945 
13 Aug Signal, 'Directive to AJUF on conclu- 110 
sion of the armistice' 
15 Aug Proclamation no 1 to establish a Brit- 111 
ish Military Administration in Malaya 
17 Aug Directive to SACSEA on civil affairs for 113 
Malaya 
19 Aug Signal, 'Force 136 policy, Malaya' 115 
24 Aug Signal on publicity for Malayan policy 115 
29 Aug Cabinet memo, 'Policy in regard to 116 
Malaya and Borneo' 
31 Aug Letter on an economic adviser for 120 
Malaya 
3 Sept Conclusions authorising the Mac- 122 
Michael mission 
3 Sept Tels on publicity for British policy & 123 
aims of MCP 
6 Sept Minute on publicity for Malayan policy 125 
9 Sept Instructions, 'Initial relations with 128 
Malay sultans on the liberation of 
Malaya' 
14 Sept Tel on Japanese surrender ceremony in 
Singapore 
14 Sept Minute of departmental discussion on 
implementation of Malayan Union 
policy [Extract] 
4 Oct Cabinet memo, 'Policy in regard to 
Malaya', + Annexes I & 11 
7 Oct Report on interviews with Malay rulers 
9 Oct Memo on political organisation in 
SEAC 
130 
130 
133 
139 
169 
[59-72] BRITISH MILITARY ADMINISTRATION lxxxix 
NUMBER SUBJECT PAGE 
1945 
59 Sir H MacMichael 22 Oct Letter on interviews with Sultan of 171 
(King's House, 1ohore, + Enclosures 
Kuala Lumpur) 
to Sir G Gater (CO) 
60 Sir H MacMichael 25 Oct Letter on interview with Sultan of 176 
to Sir G Gater Selangor 
61 BMA, Malaya 31 Oct Fortnightly report no 4 on post-war 176 
rehabilitation [Extract] 
62 CO 8 Nov Note on heads of agreement between 178 
CO & War Office on steps required to 
facilitate transition from military to 
civil administration in Malaya, Borneo 
& Hong Kong 
63 1 1 Paskin (CO) 16 Nov Minute of meeting with T B Bar low on 179 
to Sir G Gater (CO) reactions of Rubber Growers' Associa-
tion to British plans for Malaya 
64 Sir H MacMichael 30 Nov Notes on interviews with regent (later 180 
-3 Dec sultan) of Kedah 
65 VW W S Purcell 3 Dec Report on Malaya's political climate 186 
(principal adviser [Extract] 
on Chinese affairs, 
BMA, Malaya) 
66 Brig A T Newboult 31 Dec Memo on political position in Malaya 187 
(DCCAO, Malaya) with regard to new policy proposals 
1946 
67 Admiral Mountbatten 4 1an Letter on need for local consultations 190 
(SACS EA) in implementation of Malayan Union 
to Mr Hall (CO) 
68 Maj-Gen H R Hone 7 1an Letter on need for local consultations 191 
(CCAO, Malaya) in implementation of Malayan Union 
to Sir G Gater (CO) 
69 Cabinet meeting 10 1an Conclusions, 'Malaya: future constitu- 193 
CM 4(46)3 tion' on draft White Paper 
70 Sir G Gater (CO) 4 Feb Letter on resumption of civil govern- 194 
to Sir E Speed ment in Malaya 
(War Office) 
71 Cabinet Office 13 Feb Tel on appointment of special commis- 195 
to Admiral sioner in S E Asia 
Mountbatten (SACSEA) 
72 HQ Malaya Command 23 Feb Weekly intelligence review no 17 on 197 
local reactions to White Paper 
[Extract] 
XC SUMMARY OF DOCUMENTS [73--86] 
NUMBER SUBJECT PAGE 
1946 
73 H T Bourdillon (CO) 23 Feb Minute on Malay reactions to White 199 
Paper [Extract] 
74 Maj-Gen H R Hone 23 Feb Transmits tel for CO on local reactions 201 
(CCAO, Malaya) to Malayan Union citizenship 
to War Office 
75 HT Bourdillon (CO) 25 Feb Minute of departmental meeting on 202 
Malay reactions to White Paper 
[Extract) 
76 Mr Hall (CO) 26 Feb Cabinet memo, 'Malayan policy' 203 
77 War Office 1 Mar Tel transmitting CO reply to 74 205 
to Maj-Gen H R Hone 
(CCAO, Malaya) 
78 HQ, BMA (Malaya) 5 Mar Transmits tel for CO on Pan-Malayan 207 
to War Office Malay Congress 
79 W S Morgan (CO) 8 Mar Minute on local reactions to Malayan 208 
Union 
80 Mr Creech Jones (CO) 15 Mar Minute on postponement of citizen- 209 
to Mr Attlee ship proposals 
81 M E Dening (chief 25 Mar Despatch reviewing political events in . 210 
political adviser SE Asia 1945 - Mar 1946, + Enclo-
to SACSEA sure [Extract) 
to Mr Bevin (FO) 
Chapter 3 
Constitutional conflict: from Malayan Union to Federation, 
Apr 1946-Feb 1948 
1946 
82 Sir E Gent (Kuala 1 Apr Tel on boycott of governor's installa- 219 
Lumpur) tion 
to Mr Hall 
83 SirE Gent 2 Apr Tel on boycott of governor's installa- 220 
to Mr Hall tion 
84 Mr Creech Jones (CO) 8 Apr Minute on Pan-Malayan Malay Con- 220 
gress 
85 H T Bourdillon, 25-26 Minutes on Malay opposition to 221 
J J Paskin & Apr Malayan Union; possible courses of 
Sir G Gater (CO) action 
86 SirE Gent 4 May Tel recommending conciliation with 225 
to Mr Hall regard to sultans' constitutional prop-
osals 
[87-101] MALAYAN UNION TO FEDERATION xci 
NUMBER SUBJECT PAGE 
1946 
87 Mr Hall 8 May Tel on sultans' constitutional propos- 227 
to SirE Gent als; detailed appreciation of local poli-
tical situation requested 
88 SirE Gent 11 May Tel on strength of Malay opposition to 229 
to Mr Hall Malayan Union 
89 SirE Gent 11 May Tel (reply to 87) advocating a federal 229 
to Mr Hall system as a means to achieve closer 
unity 
90 HQ Malaya Command 16 May Weekly intelligence review no 28 on 232 
inaugural conference of UMNO 
[Extract] 
91 Mr Hall 16 May Tel (reply to 89), + Minute by H T 233 
to SirE Gent Bourdillon (CO) of a discussion be-
tween Hall and Mr M 1 MacDonald 
92 Mr M 1 MacDonald 25 May Tel on proposed concessions to Malays 236 
(Penang) 
to Mr Hall 
93 Mr Hall & 31 May Minutes on fundamental principles of 239 
T L Rowan (private Malayan policy & proposed conces-
sec to prime minister) sions to Malays 
to Mr Attlee 
94 HQ Malaya Command 31 May Weekly intelligence reviews nos 30-32 241 
-22 June on communal violence & political 
militancy [Extract] 
95 Lord Killearn 17 June Savingram on co-ordination of terri- 246 
(Singapore) tories in S E Asia 
to FO 
96 Mr M 1 MacDonald 21-22 Tel on MacMichael treaties & concilia- 252 
(Singapore) June tion of Malay opposition 
to Mr Hall 
97 Mr Hall 5 July Tel on MacMichael treaties & concilia- 255 
to SirE Gent tion of Malay opposition 
98 Gov-gen's conference 20-21 Minutes (item 7) on closer association 256 
Penang Aug of Malaya & Singapore 
99 HT Bourdillon (CO) 29 Aug Note on developments in Malayan con- 259 
stitutional discussions; deliberations of 
Anglo-Malay working committee 
100 SirE Gent 14 Sept Tel on citizenship 261 
to Mr Hall 
101 H T Bourdillon, 17-24 Minutes on developments in Anglo- 262 
T I K Lloyd & Sept Malay constitutional discussions 
Mr Creech Jones (CO) 
xcii 
NUMBER 
102 
103 
104 
105 
106 
107 
108 
109 
llO 
lll 
ll2 
ll3 
ll4 
ll5 
ll6 
ll7 
Mr Hall 
to SirE Gent 
SirE Gent 
to Mr Hall 
Mr Hall 
to SirE Gent 
SirE Gent 
to Sir G Cater (CO) 
HT Bourdillon (CO) 
H T Bourdillon 
SirE Gent 
toT I K Lloyd (CO) 
Mr Creech Jones (CO) 
for Cabinet Colonial 
Affairs Committee 
Cabinet Colonial 
Affairs Committee 
meeting 
Gov-gen's conference 
Penang, 5th meeting 
Gov-gen's conference 
Penang, 5th meeting 
SirE Gent 
to Mr Creech Jones 
Dato Onn bin Jaafar 
to SirE Gent 
Mr Thomas (CO) 
SirE Gent 
to Mr Creech Jones 
Gov-gen's conference 
Singapore, 6th meeting 
SUMMARY OF DOCUMENTS [102- 117] 
SUBJECT PAGE 
1946 
24 Sept Tel (reply to lOO) 265 
28 Sept Tel (reply to 102) 267 
11 Oct Tel (reply to 103) [Extract] 269 
5 Nov Letter on Anglo-Malay constitutional 271 
proposals, +Enclosure: extract of let-
ter from R Braddell (legal adviser, 
UMNO) to AT Newboult (chief secret-
ary, Malayan Union),+ Minute by HT 
Bourdillon (CO) 
[Nov] Note on Malayan citizenship [Extract] 274 
22 Nov Minute of departmental meeting on 278 
106 [Extract] 
22 Nov Letter on Anglo-Malay constitutional 279 
proposals 
29 Nov Memo, 'Malayan policy' 280 
3 Dec Minutes on 109 285 
1947 
19 Jan Minutes (item 7) on federation propos- 287 
als; consultative process 
19 Jan Minutes (item 8) on Singapore con- 289 
stitution; closer association 
27 Jan Despatch no 92/47 on UMNO, + 292 
Annex: report on UMNO general 
assembly, 10-12 Jan 
17 Feb Letter on UMNO reactions to federa- 294 
tion proposals 
22 Feb Report on his visit to Malaya; constitu- 294 
tional proposals [Extract] 
+Minute by HT Bourdillon (CO) 
24 Feb Despatch no 1 on Malay extremism and 299 
API 
11 Mar Minutes (item 3) on labour problem 303 
[Extract] 
[118-133] MALAYAN UNION TO FEDERATION xciii 
NUMBER 
118 
119 
120 
121 
122 
123 
124 
125 
126 
127 
128 
129 
130 
131 
132 
133 
Lord Killearn 
(Singapore) 
to Mr Bevin (FO) 
ME Dening (FO) 
Treasury 
Mr M J MacDonald 
(Singapore) 
to Mr Creech Jones 
0 H Morris & 
HT Bourdillon (CO) 
SirE Gent 
to Mr Creech Jones 
SirE Gent 
to Mr Creech Jones 
Mr M J MacDonald 
(Singapore) 
to Mr Creech Jones 
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1 CO 875/14/9 18 Mar 1942 
[Criticisms of colonial policy in the light of the Malayan campaign]: 
memorandum by N J B Sabine1 
The time has come when it seems opportune to record briefly the origin and scope of 
the criticisms of Colonial policy which have arisen since the campaign in Malaya 
started: to examine the weight and validity of some of the less irresponsible and 
ill-informed of these criticisms: to attempt an appraisement of the effect they have 
had on public opinion: and to try to state (for what it is worth) the estimate of the 
character and achievements of our Colonial policy which has recently been made by 
public opinion; and what action seems to be expected by the public-or such sections 
of the public who have views to register or to express-from those charged with the 
responsibility for the conduct of Colonial affairs. 
2. It will be agreed, I think, that these matters fall within my province as Public 
Relations Officer. I propose, however, in this note to go somewhat beyond that, and 
to put forward one or two suggestions, based on my experience both inside this office 
and outside it, which I hope may be considered. I am conscious that some or all of 
them may appear to be far-fetched and perhaps extravagant. I have tried to keep them 
practical, and I hope that, if it is thought that the leisure which I have enjoyed for the 
last few days-with its unusual opportunity for detached reflection-has proved 
altogether too stimulating, judgment will be tempered with indulgence. I hope also 
that the proposals will not be regarded in any way as sops to public opinion or 
window dressing. Nothing could be farther from my intentions. 
3. Public opinion on colonial policy 
I have a deep rooted belief that the creation of an interested, well-informed public 
opinion is vitally necessary to the successful solution of our Colonial problems. That 
is not to say that the public will ever lead the way: there will not be-and it would be 
much too much to expect-the necessary detailed and practical knowledge or the 
necessary freedom from other preoccupations. But I do believe that in attacking the 
problem, the Secretary of State and his officers-in England and overseas-would be 
greatly fortified in their task by understanding, sympathy, criticism of the right kind, 
and encouragement, all of which, I am convinced, the people of this country, with 
their unique qualities of humanity and common sense, could offer. I believe that now 
is the time to ask for it, and I will deal with this aspect later in this note. 
4. Recent publicity policy 
The first publicity measures with which I was concerned in the office were those 
taken when the White Paper on the new Colonial Development and Welfare Policy 
was published in February 1940. For this event, a somewhat complicated directive 
was prepared, which, on paper and with some necessary modifications, has served 
since as a model and a guide. This directive laid emphasis on the fact that it was both 
worthy of notice and of praise that in the midst of war we could take this practical 
and forward step to meet our Colonial responsibilities: but any charge of complacen-
cy was anticipated by a saving clause to the effect that we were only at the beginning 
of the problem, and that much remained to be done etc. A reference to the loyalty 
and support of the Colonial peoples, the financial soundness of the exchequer which 
I Public relations officer, eo. 
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could support such a burden (a guarantee of "ultimate and inevitable victory however 
long and hard the road") and a somewhat (it must be confessed) smug comparison of 
our policy with some of the more revealing passages in "Mein Kampf" completed the 
picture. 
5. The loyalty and support of the Colonial peoples had not then been tested so 
cruelly as they have been since, and "business as usual" had hardly begun to be 
discredited. So the press (and the public) were good enough to follow the directive 
almost as it stood: and there was in the press for a day or two a considerable and 
unwonted flood of material about Colonial affairs which subsided as quickly as it had 
arisen. In terms of inches of space in the press the campaign had been an unqualified 
success, and there is no doubt that, in spite of its short life, it did spread abroad the 
idea that we had embarked upon a new, progressive Colonial policy. 
6. Since that time, however, the pace of the war has progressively quickened; its 
character has changed, the threat has come nearer and clearer, and our reactions too 
have changed accordingly. In practice, therefore, we have in our publicity policy 
concentrated on two aspects: the generous support which the Colonies have shown 
for the war effort in so many ways: and, complementary to that, what we have been 
able to do for them. There was nothing false or artificial about this treatment; 
although it did not and could not purport to give the whole of a very complicated 
picture. But it can be claimed, I think, that a good deal of it got across. Bitter 
complaints are often made-and with good reason-that children in schools think 
that Nairobi is in South Africa, describe Canada as a Colony, and have never heard of 
Uganda. But I fancy that a good many people in this country, of all ages and classes, 
know that Colonies have bought Spitfires and mobile canteens: and a fair number 
also know that we have bought Jamaica's bananas, and that we encourage trade 
unions in Colonies by appointing professional trades unionists from this country to 
posts abroad. 
7. So it may be said that until the last month or so-it was generally accepted that 
the Colonies were loyal and happy under our rule and helping us to the limit of their 
resources: that our policy was enlightened, humane, and r,easonably progressive: and 
that our Colonial Service was, in the best traditions of our Services, worthy of 
approval and even pride. There was-rightly and justly- least questioning of the last 
assertion. On the first two, awkward questions about Bustamente and Uriah Butler, 
labour conditions in British Guiana, and strikes on the Copper Belt struck from time 
to time an occasional unharmonious note; and Fabians and others sometimes 
referred to the "Colour Bar" and suggested that the provision for Colonial 
Development should be £50 million a year instead of £5 million. But by and large 
these were merely ripples in the pool: there was little real public interest and 
therefore no widespread public curiosity. In such circumstances came the Malayan 
disaster. 
8. Malaya 
It must be said that everything possible- and it was a great deal-had been done to 
ensure that if Malaya went seriously wrong the press and the public should be raised 
to a pitch of record fury. Everyone had an ill-defined and ill-informed contempt for 
the Japanese as a fighting force, based on the long drawn out, still unresolved 
conflict with China, and no one could believe that she would go to war with America, 
ourselves, the Netherlands, and possibly Russia. They had been told of the defences of 
Singapore (described quite inaccurately as an impregnable fortress); and during the 
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onth of tension before December, they had been lulled into a sense of security by 
lk of reinforcements of men and equipment pouring into Singapore. No doubt 
tere was good reason for all this but it is not easy to explain. 
9. It did not get any easier, as with every day that passed, it was evident that 
1ings in Malaya were going very badly wrong. Added to that, public irritation was 
ontinuously and progressively aggravated by the complacencies of military spokes-
len, difficulties of censorship, reports of internal quarrels and inefficiency-
verything, in fact-that could have been devised by the most malignant fate, as the 
ragedy ran its course, true to its early form, from Khota Bahru to Fort Canning. 
10. It is not always easy to foresee the reaction of the British people to any given 
:vent but it is always safe to say that they will react positively and energetically to 
tdversity. It had proved the case during the days of Dunkirk, when nearly everybody 
;ould find some opportunity for strenuous service-in civil defence, in the factory, in 
the Home Guard: and it proved the case now-but with this difference, that there 
was very little anyone could do about it. So the energy found its outlet in furious, and 
not too well balanced or well informed criticism. The first target was in the C.-in-C. 
Far East:2 then it appeared that not only had he been been relieved of his command, 
but that this step had in fact been taken before the campaign started. With a certain 
feeling of baffled rage, the press and the public looked for another scapegoat: and at 
this convenient juncture the Editor of the "Straits Times", a newspaper in Singapore, 
saw fit to make a violent attack on the alleged deficiencies of the Malayan Civil 
Service. This was telegraphed home and, since any attack on any Civil Service is a 
popular and well tried gambit, it was taken up: not very violently, however, and not 
with any great confidence, except by some of the more disreputable Sunday papers. It 
is pleasant to record that many papers kept clear of it, and that at least one not only 
took a strong line against ill-informed criticism, but even telegraphed in full at its 
own expense the text of an article and an excellent leader to the press in Malaya, 
Ceylon and parts of the West Indies. 
11. In quite a short time the campaign had subsided, and the Malayan campaign 
fell once more into perspective as a first class military disaster. 
12. During the earlier part of th~ controversy "The Times", apart from one or two 
casual and acid references to rubber planters, had kept aloof from it. But on February 
18 it published an article from a correspondent in Batavia which analysed the causes 
of the fall of Malaya.3 The article was written as all "Times" articles are, in a sober and 
moderate style and was accurate in certain, though not all, particulars. In general it 
ascribed the fall of Malaya to military factors but it contained one very significant 
phrase. It described the Government of Malaya as "having no roots in the life of the 
people of the country." 
13. The effect of this article in this country and abroad was immediate and 
striking. By the use of this significant-and to many-damning phrase, it called into 
question the whole spirit and basis of our Colonial policy in a way that the previous, 
more personal and more limited attacks could never have done. It could not be 
countered by showing that in Malaya we were advisers, not rulers, or by questioning 
2 Air Chief Marshal Sir H R M Brooke-Popham, governor of Kenya, 1937-1939, had come out of 
retirement to be commander-in-chief, Far East, 1940-1941. 
3 None of the press articles cited in this memorandum has been printed here. The Times correspondent 
covering the Malayan campaign was !an Morrison, author of Malayan postscript (London, Faber, 1942). 
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our moral right to invite peaceful Malays to fling themselves unarmed in front of the 
Japanese tanks to stem for a few minutes the advance on Singapore. It did in fact 
contain the substance of a reasoned and fundamental criticism which was instinc-
tively recognised, appreciated and given weight, by public opinion. 
It was of course taken up in the House of Commons, and several members read out 
extracts from the article. In his reply, the Lord Privy Seal in referring to these 
comments confined himself to a bare statement that there was a new Colonial 
Secretary and that he would no doubt review Colonial policy and administration. 
14. The position has thus been created in which it is widely recognised that while 
our Colonial policy, reflecting as it does the virtues and defects of our whole political 
system, has achieved much that is good, a revision and review of our existing 
principles and administration is urgently called for. There has been a good deal of 
comment in the press and elsewhere but naturally enough, nothing tangible or 
definite has emerged. I would, however, invite particular attention to the articles 
attached to this note: (i) an article in the "Economist" of March 7 and (ii) two 
articles4 by Miss Margery Perham in "The Times" of March 13 and 14, and a "Times" 
leader of the latter date. All these articles, while they contain statements and 
implications which can be seriously challenged, are written with considerable 
knowledge and care and contain constructive ideas: they are in effect, however (and 
are probably intended to be) designed to stimulate questioning rather than to supply 
any of the answers. And we are left with the situation I have described: in which 
recognition is given to our approach to the problem and to our considerable 
achievements, but in which has emerged an ill-defined feeling of malaise and a vague 
demand for urgent and dynamic remedial action. Is any such action called for? If so, 
what is it to be[?] 
15. Some general considerations 
It would be neither fitting nor profitable if I were to attempt in this note to generalize 
about the principles underlying our Colonial policy: but before putting forward 
certain specific suggestions I should like to refer briefly to two aspects of our 
administration which have in fact been in my mind for some time. 
16. The first concerns the administration by the Colonial Office of the Colonial 
policy formulated by Parliament. On this , with the greatest diffidence, I would make 
the following comment: that a wholly disproportionate amount of time, thought and 
energy appears to me to be devoted to matters of routine as compared with that given 
to wider, fundamental issues ultimately affecting the personal wellbeing and 
happiness of millions of people. Thus, the annual estimates of Colony X, an 
application for funds for a hospital, proposals for new taxation, proposals to promote 
various officers will be examined with the greatest care. I do not for a moment put 
forward the suggestion that this is not essential (although I believe some of the 
matters which are the subject of decisions in the Colonial Office might be better left 
for decision locally): but I cannot help seeing at the same time that bigger questions, 
such as: Why is Colony X, with its accounts in good order, its constitution and public 
services working efficiently, in reality a most unhappy little state with no real 
harmony between Governors and governed, are not even asked, let alone answered. I 
am fully aware of the difficulty of raising these general questions and aware of the 
argument that they are matters for the Governor. One explanation may be that the 
4 Later reprinted in Margery Perham, Colonial sequence, 1930-1949 (London, Methuen, 1967). 
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lack of statesmanship and vision which has characterised the conduct, on the highest 
plane, of our affairs for a good many years now has resulted in an imperfect and 
unrealistic definition of policies and principles, which makes it fruitless and of no 
avail to raise questions which, in the absence of a completely worked out policy, 
cannot in the nature of things be answered. I know that in certain spheres e.g. the 
economic sphere, the sphere of social services, the sphere of education, and in 
connexion with the organization of the Colonial Service, a great deal of wide and bold 
planning has been done and beneficial action has been taken. But even so, I cannot 
resist the conclusion, and I feel it my duty to state it, that for whatever reason it may 
be, routine matters receive an amount of attention disproportionate to that given to 
the consideration of larger issues. 
17. The second concerns the basis of our relations with what we call "the Colonial 
people." There is in this country very little indication of any realization that the 
British Empire is very largely a coloured Empire and that this applies particularly to 
the Colonial Empire. The colour question has never been squarely faced by the public 
of this country, with all its implications for the future: and the result is the kind of 
question which is crystallised in the following passage from the second of Miss 
Perham's articles in "The Times". 
"Many an officer works and overworks with the utmost devotion for the group 
in his charge, while in their clubs and in European residential quarters, he 
and his wife may live wholly insulated from the real life of the people and the 
country. Why are the stimulating and friendly relations possible in this 
country between ourselves and coloured visitors and students almost wholly 
barred in some of our colonies? Is the answer, which has to do with official 
and racial prestige, sufficient to justify this numbing of personal rela-
tionships? No impossible alternative need be presented. Differences of race, 
colour, language and customs are barriers; backwardness is a dividing fact. 
But there is a level of education and of potential common interests upon 
which we are held back only by our prejudices from co-operation and 
friendship. Yet, without these, imperial rule cannot change into the working 
partnership which the coming age demands." 
The attitude characterised in the passage is, I think, fairly general in the Colonies. It 
may be right or wrong; it is certainly in existing circumstances inevitable because it 
has its roots and origin in the attitude of the public in this country. The truth is that 
the public here has not been in fact educated into regarding coloured people as fellow 
human beings and potential fellow citizens in the fullest sense. I am aware that a 
great deal of careful thought has been given to this subject and that any process of 
eduction must be a long one. But although the establishment of a Welfare 
Department was a considerable advance, the subject has not been fully ventilated in 
public; and I consider that it is so closely bound up with fundamental issues in our 
Colonial policy that it should be brought more formally and explicitly to the notice of 
the public as an urgent, pressing and delicate problem, than it has been hitherto. 
18. Some suggestions 
Arising out of the matters discussed in this note, I would submit the following 
suggestions. 
(1) That the question of making some pronouncement defining our Coloniar 
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policy should be considered as a matter or urgency. At the present time, the 
position is perhaps necessarily not altogether clear. The stock definition of our 
Colonial policy which I state, subject to correction, is something on the following 
lines, "By means of education in its widest sense, to raise the standard of life of the 
Colonial people and to develop their resources so that in due course they may take 
an ever increasing share in the ordering of their own affairs." It may not be 
possible to go beyond a statement on these lines, but yet this statement leaves a 
number of questions and implications unanswered. It is at the same time 
sometimes assumed and stated in public, though not with any official backing, 
that we have promised full self-government to Colonies. This again begs all kinds 
of questions. The effect of a satisfactory pronouncement, if it could be produced, 
would be two-fold; it would produce useful and, I hope, fruitful discussion in this 
country; and it would, I am sure, have a good effect in many of the Colonies. It 
would be necessary, of course, to consult Governors on the terms of the 
pronouncement. 
(2) I have referred above to an impression which I have, which may be right or 
wrong, that there is in general not enough time in the office to think about really 
fundamental issues. It has occurred to me that it might be possible to devise 
machinery in the form of a small working committee composed of a nucleus of 
members of the office with power to eo-opt from time to time other persons 
outside the office who are interested and knowledgeable about Colonial affairs. I 
will not burden this note with any further suggestions about the composition of 
this committee, but I merely say that I would visualise a body which would in 
some sense correspond with the Hailey Committee,5 except that it would be 
dealing with current problems instead of the problems of the future in so far as 
these can be separated. It would add greatly to the usefulness of this committee if 
individual members of it could at times find it possible to make short visits to 
Colonies which were the subject of any particular enquiry. It would be necessary to 
take Governors with us on this proposal also. 
(3) The third proposal I would make arises from the experience I had recently of 
hearing a two day debate in the House of Commons at which Colonial questions 
were discussed with a lamentable lack of knowledge and appreciation of the issues 
which lay behind them. I wondered whether it would be possible for the 
Parliamentary Under Secretary to sound a few members of all parties and try to get 
them interested in Colonial matters. This would be quite informal and there would 
be no suggestion of creating a small caucus to defend the Colonial Office in the 
House of Commons. That would have to be made clear. 
(4) I would recommend that immediate consideration be given to the publication 
of some statement about the colour question. Something has already been said by 
the late Secretary of State on this subject, but it has not been fully ventiliated. I 
would visualise a short straightforward statement of our views on this important 
matter together with urgent action, in consultation with other Departments 
concerned, to try to remove some of the disabilities under which Colonial people 
at present find themselves in this country. I am fully aware of the difficulties 
attendant on both these courses of action but one thing can be done immediately 
as ground work and that is to keep up and expand as much as possible the practice 
5 The Colonial Research Committee, chaired by Lord Hailey, 1943--1948. 
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started by Mr. Hall when he was Under secretary here, of inviting Colonial visitors 
to this country and residents in this country to the Colonial Office as frequently as 
may be practicable. 
(5) The last proposal is one which I find some difficulty in putting forward, since it 
concerns my own sphere. I am very far from satisfied with the progress that has 
been made to date both in projecting to people in the Colonies certain aspects of 
life in this country and in projecting the problem of the Colonies to the people of 
this country. I am aware that arrangements are in train to improve the position 
but there are one or two other matters which I should like to raise at a convenient 
opportunity. 
19. I have tried to show in this minute that the members of the public are 
expecting some kind of reaction from the office to the recent comments and 
criticisms. I have tried to indicate for consideration some of the steps which might be 
taken, but it is clear to me that some action must be taken, whether it is positive, i.e. 
certain ch;mges, or whether it is negative, i.e. a full statement about what is being 
done already, and the reasons why it is impracticable or unnecessary to make any 
change. The question of the publicity measures to be taken in either case is one 
which must, I think, wait until some decision has been reached. 
20. There is only one further point which I should like to put. That is that while 
some of the measures I have advocated may seem to be a little remote from the war I 
feel strongly that if at least some of them could be taken and put across to the public 
together with some further statement of the problems involved in a robust and 
realistic way, and with an indication that we knew what we were doing, the result 
would be bracing and beneficial to the general war effort rather than the reverse. 
2 CO 825/35/4, f253 2 Apr 1942 
'Question of the restoration of government in Malaya, Hong Kong, 
etc': minutes of the CO Committee on Post-war Problems (CPWP 
35(42)2) 
Mr. Jeffries1 said that the Eastern Department assumed that these places would be 
re-occupied by military reconquest. In the first instance administration would be 
undertaken by the military, and persons were being designated to advise the military 
on civilian administration in that stage. The final reconstitution of civil government 
would raise many very complicated questions which would be the concern of several 
departments of the Colonial Office. It was accepted that the arrangements existing 
before the Japanese occupation would not be restored. We have to envisage a new 
deal. It was agreed that the Committee need not at present concern itself with this 
matter, but might assume that the Secretary of State would set up a special 
committee to deal with the subject, as was done in the case of Somaliland. If later a 
stage arrives at which the Committee on Post-war Problems can help, the subject 
will then or [?be] brought up. 
1 C J Jeffries, assistant under-secretary of state, CO, 1939-1947; joint deputy under-secretary of state, 
1947-1956. 
8 WARTIME PLANNING [3) 
3 CO 825/35/4, no 15 12 June 1942 
'Record of a discussion which the S of Shad with Dr Van Mook, 1 Dutch 
colonial minister at the Colonial Office on the 12th June': minute by 
Lord Cranborne on post-war colonial restoration. Minute By G E J 
Gent 
M. Van Mook came to see me this morning. He told me that he had a particular point 
which he wished to put to me, speaking not as a representative of his Government, 
but personally. It related to the future of the Netherlands East Indies and its relation 
to Holland. He felt that the present relationship could not be recreated after the war, 
and he, and I gathered some of his colleagues, had in mind the possibility of some 
kind of federation. There would be a Netherlands Government and a Government of 
the Netherlands East Indies, which would have an equal status, and above them, 
responsible for defence and foreign policy and matters of general interest, an 
Imperial Government. He was anxious, if his Government agreed, to make some 
announcement to this effect at an early date, for several reasons. First, he wanted to 
give to the people of the Netherlands East Indies some attractive alternative to the 
propaganda which was being daily pumped into them by the Japanese. And secondly, 
he wanted to counter the vigorous propaganda which was going on in the United 
States and in China to the effect that recent events had shown the Dutch-and the 
British-not only to have been Imperialists but bungling Imperialists at that, whose 
day was now over. He evidently thought that, taking a long view, the danger from the 
United States and China was far greater than that from Japan. They would come to 
the Peace Conference claiming to have won the war in the Pacific, and would demand 
a say in the post-war set up over the whole of that area. He wanted to forestall their 
interference, so far as the Netherlands East Indies w~re concerned. But he did not 
want to cause embarrassment to Great Britain. He therefore came to ask, had we yet 
formulated our post -war policy for Malaya? 
I told him that, while we were of course considering all these matters, we had not 
yet come to definite conclusions. Indeed, to do so pending a settlement of the 
problem of security in the Pacific seemed to me to be difficult. To announce a 
detailed programme of constitutional reform in our territories there seemed to me to 
be premature pending a settlement with the Chinese and the Americans as to how 
the status quo was to be maintained after the war. Moreover, he would know that our 
position in Malaya was complicated by the fact that it rested in part on agreements 
with local rulers, who were now unhappily in enemy hands. It would be difficult, if 
not impossible, to make any announcement as to the future of their states except 
after consultation with them. In general, of course, our colonial policy had always 
aimed at gradually increasing the association of colonial peoples with the Govern-
ment of their countries. I assumed that we should continue that policy in the future. 
But whether the time had come for a general announcement to that effect I was not 
so sure. At any rate, I would think over what he had said, and have a further talk with 
him later. 
1 Or H J van Mook was minister for colonies in the Dutch government in exile and it-governor of the 
provisional and post-war government of the Netherlands East Indies, 1942-1948. 
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Minute on 3 
This is a most interesting expression of Dutch views and the Dutch apprehensions at 
(A)2 are I think shared by many of us. I have had some conversations in recent days 
with Sir John Brenan3 of the Foreign Office who is concerned with the prospective 
Pacific Relations Conference in the U.S.A.4 and the need for formulating at least an 
outline of British post war policy in the Far East for the guidance of the British 
delegates at the Conference. Mr. Ashley Clarke, Head of the Far East Department of 
the Foreign Office has recently come back from America, where he has been 
impressed by the volume and nature of certain vocal American criticism of British 
Colonial Administration in the Far East. He has written a long, and in Sir John 
Brenan's view, interesting memorandum on his visit, and it is being printed and a 
copy of it will in due course come to us.5 
But what seems to be lacking in the F.O. is any sign of robust reaction to American 
largely uninformed criticism on this matter such as the practical line the Dutch take 
in the Secretary of State's note about Mr. Van Moek [sic]. There is a kind of defeatism 
in the Foreign Office Far Eastern outlook which is not a new phenomenon. They 
suffer from what to my mind is a quite fatal lack of belief and confidence themselves 
in our position in the Colonies, and they seem to be fascinated by the belief that 
H.M.G. must be subservien( to the supposed American policy of preventing the 
restoration of British sovereignty in Malaya, Hong Kong, and possibly Burma too. 
There are various side currents which tend to encourage the Foreign Office in their 
inclination to abase themselves before "American" opinion right or wrong e.g. the 
possibility of American forces themselves being in the position of liberators of Malaya 
and Hong Kong when the time comes: and also the predominant part which it is 
likely that American relief and reconstructive organizations will play in the Far 
Eastern sector. It is certain that the Foreign Office need stimulating in order that 
their phobia in these urgent practical questions of the formulation of post war policy 
in the Far East, including the restoration of British Authority in Malaya and Hong 
Kong, may be removed. I told Sir John Brenan, when I saw him yesterday, that it 
seems to me that it may be necessary for the Colonial Office to start the ball rolling 
by convening an interdepartmental meeting if it was impossible for the Foreign 
Office (whose function it ought to be) to do so, since any plans we make in the 
Colonial Office must envisage our restoration in Malaya and Hong Kong whatever 
changes might thereafter result from negotiations with China or other of our present 
allies. 
2 ie the first paragraph of Cranborne's minute. 
3 Consul-general, Shanghai, 1929-1937; adviser on Chinese affairs at the FO since 1937. 
G.E.J .G. 
17.6.42 
4 In fact the conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations was held at Mont Tremblant, Quebec, in Dec 
1942. 
5 Gent commented on Ashley Clarke's report in his minute of 29 June, see 4. 
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4 CO 825/35/4, f 8 29June 1942 
[Post-war colonial restoration and US anti-imperialism]: minute by 
G E 1 Gent on forthcoming talks at the FO 
[On the afternoon of 17 June, Cranborne and Eden spoke about the desirability of 
initiating discussions between the CO and FO on future policy towards Malaya and Hong 
Kong.) 
I have arranged with Mr. MacDougall1 that we shall have a talk with Mr. Ashley 
Clarke at the Foreign Office tomorrow evening. Mr. Ashley Clarke tells me that he is 
under instruction from Mr. Law2 to compile a set of questions on policy of the sort 
which will contain all the chief points of criticism, particularly, with which he met in 
the United States, and also his ideas of the answers to them. He was proposing to do 
this first before having any consultation with the Colonial Office, but at my 
suggestion he agreed that it might be a good thing for us to have a talk first. 
His report to Mr. Eden of June 11th on his visit to the United States shows him to 
have been very receptive of the contemporary tendency in the United States State 
Department, and the unofficial circles in America which correspond to our Chatham 
House,3 to ascribe our military failure so far in the war against Japan to some 
inherent faults of "Imperialism" and selfish exploitation of the territories and peoples 
concerned. He credits "public opinion" in America with a feeling that it would feel 
itself cheated if the status quo in Hong Kong, Malaya, Burma, India, and the 
Netherlands East Indies were restored as a result of our victory in this war. 
He touches upon the question of the United States access to the raw materials of 
Malaya and the Netherlands East Indies, and no doubt that is an economic interest of 
the United States which is responsible for a good deal of hopeful thinking in New 
York and Washington. 
I think we should all agree with the conclusions he' reaches in paragraphs 21 and 
22, viz. that we should make more extensive and whole-hearted arrangements to 
make known in the United States the facts about our war effort and the facts about 
our efforts in our Far Eastern territories to promote the interests of the local people 
and the production of commodities to which the whole world had access. But there is 
a tendency throughout Mr. Ashley Clarke's report to put the whole problem and its 
answer in the terms of current American expressions of criticism and the policy by 
which we should be governed in order to secure American consent in a post~war 
settlement. He makes it clear that American opinion attaches importance to China as 
an equal Power with themselves (and presumably ourselves) in the future organisa-
tion in the Far East, but it seems that His Majesty's Government is to have regard to 
Chinese views only as reflected indirectly through America. 
While it is, of course, politically necessary to take into account serious American 
opinion, we should not necessarily allow our policy to be formulated for us by that 
opinion. On the contrary, we should ourselves formulate it in direct relation to what 
1 D M MacDougall of the Hong Kong Civil Service was attached to the CO in 1942 and then to the embassy 
in Washington, 1942-1943. 
2 Richard Law, parliamentary under-secretary of state, FO, 1941-1943; minister of state, FO, 1943-1945. 
3 ie Royal Institute of International Affairs. 
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we ourselves believe to be in the best interests of China and ourselves, and what we 
believe would secure future friendly relations with China. When, on that basis, the 
framework of our policy is completed, we could then let the Americans know the 
lines on which we were working, and possibly make some minor adjustments to meet 
any needs of Anglo-United States collaboration after the war. Certainly in such 
matters as freedom of access to the raw materials of Malaya, or freedom of the port of 
Hong Kong, the Americans can have no serious grumble at our record, nor need they 
be apprehensive of our post-war policy. 
Further, the future of Malaya and Hong Kong, and of course Burma, should be a 
matter primarily for consultation and decision by this country and the Dominions; 
even if Canada were specially responsive to American opinion that need not 
necessarily be so in the case of Australia and India. Mr. Ashley Clarke presents in his 
paragraph 18 a reported distinction between the breaking up of the British 
Commonwealth and the breaking up of the Colonial Empire. That is possibly a snare 
which the Foreign Office may be in particular danger of falling into, and it would be 
very desirable to make it clear at the first opportunity that the disposal of the 
Colonial Empire, particularly of the territories of such Empire importance as those 
in the Far East, could not be contemplated for a moment except in the fullest 
agreement with the Dominions and India. 
As a quite provisional policy or programme it might be well for the Colonial Office 
view to be somewhat on the following lines. 
1. We envisage the restoration of our sovereignty in both Hong Kong and the 
Straits Settlements and of our former Treaty relations with the Malay States. 
2. As a matter of policy we should at some convenient moment (possibly when we 
make an approach to China in the matter of extra-territoriality) let the Chinese 
Government know that this is our intention, but that we should hope to discuss 
with them the lines of a closer liaison in both Colonies with Chinese Government 
representatives-possibly in Hong Kong taking the form of an Anglo-Chinese 
Council which would have a special influence in ocean and coastal trade with 
China through the port of Hong Kong. This would be an immediate post-war 
arrangement, and thereafter we could at leisure discuss and negotiate with the 
Chinese Government some longer term policy (even possibly involving the 
transfer of the sovereignty of Hong Kong to China). 
3. When the chief structure of a policy on these lines had been thought out and 
settled, we should then bring into consultation, and hope to obtain the collabora-
tion of, both the United States and the Dutch, but as regards British policy in 
respect of the British territories concerned, it should primarily be our own and not 
an American policy, and one in which our relations are direct with the Chinese, 
and not one in which we follow American guidance and permit ourselves to be 
unduly influenced by current American pressure, which is partly at least based on 
American business interests which are customarily hostile to us in the Far East. 
4. A most important point underlying all our policy as affecting China and the 
Chinese shd. be that the Chinese must be able to see for themselves that British 
policy (a new, progressive, and generous policy towards China) is not one which is 
dictated by America, but is formulated by ourselves, and particularly that in any 
concessions which we make to China they shall be concessions freely given to 
China by ourselves, and not under American pressure. 
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5 CO 825/35/4, f 10 1 July 1942 
[Postwar colonial restoration and US anti-imperialism]: minute by 
G E 1 Gent on talks at the FO 
Mr. MacDougall and I had a talk yesterday evening with Mr. Ashley Clarke, head of 
the Far Eastern Department of the Foreign Office, and Mr. Denning [sicf, a member 
of the same Department, and Mr. Nevile Butler, who is head of the American Dept. 
The immediate need for the formulation of a basis of our policy in the Far East has 
arisen, Mr. Ashley Clarke explained, on account of the impending Pacific Relations 
Conference in the United States,2 and the desirability of giving the British unofficial 
delegates to that Conference the necessary guidance. 
I explained that our provisional feelings in the Colonial Office regarding the future 
of Hong Kong and Malaya were generally as set out in my minute of 29.6} and it was 
agreed by the Foreign Office representatives that it was an important point that we 
should not allow the Chinese to get the impression that our policy was dictated 
under pressure from the United States, and particularly that in any arrangements we 
contemplate for giving the Chinese in the future some more influential position in 
Hong Kong, we should so play our cards that the Chinese would not be left with the 
impression that for any such concessions it was the Americans to whom they were 
indebted and not ourselves. 
Mr. MacDougall said that official Chinese Government opinion was that Hong 
Kong was British, and it was not for the Chinese to take the initiative in proposing 
any other status for the Colony when the Japanese had cleared out. Unofficially, 
however, in Chungking, there was plenty of speculation as to the future of Hong 
Kong and an irredentist attitude towards it. In the course of the discussion the 
following points were made on the Foreign Office side:-
(1) If Hong Kong were recovered from the Japanese by Chinese land forces and 
American sea forces, our claim for the restoration of British sovereignty might be 
a little difficult to sustain. 
(2) If we were hoping that after the war international peace in the Far East should 
be maintained by the collective action of the United Nations, we might not feel 
that we had a very strong case for claiming that we should resume British 
sovereignty and administration in Hong Kong and the Straits Settlements. 
(3) The Chinese, following their usual subtle course, are quite likely to incite 
American "anti-Imperialist" criticisms of the British position in Hong Kong and 
the Straits Settlements in order that we shall be intimidated into surrendering 
Hong Kong to China. 
The Foreign Office attitude as expressed by Mr. Ashley Clarke at the end of the 
meeting was that "we must be prepared to give up non-essentials in order to 
maintain the really important things", and that he did not think that Hong Kong or 
even Malaya must necessarily be regarded as an essential. I said that I could see his 
point if it were simply a matter of pieces in the game of international politics, but 
that our attitude towards British territories-fully-going communities and concerns 
at the moment when our military weakness cut them off from us-must be a rather 
1 ie M E Dening. 2 See 3, note 4. 3 See 4. 
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different one, and that our policy must be based on what we believed to be right 
rather than solely on what would be the best moves from the point of view of foreign 
politics. 
The Far East Department, Foreign Office, are now commissioned to supply Mr. 
Law with their provisional notes and suggestions on H.M.G.'s Far Eastern policy, and 
they have promised that we shall have a copy. At the same time they ask that we will 
put down corresponding notes from our point of view on the matter of the future of 
Hong Kong, Malaya, and Borneo, and let them have a copy so that both can be 
considered by the Ministers. 
This we are getting on with.4 
4 See 6. 
6 CO 825/35/4, f 227 [July 1942] 
'Note on future policy in the Far East': memorandum by G E J Gent 
and D M MacDougall [Extract] 
Minute by Lord Cranborne 
General points 
1. Recognition of China as an equal Power in our conduct towards her. 
2. Recognition of British rights and obligations in British and Protected Terri-
tories. 
3. Recognition of Dominions' (particularly Australia and Canada) and India's 
right to full consultation and association with the United Kingdom in any 
modification of 2. 
4. Recognition of the interest of the United Nations (particularly the United 
States of America, China and Netherlands) in the post war order, and reconstruction, 
and in the preservation of peace in the Far East. 
5. Recognition of the economic and other declarations in the Atlantic Charter. 
Particular points-Hang Kong, Malaya, Bomeo1 
7. Malaya. The Malay Peninsula comprises (1) the British territories of the 
Straits Settlements, and (2) nine Malay States. In the Malay States the British 
position is dependent on Treaties and Agreements with each of the Malay Rulers, who 
are constitutionally independent Sovereigns. Owing to the development by foreign 
capital (British, Chinese, American, etc.) of the valuable natural resources of the 
States, it has fallen to the British to develop the local administrative systems and to 
ensure law and order. 
(a) Straits Settlements. The present majority of the population consists of 
immigrant Chinese who come to Malaya to engage in business and professions, and 
who maintain their links with China. The port of Singapore has flourished as a free 
port visited by ships of all the nations engaged in Far Eastern trade. Its strategic and 
1 Only the section on Malaya is printed here. 
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commercial importance is obvious, and if the life and trade of the Malayan 
archipelago, as well as the ocean trade of the East, is to be promoted, the port of 
Singapore must be maintained under reliable and efficient control. The Netherlands, 
China, Australia, and India, besides the United Kingdom and other Powers, have all a 
direct interest in the services of Singapore as a port and mart, and the source of the 
raw materials of the Peninsula. Free access to these materials and to the services of 
the Port must be assured as the basis of British policy. 
We should be agreeable, if that were favoured by the United Nations (including 
India), to the establishment of a Commission to control the port of Singapore which 
would comprise representatives of all the principal countries interested in the 
services of the Port. The British sovereignty of the Straits Settlements would remain 
unaffected. 
(b) Malay States. Our policy has been to maintain the sovereignty of the Malay 
Rulers, and to make it continually more real in those States where it had tended to 
become overlaid by our own direct Administration under the pressure of economic 
development (e.g. the decentralisation policy in the Federated Malay States). Our 
declared policy has also been to promote the well being and efficiency of the Malay 
peoples and their educational fitness to fill the official Services in their own 
territories. 
The continual and legitimate fear of the Malays has been that they would be 
swamped by the more efficient and numerous Chinese and to a lesser extent the 
Indians. Chinese immigration has been controlled for this reason and limited to the 
economic capacity of the tin and rubber industries. 
These policies are in the interests of the people of the country and should be 
maintained for their paramount advantage. But in order to show our own good faith 
it might be considered whether, on our resumption of authority in Malaya, we should 
not propose that the Malay Rulers be invited to negotiate with ourselves and the 
United Nations new Treaties which would in form be multilateral agreements to 
which each Ruler and each of the United Nations would be parties and contain 
clauses 
(1) declaratory of the above principles, 
(2) assuring most favoured nation treatment to all non-Malays in the matters of 
access to raw materials, tariffs and residence, 
(3) accepting resident British Officers in each Malay State to advise the Malay 
Administrations (Great Britain being the Power with whom they are accustomed 
to deal in practice and the Power with the modern experience and resources most 
needed to ensure the practical purposes of the economic clauses in the Treaty). 
(4) Providing for periodical meetings of the Treaty Signatories to review develop-
ments and to agree upon any new proposals . . .. 
Minute on 6 
I have read Mr. Gent's and Mr. MacDougall 's note on Far Eastern Policy, and should 
like to have a discussion on it. It contains most interesting and far reaching 
proposals. But I must confess I do not feel altogether happy about them. They involve 
considerable concessions by us, without any quid pro quo by the other Pacific 
Powers. This will only be regarded by China and the United States as a confession of 
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failure on our part, without any reflection on them, whereas it is in fact the United 
States who have above all brought about the present situation in the Far East by their 
refusal to shoulder their responsibilities and co-operate with other nations in 
restraining Japan in the years before this war. Moreover, were we to accept such a 
post-war settlement as this in respect of our Far Eastern territories, it would be 
difficult, if not impossible, for the Dutch to refuse to do the same, and they would 
certainly, from what Dr. Van Mook said to me,2 regard us as having let them down, if 
not actually betrayed them. 
It seems to me that what we have first to decide is where, if anywhere, we have 
failed. Is it in the administration of our territories or merely in their defence? It may 
well be said that our administration has not been perfect, that it was too rigid, that it 
did not show itself capable of adapting itself to the conditions of war, that it was too 
much concerned with material improvements and too little inspired by a high 
spiritual outlook, and so on. But, taken by and large, our record of administration is 
not one of which we need be ashamed. We created Singapore and Hong Kong, two of 
the greatest ports in the Pacific, out of nothing. We made of Malaya one of the richest 
and most vital producing areas of the world. We brought to her peoples law and 
order, happiness and prosperity. These are no mean achievements. Where we did fail 
was in giving them protection from Japan, and this criticism may equally be levelled 
against the Dutch and the Americans. I suggest that, in considering the future of the 
Far East, it is on this defence aspect that the Allied Powers-and the Institute of 
Pacific Relations-should concentrate. The Allied Pacific nations must aim at 
building up in the Pacific an effective system of mutual defence. This will no doubt 
involve considerable concessions by all concerned. There may have to be internation-
al ports, where all members of the peace system will have equal rights. As a 
consequence, those ports may well have to be managed, both as to their defence and 
administration, by international bodies. We should, I feel, be prepared to agree to 
Singapore and Hong Kong coming under such a regime. But it must be on a basis of 
reciprocity. Concessions which we make at Singapore and Hong Kong, the 
Americans should also make at Manila and Honolulu, the Dutch in their ports, and 
the Chinese at certain selected places. 
Hong Kong, no doubt, is in a slightly different category from Malaya and our other 
Pacific territories. It forms almost part of the mainland of China. It may be that we 
may have to agree to a resumption of Chinese sovereignty there. But this should 
surely form part of the general deal, and be conceded in return for facilities given to 
us and other Pacific nations in treaty ports in China. I agree strongly with Sir G 
Cater that we should not decide now to lower our flag there after the war. To put it 
on no higher plane, that would be to surrender one of our main bargaining counters 
before the negotiation begins. 
Nor do I much like the idea of multilateral agreements between the local Rulers in 
Malaya and the United Nations. The Malayan States will never be strong enough to 
stand on their own feet in the modern world. They must come in to some great 
power's sphere of influence. If they have treaties with several nations, they will only 
play off one against another and become a source of friction. We are the obvious 
people to keep an eye on them. It may well be, of course, that the Chinese and 
Americans, and possibly the Australians, will want some international cartel to 
2 See 3. 
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control and supervise the production of Malayan rubber and tin, and that we may 
think it wise to agree to this. But we should, I feel, maintain political control of these 
areas. 
In conclusion, I think it is most important that we should not allow ourselves to be 
manoeuvred into the position of having been alone responsible for what has 
happened in the Far East. In fact, I feel that the responsibility of the United States is 
far heavier than ours. If they had been willing to collaborate with the League of 
Nations in the early days of the China incident, all that has happened since might, 
and probably would, have been averted. In fact, they hung back not only till it was too 
late to save the situation, but until they were actually attacked. By all means, let us 
shoulder our share of the blame. But do not let us shoulder theirs too. 
c. 
14.7.42 
7 CO 825/35/4, no 46 20 Aug 1942 
'British post-war policy in the Far East': minute by G E J Gent of a 
meeting between Lord Cranborne and Mr Law on 19 Aug 
The Secretary of State had a visit from Mr. Law, Parliamentary Under-Secretary, 
Foreign Office, and two Foreign Office officials, yesterday, in which Sir G. Cater and I 
took part. Mr. Law is very shortly going to America and he felt that he should as far as 
possible equip himself with ideas to cope with the current American criticism of our 
Colonial administration and their vague ideas about a post-war organisation in the 
Far East. 
The discussion covered a good deal of ground, and the following points were 
made:-
(1) Convincing answers to American criticisms require a conviction in England 
that our record was, in general, a good and progressive one, and a conviction that 
the Empire was not a thing to be ashamed of, and that the British people had a 
useful mission to continue in the Colonies; in short, that we must first show 
confidence in ourselves before we could expect to remove the lack of confidence in 
us which others are expressing. This is a matter for propaganda to be organised by 
the Ministry of Information in association with the Colonial Office. 
(2) That Colonial peoples were not possessions to be bartered round the peace 
table but that we had continuing obligations which we must be prepared to fulfil. 
Our record in the Eastern Colonies was a good one. Our only principal failure 
being our failure to defend them against Japan. 
(3) Similar failures took place by the Americans in the Philippines, by the Dutch 
in the Netherlands East Indies, by France in Indo-China-and not only by the 
colonial powers, but also by independent states like Siam. Having regard to our 
operational commitments against Germany and Italy at the time of the Japanese 
assault the major blame for the failure of the United Nations to resist the enemy in 
the Pacific could not be said to lie at our doors. 
The Secretary of State referred to the memorandum and letter which he was on 
the point of sending to the Secretary for Foreign Affairs and which contains specific, 
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though provisional, proposals for our policy in respect of British territories in the Far 
East. 
It was agreed that Hong Kong was a special case, and that any matter about our 
sovereignty there was primarily one for negotiation between ourselves and China. 
The memorandum explained that the maintenance of British sovereignty was not 
indispensable to us in Hong Kong, and that we should be prepared, at a suitable time, 
to discuss the whole position with China, not even excepting the question of 
sovereignty. As regards Malaya, the memorandum set out the political make-up of 
the Peninsula and our treaty obligations to the rulers of the nine Malay States. 
Reference was made to a telegram received in the Foreign Office which purported to 
represent the personal views of President Roosevelt, in which he appeared to assume 
that it was impossible for the British to return to their old position in Malaya. It was 
thought likely that the President, like other distinguished Americans, had only a very 
vague understanding of the Malayan position, and we certainly should not concede 
the assumption that the restoration of our sovereign position in the Colony and our 
Protecting position in the Malay States was impossible. It was a matter for ourselves 
to decide what, if any, new grouping or constitutional arrangements in Malaya (and 
possibly in Borneo too) would best suit new conditions. 
The Secretary of State's conclusions were on the following lines:-
(1) That a propaganda campaign in this country was needed to convince ourselves 
that we had no need to be ashamed of our record in Colonial administration, and 
that we had continuing obligations towards our territories in the East which we 
should not only be resolute in carrying on but which also we were well fitted to 
carry on from our experience and qualities. 
(2) This should be the basis of our attitude towards American and other foreign 
critics, and we should studiously avoid standing in a white sheet over an alleged 
failure in the East in Colonial administration or in a progressive policy towards the 
local peoples. 
Our only substantial failure was the failure to protect our territories, which was 
a matter not lying at our doors alone, but one which was shared, possibly to a 
major extent, by other sovereign powers in the Far East and particularly by the 
Americans. 
(3) Post-war conditions after the victory of the United Nations would call first and 
foremost for association in achieving security to prevent another disastrous armed 
conflict, and this association in security should be the basis and essential 
justification of the United Nations' policy in the Far East and of any 
contributions-political or economic-which we and others would be able to 
make. 
(4) With this basis of mutual defence obligations we should contemplate the 
institution of some sort of regional council of the United Nations concerned with 
the Pacific area. 
(5) The British Government as the authority in Malaya, the Dutch in the 
Netherlands Indies, and similarly the effective authorities in the Philippines, and 
those in other territories of the Pacific area constituting the United Nations would 
be in constitutional and administrative control in their own several territories. 
(6) Hong Kong was a subject for special consideration, and, as explained above, 
was a territory in which the maintenance of our sovereignty need not in the new 
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conditions be regarded as a cardinal point of British policy. If there were 
advantages to us as well as general advantages in a post-war settlement, its 
sovereignty should revert to China. We must, however, be ourselves the judges of 
our action vis-a-vis China in respect of Hong Kong, and we should avoid being 
placed in a position of acting, or appearing to act, under the pressure of American 
criticism in any discussions we had on the matter with the Chinese Government. 
(7) The British delegates at the International Pacific Relations Conference were 
looking to H.M.G. for some guidance on questions of British policy in the Far East, 
and it was, therefore, desirable for the interested Departments here to get together 
to advise Ministers on the policy to be adopted. Lord Hailey, as leader of the British 
delegation, could be confidentially informed of H.M.G.'s policy on particular 
points. 
(8) Our publicity line should be that the British, Dutch, Americans, etc. have 
remarkably fine records of progressive and enlightened administration in their 
Eastern territories-we all fell down over the question of defence, and that is the 
primary matter to be remedied. We can all contribute to the establishment of 
greater strength and cohesion to prevent another successful aggression, and in 
common with our allies we shall be ready to play our part. 
-8 CO 825/35/4, no 52 [Aug 1942] 
'A post-war settlement in the Far East: need for a definite policy': joint 
CO-FO memorandum [Extract] 
At latest when victory has been won and probably before that we shall be called upon 
to declare our aims in the Pacific area (including Australasia and the Far East 
generally). But we cannot leave the working out of those aims until then and there 
are in fact several reasons why it is becoming increasingly urgent to undertake this 
task now. 
2. The first of these reasons is the widespread and constant speculation on the 
subject in the United States which has been stimulated by speeches by the 
Vice-President, 1 Mr. Hull,2 Mr. Sumner Welles,3 and other high officials of the 
Administration. These utterances, although (perhaps fortunately) lacking in precise 
proposals have abounded in general statements concerning the post-war world the 
effect of which may be to make opinion crystallise in forms which we should not 
desire. Another is the fact that in December next an unofficial international 
conference is being held in the United States to discuss the problems of the Pacific 
area. At this conference one of the subjects which will arouse most interest will be 
the future of the territories of South-East Asia and it will be necessary for the British 
delegation (representing Chatham House) to express their views. 
Forthcoming I.P.R. conferences 
3. The Conference presents a danger and an opportunity. The danger is that if not 
adequately prepared and enabled to strike out on a positive line of their own the 
1 Henry A Wallace, vice president of the USA, 1941-1945. 2 Cordell Hull, US secretary of state, 1933--1944. 
3 Sumner Welles, US under-secretary of state, 1937-1941. 
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British delegation will be forced on to the defensive by American and Chinese attacks 
on the right of Great Britain to maintain her position in the Far East. That we should 
be put by our allies in such a situation (even unofficially) in time of war may be 
highly deplorable, but it is an eventuality which must be faced. The trend of the 
speeches and press speculation in the United States referred to above may be 
summed up in Mr. Welles' phrase "the age of imperalism is dead" and in the 
observation of the well-known writer on Far Eastern affairs, Mr. W.H. Chamberlain, 
that "It would be futile and stupid to pledge great numbers of American lives for such 
an objective as the integral restoration of British and Dutch imperial rule". These 
utterances give an idea of the line which is likely to be taken by some members at 
least of the American and indeed Chinese delegations and it can only be met 
effectively by showing not only the benefits which have been conferred by British 
rule in the past but by indicating, however summarily, that British participation in 
the management of the affairs of Asia is essential to its stability and welfare in the 
future and the lines on which we shall contribute to these objects. 
4. In this respect the Conference offers an opportunity. British policy in the Far 
East, notably towards China, and the British genius for colonial administration have 
lately fallen into disrepute on account largely of the military and naval weakness 
which permitted our humiliation in China (e.g. at Tientsin) and (after the outbreak 
of war with Japan) of our military and naval disasters at Hong Kong, in Malaya and in 
Burma. The unexpected magnitude of these latter have blotted out not only our long 
record of positive and beneficent achievement in the Far East but even the extent to 
which British naval and military preponderance prior to the Washington treaties of 
1922 was responsible for the stability and peace of Australasia as a whole: although 
there are signs of an increasing realisation in America that the debacle at Pearl 
Harbour was largely responsible for our disasters and that the ordeal under which we 
failed was one to which we ought not to have been exposed. The Conference offers 
the opportunity to make known to a wide public our record, which is an outstanding 
one. No one will deny that the creation of the British Commonwealth of Nations is a 
political achievement of the first order: our record of achievement in the Colonies is 
less well-known. 
Need for a campaign of education 
5. But this is not enough . Our territories in the Far East and the work we have 
done there entitle us to a leading part in the post-war settlement in the Far East but 
we cannot convince others of this unless we can put forward with conviction 
constructive ideas for the future. At present there is in this country not only no 
unanimity as to our objectives in the Far East, even among those who are actively 
studying these problems, but there is a great degree of ignorance and a serious 
atrophy of our power to "think imperially". An essential basis for establishing our 
leadership depends therefore on promoting new awareness at home of the problems 
involved and on arousing the nation to a sense of having a mission to continue and 
fulfil in the world at large, particularly in our colonial Empire. However true it may 
be that this Empire grew almost unconsciously out of our instinct to trade with the 
world and to give our trade the protection of our flag, we had at least during the 19th 
century a sense of responsibility for furthering the interests of those parts of the 
world over which we had established our control. That sense of responsibility has not 
altogether been lost but it is no longer nation-wide and it has lost its purposefulness. 
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This is what we have to regain, since this is what gave us a preponderating voice in 
the counsels of nations. Once we have convinced ourselves afresh of our civilising 
mission in the world and of our determination and ability to rule in pursuance of that 
mission we should have little difficulty in convincing others. 
6. It is not the purpose of this paper to examine how this campaign should be 
launched and sustained: but one way is clearly for Ministers to cover some of the 
ground in their speeches in this country. It is not necessary that we should here and 
now make detailed public proposals: but it is necessary that we should know our own 
minds and be able to indicate in public the general principles on which we propose to 
work. 
General principles of a post-war settlement 
7. To work out a detailed policy at the present stage is impossible. That will 
necessarily be conditioned by the future course of the war and the state of affairs 
prevailing at the end of the war. The suggestions as to the future of particular 
territories made below are to be regarded as the barest outlines and highly tentative. 
We may however postulate that on the victorious conclusion of the war against Japan 
the reconstruction plans of the United Nations will be based on:-
(a) the general interest which all would have in keeping Japan within bounds and 
assuring the collective defence of the whole area; 
(b) the economic and commercial interest which all would have in access to raw 
materials, markets and ocean ports and in opportunities for investment and 
development; 
(c) conformity with the general principles of the Atlantic Charter where applic-
able and of Article VII of the Anglo-American Mutual Aid Agreement. 
8. Accordingly our own plans should fall demonstrably within these limits. It 
should in particular be noted that any policy for which we require the support of the 
United States Government and therefore of American public opinion should if 
possible be based on broad principles. The key to obtaining American support may 
also be found in our attitude towards China. An orderly and unified China is in any 
case a necessary requirement for the maintenance of stability in the Far East and, up 
to a point, a guarantee against the resurgence of a menacing Japan. Commercially 
too we have everything to gain by earning China's goodwill. If we can show the 
Americans that we are dealing liberally with their friend China, we may hope to find 
it easier to enlist American support in applying to China the implications of Mr. 
Welles's dictum that "the age of imperialism is dead" if and when Chinese aspirations 
go beyond what is legitimate and in directions dangerous or inconvenient to 
ourselves. In formulating our plans for the future therefore there must throughout 
be a double process, namely, first that of laying down what we consider to be 
desirable and practicable, and secondly the translation of such plans into terms of 
principles acceptable to all. 
9. The first and in many ways the most crucial problem for us is our future 
relationship to our Far Eastern territories. A number of different possibilities are 
being canvassed at the present time. At one end of the scale is the notion that these 
territories should be "liberated" on the model of the undertakings given by the 
United States to the Philippines: at the other is the notion that they should return to 
British sovereignty on exactly the same basis as before. In considering the feasibility 
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or desirability of either of these courses or of any lying in between, it is well to 
consider what is essential to us and to the populations of the territories themselves in 
terms of defence, economic development and administration. 
Essential British requirements 
10. From the economic point of view, the things which it is essential for us to 
preserve in our colonies are precisely those things which are mentioned in (b) in 
paragraph 7 above, namely access to raw materials, markets for our manufactures, 
access to ocean ports and opportunities for investment and development. From the 
defence point of view it is essential that we should not find ourselves again in the 
position which we have been in during the last decade, namely of being responsible 
for the defence of vast territories with totally inadequate forces and no certainty of 
outside help. It is therefore necessary that there should be a system of collective 
defence in which we shall participate but in which above all we should be able to 
count on the United States also participating. From the administrative point of view 
it is essential that we should resume the fullest measure of internal responsibility 
and that we should not be called upon to share such responsibility with one or more 
outside Powers (i.e. no condominiums). Subject to these essential requirements, it 
should be possible for us to offer to cooperate with other similarly placed Powers by 
adjusting the resumption of our sovereign rights in the British territories in the Far 
East so far as may be necessary to meet the requirements of collective defence and 
economic development, and indeed to treat our administration of those territories as 
a trusteeship in the interests of their populations. It may be supposed that some form 
of United Nations Council for the Pacific would be established to which those 
countries responsible for dependent territories would be answerable. It would of 
course be understood that our acceptance of any obligations of this nature would be 
dependent on the acceptance of similar obligations on the part of the other Powers 
concerned. 
International supervisory councils 
11. In considering the nature and degree of such an international supervision it 
cannot be too strongly emphasised that a primary objective must be the encourage-
ment of the maximum cooperation of the United States in post-war arrangements in 
the Far East. The danger for the peace of that area and of the world is indeed likely to 
arise less from an excessive interference in the affairs of other nations on the part of 
the United States than from a reversion by the latter to isolationism, leaving the 
same problem for the United Nations as the United States left for the Allies in 1919. 
This, even more than the material contribution to victory in the Pacific which the 
United States are likely to make, is the compelling reason for taking due account in 
our plans of American thought on this subject. 
12. We are not yet informed as to the exact lines of American official thought and 
it will probably be well, before committing ourselves in public, to probe this matter. 
But we have good indications that United States Administrations, whether Democrat 
or Republican, will favour a general world responsibility for the maintenance of 
peace on the part of the four Powers, the United States, Great Britain, Russia and 
China, acting in some sense with the sanction of the United Nations as a whole. The 
implications of any such Four-Power plan are being examined in another paper but 
we may probably take it for granted that any arrangements made for the future 
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settlement of the Far East will include some such Council as suggested in paragraph 
10, on which these Powers will be represented. It is possible that in particular parts 
of the world the form and membership of the Council will vary and it may be 
expedient in the Far East, for example, for certain purposes to eo-opt representatives 
of Australia and New Zealand and of the Netherlands. The extent of the powers of the 
Council would doubtless also vary in relation to different territories. 
13. While the foregoing is as yet indefinite, it must serve as a rough and ready 
background for the examination of our future relations with the various territories of 
the Far East which we may now proceed to do in greater detail. . .. 4 
Malaya, North Borneo and other British territories in the South Seas 
25. These will perhaps provide the most contentious issues at the eventual peace 
conference. While we may readily assume that our resumption of control is the 
obvious and only reasonable arrangement, it is desirable to examine the grounds on 
which our right to it can be presented to other governments and to public opinion 
(including certain sections of public opinion in this country). In particular what is 
the bearing on this problem of the third article of the Atlantic Charter?+ 
26. It is proposed here only to suggest in very general outline how this problem 
might be approached, viz. 
(a) it is our intention to foster self-government in accordance with the spirit of 
Article 3 of the Atlantic Charter but it is evident that the attainment of complete 
self-government involves a degree of responsibility to which some peoples have 
not yet attained. 
(b) it is our intention to promote and accelerate the processes by which the 
inhabitants of such territories under our charge attain to this degree of 
responsibility. 
(c) we have long-standing obligations by treaty, and otherwise towards the 
inhabitants of these territories which it is our intention to discharge; 
(d) in accordance with article 6 of the Atlantic Charter* we are bound to assure 
freedom from fear and freedom from want to those territories which are not in a 
position to provide them for themselves; 
(e) freedom from fear should be provided by a system of collective defence in 
which we are ready to bear our full share; 
(0 the most rapid and the surest way of achieving freedom from want is to leave 
the task to those who have successfully carried it out in the past and who have in 
addition long experience of local administrative problems; 
(g) meantime, while resuming full administrative responsibility (it is better to 
+ Third, they respect the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live; 
and they wish to see sovereign rights and self-government restored to those who have been forcibly 
deprived of them. (N.B. Although the U.S. have expressly admitted the applicability of the Atlantic Charter 
to the Far East, we have not.) 
• Sixth, after the final destruction of Nazi tyranny, they hope to see established a peace which will afford to 
all nations the means of dwelling in safety within their own boundaries, and which will afford assurance 
that all the men in all the lands may live out their lives in freedom from fear and want. 
~Paras 14-24 on China omitted. 
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avoid the word "sovereignty") for these territories, we are ready to co-operate with 
the other Powers concerned in the creation of a regional council of the Pacific, or 
for any particular areas bordering on the Pacific, on which the principal United 
Nations would collaborate in measures for the advantage of all. In other words, all 
the Powers exercising administrative responsibility within any given area should 
declare their willingness to treat their administration as a trusteeship, under the 
supervision of a suitable international body in respect of certain matters to be 
defined. 
27. It is suggested that these principles should form the basis for the resumption 
of control over other territories by the Dominions (the mandated territories), the 
United States (the Philippines), China (Formosa) and (with modifications) for the 
assumption of control over new territory on the part e.g. of the United States (over 
the Japanese mandated islands) . 
28. It should be noted that a system of collective defence may render necessary 
special measures of cooperation at certain strategic points, e.g. the Kra Isthmus, 
Singapore, Corregidor, Chilung (Formosa). This will be especially so if an "interna-
tional police force" is created as proposed by Mr. Sumner Welles. From our own 
point of view such special measures are desirable in that these strategic points will 
form a concrete and perpetual reminder of the joint responsibility of all the Powers 
concerned in the preservation of peace and stability in the whole area. It may 
reasonably be held that such security measures do not constitute a derogation from 
the Atlantic Charter, since they do not amount to "aggrandisement, territorial or 
other". 
Malaya 
29. The Malay Peninsula comprises (1) the British territories of the Straits 
Settlements, and (2) nine Malay States. In the Malay States the British position is 
dependent on treaties and agreements with each of the Malay Rulers, who are 
constitutionally independent Sovereigns. Owing to the development by foreign 
capital (British, Chinese, Americans, etc.) of the valuable natural resources of the 
States, it has fallen to the British to develop the local administrative systems, to build 
up the social services, and to ensure law and order. 
30. (a) Straits Settlements. The present majority of the population consists of 
immigrant Chinese who come to Malaya to engage in business and professions, and 
who maintain their links with China. The port of Singapore has flourished as a free 
port visited by ships of all the nations engaged in Far Eastern trade. Its strategic and 
commercial importance is obvious, and if the life and trade of the Malayan 
archipelago, as well as the ocean trade of the East, is to be promoted, the port of 
Singapore must be maintained under reliable and efficient control. The Netherlands, 
China, Australia and India, besides the United Kingdom and other Powers, have all a 
direct interest in the services of Singapore as a port and mart, and the source of the 
raw materials of the Peninsula. Free access to these materials and to the services of 
the Port must be assured as the basis of British policy. But the same must be true of 
the products and ports in the territories of other powers in the Far East. Concessions 
which we make must not be unilateral. 
31. (b) Malay States. Our policy has been to maintain the sovereignty of the 
Malay Rulers, and to make it continually more real in those States where it had 
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tended to become overlaid by our own direct Administration under the pressure of 
economic development (e.g. the decentralisation policy in the Federated Malay 
States). Our declared policy has also been to promote the well being and efficiency of 
the Malay peoples and their educational fitness to fill the official Services in their 
own territories. The continual and legitimate fear of the Malaya [Malays] has been 
that they would be swamped by the more efficient and numerous Chinese and to a 
lesser extent the Indians. Chinese immigration has been controlled for this reason 
and limited to the economic capacity of the tin and rubber industries. These policies 
are in the interests of the people of the country and should be maintained for their 
paramount advantage. 
32. It may be necessary after the war to take steps to achieve some form of closer 
union of the Malay States (probably not only with each other but involving the 
Straits Settlements also) with a view to ensuring a common policy in matters of 
concern to Malaya generally, and indeed to other countries which have interests in 
Malaya. It is probable that the views of the State authorities in such negotiations will 
be coloured by their recent experience and that they will attach particular 
importance to reassurances about defence. It may therefore be that while the 
Treaties would be concluded as between Great Britain and the Malay States the 
defence provisions would necessarily fit into the more general plan of the United 
Nations for mutual support in the Pacific. 
33. This conception of British policy for Malaya would form part of a wider scheme 
in the Pacific area arranged by the United Nations in co-operation, and sealed by a 
United Nations mutual engagement for defence and for economic development as 
suggested earlier in this paper. 
Borneo 
34. The territories under British protection in Borneo comprise: (1) the State of 
Sarawak under the sovereignty of Rajah Brooke5 and '\.lnder an Agreement with His 
Majesty's Government which places the responsibility for foreign relations and 
defence upon the shoulders of His Majesty's Government; (2) the State of Brunei 
under the sovereignty of a Malay Sultan who is in similar Treaty relations with His 
Majesty's Government as the Malay States in the Peninsula; (3) the State of North 
Borneo which is administered by a Chartered Company in London as an independent 
State under His Majesty's protection. 
35. Of these three territories Sarawak and Brunei would continue to be 
independent States under His Majesty's protection by treaty but if some form of 
Malayan Union were developed it would be appropriate that Brunei at least and 
possibly Sarawak also should be associated with that Union. 
36. In North Borneo the continued sovereignty of a Chartered Company would 
not be impressive as a desirable and modern form of authority. Although the 
Chartered Company differs from other examples in that it does not itself engage in 
trade but confines itself to its functions of administration, it nevertheless has the 
outward form of a commercial concern with shareholders, occasional distribution of 
dividends etc., and cannot be regarded as having the resources, experience, or 
international authority to exercise sovereign functions over a backward people. 
Under the plan of reconstruction in the Pacific, therefore, an opportunity will arise 
5 Charles Vyner Brooke had succeeded his father, Charles, as third rajah in 1917. 
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for proposing the direct assumption by the British Government of administrative 
responsibility for North Borneo, and that the Company's Charter be extinguished on 
suitable terms. If that course were adopted, the State of North Borneo might also be 
associated with the Malayan Union since its communications are largely with 
Singapore and its administrative problems and needs are similar to those of the less 
developed States in the Malay Peninsula. 
37. A Malayan Union which includes the States in North Borneo might need a 
different name but would be a substantial block of territories with Singapore as its 
natural centre of trade and communications and would possess a potential strength 
which would offer promise of economic and political development. ... 6 
6 The memorandum next turned to other territories such as the Japanese mandated islands. 
9 CO 825/35/4, no 53 11 Sept 1942 
[Post-war settlement in the Far East]: minute by G E J Gent of a 
meeting of ministers on lOSept to discuss the joint CO-FO 
memorandum1 
Mr. Attlee said that the memorandum was based on the idea that the Far East was to 
be treated as a separate problem from that of Colonial territories in other parts of the 
world, but could there not in general be said to be a single Colonial problem having 
much the same general characteristics everywhere? 
Mr. Eden said that the special feature of the Far East was that, besides the British, 
there was a group of the leading countries in the United Nations which was 
intimately concerned with the territories in the Far East, the United States, China, 
Holland and to some extent Russia; whereas they had no such interest, for instance, 
in Africa. 
Mr. Amery said that he was not happy about the proposal in the memorandum that 
we should give up Hong Kong. In his view we should approach the whole subject 
from the standpoint that we are giving up nothing, and particularly he stressed the 
overriding importance of strategic considerations; if it were proposed that we should 
give up any territory we should first be quite sure that it would not be a strategic loss 
to us, but what we might give up would be counter-balanced by gaining something of 
no less strategic value. 
Mr. Eden stressed that our aim was to secure collective defence in the Far East and 
particularly to ensure that the United States committed themselves to play their part 
in a United Nations defence system. His idea was that each country would be 
responsible for maintaining the defence of their own territories but would share in a 
general collective undertaking and in reciprocal facilities for each other's forces in 
the bases etc. in the several territories. 
He said that there were three objects before us: (1) Guidance for the British 
1 See 8. The meeting was attended by Attlee (DO), Cranborne (CO), Eden (FO), Amery (India Office) and 
officials from their respective departments. 
26 WARTIME PLANNING [9) 
Delegation at the Pacific Relations Conference. (2) The education of opinion here and 
in America. (3) The question of Mr. Cordell Hull's suggestion for a joint Anglo-U.S. 
declaration about the future of Colonial territories as a kind of appendix to the 
Atlantic Charter. 
Mr. Amery repeated his warning as to the importance of judging the future 
requirements of our policy in the Far East according to the dictates of strategy. What 
the future value of Hong Kong might be could not at present be accurately judged. 
Possibly its cession to China might be considered in exchange for such a place as 
Hainan on the ground that the latter would be more useful to us from the strategic 
point of view. 
Lord Cranbome explained that there was nothing in the memorandum to commit 
the British Government to surrendering any British territories, and especially it 
envisaged that any settlement between the United Nations should not be merely 
one-sided as far as we were concerned, but that all would contribute to the general 
advantage. 
Mr. Attlee explained that there was an important political aspect about all this, and 
that in the view of the Labour Party the British electorate would not be content to go 
on bearing a financial burden in respect of Colonies for which the advantage mainly 
accrued to a capitalist group. The maintenance of national sovereignty over Colonies 
required the maintenance of national armaments; and in respect both of armaments 
and sovereignty over backward peoples the political views which he shared were in 
favour of the substitution of an international system of responsibility and control. 
National sovereignty and national armaments had shown poor results and would 
inevitably lead to renewed war in due course. A new conception of international 
collaboration and responsibility and a pooling of the burden, including the financial 
burden, of armaments was required. 
Lord Cranbome said that he did not accept that our record in the Colonies, and 
particula_rly in Malaya and Hong Kong, was a poor one. Not only we but also the 
Dutch in the Netherlands East Indies and the Americans in the Philippines had 
rendered great service, and effectively established great reforms in our respective 
territories to the great advantage of the native peoples. We have all fallen down in 
one respect, namely, defence, and as far as the British were concerned we might be 
said to have less blame for this than the Americans vis a vis Japanese aggression. 
Mr. Eden said that our principal object must be to establish a system in the Pacific 
region in which the United States will not only consent to participate but will be 
definitely anxious to participate. Clearly the mere restoration of the status quo with 
all concerned clinging rigidly to their pre-war rights and policies would not attract 
the Americans to incur any obligations for the future defence of such an arrange-
ment. There must be an agreed system of administration, standards, responsibilities, 
and mutual obligations which would be sealed by a willingness of all concerned to 
contract to defend, and it would be important from our point of view that the 
Dominion Governments should be at every stage at one with us in formulating 
British policy in this region. 
Lord Cranbome explained that his idea of the Pacific Regional Council proposed in 
the paper was that it should comprise representatives of the great Pacific powers and 
the Dominions. The Council would be responsible for stipulating a certain set of 
principles to which the local governments would conform. But the sovereign 
authority in each territory would rest with the power or country concerned and not 
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with an international body. The chief difference which he saw in the new Regional 
Council as compared with the former Mandates Commission of the League of 
Nations was that the new Council would comprise a body of experts with colonial 
experience-and experience of the region-whereas the Mandates Commission's 
influence was compromised by the fact that it was often composed of representatives 
of Norway, Poland, Venezuela, etc. who had no such experience. 
Mr. Attlee asked what would be the sanction for the Regional Council's authority, 
and Mr. Amery expressed the view that while the only ultimate sanction in 
international affairs was war, it would be in this case the interest of all the powers 
concerned in the region to secure compliance with the standards and obligations 
which all had agreed to regard as the basis of co-operation and peace in the Pacific. 
He thought that some special international system might well be established in the 
economic field and Lord Cranbome agreed that the special needs of America in 
particular for the rubber and tin of the region might be usefully met by a special 
economic control. 
Mr. Attlee represented his preference for an international system of administration 
and said that it was not sufficient to condemn such a system by pointing to the 
inefficiency of the international system at Tangier or the Condominium in the New 
Hebrides. In neither of those cases was there an obvious effort to promote efficiency. 
But something on a much larger scale deriving from an intention to collaborate to 
mutual advantage and the achievement of results is worth examination. It would not 
necessarily mean that the local executive in any territory would be a polyglot mixture 
of officials but the international authority would need to be the sovereign authority 
with the power of laying down standards and regulations and to carry out inspection 
in any way and matters thought necessary. 
Mr. Amery felt that this would be incompatible with Parliamentary responsibility-
in so far as a Minister in H.M.G. would be involved in an international council to be 
established with sovereign authority responsible to no one but itself. 
Mr. Eden said that he felt there were only two courses possible and there was no 
middle way. (1) We must either be responsible for the administration of our 
territories and have the ultimate power of Government or (2) sovereign authority 
must lie elsewhere and H.M.G.'s responsibility to Parliament for the local adminis-
tration would disappear. There were obviously high matters of policy to be settled by 
H.M.G. before further progress could be made on this memorandum and he 
suggested, and Mr. Attlee and the other Ministers agreed, that further discussion of 
British Far Eastern policy and of the memorandum must be deferred for the present. 
10 CO 825/35/4, no 61 1 Oct 1942 
'Record of conversation between the secretary of state and the Chinese 
ambassador at the Colonial Office on Wednesday, 30 September, 
1942': minute by Lord Cranborne 
I had a visit yesterday afternoon from the Chinese Ambassador. 
He told me that he was shortly returning to his own country for a visit and when 
he arrived there he would be bound to be asked what was the view of the British with 
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regard to the future of their Colonial Empire. He wondered whether I could give him 
any information about our post-war colonial policy. 
I asked the Ambassador whether he had in mind a policy for the Far East or for the 
Colonial Empire generally. 
He said that he would be glad of information about both. 
I then told him that so far as the Colonial Empire generally was concerned he had 
asked me a difficult question. The one thing which had impressed itself most upon 
my mind during the six months that I had been in the Colonial Office was that it was 
almost impossible to lay down a cut and dried policy applicable to all colonies alike. I 
was in charge of the administration of no less than 50 territories, and in all of them 
conditions were to some extent different from those that obtained in the others. For 
instance, how could it be said that one could lay down exactly the same policy for 
Malta and Nyasaland, or for Bermuda, which had enjoyed a Constitution of its own 
for over 200 years. My experience led me to believe that the conditions in each colony 
must be considered individually, and that any attempt to standardize policy would be 
bound to lead to disaster. At the same time, it would be true to say that there were 
certain general principles which we accepted for the administration of backward 
peoples. We had long believed in what was known as the doctrine of trusteeship, that 
is to say, the training of backward peoples with a view to their ultimately taking over 
the government of their countries. To that principle we adhered. I should, however, 
make it clear that in some parts of the world it was bound to be a very long term 
policy, and we had lately tried to speed it up by bringing in to our own administration 
outstanding representatives of the indigenous peoples. We had made a start in West 
Africa, and had achieved a measure of success. This development, as he knew, had 
been given the name of 'partnership', and no doubt this process of bringing in the 
local population into British administration would be continued and extended. I 
would not, however, like him to form the impression that an extension of 
partnership would lead in the near future to anything like dominion status for the 
more backward areas. Dominion status, to my mind, meant something very special. 
It indicated that a particular territory was now an adult nation responsible for its 
foreign policy and defence. This was clearly not true of the more backward parts of 
the British Empire at the present time, and would probably not be so for some 
considerable period. 
The Ambassador then turned to the question of the Far East, and asked what were 
my views about this. I said that the principles which I had tried to define regarding 
our future policy towards the Colonial Empire as a whole clearly applied equally to 
our territories in the Far East. In the case of Malaya the population was evidently 
more advanced than in Africa, and there the policy could no doubt be speeded up 
more rapidly after the war. I did not accept the view which had been propounded in 
some quarters that the actual administration of our Far Eastern dependencies had 
been defective in the past. No doubt there had been faults, but on the whole the 
period during which we had had control of them had been one of steady development 
and increased prosperity. Where there had undoubtedly been a gap had been in the 
matter of defence. It was there that we had fallen down, but this applied equally to 
the Dutch and the Americans. He would remember the years before the war and how 
we had hoped that it would be possible for the United States to play a full part in 
maintaining peace in the Pacific. But unfortunately at that time it had been 
politically impossible for them. It seemed to me-and here I explained that I was 
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speaking merely for myself-that it would be essential after the war that there should 
be some scheme of mutual defence agreed between the Pacific powers. Only so 
should we avoid a repetition of the present disasters. I hoped very much that in such 
a defence scheme China would find it possible to play a part. To this the Ambassador 
appeared to assent. I also said that it seemed to me possible that it would be to the 
advantage of the powers concerned that there should be some international 
consultative body which could meet frequently and discuss questions of mutual 
interest to the member powers. 
The Ambassador said that he was glad to know the kind of direction in which our 
minds were moving in this country. It would be most helpful to him when he got to 
Chungking. 1 
1 Chungking was the capital of Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist regime. 
11 CO 877/25/7/27265/7, no 1 4 Dec 1942 
[Lessons from Hong Kongand Malaya]: report by Sir W Battershill, 1 
G E J Gent and W L Rolleston2 
Introduction 
1. Our terms of reference:- "To consider and report what lessons, from the 
point of view of Colonial administration in wartime, can be drawn from the 
experience of Hong Kong and Malaya". 
For the sake of brevity we use the word "Colony" to cover all forms of Colonial 
dependency and the word "military" to cover all fighting services. 
2. We would emphasise first that owing to the differences which exist between 
the various Colonies some of our conclusions are stated in general terms and can 
only be applied with considerable variations from Colony to Colony. And secondly 
that the evidence and data on which we have based our conclusions are very 
incomplete. Our conclusions must be read in the light of this fact. 
Relations with the fighting services 
3. There is evidence that relations between the civil government and the military 
could have been improved, though however good the administrative arrangements 
may be to ensure this end, everything must in the last resort depend very largely on 
the personalities of the men at the top. 
4. In Malaya, apart from the complications of the civil machine owing to the 
existence as separate entities of the Straits Settlements, the Federated Malay States 
and the Unfederated Malay States, there existed military, naval and air force 
commanders for Malaya, and also Commanders-in-Chief commanding areas larger 
1 Sir William Battershill, deputy under-secretary of state, CO, 1942- 1945, and governor of Tanganyika, 
1945-1949. 
2 W L Rolleston, Royal Engineers, 1925-1946, and colonial service, Singapore and North Borneo, 
1947-1950. 
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than Malaya but having their headquarters inside the territory.* In addition there 
were representatives of various other branches of the Home Government, e.g. the 
Ministry of Economic Warfare, the Ministry of War Transport and the intelligence 
services. Each of these many organisations corresponded separately with their own 
headquarters in this country. As a result of these complications in the administrative 
machine there was, at all levels, too often uncertainty and delay in reaching 
decisions. 
5. In Hong Kong there was a simpler administrative machine and a less 
complicated hierarchy among the fighting services. In fact there was no evidence of 
discord in the direction of the Colony's defence. 
6. Some of the difficulty of the position in Malaya seems to have been recognised 
before the invasion took place and no doubt this was one of the reasons for Mr. Duff 
Cooper's journey to the Far East.3 But it seems that his few weeks' tenure of office 
did not remedy all the defects and on General Wavell's appointment as Commander-
in-Chief he left Malaya some weeks before its fall . Difficulties of a comparable order 
have been recognised in the Middle East and West Africa, and partly with the object 
of meeting them a Minister of State has been appointed to the Middle East and a 
Resident Minister to West Africa. In Ceylon, Admiral Layton has been given a 
position of special authority. 
7. The first lesson we draw is that there should in wartime be some authority Qn 
the spot with the necessary power of direction in a time of crisis to resolve at once 
any differences between the civil and military. There seem to us three possible ways 
of achieving this. First a Regional Authority such as a Minister of State or Resident 
Minister, who even if not actually in a Colony would be near enough to it to have 
first-hand knowledge of its problems and personalities. Secondly the Ceylon model 
under which there is in the Colony itself not only a Governor and a General-Officer-
Commanding but a Commander-in-Chief with a co-ordinating authority. Thirdly an 
arrangement could be made for either the Governor or the Senior Military Officer to 
have authority over the other, either at all times or preferably in time of military 
crisis only. 
Value of regional authority 
8. We believe that the Ceylon arrangement is working very well in that Colony 
but we doubt whether it would be suitable for general application to other Colonies. 
We are however much impressed with the value in war-time of a Regional Authority, 
properly established before a crisis arrives. From a civilian standpoint his value can 
be stated briefly as follows:-
(a) He can take a wide view of the needs and requirements, strategic, political and 
economic, of his whole area. 
(b) He can secure co-ordination of policy between the civil administrations and 
the military. 
• Though General Wavell's headquarters as Commander-in-Chief, South West Pacific, were outside 
Malaya. 
3 In Aug 1941 Alfred Duff Cooper, chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, left for the Far East to examine 
the co-ordination between various British authorities in the region. After Pearl Harbour he was appointed 
resident minister in Singapore. See 39, note 4. 
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He will be in a position to smooth out any local difficulties between the civil 
, military which arise from time to time and in a crisis will be able to take 
nediate decisions on the spot with all the authority that goes with Cabinet 
tk. 
He can correlate the work of the representatives of the various branches of the 
•me Government mentioned in paragraph 4 above, many of whom are of 
mparatively junior rank, and assist them by the weight of his authority. 
1 By personal visits to Colonies within his area he can help to dispel that sense of 
>lation, as to the existence of which we have evidence, and can ensure from his 
wwledge of local personalities that the administration is carrying out its task 
ficiently and is imbued with the proper war-time mentality. 
. We consider the value of a Regional Authority to be the prime lesson to be 
.vn from the fall of Malaya. There may be special political or other conditions 
eh would prevent a Regional Authority in other parts of the Colonial Empire from 
ing the same value, but we recommend that the possibility of their appointment 
m emergency measure of war-time organisation should be carefully considered. 
~ three regions which suggest themselves are East Africa (in which we would 
:lude Mauritius and Seychelles), the Western Pacific and West Indies. Clearly a 
:ision on so important a matter should not be left till the moment of crisis has 
rived. 
10. There may come a time when even the authority of a Regional Authority is 
o distant. If for instance Mauritius and the Seychelles were invaded or closely 
treatened, a Resident Minister for East Africa would be little better able than his 
>lleagues in London to ensure unity of effort between civil and military in those 
olonies. We think therefore that there should be for every Colony, whether or not it 
>rms part of the sphere of action of a Regional Authority, administrative arrange-
.1ents whereby in time of imminent military crisis some one individual actually in 
he Colony or very close to it becomes supreme.+ Who that person should be would 
·equire consideration in each case. Where there was a Regional Authority it would be 
or him to decide when the situation was such that he could no longer exercise his 
)OWer and when therefore the local man should take over. If the military commander 
became the supreme authority, the civil government should continue as long as 
possible under his general direction. 
11. We certainly do not advocate that the present arrangements between the 
Governor and the military commander should be altered except at a time of real 
military crisis such as invasion or an imminent threat of it. But we do think it should 
be quite clear what is to happen in such a crisis and that all arrangements should be 
worked out beforehand. 
A war council 
12. Harmonious working of all the branches of the public services civil and 
+ A complication arises where the Colony forms only part of the command of the General Officer 
Commanding and yet is close to his headquarters-as in Kenya, Uganda and Tanganyika. In this case it 
may be preferable not to have a supreme authority actually in each Colony but to have one authority 
(either civil or military) for the three. In Mauritius or the Seychelles, however, which are also in the East 
Africa Command but geographically remote for the G.O.C.'s headquarters, a single authority in each 
island seems desirable. 
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than Malaya but having their headquarters inside the territory.* In addition there 
were representatives of various other branches of the Home Government, e.g. the 
Ministry of Economic Warfare, the Ministry of War Transport and the intelligence 
services. Each of these many organisations corresponded separately with their own 
headquarters in this country. As a result of these complications in the administrative 
machine there was, at all levels, too often uncertainty and delay in reaching 
decisions. 
5. In Hong Kong there was a simpler administrative machine and a less 
complicated hierarchy among the fighting services. In fact there was no evidence of 
discord in the direction of the Colony's defence. 
6. Some of the difficulty of the position in Malaya seems to have been recognised 
before the invasion took place and no doubt this was one of the reasons for Mr. Duff 
Cooper's journey to the Far East.3 But it seems that his few weeks ' tenure of office 
did not remedy all the defects and on General Wavell's appointment as Commander-
in-Chief he left Malaya some weeks before its fall. Difficulties of a comparable order 
have been recognised in the Middle East and West Africa, and partly with the object 
of meeting them a Minister of State has been appointed to the Middle East and a 
Resident Minister to West Africa. In Ceylon, Admiral Layton has been given a 
position of special authority. 
7. The first lesson we draw is that there should in wartime be some authority Qn 
the spot with the necessary power of direction in a time of crisis to resolve at once 
any differences between the civil and military. There seem to us three possible ways 
of achieving this. First a Regional Authority such as a Minister of State or Resident 
Minister, who even if not actually in a Colony would be near enough to it to have 
first-hand knowledge of its problems and personalities. Secondly the Ceylon model 
under which there is in the Colony itself not only a Governor and a General-Officer-
Commanding but a Commander-in-Chief with a co-ordinating authority. Thirdly an 
arrangement could be made for either the Governor or the Senior Military Officer to 
have authority over the other, either at all times or preferably in time of military 
crisis only. 
Value of regional authority 
8. We believe that the Ceylon arrangement is working very well in that Colony 
but we doubt whether it would be suitable for general application to other Colonies. 
We are however much impressed with the value in war-time of a Regional Authority, 
properly established before a crisis arrives. From a civilian standpoint his value can 
be stated briefly as follows:-
(a) He can take a wide view of the needs and requirements, strategic, political and 
economic, of his whole area. 
(b) He can secure co-ordination of policy between the civil administrations and 
the military. 
• Though General Wavell's headquarters as Commander-in-Chief, South West Pacific, were outside 
Malaya. 
3 In Aug 1941 Alfred Duff Cooper, chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, left for the Far East to examine 
the co-ordination between various British authorities in the region. After Pearl Harbour he was appointed 
resident minister in Singapore. See 39, note 4. 
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(c) He will be in a position to smooth out any local difficulties between the civil 
and military which arise from time to time and in a crisis will be able to take 
immediate decisions on the spot with all the authority that goes with Cabinet 
rank. 
(d) He can correlate the work of the representatives of the various branches of the 
Home Government mentioned in paragraph 4 above, many of whom are of 
comparatively junior rank, and assist them by the weight of his authority. 
(e) By personal visits to Colonies within his area he can help to dispel that sense of 
isolation, as to the existence of which we have evidence, and can ensure from his 
knowledge of local personalities that the administration is carrying out its task 
efficiently and is imbued with the proper war-time mentality. 
9. We consider the value of a Regional Authority to be the prime lesson to be 
drawn from the fall of Malaya. There may be special political or other conditions 
which would prevent a Regional Authority in other parts of the Colonial Empire from 
having the same value, but we recommend that the possibility of their appointment 
as an emergency measure of war-time organisation should be carefully considered. 
The three regions which suggest themselves are East Africa (in which we would 
include Mauritius and Seychelles), the Western Pacific and West Indies. Clearly a 
decision on so important a matter should not be left till the moment of crisis has 
arrived. 
10. There may come a time when even the authority of a Regional Authority is 
too distant. If for instance Mauritius and the Seychelles were invaded or closely 
threatened, a Resident Minister for East Africa would be little better able than his 
colleagues in London to ensure unity of effort between civil and military in those 
Colonies. We think therefore that there should be for every Colony, whether or not it 
forms part of the sphere of action of a Regional Authority, administrative arrange-
ments whereby in time of imminent military crisis some one individual actually in 
the Colony or very close to it becomes supreme.+ Who that person should be would 
require consideration in each case. Where there was a Regional Authority it would be 
for him to decide when the situation was such that he could no longer exercise his 
power and when therefore the local man should take over. If the military commander 
became the supreme authority, the civil government should continue as long as 
possible under his general direction. 
11. We certainly do not advocate that the present arrangements between the 
Governor and the military commander should be altered except at a time of real 
military crisis such as invasion or an imminent threat of it. But we do think it should 
be quite clear what is to happen in such a crisis and that all arrangements should be 
worked out beforehand. 
A war council 
12. Harmonious working of all the branches of the public services civil and 
+ A complication arises where the Colony forms only part of the command of the General Officer 
Commanding and yet is close to his headquarters-as in Kenya, Uganda and Tanganyika. In this case it 
may be preferable not to have a supreme authority actually in each Colony but to have one authority 
(either civil or military) for the three. In Mauritius or the Seychelles, however, which are also in the East 
Africa Command but geographically remote for the G.O.C.'s headquarters, a single authority in each 
island seems desirable. 
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military, will not necessarily be ensured solely by the existence either of a single 
authority in each Colony or of a Regional Authority for some larger area. There must 
be the most careful arrangements for collaboration at all levels. 
13. We have evidence as to the value of war councils as a factor in co-operative 
working of all branches of the civil and military machines. The Minister of State at 
Cairo has a war council consisting of the Governors of the territories within his 
sphere, the British Ambassadors and the Chiefs of the fighting services, and we are 
aware of the existence in various colonies of similar councils consisting of the 
Governors and representatives of the military and civil administration. Meetings of 
these Councils not only serve to expedite decisions and to cut down paper work, but 
also afford a common meeting ground for the exchange of information and the frank 
expression of views. They have no legal status and need none. We recommend that, 
where these do not exist, Governors should be asked to consider whether it would 
not be advisable to include them in the administrative machinery. 
14. A lesson to be learnt from Malaya is the desirability of recording at the actual 
meeting of the Council clear-cut decisions, beyond the possibility of misunderstand-
ing, on which action can be taken immediately. 
Liaison officers 
15. It seems to us very desirable that there should be some regular day to day 
liaison between the Governor and the Secretariat on the one hand and the military 
on the other. We think that all Governors should normally have a military officer on 
their personal staffs. In Colonies with small military establishments an officer of the 
ordinary rank of an A.D.C. may suffice. In other Colonies Governors might find it 
useful to have a more senior officer attached to them who might be known as 
"Military Secretary". Such an officer while living at Government House as a member 
of the Governor's personal staff could maintain contact between Secretariat and the 
military and could generally assist the Governor in keeping the closest day to day 
.contact with them. 
16. There are considerable advantages in the headquarters of the various services 
being close to one another. In Malaya the various headquarters were for various 
reasons many miles apart. This made close liaison more difficult. 
Liaison arrangements in districts 
17. In all potentially "front-line Colonies" arrangements for co-operation be-
tween various services must be as carefully made in the districts as they are at the 
capital. There were plenty of complaints from Malaya of poor co-operation between 
civil and military in the districts, for instance in Penang. A large part of the trouble 
seems to have been due to the receipt of different orders from the respective 
headquarters. If co-operation at the centre is good, the likelihood of difficulty in the 
districts will be minimised. 
18. We have suggested that in each territory there should at a time of crisis be 
one supreme authority . We do not see how similar provision could be made district 
by district. Very often military and civil boundaries will not coincide, troops may be 
moved suddenly from the district, new troops may come in, and so forth. 
Accordingly, we must rely on good personal relations and on each side receiving 
similar orders from the centre to avoid difficulties. If active operations are 
proceeding, the district commissioner must without question comply immediately 
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with the requirements of the military. It would be convenient at such times for the 
district commissioner to be attached to local military headquarters. Events in Malaya 
made it abundantly clear that it was of great value to the local officer commanding to 
have on his staff and constantly available to him during active operations an 
experienced civilian official speaking the local language and knowing the local 
customs as well as the lay-out of the civil administration. 
19 It might be possible to have in some districts a projection of the war council 
and this might do much to solve local problems and to educate both civil and 
military in the difficulties and point of view of the other. In any case the district 
commissioner should regard it as part of his duty to take the initiative in establishing 
close liaison with the military authorities. 
20. During active operations a district may be cut off entirely from the centre of 
government, and it has been suggested to us that in such circumstances the district 
commissioner may require extra powers to enable him to carry on the administra-
tion. We suggest that all "front-line Colonies" should be invited to consider this 
point. 
Social contracts {contacts] with the lighting services 
21. We have so far been concerned only with administrative arrangements at the 
centre of government and in districts for co-operation between the civil and military 
authorities. But good relations cannot be attained merely by administrative order or 
official procedure. Friendly social contact is also important, and this should not be 
only of the impersonal or "institutional" variety. Civil officials should go out of their 
way to get to know members of the fighting services socially. 
Organization of manpower 
22. One of the clearest lessons of the Malayan campaign is the importance in a 
period of crisis of utilizing to the best advantage all the available manpower, official 
and unofficial. In Malaya most Europeans and some responsible Asiatics, in both 
cases official and unofficial, had been trained for employment In the Volunteer Force. 
Some attempt was made to ensure that those whose work would be of importance in 
war-time were not taken to serve in the Force, but in the event it proved that not 
nearly enough exceptions had been made and that those who served in the Force 
were too often employed on unimportant jobs as ordinary rank and file. Many would 
have been doing more valuable work in their civil jobs, while others would have been 
of greater value in the military as guides, interpreters and advisers (of which they 
stood in great need) than as ordinary volunteers. There was thus a serious waste of 
manpower. We suggest that all "front-line" Colonial governments should keep their 
manpower arrangements in constant review with particular reference to those 
enrolled in combatant forces. 
23 . It is important that special care should be taken in the organization of labour 
on essential services of all kinds. Everywhere in Malaya labour melted away as soon 
as heavy bombing developed. After the bombing of Penang practically all the labour 
employed in the town disappeared, while during the last few weeks only 1,000 men 
could be found to work for the military in Singapore when many thousands were 
needed. Shortage of labour was undoubtedly a major difficulty during the last weeks 
in Malaya. 
24. It is not possible to lay down any hard and fast rules for the treatment of 
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labour so as to ensure that it does not disappear under the stress of operations. Each 
Colony will have to consider the problem for itself. But generous provision for the 
dependants of labourers who suffer through enemy action, adequate shelter 
accommodation at their places of employment, and the provision of canteens and 
other welfare services are factors which have a considerable bearing on the 
staunchness of labour under war conditions. It goes without saying that where any 
trade unions exist those responsible for organizing essential labour should work in 
close touch with the trade union leaders. 
Financial latitude 
25. The civil Governments in Malaya undoubtedly had an advantage over the 
military authorities in that they had a wider financial latitude. They were able to 
finance urgent defence works without reference either to the Legislature or the 
Secretary of State, while the military authorities had in certain matters to refer to 
London. For instance when it was difficult to obtain labour the Governments were 
able to pay whatever wages seemed to them to be necessary but the military had to 
refer home. As uniformity between civil and military was obviously desirable, there 
was delay in a matter on which the decision was urgent. 
26. We recommend that this question of financial latitude should be brought to 
the notice of the military authorities. We recommend also that other Colonial 
Governments should be given, either by the Secretary of State or the Legislature, a 
latitude similar to that enjoyed by the Governments of Malaya. In Ceylon the 
government have obtained from the Legislature a block grant for defence purposes. 
It might be useful for other governments to do this too. 
Maintenance and distribution of essential supplies 
27. Special emergency plans should be ready for the maintenance and distribu-
tion of essential supplies. The food distribution scheme in Malaya "was well worked 
out but relied too much on the maintenance of normal civil supply channels and 
ignored the risks of shops being shut". After the Penang raid all the shops shut and 
most of the municipal employees disappeared. In Colombo the shops shut after their 
big raid. 
28. It is, of course, of the greatest importance that Colonies should be kept au fait 
with the latest developments in Air Raid Precautions technique and should have 
sufficient equipment and staff for that purpose. We understand that satisfactory 
arrangements exist to ensure that these requirements are met and that no 
recommendation on our part is necessary. 
Information and propaganda 
29. The Government of Malaya and high military officers there were at great 
pains to magnify in public estimation the preparations for defence and the 
impregnability of Malaya. Their primary object was to deceive the Japanese, though 
whether they succeeded is not apparent. What is however clear is that they deceived 
many members of the Government service. The policy may have been necessitated by 
the weakness of our defences, but the effect of it on our own people indicates 
sufficiently clearly the dangers of misleading propaganda. 
30. There is no doubt that it is most important to provide means for the rapid 
dissemination of accurate news throughout the country during active operations. It 
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may not be possible to produce newspapers or to distribute them. They should be 
supplemented by wireless broadcasts and by the use of loud speakers at pre-arranged 
points or, as was done in Hong Kong, on mobile vans. Care must, however, be taken 
against assembling large crowds where there is a danger of sudden air attack. 
Evacuation 
31. The Governments of both Malaya and Hong Kong have come in for much 
criticism in the matter of their evacuation policies and, particularly in Malaya, their 
methods of handling the problem. 
32. There are at least two distinct sets of circumstances in which evacuation of 
civilians has to be considered: first, the complete evacuation beforehand of "useless 
mouths" from potential war areas, and secondly the withdrawal of civilians from 
actual zones of operations. In both cases, we consider that policies must be governed 
strictly by defence considerations. For that reason in Hong Kong the evacuation of 
the majority of British women and children was carried out more than a year before 
the actual event of war with Japan. It was based on the difficulty of the supply in siege 
conditions of the kinds of food necessary for Europeans. There was very bitter local 
criticism alleging that British families alone were separated by their women and 
children being forced to leave . the Colony whereas others were left undisturbed. 
33. The other set 9f circumstances in which an evacuation policy has to be 
framed relates to withdrawal from actual zones of operations. In Hong Kong the 
military defence scheme provided for a withdrawal of the garrison to the island . to 
prepare for a siege which might last for many months with a consequent food 
problem as a major concern on the island. It was, therefore, a vital defence interest to 
prevent a numerous Chinese population moving on to the island when the troops 
withdrew from the mainland. In the event, this policy was carried out, and was 
naturally strongly criticised by the Chinese. 
34. In Malaya it was the policy of the War Council that British men should be 
progressively withdrawn for further useful service as the troops withdrew down the 
Peninsula. It was also the policy that British women and children, having regard to 
their particular exposure to the risk of atrocities at the hands of the Japanese forces, 
should also be removed. In the case of the men, the defence considerations were in 
our view correctly given a decisive influence, and in regard to the women and 
children we have no criticisms to offer. As far as possible opportunities of evacuation 
were also offered to Asiatics and, if a larger proportion of Europeans than Asiatics 
were in fact evacuated, one of the reasons was that the Asiatics either definitely 
preferred to stay or so continually changed their minds at the last moment that they 
repeatedly missed the boat. 
35. It is to be recognised that the withdrawal of British officials, District Officers 
and others, led to the particularly damaging criticism that at the moment of danger 
our administration deserted the people, and it is widely suggested that this feeling 
will continue to be strongly held and will add to our difficulties when we reoccupy 
the country. 
36. We repeat our view that considerations of national prestige or of the personal 
feelings of administrative officers or managers of estates, creditable as they are, 
should not override the defence advantage if the latter is best served by the 
withdrawal of the British manpower possessing local experience of the teritory and 
the people. This may be of the greatest possible value in the counter-advance of our 
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forces and the re-establishment of our position in districts temporarily occupied by 
the enemy. It might be that instead of their being withdrawn some British civilians 
could best serve the defence by being entrusted with special post-occupational tasks 
of a para-military nature. We have seen suggestions that the hinterland of Malaya 
would have offered suitable opportunities for such work. But that is a decision to be 
taken in accordance with the military plan of operations. 
37. The essential point is that there should in no territory be any uncertainty as 
to the authority who is to give the orders in matters of evacuation of civilians, and 
that those orders should be given in the clearest and most definite form and detail in 
good time for them to reach all concerned. We have no doubt from our study of 
Malayan experiences that the orders, in circumstances of actual invasion at any rate, 
should emanate from the military. 
38. The policy which suits one Colony may be inapplicable or wrong in another, 
and we suggest that the present instructions should be reviewed in order to ensure 
that in all Colonies the paramount defence needs, as they develop, are primarily and 
fully served. 
The administrative machine 
39. Many criticisms have been made of the Malayan Civil Service. It is said that 
before the invasion they carried on much as in peace-time, that much of their work 
was not connected with the war effort, and that the administrative machine failed to 
adjust itself to the critical conditions of the last few weeks. 
40. It is our business to draw lessons for the future, not to apportion blame for 
the past. But we think it right to say that much of this criticism seems to us 
misguided. In an enemy attack no amount of efficiency on the part of the civil 
administration can make up for military weakness. As regards the type of work done 
before the invasion, it is not always realized that the civil administration must 
continue to handle the great majority of its normal work e.g. revenue, posts, lands, 
schools, health services or that the production of foodstuffs or raw materials may 
itself be of great value to the war. As regards events during the invasion, the 
cataclysm was so abrupt and so contrary to what everyone had been led to expect 
from the publicly expressed views of high military and civil authorities that it must 
have been exceedingly difficult for the administration to adjust itself to it; much as it 
must have been very difficult for the civil administration in France to adjust itself to 
events in the last days before the capitulation of their country. It was indeed difficult 
enough to adjust oneself in this country; and it is permissible to doubt whether from 
an administrative point of view at any rate that adjustment has yet been satisfactorily 
completed. 
41. Yet this difficulty of adjustment emphasizes how important it is that Colonial 
civil servants, especially those in posts of authority, should be men with what we may 
call a "war-time mentality". By that phrase we mean an alertness of mind to a new 
situation, a sense of grim realism, and unhesitating recognition of the new values. 
We mean also a readiness to see a change of tempo and method in administration, a 
disappearance of peace-time checks on the possibility of mistakes, and a general 
rending of all red tape. It is impossible to expect an automatic over-night change to 
this new mentality. Even in England exhortation, propaganda, and numberless 
instructions have been needed and are constantly being repeated by Ministers, by the 
press and by the radio. How much more are such methods needed to spur on a civil 
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service depleted in numbers, working for years under a very heavy strain in a bad 
climate, mostly separated from their families with considerably reduced comforts 
and few opportunities for leave! 
42. Apparent slowness in the Colonies to respond to new conditions was no doubt 
partly due to an absence of direction from on top. While the main effort to secure a 
change must come from Governors and senior officials in the Colonies, Whitehall 
itself must give a lead. A clear-cut instruction from the Colonial Office in the early 
days of the war could have done much to assist in inculcating the proper spirit of the 
times. We think that such an instruction, very carefully framed, might still have a 
distinct value. 
43. In addition we think it important that there should be continuous personal 
contact between Colonial Office officials and officials in the Colonies. In peace-time 
there was such contact, partly by means of visits by senior officials from this office to 
the Colonies, though in our opinion there was not enough of this, but chiefly by 
contacts made with Governors and others coming to this country on leave. Since the 
war both these contacts have to a large degree disappeared. They are, however, 
certainly no less important now than in peace-time. We feel strongly, therefore, that 
every opportunity should be taken to send senior officials of the Colonial Office, who 
are themselves engaged in the current stress of war problems in London, to visit the 
Colonies on which the war is making the heaviest demands. We think that the 
Colonial Office should not be hesitant in asking for air passages for this purpose and 
should not regard the obvious difficulty of sparing staff from this office as an effective 
reason against regular visits. 
44. It has been suggested to us that the Colonial Office and Colonial Govern-
ments are not nearly drastic enough in getting rid of officials who have passed their 
maximum ability or who are no longer capable of standing up to the stresses and 
strains of war-time administration. We appreciate that it may be difficult to make 
now a fundamental change of policy to meet a temporary and abnormal situation. 
But whether or not any such fundamental change need be involved, we have been 
made keenly aware how important it is that no difficulties should prevent the 
displacement of individuals among the higher personnel in the Colonies, if this is 
necessary to secure war-time efficiency and a war-time tempo in the machine. 
Whether or not the officers displaced can be usefully employed in other appoint-
ments elsewhere in the Service or must be placed on pension (if only temporarily) 
would, no doubt, be considered in each case. But nothing should be allowed to 
prevent their removal if they are not up to the exacting standards of key 
appointments in war-time conditions. 
45. A certain number of officials have been kept on after they have reached the 
retiring age and a certain number of Governors after their normal tour of duty has 
expired. In some cases the extension has been made for a year or more. We feel 
certain that it is a mistake to make any promises as to the length of time such officers 
will be retained in the Service. Their services should be retained on short notice so 
that they can be retired at say one month's notice if required. We suggest that 
instructions be issued on these lines. 
46. If the quality of freshness of mind and energy in execution is to be 
maintained, a periodical holiday or change of occupation and environment is 
essential for Colonial officials. The difficulties are formidable but we believe they 
could be overcome. We understand that this question is at the moment under 
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consideration in the Colonial Office. We are glad of this, as we are sure that action is 
urgently required. 
47. If officers are to take leave, that will only make the greater the need for extra 
staff. Nor have we only to think of the present. Great demands will be made of the 
Colonial service in the immediate post-war period and we must be ready for all 
developments, including the reconstitution of the administrations in the Far East. 
We understand that an attempt is being made at present to recall to the Colonial 
services as many as possible of those who have been lent to the fighting services. We 
would only say that it seems doubtful whether this will provide sufficient staff, even if 
the Director of Recruitment continues to be as successful in the future as he has 
been in the past in maintaining a reasonable flow of recruits to most of the Colonial 
services. We suggest that the question should be considered whether it might not be 
advisable to offer short service conditions with a promise of a gratuity at the end to 
men who might hesitate here and now to decide to spend the whole of their future 
careers in the Colonial service. 
48. We think that it should be possible to simplify some of the administrative 
machinery in some Colonies, that a general devolution of authority to a lower level 
than at present should be insisted upon and that the risk of mistakes being made 
should be accepted. Suggestions to this end on the lines of the Prime Minister's 
instructions (which could be quoted with advantage) should be made to all 
Governors. When staff is short and overworked, every legitimate form of delegation 
and simplification is desirable. 
49. We are glad to note that the question of increasing the power of Colonial 
Governors to authorise additional expenditure has already been taken up. We feel 
that this is a matter on which considerably greater latitude might well be given with 
considerable advantage. 
General political questions 
50. One criticism which has been levied [? levelled] against the civil administra-
tion both in Malaya and Hong Kong may be briefly summed up, in the words of an 
article in the Times, as the "lack of larger purpose".4 This, says the article, "was the 
flaw in our Far Eastern Empire beside which other criticisms are trivial. . . . At the 
level of practical attainment and routine administration the Colonies were indeed 
successful. ... The populations were free, prosperous and reasonably happy. Yet 
something was missing from both Government and governed which prevented the 
fusion of the community into a living whole . . .. Without a common aim, able 
officers who should have been thinking in terms of high policy devoted more and 
more time to organizing the incidentals of local administration." 
51. Another observer writes: "The weak point was that the Government were 
alien to the whole of the population save to the small minority of Europeans. There 
was not and could not be any patriotic feeling." 
52. We take it that the ideas underlying these criticisms are as follows: first that 
the local Governments were too much concerned with day to day administration, 
secondly that there was no clear policy on ultimate objectives, thirdly that the 
administration was alien to the people, and fourthly that, partly for the last two 
reasons, there was an absence of what Lord Hailey calls "that sentiment of common 
4 cf l. 
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purpose between the administration and the people which is so essential to all 
progressive government". 
53 . We think that there may well be lessons to be learnt from these criticisms. As 
regards the first, it is a general criticism of all civil servants that they tend to become 
immersed in detail; it is true of civil servants in the Colonial Office and it is no doubt 
equally true of those in the Colonies. We can propound no easy remedy for this 
failing, but it is very desirable that all senior civil servants here and in the Colonies 
should have the time and the machinery for thinking ahead. Time can be secured 
only by the devolution of responsibility and increased staff. The machinery must vary 
from Colony to Colony. Possibly something comparable to the machinery of the Joint 
Planning Staff might be useful both here and in certain Colonies or regions-though 
colonial questions are not susceptible to the same treatment as strategic plans. 
54. As regards the criticism that there was no clear policy on ultimate objectives, 
that is a criticism which has been levied [? levelled] against most Colonial 
Governments and even against successive Secretaries of State for the last twenty 
years or more. The degree to which one ought to try to lay down in advance a course 
of evolution which must be largely affected by external events, is limited. Neverthe-
less it may be that the fresh and increased attention, which is being given to Colonial 
questions now and will no doubt continue to be given to them throughout the 
post-war settlement, may produce some clearer definition than there has been in the 
past. There is no comment that we can usefully make in this report. 
55 . As regards allegations that in Malaya and Hong Kong the Government was 
alien to the people and that there was no sentiment of common purpose, there were 
special difficulties in both countries. In Malaya a large proportion of the population 
was not of the Malay race or for the most part even born or domiciled in Malaya. 
Consequently there were many divided loyalties. Much had been done in Malaya to 
bring Malays and other Asiatics of the country into the government services and, if in 
the Straits Settlements there was constitutionally no direct association of the people 
with the government, in the Malay States the traditional government of the Sultans 
remained and its structure was, as a matter of policy, continually being streng-
thened. Actually we doubt whether any closer association of the people in the 
government or any greater sentiment of common purpose would have appreciably 
altered the course of events in either Malaya or Hong Kong: unarmed civilians, 
however patriotic, cannot do much to check the invasions of modern armies 
supported by naval and air superiority. But, even if from that point of view there is no 
particular lesson to be learnt from events in Hong Kong and Malaya, it undoubtedly 
remains an important objective of Colonial policy generally, in peace as in war, that 
the people of the Colonies should be associated in the government and that 
everything possible should be done to foster the sentiment of common purpose. 
In concluding our Report we wish to record our appreciation of the services 
rendered to us by our Secretary, Mr. Eastwood. 
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12 CO 825/35/6, no 2 20 Mar 1943 
'Plans for constitutional reconstruction in Far East': memorandum by 
W B LMonson 
[Towards the end of 1942 Cabinet decided that immediately after their reoccupation 
military administrations would be set up in Burma, Malaya and Borneo. In Feb 1943 
weekly inter-departmental meetings got underway between the CO and the WO in 
preparation for the Malayan Planning Unit which was formally established in July under 
Major-General H R Hone. In order to provide military planners with guidance on future 
policy, Gent, Paskin and Monson discussed the question of constitutional changes with 
Sir K Poyser, the CO's legal adviser. Document 12 was a revised version of Monson's first 
draft of 5 Mar which emerged from the meeting with Poyser the previous day. Gent next 
sought the opinion of an 'outsider', Lord Hailey, who had effectively defended Britain's 
colonial record at the Pacific Relations Conference and who in his response drew 
attention to the particularly sensitive issue of the sovereignty of the Malay rulers (see 13). 
Fortified with Hailey's support, Oliver Stanley approved the framework for the new policy 
at a meeting on 13 May (see 14) . The revised memorandum on 'Constitutional 
reconstruction in the Far East: Malaya, North Borneo and Sarawak' (see 15) would form 
the basis of the later directive on Malayan planning.) 
(N.B. These notes are intended to set out the main lines of policy to be followed in 
constitutional reconstruction of British or British protected territories in the Far 
East, now in Japanese hands. They do not, of course, cover all implications of the 
programme envisaged in each of the territories concerned.) 
I. General aim 
1. The object will be to secure closer co-operation and control of policy 
throughout the territories concerned in Malaya and Borneo at the least, and possibly 
also Hong Kong. 
2. Before the Japanese invasion such co-ordination, as was possible locally, was 
due to the exercise by the Governor of the Straits Settlements of the additional 
functions of High Commissioner for the Malay States and British Agent for Borneo 
(including Sarawak) . 
3. It is suggested that any future plans should envisage the appointment of a 
supreme British regional authority without direct governmental functions within 
any of the units concerned but with direct control over all the chief officers of the 
several administrations. 
4. In this memorandum this officer is for convenience referred to as the 
Governor -General 
11. Territories in Borneo 
(A) North Borneo 
(a) Pre-occupation status was that of a Protected State, administered by a 
sovereign Chartered Company with Headquarters in London. His Majesty's 
Government possessed certain limited powers over the operations of the Chartered 
Company by virtue of the terms of its Charter and of the agreement placing the 
State under His Majesty's protection. 
(b) It is agreed that the continuance of Chartered Company rule would be an 
anachronism, and that the fi rst step is to reach an agreement whereby the 
Chartered Company would relinquish its administrative rights in the territory. 
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Provided due provision is made for the interests of the Company's shareholders 
and staff, this should not be difficult to secure. 
(B) There remains the question of the future status of the territory: here there 
appear to be three courses open:-
(i) The transfer of the State to the rule of a native ruler, as in a Malay State. 
There is no obvious choice as the territory was not, previous to Company rule, a 
political entity, and the various native stocks have no traditional ruling house to 
whom they would naturally look for leadership. The Company's rights are derived 
from the transfer of more or less shadowy rights over the area possessed by the 
Sultanates of Sula [Sulu] and of Brunei. The former house has been deposed by the 
United States authorities in the Philippines, and the latter has shown no qualities 
which would justify an extension of its territories . This course can, therefore, be 
ruled out. ' 
(ii) Annexation by the Crown as a Colony. This would on political grounds 
probably be regarded as nearly as anachronistic as the continuance of Chartered 
Company rule. 
The United Kingdom authorities (especially the Home Office) have also 
generally objections to the admission of inhabitants of backward non-European 
areas to the full rights ofBritish subjects at law. 
(iii) The establishment of the State as a British Protectorate. This is probably the 
best solution. 
There is a precedent in the procedure adopted in Northern Rhodesia after the 
"buying-out" of the British South Africa Company's administrative rights there. 
The chief officer of the administration would be a Governor, assisted by Executive 
and Legislative Councils. (A basis of this framework already exists in the State). 
Ill. Labuan 
1. This is already British territory, as being part of the Colony of the Straits 
Settlements. 
2. If proposals for North Borneo go through as suggested above, it should most 
conveniently be included in North Borneo for administrative purposes. (The union in 
one administrative entity of a Colony and Protectorate is frequently found elsewhere 
in the Colonial Empire, e.g. Nigeria, Gold Coast, Kenya, etc) . 
N. Brunei 
This is at present a Malay State (Unfederated). The present constitutional position is 
governed by a Treaty with the Sultan on the usual Malay State lines (i .e. for the 
appointment of a British Adviser whose advice must be taken on all matters not 
affecting Malay religion and custom) . This position is sati~factory. 
V. Sarawak 
1. A Protected State ruled by a Rajah of the Brooke family. 
2. Relations with His Majesty's Government rested on:-. 
(i) an agreement of 1888 giving His Majesty's Government control of foreign 
relations and a right to decide any "question" arising about the succession, but no 
right to intervene in the internal administration. 
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(ii) an agreement of 1941 (never implemented owing to the outbreak of war) for 
the appointment of a British representative whose advice would have to be 
accepted in matters relating to foreign relations and defence, but who would be 
available for advice and consultation on other matters. 
3. It is probably safe to accept the premise that the inhabitants of Sarawak would 
not revolt against a restoration of Brooke rule. On that basis we should aim at the 
conclusion of a Treaty on the usual Malay State lines. 
4. The present Rajah may not wish to accept these conditions or indeed himself 
to resume actual leadership in the State at all. If any question arises of buying out his 
rights, it should be remembered that he may be said to have only a life-interest in the 
succession, and that the heir in the male line of descent (his brother and successively 
his nephew) have a right to be considered. 
VI. General 
1. The arrangements envisaged above would secure uniform British administra-
tive control of the territories in northern Borneo through the subordination of the 
Governor of North Borneo and the British Residents in Brunei and Sarawak to the 
Governor-General (see Section I). This would be strengthened by the institution of 
common senior Civil Services for Malaya and the Borneo territories. 
2. It may be thought attractive to increase this by linking the three Borneo 
territories in a federation as between themselves or in a larger Malayan federation 
that may be envisaged. 
3. In practice it is, however, doubtful whether any closer form of constitutional 
union would be justified in the present stage of their development. They have little 
direct inter-communication and trade between each other and they are racially 
disunited. 
VII. The Malay Peninsula 
(A) Singapore 
It is suggested that in any constitutional re-arrangement of the present political 
system a special status should be given to the island of Singapore on the following 
grounds:-
(i) it has a special position as an entrepot and distributing centre for all the 
United Nations territories in South East Asia. Its "free port" policy should, 
therefore be preserved; 
(ii) it will have a similar special importance to the United Nations as a naval base; 
(iii) its wealth gave it a preponderance in pre-war Malaya which was resented by 
other political units in the Peninsula and so created a barrier to closer union since 
the latter feared that, in any closer union, their interests would be subordinated to 
the rather special different interests of Singapore; 
(iv) the problems of government in Singapore which is so much urbanised are in 
important respects different from those in the rest of the Peninsula. 
It is, therefore, suggested that the Island should be excluded from any federation 
and/or customs union that may be established in the rest of the Peninsula. 
Local government could be based in the organisation of the Municipality of 
Singapore, but the Island should also be the headquarters of the Governor-General. 
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Such central administration as is necessary in respect of Christmas Island and the 
Cocos-Keeling Islands could also be carried on from Singapore and the Islands would 
remain part of the Settlement: but past practice of normally excluding them from the 
operation of legislation applicable to the Straits Settlements should be continued. 
VIII. Remaining territories in the Malay Peninsula 
It is assumed that the present separate identities of the Malay States under their 
Rulers will be preserved. 
It is suggested that all States in the Peninsula (whether in the present Federation 
or not) together with the Settlements of Penang and Malacca (which are British 
territory) should be linked in a new Federation with its capital at Kuala Lumpur, 
which would be the headquarters of a High Commissioner who would be subordinate 
to the Governor -General. The internal government of the Settlements of Penang and 
Malacca would be in the hands of Residents acting with municipal councils. It is not 
envisaged, however, that the Province Wellesley portion of the present Settlement of 
Penang should be retroceded to or divided between the States of Kedah or Perak. 
One important consideration should be borne in mind in framing the constitution 
of the Federation. So far, His Majesty has not possessed "even a scintilla of 
jurisdiction" in the Malay States. This has been difficult administratively since it has 
not been possible to take legislative action here e.g. to extend the Emergency Powers 
(Defence) Act to the States, or to establish the status of Chinese born in a Malay State 
as British protected persons. The latter point is of political importance since the 
Malay Rulers have never been ready to recognise Chinese, however long established 
in their States, as being nationals of those States. It is desirable, even at this stage, 
that the formal status of 'British protected persons' should be given to those Chinese 
who are domiciled in the Malay States. Whether they must retain Chinese nationality 
is a matter dependent on Chinese law. 
One solution for this particular problem may be found in the conditions existing 
on re-occupation of Malaya by British troops. It is contemplated that this will be 
followed by the establishment of a military administration in which jurisdiction will 
be assumed by the G.O.C. by Proclamation deriving its authority from the usages of 
war. A fortiori His Majesty will have acquired jurisdiction in the course of that 
process and the problem will be to determine how that jurisdiction can be made to 
survive the termination of the G.O.C.'s authority. 
It is suggested that this question and the whole problem of closer union generally 
should be made the subject of investigation by a Commission of Enquiry to be sent 
out during the period of military administration. 
In addition to the points mentioned above, the following considerations also come 
to mind:-
(i) Financial. The Straits Settlements and Federated Malay States Governments 
have issued loans secured on their revenues. It is important that the standing of 
these loans, particularly the sterling loans of the Federated Malay States Govern-
ment should not be lowered or the terms of issue disregarded. The question of the 
arrangements for the servicing of these loans and for their ultimate conversion 
would require careful consideration. 
(ii) In any new Federation, care should be taken to leave with the central 
authority the residual powers of legislation over matters not specified in the 
convention establishing the respective powers of central and state etc. authorities. 
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(iii) It is envisaged at present that the legislature of the new Federation should be 
constituted at any rate in part by some form of election of representatives by the 
State and Settlement legislatures. 
It is also suggested that the State Rulers should form a quasi-Chamber of Princes 
with a special position of interest in relation to legislation affecting their princely 
status and Muslim law and custom. As a matter of form the High Commissioner 
would preside and would himself represent His Majesty in respect of the Colony. 
IX .. Hong Kong 
It is to be anticipated that a strong move will be made by the Chinese to secure the 
rendition of Hong Kong (both Colony proper and New Territories), and it would be as 
well to reckon on the probability of the New Territories being restored to China 
before the end of the present 99 years' lease (which runs from 1898), or on China 
being admitted to joint jurisdiction in this area. 
On commercial grounds, however, there is a strong case for preserving some 
portion of British territory at Hong Kong to allow China merchants to take 
advantage of e.g. the facilities for registering British ships and of a secure currency as 
a backing to their trade. For this purpose the maintenance of Hong Kong Island and 
the tip of the Kowloon Peninsula already in the Colony proper might be sufficient, 
but such a territory would hardly warrant the appointment of a full-rank Governor, 
rather than a Chief Administrator or Commissioner. In any case the head of the 
Government of Hong Kong should be closely connected with (even perhaps 
subordinate to the direction of) the Ambassador in China. Alternatively he might be 
under the control of the Governor-General at Singapore. 
13 CO 825/35/6, no 3A 19 Apr 1943 
[Constitutional reconstruction]: memorandum by Lord Hailey1 on the 
CO proposals 
I recognize that the proposals contained in the Memorandum2 below are in the main 
directed to finding an answer to the question which the military authorities must ask 
when they set about the reconquest of these areas. They will, of course, ask what they 
are to indicate to their "political staff' as the arrangements which the U.K. 
Government contemplates for the future constitutional or administrative make-up of 
these territories. 
It is necessary that we should be ready with this answer, and I do not wish to 
suggest that we must atternpt at this stage to look too far forward into the future. But 
we must realize that others than the British military authorities will in time ask us 
this question. Recovery of these territories may possibly be a joint Anglo-American 
1 Lord Hailey (1872-1969); entered the Indian Civil Service, 1895; governor of the Punjab, 1924--1928, 
and United Provinces, 1928--1930, 1931-1934; director, African Research Survey, 1935--1938; member, 
Permanent Mandates Commission of the League of Nations, 1935--1939; chairman, Colonial Research 
Committee, 1943--1948. 
2 See 12. 
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operation, and unwelcome as it may be to us to contemplate that America may seek 
to have a voice in deciding on their future, nothing could prevent American opinion 
from expressing itself freely on the subject. Adverse expressions of American opinion 
might not necessarily impair our co-operation in military operations, but they would 
strengthen the hands of our own domestic critics if they thought that our policy was 
not sufficiently "forward looking". Critics will not fail to search in the record of our 
previous administration of these areas for reasons why the inhabitants did not seem 
to support us in our campaign against the Japanese, or why-as may happen-they 
do not give active assistance to our forces when we begin the campaign for ousting 
the Japanese. The reasons which our critics discover may be the wrong ones. But it 
will be troublesome if we have at the same time to correct false impressions about 
the past, and encounter difficulty in justifying our plans for the future. 
The administrative dispositions to which we look forward are largely a matter for 
the Colonial Office. Outside opinion will attach chief importance to our answer to the 
question- What are your plans for the future political status of these areas? On what 
terms do you propose to readmit private European enterprise to these territories? My 
point in referring to these questions now is that in framing our statement to the 
military authorities, we should not commit ourselves to anything inconsistent with 
what we may have to contemplate when we consider the answer to be given to these 
two questions. 
Turning now to the Memorandum, I agree that a post of Governor General, with 
Singapore as his headquarters, should be created for the control of these areas. It will 
be one step forward in the process of grouping the colonies under control of 
"intermediate authorities" which many have advocated. But it does not seem to me 
adequate to say that the Governor General must be "without direct governmental 
functions". This leaves him, so to speak, in vacuo. It is necessary that we should from 
the first have some conception of his relations firstly, with the Secretary of State, and 
secondly, with the officers in charge of the administrations included in his Governor 
generalship. 
The Secretary of State must retain his responsibility to Parliament. That would 
not, however, prevent his devolving on the Governor General aconsiderable number 
of functions now discharged by the Colonial Office. In the case of India this was 
effected in the first instance by measures of financial decontrol. In this case the 
Governor General might have authority to dispose of all financial matters (other than 
those affecting the pay of services recruited by the Secretary of State, or certain 
similar matters) up to a certain amount. The convenience of this arrangement lies in 
the fact that, as time proceeds, the amount can be progressively increased. He might, 
again, be the final authority for sanctioning local budgets, save where they involve 
tariff questions or where a budget is seriously unbalanced. He would dispose of 
contracts or concessions, up to a figure to be fixed. He would dispose of petitions 
from Government employees, other than those recruited by the Secretary of State, 
and would also dispose of petitions from the public subject to periodic report to the 
Colonial Office on action taken by him, or reference on important matters of policy. I 
give these as illustrations-there is some material for filling out the . list in a 
Memorandum I wrote for the Colonial Office regarding the executive relations of the 
Secretary of State to colonial governments. 
As regards the relations of the Governor General to the authorities in charge of 
areas under his control, he would not himself be a source of legislation. This would 
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only be possible if the areas were grouped in some form of federation, with a federal 
council, and I agree with the Memorandum (VI (3)) in holding it premature to 
contemplate this. But nevertheless he could (subject to the orders of the Secretary of 
State) control legislation, so long as any legislative authority-e.g. the Malayan 
Council-had an official majority, or alternatively, so long as the Governors or 
similar authorities had "reserved" powers. When self-governing institutions are 
introduced, this point would have to be reconsidered. Legislation is, however, at this 
stage a less important factor than executive supervision. The Governor General 
would be ineffective as an agency fo r initiating or directing schemes of economic or 
social development unless he had his own staff of advisers. Each of the areas-or at 
all cevents the largest-would have its own departmental services under their 
departmental heads. But India in the pre-1935 period again offers a useful precedent 
here. There were at different times attached to the Governor General in Council 
certain officers, known as Inspectors General of Irrigation and Forests, the Health 
Commissioner and Educational Adviser. They had no executive control over the 
provincial Departments, but they rendered advice to the Governor General on policy, 
and their technical advice was also valued by the Provincial Governments them-
selves. They spent a great part of their time touring in the Provinces. 
Coming now to the detailed proposals in 11 and the following sections of the 
Memorandum, there is one preliminary observation. It would be well to be clear as to 
the juridical situation created by the temporary loss of sovereignty over these areas. I 
do not suggest that the juridical position is decisive as to any obligations we may 
decide to recognize, for this depends also on moral and political considerations; but 
we should be more at ease in applying these considerations if we knew the juridical 
position. Moreover, others may raise the point. It is the fact that agreements, 
contracts or commitments into which we have entered are 'frustrated' by the loss of 
control over these territories? If so, are they to be regarded as terminated, or only 
held in suspense pending recovery of the territories? I attach a paper3 given me by 
Mr. Gent, with whom I raised some of these questions in the course of discussion. I 
do not think that it supplies a final answer to these questions. I propose, however, to 
assume for the purpose of this note, that any agreements made by us remain in 
suspense. Whatever the juridical position, it may well be that this is the attitude we 
should take, on political grounds. 
As regards North Borneo, there has already been a general agreement (in which 
the representative of the Company has apparently joined) that the Company has 
outlived its use as an agency for administration. In any case, public opinion would 
not support the restoration of the territory to Chartered Company rule. The 
Chartered Company had sovereign rights in North Borneo, acquired by agreement or 
purchase from the indigenous rulers. Our charter did not, therefore, create those 
rights; it only recognized them, and in return for the promise of protection, the 
Company agreed to certain limitations on their exercise. The assets held by the 
Company were acquired by the use of their own capital and by the exercise of their 
revenue raising powers. Our reconquest of North Borneo would put us in a position 
to allow the Company to renew its sovereign powers, but I doubt if there is anything 
in our Agreement which would compel us to do so, unless indeed it is felt that the 
3 Not printed. 
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promise of "protection" implies this. On the other hand, we should probably decide, 
as a matter of policy and of equity, that we ought to compensate the Company for the 
loss of the sovereign rights taken over by us; we should of course be obliged in any 
case to compensate it for any standing assets which we acquired, as these are private 
property. It is to be hoped that we shall acquire all rights and property from the 
Company and shall avoid the precedent by which we left mineral rights to the B.S.A. 
in the Rhodesias, with very embarrassing results. (I have given in a separate note 
some figures about the capital of the Company and the dividends paid by it. It has not 
proved to be very profitable to the shareholders.) 
As regards the choice of form under which we should assume jurisdiction 
(annexation as Colony or establishment as a Protectorate) I differ from what is said in 
II.B.(ii) regarding annexation. If it is meant that annexation is an anachromism [sic] 
because we are bound to refrain from "territorial aggrandisement", this argument 
does not really apply. In the eyes of the rest of the world, North Borneo is already 
British territory. We should have no difficulties on that score. Coming, however, to 
the forms under which jurisdiction may be exercised, it is the form of a Protectorate 
which is really an anachromism [sic], not that of a Colony. When so much has been 
said about the Empire or Commonwealth ideal, it seems strange that we should 
hesitate to admit the inhabitants of a dependency to the status of "British subjects". 
(The legal differences in status have been examined in a Memorandum prepared for 
the Post-war Committee.) The issue is, however, a general one, affecting many 
important dependencies, and until it has been settled I agree with the conclusion in 
II.B.(iii) that North Borneo should be treated as a Protectorate. This will involve the 
extension of the Foreign Jurisdiction Act4 to it. 
As to Labuan (Ill) I agree. 
In regard to Brunei (N) please see what is said below about the Malay States. 
Sarawak (V) is another of the constitutional oddities which are included within the 
orbit of the British Empire. Public opinion is likely to feel that we should either 
dissociate ourselves entirely from Sarawak, or should exercise full jurisdiction over 
it. We now extend "protection" to it, but have no control over its internal 
administration. If it is undeveloped-as it most certainly is-or badly ruled-as it 
might at any time become-we have to stand the discredit. 
Our reconquest of Sarawak would (as in the case of North Borneo) put us in a 
position to allow the Raja to resume his sovereignty, under our protection. I suggest, 
however, that the proper course is to declare Sarawak a Protectorate, and to extend 
the Foreign Jurisdiction Act to it, so that we shall have complete legislative and 
executive authority in the area. By virtue of that authority, we could then assign to 
the Raja such position as we considered fit. He might in this case suitably be given a 
position analogous to that of the Sultan of Zanzibar. 
I agree with the suggestion about Singapore (VII) . The strongest argument for its 
treatment as a separate entity lies in the great predominance of Chinese in the 
population. 
The treatment of the rest of Malaya is our most difficult problem. There is on the 
4 The Foreign Jurisdiction Acts of 1890 and 1913 empowered the Crown to exercise jurisdiction within a 
foreign country as if it had acquired that jurisdiction by conquest or the cession of territory. Theoretically 
interpreted as jurisdiction over British subjects alone, in practice the Act was brought to bear upon 
indigenous peoples as well. 
,. 
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one hand, the obligation of honour to replace the Sultans in the position which our 
Treaties have assigned to them; there is, on the other hand, the need to take account 
of our announced policy of promoting self-government in the Colonies. It is obvious 
that there are many advantages in the existing system, which is practically one of 
direct official rule, under the facade of "advice" to Malayan rulers. It pays respect to 
the declarations made-as for instance by the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of 
State in 19255 -that the maintenance of the authority and prestige of the Rulers 
must always be a cardinal point in British policy. It affords the Malay population a 
guarantee against political submergence by Chinese and Indian immigrants-now 
amounting to 56.5 per cent. of the total Asiatic population. That it is convenient to 
the official administration is clear from the almost passionate devotion with which 
some of them support it. Moreover-and this is a substantial fact-it has enabled us 
in the last half century to make an advance in the improvement of economic and 
social conditions which, in a considerable part of the country at least, has been 
almost dramatic in its character. 
But we shall be obliged to face two questions, first, whether the system is capable 
of being adjusted to the promotion of self-governing institutions, and secondly, 
whether it will enable a suitable status to be given to those Chinese and Indian 
immigrants who may acquire a permanent interest in the country. Is it intended, for 
instance, that self-government shall take the form of a progressive relaxation of 
official control over the Sultans and their councils? That might be termed 
self-government; but unless we retained authority to prescribe and regulate their 
functions, it would mean something like autocratic rule in the hands of the Sultans 
and their Malay advisers. Such rights as the immigrant population might acquire 
would only be obtained on sufferance, nor would there be any guarantee for any 
co-ordinated policy in economic and social matters throughout Malaya as a whole. 
But would the retention of a really effective measure of control in our own hands be 
compatible with the principle of self-government? 
I suggest that there is one essential requirement. We must obtain undisputed 
rights of jurisdiction throughout this area, and this can be achieved only by its 
treatment as a Protectorate, and the extension to it of the Foreign Jurisdiction Act. I 
do not suppose that any lawyer would question that we have obtained that "scintilla" 
of jurisdiction which would justify this. In this regard, usage is as solid a source of 
authority as treaty. We shall thus make it impossible to raise those questions of 
"ultimate jurisdiction", of possible "concurrent authority" and the like which have 
proved so embarrassing to us in Basutoland and elsewhere, and which some officials 
are inadvisedly attempting to revive in Northern Nigeria. We should then be in a 
position (a) to define the exact scope of the authority of the Sultans and their 
councils, (b) to give such status as we consider reasonable to the immigrant 
population and (c) to introduce a uniform system of rule throughout Malaya. 
What would be the effect of such a measure on our treaties with the Sultans? The 
general tenour of Privy Council judgements points to the conclusion that where the 
5 W G A Ormsby-Gore, under-secretary of state for the colonies 1924-29. Hailey may have been referring 
to Ormsby-Gore's report of 1928 in which he stated: 'Our position in every State rests on solemn treaty 
obligations . . . . We have neither the right nor the desire to vary this system of government or to alter the 
type of constitution or administration that now obtains.' W G A Ormsby-Gore, Report on His Visit to 
Malaya, Ceylon and Java (Cmd. 3235, December 1928) p 17. 
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Foreign Jurisdiction Act has been applied, no previous treaty has any force, in the 
sense that it cannot be quoted against the Government in any municipal court. But 
this would not cancel the moral obligation to respect it. If we take as an example the 
Treaty with the Chiefs of Perak in 1874, it provided that the Sultan would accept a 
British Resident, whose advice had to be taken on all matters except those relating to 
Malay custom and Mohammedan religion; all revenues were to be collected and 
appointments made in the name of the Sultan, but the collection of revenues and the 
control and general administration of the country would be regulated by the advice 
of the Resident. The agreements which formed the basis of the constitution of the 
Federated States do not seem to have modified this basic position to any significant 
extent.6 
It is advisable to see how far any constitutional development which we may 
envisage for the future would conflict with a Treaty of this type. I put forward the 
following mainly by way of illustration; many variants are of course possible. The 
functions of the Sultans and their own Councillors would be confined to the field of 
matters relating to Muslim law or custom. The financial position of the Sultans 
would be safeguarded by giving them a civil list, which would include the possession 
of family lands. Each State would have a Legislative Council, of which the 
composition would be laid down by the Governor, and of which membership would 
in the first place be obtained by his nomination. It would have a defined sphere of 
local legislation only, including "local" taxation. It is a question whether the Sultan 
should or should not be given the honorary position of President. The main 
legislation, including civil and criminal law, taxation (other than local) would be 
conducted by a Malayan Assembly which would be directly representative of the 
Legislative Councils, together with representatives nominated personally by the 
Sultans. On the executive side, all orders would be expressed as those of the 
Governor, following the usual practice where the Crown has sole jurisdiction. Such a 
constitution would provide the basis on which self-government could ultimately be 
built up. Representation would in time have to take some other form than 
nomination, though I do not mean to suggest that election on the ordinary lines 
(save perhaps in townships) would be the sole alternative. 
In form, a constitution of this type would involve some invasion of the position 
given to the Sultans by Treaty. But the position actually established by usage is 
unreal, even in relation to the terms of the Treaties. Are all duties, for instance, really 
collected in the name of the Sultan? What is the real value of making appointments 
in the name of the Sultan? Actually, the greater part of the administration is carried 
out, in the Federated States at all events, by officers of departments acting under 
direct orders of the Governor. Sooner or later, we shall have to face squarely the 
question whether we are to allow the facade of Sultan-rule to persist, with all the 
difficulties which it presents to the attainment of any form of self-government, or to 
build up a constitution on the basis of realities. There are doubtless many who might 
feel that a well-conducted official regime might be the best for these territories; but 
it is not the ideal which we have professed to the rest of the world. 
I come to the second question to which I have referred above-the terms on which 
we are to allow the resumption of private enterprise in these areas. I raise it partly 
6 Hailey is referring to articles 6 and 10 of the Perak Treaty of 20 Jan 1874 and the Federal Treaty of July 
1895. 
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because a great deal has been said on the subject in various quarters, and partly 
because it is bound, in the natural course of things, to force itself on our notice at an 
early stage in the "reconstruction" period. There can be no question of the past 
benefits to Malaya from the operations of private enterprise. But two questions have 
now to be faced. First, whether the revenues of the country have actually had a due 
share of the profits made by private capital? Secondly, whether production such as 
that of rubber should in the future remain so largely in the hands of companies, or 
whether "peasant" production (under suitable regulation) should not take an 
increasing share in it. The answer to both questions may be simple; but it would be a 
mistake to allow the present economic system to be re-established without first 
giving some consideration to them. 
The questions arising out of the future position of Hong Kong are of a very 
different nature to those of Malaya. The constitutional issue is relatively unimpor-
tant. There seem to be three questions to consider. How far do we need on our own 
behalf or that of the United Nations to retain possession of Hong Kong for strategic 
purposes? How far is it essential in the interests of international trade that it should 
be maintained as a free port? How far in either of these two cases would it be possible 
to meet the claims of China-which have received considerable support elsewhere-
by recognizing Chinese sovereignty subject to conditions which would give us 
effective control? We cannot usefully consider the questions of the form under which 
control is to be exercised, until we know the attitude of the United Kingdom 
Government on these questions. 
14 CO 825/35/6, no 4 14 May 1943 
'Constitutional reconstruction in the Far East': CO conclusions of a 
departmental discussion on 13 May 
I. Singapore: proposals in para. VII (a) of the Eastern Department's memorandum of 
20.3.431 are acceptable. 
11. Remaining territories in Malay Peninsula 
It was agreed that a restoration of the 1941 arrangements was impossible on the 
grounds of 
(a) proper and efficient administration & security of the territories 
(b) our declared intention of promoting self-government in the Colonial Empire. 
In particular it was important to avoid the dilemma towards which pre-war 
arrangements were developing, viz. that the logical alternative to the system of direct 
official rule behind a facade of Sultan rule was its replacement by a system of 
autocratic rule by the Sultans and their Malay advisers. 
But at the other extreme it was important to secure that self-government did not 
rest on a numerical counting of heads which would mean the swamping of the 
1 See 12. 
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permanently resident communities (especially the Malays) by immigrants without a 
lasting interest in the country. 
The steps to be taken to achieve our policy should be:-
(1) the extension to the area of the Foreign Jurisdiction Act. 
) the negotiations of a new treaty which would establish 
(a) a central body representing both the States and the residue of British 
territory, outside Singapore, and in which would be vested any residual 
authority not specifically delegated to State Governments. 
(b) that within this framework, the Sultans should preserve their existing social 
and religious position and the State Governments be vested with the exercise of 
such administrative functions as might from time to time be allotted to them by 
the central authority. 
The declaration of our purpose in carrying through the policy (the implementa-
tion of which would have to be studied on the spot) would be that Malay interests 
must be recognised as paramount in carrying through such a scheme but that other 
communities with permanent interests in the country must be given their due 
opportunity to share in an advance towards self-government. 
Ill. Sarawak. This State should be declared a Protectorate and the Foreign 
Jurisdiction Act should be extended to it. The position of the Rajah under this new 
status will be a matter for future consideration and negotiation. 
IV. North Borneo. Steps should be taken immediately to acquire for His Majesty's 
Government the sovereign rights in this territory possessed by the B.N.B. (Char-
tered) Company. 
15 CO 825/35/6, no 5 18 May 1943 
'Constitutional reconstruction in the Far East: Malaya, North Borneo 
and Sarawak': revised memorandum by G E J Gent [Extract] 
Malaya 
1. A full restoration of the pre-war constitutional and administrative system will 
be undesirable in the interests of efficiency and security and of our declared purpose 
of promoting self-government in Colonial territories. The first of these interests 
requires a closer union of the territories comprising the relatively small area of the 
Malay Peninsula: and the second requires that self-government should not merely 
develop towards a system of autocratic rule by the Malay Sultans but should provide 
for a growing participation in the Government by the people of all the domiciled 
communities in Malaya, subject to a special recognition of the need to preserve the 
political, economic and social rights of the Malay race. 
2. On the re-occupation of Malaya direct authority would be exercised by the 
Military Commander and the old position in which H.M. had no jurisdiction in the 
Malay States would thus disappear, and it would be possible to legislate for the 
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territory under the Foreign Jurisdiction Act. This jurisdiction should be preserved 
when the Military Administration gives way to a permanent civil administration. 
3. The port and Island of Singapore had distinctive characteristics in the Malayan 
picture and should be treated as a special "free port" area in which self-government 
would develop by municipal methods and which would be a district administered 
separately from the rest of Malaya. 
4. For the rest of the peninsula including the British Settlements of Penang and 
Malacca a constitution should be devised which would provide for a single united 
authority representing the States and the Settlements but resting on the ultimate 
authority of British power and jurisdiction under the Foreign Jurisdiction Act. The 
present treaties with the Malay rulers which are at present to be regarded as still 
operative, though for practical purposes in suspension owing to the enemy's 
occupation of the country, should be revised to accord with the new position and 
especially with H.M.'s new power of jurisdiction. 
Subject to the overriding authority of this central constitutional power the several 
States and Settlements would have local institutions empowered to deal with such 
local affairs as may be devolved upon them by the central authority. These local 
bodies would be constituted so as to be representative of the principal communities 
and interests in the State or Settlement concerned. 
The Malay rulers would retain their customary position of eminence in such 
social, religious etc. respects as accord with Moslem ideas. The elaboration of this 
general policy should be left for examination by a commission which would be 
appointed to consider the problems as soon as hostilities ceased and local conditions 
permitted .... 1 
1 The sections on North Borneo and Sarawak are not printed here. 
16 CO 825/35/6, no 14 28 July 1943 
'Post-war constitutional arrangements for the mainland of Malaya': 
memorandum by Major-General H R Hone 
[Hone was released from his duties as adviser, Political Branch GHQ Middle East, to be 
head of the Malayan Planning Unit. A senior member of the Colonial Legal Service, Hone 
had no previous experience of Malayan affairs and drafted this memorandum less than a 
month after he had taken charge of the MPU. Since it significantly directed planning away 
from federation and towards union, it may well have reflected the thinking of other 
members of the MPU, notably Brigadier H C Willan. The CO Eastern Department 
endorsed the notion of 'Malayan Union' and at the end of Aug submitted to the secretary 
of state two papers on future policy in respect of Malaya and North Borneo (see 17). 
Stanley recommended further inter-departmental consultations before taking the matter 
to Cabinet. The CO memoranda met with 'a fairly good reception' within Whitehall (see 
18) although Sydney Caine objected strongly on economic grounds to the separation of 
Singapore from the peninsula (see 19).) 
Arising out of recent discussions in the Colonial Office there are two matters which I 
should like to ventilate further, firstly to clarify my own mind, and secondly, in order 
that some covering memorandum to the Colonial Office policy paper may be 
prepared for the information of the Cabinet, in order that H.M.G. may appreciate the 
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present proposals represent a change in policy, and that we, for our part, may be 
satisfied that the Cabinet is prepared to stand by its decisions, even though there may 
be an outcry from certain quarters. 
New treaties with the Sultans 
I have reflected further on the question of the proposed new treaties by which the 
Sultans will cede jurisdiction to H.M. in all States both Federated and un-federated. 
It is argued by Lieut. Colonel McKerron1 that the change proposed is merely a legal 
one, but that in practice there is in fact no change. He points out that the present 
situation is that though in law the Rulers are independent, they have bound 
themselves by treaty to accept the advice in all matters of the British Resident (in the 
case of the Federated States) and the British Adviser (in the case of the un-federated 
States). Thus, if any law is to be passed or any action is to be taken, uniformity is 
achieved through the advice device and the Sultans have in fact no power at all. 
Further, in Federated States the Rulers have only these theoretical powers when the 
Federal Government (which means the Governor) is willing to delegate any 
particular subject to a State Government. 
Though Lieut. Colonel McKerron's argument is attractive, I do not think that it is 
likely to carry any weight with the Sultans themselves when asked to sign on the 
dotted line: our real purpose' in negotiating this change is not really connected with 
the day to day government of the country. It is based, I suggest, solely with the 
question of the future constitutional arrangements. If we get this concession of 
jurisdiction, we can set up a new constitution by an Order in Counsil [sic], whether 
the Sultans like it or not. If we do not get this jurisdiction for H.M., any change in 
constitution will require the negotiation of fresh treaties with all the Rulers in all the 
states; one recalcitrant Ruler could ruin the whole plan. In any case I think that 
Lieut. Colonel McKerron's argument is unsound, for there is only one sphere in 
which that Sultans have not bound themselves to act upon the advice of the British 
Advisers and Residents, viz., the negotiation of new treaties with Great Britain. 
It is for consideration, how far I should come out into the open when negotiating 
the new treaties with the Sultans. Am I to say frankly that this is a step towards 
setting up a new constitution? If I do, I must be in a position to tell the Sultans 
roughly what the new constitution is to be and what part they themselves may expect 
to play in it. I must have good arguments in favour of such a new constitution and, if 
possible, I must be able to give something in exchange for what I am taking away. If, 
in the case of Johore, I could promise a piece of Malacca, and, in the case of Kedah, I 
could promise Province Wellesley, I should have bartering cards of great value. Is the 
Cabinet likely to provide me with these weapons? And what about a bit of Siam for 
Kelantan and Perlis? 
Failing these inducements, the best line of approaching the Sultans may be 
something like this:-
"The British public are perturbed about Malaya. They consider that the loss of 
the dependency was partly due to the break-down of the adminisfrative 
1 P AB McKerron, MCS since 1920, was a member of the Malayan Planning Unit. Under the British 
Military Administration he was deputy chief civil affairs officer, Singapore, and on the return of civil 
government he became colonial secretary, Singapore, 1946-1950, 
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arrangements in a time of great stress which they consider was due to the 
number of small units into which the administration of the Peninsula was 
divided. They are determined that the errors of the past shall not be repeated 
and that a more cohesive Government must be established. A great deal of 
British money will be required to rehabilitate the trade and social services of 
Malaya and to ensure its proper economic organisation to meet the difficul-
ties of the post-war problems. Unless this proposed change in administrative 
arrangements is agreed to, the British public will not be prepared to vote the 
large sums of money which Malaya requires, and, therefore, it is essential that 
the Treaty changes that the British Government proposes should be 
accepted." 
But I doubt if I ought to take a line of this sort without Cabinet approval. 
For nearly a century our policy in Malaya has pivoted on the recognition of the 
independent local status of the Rulers, and there can be no doubt that the new 
treaties, if negotiated, will destroy their independence. No further treaties will ever 
agairr be necessary. I regard it as most important that the Cabinet should be fully 
aware of this reversal of policy which is fundamental in its importance. It is also 
necessary for me to know whether H.M.G. is prepared to go so far as to remove from 
office any Sultan who refuses to sign away his independence. 
Federation or Union 
The Colonial Office policy paper envisages a strong central government for the whole 
of Malaya Peninsula which will delegate in its discretion certain subjects to the State 
Councils for legislation. This proposition seems to indicate that the future constitu-
tional policy in Malaya is to be developed on the lines of a Federation including in the 
future, the five States which have not hitherto joined the existing Federation. 
The Federation of the four States which was effecteg in 1895 and developed by the 
Agreements of 1909 and 1927, gradually resulted in a situation which seriously 
threatened the submergence of the identity of the States. There was in fact a marked 
tendency towards "amalgamation" as opposed to "Federation"; in addition, it was 
suggested that the term "Federation" as applied to the form of union created by the 
treaties was a misnomer. 
As a result of General Wilson's report of 1933,2 it was decided by H.M.G. to take 
steps to reverse the tendency of amalgamation among the four States and to 
endeavour to establish a truer form of Federation by a process of decentralisation of 
powers to the Rulers and their State Councils. General Wilson reported that "there is 
a strong case on political grounds for giving the Rulers of the Federated Malaya [sic] 
States control of their own domestic affairs". To this end he advised putting the 
following Departments under State Control as soon as possible:-
a. Agriculture 
b. Co-operative Societies 
c. Education 
d. Electricity 
e. Forestry 
f. Medical 
g. Mining 
h. Public Works 
i. Veterinary 
2 Brigadier-General Sir Samuel Wilson, Report on His Visit to Malaya 1932 (Cmd 4276, March 1933). 
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General Wilson advised further that as soon as possible financial responsibility for 
the domestic services of the States, should be vested in the Rulers in Council, the 
object being to make the State Governments increasingly independent as regards 
their State services. This envisaged the ultimate transfer of certain sources of Federal 
Revenue to the States, coupled with the right to impose State taxation so as to put 
the States in a position to meet all their expenditure without subvention from central 
resources. 
I think it is important that the Cabinet should decide whether the policy 
recommended by General Wilson is to be persisted in after the military administra-
tion or not. It seems to me that the policy of decentralisation will inevitably lead to 
greater and further demands by the States for the control of additional subjects until 
we reach the position when the Federal Government will be shorn of all its authority 
except for external matters such as international trade treaties and agreements, 
customs and defence. It must be remembered that I think it necessary, if the 
personal position and prestige of the Rulers are to be maintained, to give them 
during the period of military government certain local powers. This is decentralising 
and, once started, we shall be committed to that course and General Wilson's report 
will be continually urged upon us as being the approved policy of H.M.G. in Malaya. 
If, in the post war period, General Wilson's policy is to be followed, there is no more 
to be said, but, if not, I must know what the new policy is and see that I do not give 
more power to the Sultans than they are likely to have in the post-military period. 
The issue which is really to be placed before the Cabinet is whether H.M.G's future 
policy is to be based on a conception of the Federation or the ultimate union of the 
native States of Malaya. 
One can see at once that from the point of view of administrative economy and 
convenience, there can be no question but that we should establish a single 
Protectorate over the whole of the mainland of the Malaya Peninsula, and set up a 
single government for it. This would indeed be to abolish the Sultans and the Cabinet 
must say whether this is our ultimate aim or not. 
Experience in history proves the difficulties which assail small independent 
nations, and the lesson is that wherever possible small countries should unite with 
others of like race and traditions, or where union is impracticable, Federation at least 
should be attempted in order that the congregation of these small countries may 
stand together in line with the larger powers. 
So far as my limited knowledge of Malaya goes, it would seem that the existence of 
ten different entities in the Peninsula is due to historical accident. The native 
inhabitants of all the States are predominantly of the same race, characteristics and 
tradition-all having common interests. If they had been left to themselves, the 
probability is that strong Sultans who [sic] would have emerged in certain areas, and 
they would have extended their influence to adjoining territories till the Malaya 
Peninsula might have been divided between two or three powerful potentates. 
Indeed, at some point of time, one supreme Sultan might have emerged; this 
development might have been all to the good, but with our present policy no such 
development can ever take place. 
We have repeatedly stated that the principal aim of British Colonial policy is to 
train the peoples of the territories under our control to take an increasing part in the 
government of their own countries, so that in process of time they may ultimately 
stand as independent units of the British Commonwealth of Nations. Though the day 
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upon which this result will be achieved in Malaya must be far distant, I assume that 
no-one suggests that this is not the ultimate policy which H.M.G. is applying to 
Malaya. 
We have therefore, to consider whether the policy of Federation is one best 
designed to bring Malaya to the ultimate goal of all our Colonial possessions. On the 
one hand, it may be fairly argued that experience in State Control must be given to 
the Malaya [sic] Rulers and their p~ople in order to fit them for wider responsibility 
in the future. On the other hand, the policy of decentralisation which strengthens 
the State Governments, can only result in emphasizing the individuality of the State 
Governments, thus making the ultimate union more and more impossible. It may, in 
fact, be true to say that in following the policy of decentralisation H.M.G. is leading 
the States down a road which can never lead to ultimate independence, but rather 
pledges them indefinitely to the protection and tutelage of a strong outside Power. 
The question is then, are we aiming at ultimate union or Federation? 
Common sense urges union of the States but, as indicated above, this could only 
be achieved by the elimination of the Sultans one by one until, by the progressive 
fusion of States, we were left with one State and one Sultan. I doubt if this is practical 
politics, but one cannot refrain from flirting with the idea. As each existing Sultan 
dies, could we put across a fusion with the neighbouring State[?] I suspect not. 
Alternatively could we form a Board of Sultans who jointly, would exercise 
jurisdiction over all the States[?] This august body might be a sort of second chamber 
presided over by the Governor-General whilst the legislative council would be 
presided over by the Governor of the Malayan Protectorate. All the Sultans could sign 
each law which would have currency throughout all the States. The law, however, 
would of necessity be in rather more general terms than we are at present 
accustomed to. Many of the Sections would, (I hope) give power to the various States 
to promulgate regulations which though framed on the same general lines would 
give latitude to deal with special local problems in differing ways according to local 
needs. Such a system of Government would not be Federal but would of course be 
union and the finance control would be centralised completely. That each State got 
its fair share of available revenue, would be insured by the budget. I see that in an 
earlier paper emanating from the Colonial Office, it was suggested that if a Council of 
Sultans were set up as a second chamber, that body would have no control over 
money bills. I doubt if this would work in the system suggested above; in any case I 
think Sultans are entitled to have some say, though not, of course, a final say in the 
allocation of the money between the various States. At present it is true that they 
have no such function. 
If however, we are not aiming at unity, we must state what the object in view is, for 
the Sultans will certainly want to know. As indicated above, failing a union of the 
States, the next best aim is Federation. This means that the step we have in view is 
not the creation of a Malaya Protectorate but a Federation of Malay States covering 
the whole peninsula. We must try, therefore, to devise a constitution which is a true 
Federation and not something which is betwixt and between that and union or 
amalgamation. It seems to me that this is where we come up against a serious 
practical difficulty. The Sultans will want to know what subjects are to be dealt with 
by the Federal Government. I have not had time to study the constitutions of the 
other Dominions in which a system of Federal Government exists, but in those 
constitutions we may find a guide to help us. But I do know that in the Dominions, 
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the Federal form of Government which now exists has been built up on a firm 
foundation. Generally, the process has been that the States forming the Federation 
have previously existed as such with a full measure of independent Government and 
the new Federal Government has grown out of that established order. The States 
themselves have surrended [sic] certain rights and powers which have then been 
vested in the Federal Government to cover all those subjects of peculiar local 
interest. 
In Malaya we are faced with the practical difficulty that all subjects are really of 
common interest and there is none of purely local interest. An examination of the 
present laws of the Federation and of the several States will show that in practically 
every subject for which the Federation has not legislated, almost identical laws have 
been passed in every State, whilst in the Unfederated States nearly all the Federal 
laws have, in addition, been adopted as State laws, in similar terms. In these 
circumstances it is very difficult to see how a true Federal system of Government for 
the whole of the Malaya Peninsula can be justified. It all boils down to the fact that 
any constitution based on the Federation idea [is] born only of the desire to retain 
the office of Sultan in each. In fact, the policy is based on sentiment instead of 
common sense, but, be it emphasised, sentiment of the highest character, viz the 
honouring of treaties and Britain's declared word. 
17 CO 825/35/6, f 150 & no 22 30 Aug- 2 Sept 1943 
[Future policy in Malaya and Borneo]: minutes by G E J Gent and Sir 
G Gater on the preparation of Cabinet memoranda 
Sir G Cater 
I am sorry at a time when he is pressed with the business of his W[ est] A[frica] tour to 
have to put forward for submission to the Secretary of State, as a matter for direction 
to myself and the Eastern Department, the attached two memoranda1 dealing with 
future policy in respect of Malaya and North Borneo. 
These memoranda are the result of prolonged discussion and consideration in this 
Department, and, in the case of Malaya, with General Hone and the Malayan Civil 
Affairs unit at the War Office. 
In the case of Malaya, the general policy advocated is the constitution of a Malayan 
Union, comprising the States and Settlements in the peninsula, less Singapore, 
which we propose should become a distinct political unit with a Governor _of its own. 
This will be represented- by those concerned to do so-as a reversal of the pre-war 
policy of emphasising the individuality and sovereignty of the Malay States . But in 
his earlier discussions, in which Lord Hailey joined,2 the Secretary of State was 
himself sympathetic to the idea of some closer union of the ·present 9 or 10 separate 
Governments in Malaya, both for defence and economic and general administrative 
strength. The policy of a union cannot be expected to be favoured by the individual 
rulers unless they themselves may come to share the view that unity is strength. It 
would be a false hope that the rulers' long-standing fears of submersion of the Malays 
by the Chinese and Indian immigrant communities will have been allayed as the 
1 Not printed. 2 See 13. 
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result of their war experiences. On the contrary, it is not unlikely that the Japanese 
will have given particular position and powers to the leading Indian and Chinese 
quislings who have no doubt placed themselves at the Japanese disposal during the 
occupation of Malaya. 
Borneo. The proposal in the memorandum as regards the territories in Borneo is 
that the British Government should assume direct responsibility for the Chartered 
Company's State of North Borneo, and that the island of Labuan, which lies off the 
North Borneo shore, should thereafter be attached politically to North Borneo. 
Brunei and Sarawak will be affected by our proposals to the extent that their rulers 
shall be required to transfer to H.M. such jurisdiction as is necessary for legislation 
fm:: those territories under the Foreign Jurisdiction Act. In Sarawak there will be a 
Resident British Officer with similar powers to those possessed by the British 
Residents in the Malay States. 
Over all this group of territories in Malaya and Borneo will be, if our proposals are 
accepted, a Governor-General with his headquarters at Singapore. 
The second memorandum relates to North Borneo and its present administration 
by the Chartered Company. We propose that negotiations should be opened with the 
Chartered Company as soon as convenient, with a view to the transfer to the British 
Government of the present sovereignty and administrative authority possessed and 
exercised by the Chartered Company in London. This proposal has been very 
semi-officially discussed with the Treasury, and their main response is that any 
negotiations now with the Chartered Company should reserve for future decision, 
when the condition of the territory is ascertainable, the question of monetary 
compensation. We think that this is not impossible and that there is a good deal of 
spade work to be done with the Court of Directors, in the first place to determine the 
precise extent of the functions and properties which a British Administration would 
have to take over in the State. 
In the case of both these memoranda, what we need is the Secretary of State's 
general blessing on the policies proposed and his approval of our proceeding to 
discuss with the Departments concerned on an official basis and at the official level, 
the final forms of memoranda to be prepared for the Secretary of State on his return 
to present to the War Cabinet. 
Mr Gent 
G.E.J .G. 
30.8.43 
I spoke to the Secretary of State yesterday in reference to the memoranda dealing 
with future policy in respect of Malaya and North Borneo. I explained to him that 
these memoranda were based upon the decisions reached in the conferences with 
him on these two subjects. The Secretary of State agreed that we could proceed with 
discussions with the Departments concerned on the official level with a view to 
preparing memoranda for the consideration of the Secretary of State on his return. 
The Secretary of State also agreed that an approach might be made to the North 
Borneo Company in regard to the handing over of responsibility for the Territory 
from the Chartered Company to H.M.G. 
The Secretary of State said that the presentation of the memoranda to the War 
Cabinet would need careful consideration. In his judgment it was of great import-
ance to indicate with some care the reasons why these matters must be considered 
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now. Otherwise the War Cabinet might take the line, as they did in the case of 
Burma, that consideration is premature and that the future policy of these territories 
can be considered at a later date. The Secretary of State felt that it could be shown 
that it was vital to the immediate framing of plans in connection with the 
reoccupation of Malaya and Borneo for the future policy to be determined now. 
The Secretary of State also said that the actual date of presentation to the War 
Cabinet would have to be considered on his return in the light of the war situation at 
that time. 
18 CO 825/35/6, f29 
G.H.G. 
2.9.43 
18 Nov 1943 
[Future policy in Malaya and Borneo]: minute by W B L Monson on 
Whitehall reactions to draft Cabinet memoranda 
[Although Monson commented that CO policy had had 'a fairly good reception from all 
the Departments whom we consulted', it should be noted that both the FO and WO drew 
attention to the likelihood of opposition to the scheme. Sir Frederick Bovenschen, joint 
permanent under-secretary at the War Office, accepted that the proposals made 'common 
sense' but recommended caution in their implementation: 'You are, in fact, asking the 
Sultans to give away a large measure of their sovereignty, which I understand for many 
years past we have always boasted that we would maintain. I assume, nevertheless, that in 
discussing his Paper in the Cabinet, your Secretary of State will take the opportunity of 
impressing upon his colleagues the gravity of the decision which they are about to take, 
and indicate the form of public outcry which may be expected from certain sections of 
opinion in the country, unless some steps are taken to explain fully the reasons for the 
policy, and to educate the various political parties to accept it as a wise and proper course' 
(Bovenschen to Cater, 17 Nov 1943, CO 825/35/6).] 
Our two Cabinet Memoranda on future constitutional policy in South East Asia and 
on the buying out of the British North Borneo (Chartered) Company have had a fairly 
good reception from all the Departments whom we consulted. 
The North Borneo memorandum has in fact met general acceptance (and strongly 
expressed approval from the Foreign Office). The Treasury only have expressed some 
doubts as to whether there is a basis for financial discussions at the moment, but we 
have, I think, substantially met their points in our wording of the memorandum. 
We have not had the War Office views yet, but we understand that they will take 
the form of (a) approval of our intention to administer Singapore separately from the 
mainland as fortuitously fitting in with their own plans for Military Administration. 
They anticipate that they would be able to hand the mainland territory over to the 
Civil Administration at an early date after reoccupation, but that Singapore would 
have to remain under Military Administration probably until the conclusion of the 
war against Japan; and (b) we understand that the War Office are going to say that 
the Military authorities cannot be expected to accept responsibility for the negotia-
tion of fresh treaties with the Rulers as envisaged in our memorandum, and that 
therefore some civil mission will have to enter Malaya immediately after reoccupa-
tion to negotiate the necessary instruments with the Rulers in the name of H.M.G. 
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The Air Ministry have suggested that the Governor-General's duties should include 
that of centralizing R.A.F. requirements in the area. The Admiralty have made the 
same point in that they welcome the appointment on defence grounds. Our 
memorandum was (in paragraph 9 which deals with the functions of the Governor-
General) silent on his duties as regards defence, and I have added a sentence to that 
paragraph to cover the omission. 
The Admiralty make two further suggestions, to wit that the Governor-General 
should be made directly responsible for the administration of Singapore and of the 
areas in Johore immediately adjacent which would be in the defence system of the 
naval base. I am quite sure that it would be wrong to vest the Governor-General with 
direct governmental responsibility in Singapore Island, since he would inevitably 
become associated with the special economic interests of the Island, and any 
partition of Johore State would inevitably wreck our chances of creating the closer 
cooperation on the mainland to which we look. 
The Admiralty have also suggested that we should submit our memorandum to the 
Post Hostilities Planning Committee. We have in fact sent copies of it personally to 
Rear Admiral Bellairs, the Secretary of the Committee, so that he is aware of our 
plans. It will no doubt be considered in due course whether we should make a formal 
reference of the paper to the Committee. 
The Dominions Office have said that when the matter has been considered on the 
ministerial level, they would wish at some time to refer the question to the 
Dominions and suggest that the meeting of the Dominion Prime Ministers envisaged 
for next year might serve as a suitable opportunity. They have drawn particular 
attention to the interest of Australia in this matter. They have also expressed a dislike 
of the proposed title of Governor-General. We are not in our memorandum 
irretrievably committed to its use, which is explicitly stated to be used for 
convenience only. At the same time I regard it as a natural title, and it is, of course, 
the title normally borne by the chief Dutch and French officials in South East Asia. 
The Foreign Office, in their letter at (47), concern themselves particularly with the 
presentation of our proposals to public opinion in the world at large. To meet their 
point [that] it is not clear how the strengthening of direct British rule and 
diminishing the powers of native rulers leads to self-government, I have added some 
sentences to paragraph 10 of the memorandum. 
They also suggest that we should be more specific about our plans for developing 
the Malayan Union into an independent selfgoverning unit. I confess that I find it 
difficult to see how we can go beyond a general assertion of policy at the present 
moment and that there is no alternative to working out on the spot after 
reoccupation a detailed application of this policy in the light of the circumstances 
which exist at that time. We are, of course, without direct information as to the real 
extent to which the Japanese have taken the local populations into the administra-
tion of Malaya, and there is no guarantee that such information as we have at present 
will represent the conditions which will exist on our reoccupation. (ie We know that 
they have been associating representatives of the different communities in "Advisory" 
councils with their administration, and have made the Sultans Vice-Presidents 
(under a Japanese Governor) of the Advisory Council in each State. They would be 
running true to form if, when we get nearer Malaya, they gave a "phoney" grant of 
independence, as they have done in Burma and the Philippines.) 
We are at the moment, at the request of the War Office, preparing a number of 
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directives on longterm policy in different departments in Malaya. These inevitably 
hang on the memorandum in this file, and accordingly it would be convenient if a 
decision could be reached as soon as possible on our two memoranda. 
19 CO 825/35/6, no 50 30 Nov- 1 Dec 1943 
[Future links between Malaya and Singapore]: minutes by S Caine and 
G E J Gent 
Mr. Gent 
The discussion yesterday afternoon about the future constitutional position of 
Singapore took me a little by surprise, as I had not had any opportunity of seeing the 
documents until five minutes before the meeting. A few hours' further reflection has, 
however, only confirmed the opinions I expressed at the meeting. 
I am concerned primarily with the economic position.1 As I said at the meeting, I 
think that the clash between the interests of the mercantile community of Singapore 
and the producers of the mainland is very much over-emphasised. Fundamentally 
their interests are very largely identical. They depend on one another, and it would 
be just as foolish to suppose that Singapore could exist without the mainland 
community behind it as to suppose that the tin and rubber producers of the 
mainland could make profits if they had no merchants to market their produce for 
them. What we ought to do is to encourage the idea that they need each other and 
must co-operate with each other, and not to encourage what I regard as an entirely 
mischievous idea that their interests are distinct and necessarily opposed. 
It is of course inevitable that on particular issues from time to time the immediate 
interests of Singapore will be different from those of some of the mainland territories 
or even all the mainland territories together; but the same is true of any other 
individual section of the mainland. It would, for instance, benefit the rice-producing 
areas at the expense of say the Kinta Valley if a heavy tariff were put on imported rice, 
or it would benefit Port Swettenham at the expense of both Penang and Singapore as 
well as the producing areas if railway rates were so framed as to discriminate in 
favour of Port Swettenham. These are all, however, divergences of interest which are 
bound to appear in any human society, and the logical conclusion of an approach to 
politics on the basis of divergence of interest is the abolition of all government 
whatsoever, so that each individual can be its own political unit. It is far more likely 
that the differences will be amicably settled within the framework of a single 
Government than if they have to be thrashed out at a high plane between 
independent Governments. 
I suppose that the apparent clash of interests appears most clearly in relation to 
the Customs Union. Here, I would not dispute that it is probable that a rather 
different customs regime would suit Singapore taken by itself from that which would 
suit the mainland taken by itself. There are, on the other hand, certain advantages , 
both administrative and from the point of view of convenience of traders, in the 
Customs Union itself with its consequence of the abolition of barriers between 
1 Sydney Caine was currently financial adviser to the secretary of state. 
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Singapore and the mainland. If we were considering a Customs Union alone, I should 
not dispute the conclusion reached in Sir Cecil Clementi's2 time that the balance of 
advantage was against the Customs Union. It was, however, only a balance of 
advantage, and since I believe there would be other advantages in a union between 
Singapore and the mainland extending to a much wider range of matters than the 
customs regime, I should say that such disadvantage as a Customs Union taken by 
itself might possess was now substantially outweighed by the other advantages. 
In saying this, I am assuming that it would be possible to make adequate 
arrangements for free port facilities in Singapore to give reasonable assistance to the 
entrepot trade originating in Indonesia. I see no reason why that should be an 
insoluble problem. 
I need not dilate here on the other advantages which I should believe to arise from 
a union of Singapore with the mainland. Briefly, they are: the encouragement to the 
formation of a Malayan national consciousness, much greater administrative 
convenience, avoidance of cultural fissure and, though here I speak with much 
greater hesitation, defence considerations. 
Mr. Caine 
s.c. 
30.11.43 
This is an issue which, as I am sure you know, has for years been debated in 
Malaya---on a host of practical issues. 
Our first and foremost object is to secure a unification of the Malay States. That 
must be the essential basis for any larger union. It is the general view of those with 
real experience that this will be assisted by the non-inclusion of Singapore at any rate 
at the first stage. That in itself is a very important and almost an overriding 
argument. 
On defence grounds the separate treatment of ·Singapore has been strongly 
approved by the Admiralty. (The suggestion that the defence of Singapore was shown 
to depend on resistance on the mainland is, I think you will agree, a quite superficial 
one. Singapore is worth defending as a naval base. Its loss to us was due to our loss of 
sea power.) 
Singapore is a city, in the main, of Chinese immigrants. If its chief function as an 
international seaport and mart are [sic] maintained it·will continue, as far as one can 
estimate, to have that character, and its contribution to Malayan national conscious-
ness will be less than nil. Administrative convenience can be met in essentials by the 
methods we are proposing for particular branches of administration. 
We have made, in subsequent discussion with Colonel McKerron, some alteration 
of the memoranda which I will send to you as soon as it is copied. 
Mr. Gent 
G.E.J.G. 
1.12.43 
These minutes will no doubt be recorded on the relevant Eastern Dept. file. My 
primary object is to place on record my view that the economic grounds for political 
2 Sir Cecil Clementi, governor of the Straits Settlements and high commissioner of the Malay States, 
1929-1934. 
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separation between Singapore and the mainland are quite inadequate, and such 
economic disadvantages as there may be could well be [?ignored] if there are any 
other advantages to be gained by fusion. Whether there are such other advantages is 
strictly outside my sphere, but I should like to make one or two further points. 
(a) On the borderline between economics and politics there are a number of 
matters in which identical legislation and a common administrative structure 
would be distinctly advantageous, and even minor divergences might be danger-
ous, e.g. Company and Banking Law, income tax administration. I believe the 
necessary uniformity would be more easily attained under a single Government 
than under two. 
(b) As regards local opinion, I observed that the views of General Hone's advisers 
were four to one against any present decision in favour of separation. I was much 
struck by Colonel McKerron's plea that we should not prejudge a matter in which 
local opinion could only be ascertained after, and in the light of experience of, the 
Japanese occupation. 
(c) It may well be that there is virtually no prospect of a Malayan national 
consciousness ever developing at all, but I find it very difficult to visualise its 
developing if the metropolis of the peninsula-a city as large in relation to the 
country as a whole as Londori is in relation to the United Kingdom-is cut off from 
the rest. 
(d) Is it not an easy step from the proposition "Because Singapore is nearly all 
Chinese in race, it cannot be part of Malaya" to the proposition "Because 
Singapore is nearly all Chinese in race, it ought to be part of China"? I have always 
myself believed that Malaya's comparative freedom from communal disorders has 
been the result of a broadly non-discriminatory policy as between the different 
races. I believe that we have everything to gain by blurring and not by sharpening 
the distinctions between one race and another in the peninsula. 
20 CAB 66/45, WP(44)3 
s.c. 
1.12.43 
3 Jan 1944 
'Directive on constitutional policy in Malaya and Borneo': joint War 
Cabinet memorandum by Mr Stanley and Sir J Grigg 
[In early Dec the CO's Eastern Department submitted a draft Cabinet paper to Stanley 
who, reluctant to risk a Cabinet rebuff over such radical proposals, preferred a joint 
application with Grigg (secretary of state for war) for a Cabinet committee. On 6 Jan 1944 
the War Cabinet agreed to the appointment of the Committee on Malaya and Borneo, 
consisting of the lord president (Attlee, chairman), the secretaries of state for the 
Dominions (Cranborne), India (Amery), the Colonies (Stanley), War (Grigg), the attorney 
general (Sir D Somervell), and the parliamentary under-secretary at the Foreign Office 
(George Hall) (see CAB 65/41, WM 2(44)3, 6 Jan 1944). Although Stanley completed 
papers on Malayan policy on 14 and 15 Jan (see 21 and 22) the committee postponed 
meeting until 22 Mar and did not report back to Cabinet until May (see 24 and 25).) 
1. As our colleagues are aware, steps were taken some time ago to commence the 
planning of the Administration of Malaya and Borneo, after reoccupation. This 
,< 
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planning is being conducted under the War Office in close association with the 
Colonial Office and has made considerable progress. A Chief Civil Affairs Officer for 
Malaya has already been selected, and under him the nucleus of the future Malayan 
Administration during military period is in the course of assembly in this country. A 
similar nucleus Administration for all the territories concerned in Borneo is also 
being collected here. 
2. The detailed planning work on which these bodies are engaged must be 
governed by the general intentions of His Majesty's Government for the future, since 
it is important that, if possible, nothing should be said or done at the beginning of 
the reoccupation period which is incompatible with the long-term policy which we 
intend to adopt. This work of detailed planning has now reached the stage at which 
the planners find themselves in need of authoritative guidance on the broad issues of 
long-term policy, and in our view it is now necessary that a preliminary decision 
should be taken as to the future constitutional and administrative systems for the 
territories concerned. There is, of course, no necessity for any public announcement 
at this juncture. 
3. There are many problems, some of considerable complexity, to be faced in 
determining the future system. For example there are-
(a) the position of our Treaties with the Malay rulers who, though subject to 
extensive political control, are yet in the position of sovereign princes; 
(b) the positions of the territories in Borneo which comprise Labuan, a British 
Colony, Brunei, whose position is similar to a Malay State, Sarawak under the 
sovereignty of a European Rajah and North Borneo under a Chartered Company; 
(c) the participation of the important Chinese and Indian communities in the 
local government institutions of the country, in view of the attitude of the Malay 
rulers to Asiatics who are not of Malay race or Mohammedan religion. 
It is clear that problems of this magnitude will raise great political and legal 
difficulties and our decisions upon them will attract widespread attention both in 
this country and in the United States. 
4. For that reason it would, we think, be most helpful if a Cabinet Committee 
could consider the full proposals which we are prepared to put before them, and, in 
the light of those full proposals, recommend to the Cabinet a directive upon which 
the planning authorities could base their work. 
21 CAB98/4l ,CMB (44)3 14 Janl944 
'Future constitutional policy for British colonial territories in South-
East Asia': memorandum by Mr Stanley for War Cabinet Committee on 
Malaya and Borneo 
1. The policy which should be adopted as regards the political organisation of 
British and British-protected territories in South-East Asia after the termination of 
the present Japanese occupation has been under consideration in the Colonial Office. 
The administration of the territories immediately after the expulsion of the Japanese 
will, of course, be a matter for the military authorities and plans are already under 
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consideration on this basis. In particular a Chief Civil Affairs Officer for Malaya has 
already been selected, and under him the nucleus of the future Malayan military 
administration is in course of assembly at the War Office. A similar nucleus 
administration to cover all British-protected territories in Borneo is also in process 
of assembly. 
2. The planning must, however, be from the outset conditioned by the arrange-
ments which His Majesty's Government decide upon as regards future constitutional 
and administrative systems. The time has come for such general decisions to be 
taken. It is further important that, in so far as those decisions may represent a 
change from past policy, the military authorities should be satisfied that any steps 
which they take in conformity with those arrangements will be supported by His 
Majesty's Government in the face of possible opposition from any quarter. For 
reasons set out below it is also necessary to consider future plans for Malaya with 
some reference to those for British territories in Borneo. Proposals for the area as a 
whole are therefore included in this memorandum. 
3. The territories concerned comprise the Colony of the Straits Settlements 
(Singapore, Penang and Malacca in Malaya, Labuan off the north coast of Borneo, 
and Christmas Island and the Cocos-Keeling Islands to the South of Java); the 
Federated Malay States of Perak, Selangor, Negri Sembilan and Pahang in the Malay 
Peninsula; the Unfederated States of Johore, Kedah, Kelantan, Trengganu and Perlis 
in the Malay Peninsula and Brunei in Borneo; and the States of North Borneo and 
Sarawak in Borneo. (It is not necessary in this memorandum to refer to the future 
position of Hong Kong.) 
4. The Malay Peninsula, as organised under British control, consists, as ex-
plained, of a British Colony and of nine Malay States under their Malay Rulers, four 
of them being joined in a Federation. Until the seventies of [the]last century it was 
the policy to restrict British control to the three Settlements comprising the Colony 
and to discourage penetration into the Malay States. These States were at that time 
essentially reverine communities, each under their own ruler and isolated to a large 
extent by mountains and jungle. Even by 1870, however, the States were subject to 
disturbances occasioned by bands of pirates and by the impact on Malay society of 
traders and miners from the outside world, particularly Chinese. The resulting 
anarchy led to requests from the Rulers of the four States, which were later included 
in the Federation, for assistance in administration from the British Government. 
This assistance was embodied in Treaties providing for the appointment in each State 
of a British officer whose advice was to be asked and acted upon in all questions other 
than those concerning Malay religion and custom. Similar treaties were concluded at 
later dates with the other five States outside the Federation. In the Federated States 
these officers were styled British Residents, in the others British Advisers. It is, 
however, important to realise that from the legal point of view these Treaties 
involved no derogation from the position of the Rulers as sovereign princes, nor did 
they confer any jurisdiction on His Majesty in the Malay States. 
5. The introduction of this system in the 1870s was followed by a rapid 
development of the resources of the States concerned (mainly by immigrant capital 
and labour), which resulted in the breakdown of their previous physical isolation. It 
was natural that this process should have led to proposals for administrative 
machinery for closer union and in fact the States of Perak, Selangor, Negri Sembilan 
and Penang [Pahang] did agree in 1895 to the formation of a Federation. 
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Paradoxically enough the existence of the Federation proved an obstacle to further 
unification of the Peninsula. For the rapidity of the country's material development 
had outstripped the advancement in education and administrative capacity of the 
Malays, and the British Residents found themselves compelled in fact to take over 
more or less direct control of the administrative system in the Federated States. As a 
result there emerged a highly centralised bureaucracy based on the Federal capital, 
and the Rulers of the States outside the Federation fought shy of the loss of power 
which they felt they would suffer in the administration of their States by joining the 
Federation. In the cases ofKedah and Perlis the British Agreements of 1923 and 1930 
respectively include, in fact, a Clause by which His Majesty's Government have 
undertaken not to merge or combine these States with other States, or (in the case of 
Kedah) the Straits Settlements, without the written consent of the Ruler in Council. 
The attitude of the Malay Rulers was also coloured by the fact that in the main the 
penetration of Malay communities by immigrant races had gone further in the 
Federated than in the Unfederated States. 
A further obstacle to the unification of the Peninsula lay in the divergence of 
economic interest between Singapore, which as a great entrepot was essentially 
mercantile in character, and the mainland of the peninsula which was mainly 
producing for export and which feared that in any closer union its interests would be 
sacrificed to those of Singapore. 
6. Some attempt was made in the period between the two wars to meet the 
grievances of the Rulers of the Federated States by the policy of decentralisation, i.e., 
by the gradual transfer of many governmental functions from the Federal to the 
State Governments. It is important to realise however that this policy was regarded 
as an essential preliminary step for the achievement of a longer term policy, viz., the 
promotion of closer co-operation between the constituent parts of Malaya as a whole, 
by removing the deterrent which the existing Federation constituted against the 
closer association of the Unfederated States. 
7. Such administrative co-ordination as existed throughout the territories under 
discussion both in the Malay Peninsula and Borneo up to the date of Japanese 
occupation was achieved by the exercise by the Governor of the Straits Settlements of 
the additional functions of High Commissioner for the Malay States and British 
Agent for Borneo. As Governor of the Straits Settlements he was in direct charge of 
the Colony's administration: on matters pertaining to the Federated Malay States, as 
High Commissioner, he controlled the Federal Government through the Federal 
Secretary at Kuala Lumpur and the State Governments through the four British 
Residents; on the business of the Unfederated States, again, as the High Commis-
sioner, he controlled the State Governments through the British Advisers in each 
State. Finally as British Agent for Borneo he was the channel of communication 
between His Majesty's Government and the Governments of Sarawak and North 
Borneo, but apart from the emergency appointment in 1940 of a Defence Liaison 
Officer for Sarawak he had no direct representative in either territory. 
8. In the novel conditions which will exist in our return to Malaya there will be an 
opportunity to achieve closer co-operation between the constituent parts of the 
territory as a whole without going through the lengthy process which the sponsors of 
the decentralisation policy had to envisage. 
Experience has shown that the interests of efficiency and security require closer 
integration of both the legislative and administrative arrangements in Malaya. United 
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action in the past required separate action by ten Governments, a process which, 
without taking into account the opportunities it presented for local disagreement 
and the development of differences, did not conduce to speedy administration. On a 
longer view, too, the pre-war system does not seem capable of adjustment to the 
promotion of broad-based governing institutions in accordance with our proclaimed 
purpose in Colonial policy. There are important non-Malay Asiatic communities in 
the country which have substantially contributed to its development and have 
acquired permanent interests therein. But the Malay Rulers have always set their 
faces against any proposals to recognise as their subjects any persons not of Malay 
race or Mohammedan religion. The relaxation in due course of British official control 
over the Rulers would therefore, on the basis of the pre-war constitutional system, 
not be likely to provide the other communities with adequate prospects of 
participation in the government of the country. 
9. It is advisable that the function of co-ordination and direction should not be 
entrusted to an officer already burdened by detailed administrative responsibilities in 
any particular territory of the group. The appointment is therefore envisaged of a 
high British Authority (for convenience styled here a "Governor-General") for the 
whole area, viz. Malaya and British Borneo, without any direct administrative 
functions within any of the territories concerned, but with direct supervisory control 
over the chief officers of all those territories. This officer would have his own 
secretariat and a staff of expert advisers to assist him in supervising the political, 
economic, and social development of the territories and he could also be concerned 
with the representation of the interests of His Majesty's Government in the United 
Kingdom in any regional Council which may eventually be set up by the United 
Nations in that area. He would in any event have particular duties in securing due 
co-ordination on the civil side of all measures relating to the defence of the area. The 
headquarters of the Governor-General could conveniently be placed at Singapore, 
which is the natural centre of communications with all the British territories 
concerned and with neighbouring foreign administrations. 
Malaya 
10. Within Malaya considerations of dynastic pride and local particularism 
militate against the emergence within any foreseeable future of a union of the 
existing Malay States under a native Ruler; nor, for reasons explained above, would 
the emergence of a united Malay monarchy for the whole province be acceptable to 
other non-Malay communities with substantial interests in the country. The British 
Crown alone provides the common link of loyalty which will draw the separate 
communities together and promote a sense of common interest and the development 
of common institutions. It is therefore necessary that, as a first step, the old situation 
in which His Majesty has no jurisdiction in the Malay States should be remedied. The 
legal view is that our present Treaties with the Malay Rulers are at present to be 
regarded as still operative (though for practical purposes in suspension owing to 
enemy occupation of the territory). A fresh treaty, therefore, with each Ruler should 
be concluded as soon as possible after reoccupation under which such jurisdiction 
would be ceded to His Majesty as would enable him to legislate for the States under 
the Foreign Jurisdiction Act, notwithstanding, in the case of Kedah and Perlis, the 
Clauses mentioned in paragraph 5 above. Thereafter it will be possible to proceed to 
create a new constitution for Malaya by Order-in-Council under statutory powers. 
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This will involve fresh legislation in the United Kingdom Parliament in respect of the 
Straits Settlements. 
11. Our constitutional scheme should be designed, first and foremost, to provide 
for a union of all the Malay States and the settlements of Penang and Malacca. A 
central authority representing these States and Settlements should be created, and at 
its head there should be a Governor with an Executive and Legislative Council. The 
seat of Government of this Malayan Union would be conveniently at or near Kuala 
Lumpur, the capital of the present limited Federation. Subject to the new central 
authority, the several States and Settlements would be empowered to deal with such 
local affairs as may be devolved upon them by the central authority. These local 
authorities would be so constituted as to be representative of the principal 
communities and interests in the State or Settlement concerned. 
12. It is desirable that the Island of Singapore should not be included in the 
present conception of the Malayan Union. Its inclusion might adversely affect the 
Malay attitude towards the proposals for the Union of the States, which is the first 
and foremost object of our policy and the necessary basis for any more extensive 
Union. The basis for a separate organisation for the Island of Singapore already 
existed in the Municipality of Singapore, but the appointment of a separate Governor 
or Lieutenant-Govrenor for the Settlement will be desirable. There will, of course, be 
many matters of administration, e.g., Posts and Telegraphs, on which the closest 
·collaboration will be required between the authorities at Singapore and the rest of 
the Peninsula, but these can be the subject of particular agreements. Nevertheless, it 
should be made clear that His Majesty's Government has no desire to preclude or 
prejudice in any way the fusion of the two Administrations in a wider Union at any 
time should they both agree that such a course were desirable. 
13. Separate consideration is required for the extra-peninsular portions of the 
Straits Settlements not mentioned above, i.e., Labuan, Christmas Island and the 
Cocos-Keeling Islands. Labuan can most conveniently be considered in connection 
with the British-protected territories in Borneo. The remote Christmas Island and 
the Cocos-Keeling group hardly raise any questions of constitutional principle. Their 
sole links with other Malayan territories are with Singapore and they should for 
administrative purposes be subject to the direct authority of the Governor of 
Singapore. 
14. It is recognised that this programme will require the sacrifice by the State 
Rulers of some part of the authority and jurisdiction hitherto exercised by them. The 
interests of Malaya as a whole clearly require such a sacrifice. But there is no 
intention that the Rulers should lose their personal position as the natural leaders of 
their Malay people within their State territories. Indeed, the association of their 
territories in the Union will give the Rulers an opportunity to play their part in a 
wider sphere of affairs, for it is intended to devise means to associate the Rulers 
personally with the machinery of the central authority, possibly as an advisory body 
to the Governor in respect of Malay and Mohammedan affairs . In any event, our past 
obligations will require that the elaboration of the new constitutional arrangements 
should have regard to the political, economic and social interests of the Malay race. 
15. The complete details of the application of this policy and in particular the 
detailed measures to be designed for the creation of self-governing institutions can 
only be worked out on the spot after reoccupation in the light of the prevailing 
conditions. It is, however, necessary that a general directive on future policy should 
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be issued for the guidance of the officers concerned with planning for the period of 
the military administration. The draft of a directive for this purpose in respect of 
Malaya is submitted as a separate paper (CMB (44) 4).1 
Borneo 
16. To turn now to the territories concerned in northern Borneo, these 
comprise:-
(a) The State of North Borneo, administered as an independent State under 
British protection by the British Borneo (Chartered) Company, in which all rights 
of sovereignty are vested. The State is by agreement under His Majesty's protection 
and its foreign relations are subject to the control of His Majesty's Government; 
(b) The island of Labuan, a detached part of the Colony of the Straits Settlements, 
lying off the Western shore of the State of North Borneo; 
(c) the State of Brunei, a Malay State, subject to the terms of a Treaty on the 
general lines of those concluded with the States in the Malay Peninsula; and 
(d) The State of Sarawak, a Protected State under the sovereignty of Rajah 
Brooke. This State, like North Borneo, is under His Majesty's protection, but His 
Majesty's Government has no right to intervene in the internal administration. 
17. The primary object ofour policy in regard to these territories should be to see 
that, for the future, their machinery of government is of such a character as will 
conduce to their social and political development in conformity with our general 
Colonial policy. 
18. So far as the State of North Borneo is concerned, this will involve the removal 
of the limitations inherent in a system of government by a Chartered Company. This 
matter is the subject of a separate memorandum (CMB (44) 5), and all that need be 
said here is that, on the transfer of the Chartered Company's constitutional authority 
in the territory to His Majesty, the union of North Borneo with Labuan under a 
single Governor with a local Executive and Legislative Council is envisaged. 
19. As regards Brunei, His Majesty possesses (but does not exercise) a certain 
limited jurisdiction in the State. It is now desired that the Sultan of Brunei (like the 
Rulers in Malaya) should be invited to cede such jurisdiction to His Majesty as will 
enable him to legislate for the State under the Foreign Jurisdiction Act to the fullest 
extent. 
20. As regards Sarawak, however, it is most desirable that His Majesty's 
Government should be placed in a position to exercise effective control over the 
administration. To this end it is proposed that the Rajah (like the Malay Sultans) 
should be invited to cede such jurisdiction to His Majesty as will enable him to 
legislate for the State under the Foreign Jurisdiction Act. 
21. The territories in Borneo under discussion are still comparatively un-
developed, and they have few racial or other affinities. At this stage the basis for 
closer union hardly exists, but community of policy can be assured by the 
subordination of the Governor of North Borneo and Labuan, and of the resident 
British Advisers in Brunei and Sarawak to the authority and direction of the 
Governor-General at Singapore. 
1 See 22 . 
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22. The draft of a directive on future policy in respect of the four territories in 
Borneo for the guidance of the officers concerned with planning for the period of the 
Military Administration is submitted in a separate paper (CMB (44) 6). 
22 CAB 98/41, CMB(44)4 15 Jan 1944 
'Draft of a directive on policy in Malaya': memorandum by Mr Stanley 
for War Cabinet Committee on Malaya and Borneo 
1. The restoration of the pre-war constitutional and administrative system will be 
undesirable in the interests of efficiency and security and of our declared purpose of 
promoting self-government in Colonial territories. The first of these interests 
requires a closer union of the territories comprising the relatively small area of the 
Malay Peninsula; and the second requires that self-government should not merely 
develop towards a system of autocratic rule by the Malay Rulers but should provide 
for a growing participation in the Government by the people of all the communities 
in Malaya, subject to a special recognition of the political, economic and social 
interests of the Malay race. 
2. On general grounds, and more particularly in order that His Majesty's 
Government may be in a better position to ensure the development of the country on 
the lines indicated above, it is necessary that the old position in which His Majesty 
had no jurisdiction in the Malay States should be remedied and that it should be 
possible to legislate for those States under the Foreign Jurisdiction Act. Immediately 
on the reoccupation of Malaya, direct authority will be exercised by the Military 
Commander, who will carry with him sufficient authority to enable him to exercise 
such direct powers and control over the territory as will be necessary during the 
period of military administration. This military authority will, however, not enable 
His Majesty to legislate for the Malay States under the Foreign Jurisdiction Act, and 
moreover, the jurisdiction of the Military Commander will not persist when the 
military administration gives way to a permanent civil administration. 
It is considered that the proper way to achieve our purpose will be to make fresh 
treaties with the Sultans under which such jurisdiction would be ceded to His 
Majesty as would enable him to legislate for the States under the Foreign Jurisdiction 
Act. A fresh Treaty with each Sultan should for this single purpose be concluded on 
behalf of His Majesty at the earliest opportunity on reoccupation. 
3. The acquisition of this jurisdiction by His Majesty will enable an Order-in-
Council to be made to provide for the future central and local government of the 
country. This jurisdiction will render unnecessary any further dependence on 
Treaties with Rulers in any future revision of the constitutional arrangements. 
4. The new constitutional arrangements for Malaya should provide for the special 
treatment of the port and Island of Singapore in the early stages at any rate in view of 
its distinctive characteristics in the Malayan picture. 
5. The rest of the peninsula including the British Settlements of Penang and 
Malacca should be constituted a Malayan Union. For the Malayan Union a constitu-
tion should be devised which would provide for a single united authority represent-
ing the States and the Settlements, subject to the jurisdiction of His Majesty under 
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the statutory powers. At the head of the Union Government would be a Governor 
with an Executive and a Legislative Council. The seat of this Government would 
conveniently be in or near Kuala Lumpur. 
6. The co-ordination and direction of the policies of Government in the Malayan 
Union and Singapore will be secured by the appointment of a "Governor-General" at 
Singapore, with the power of control over the local Authorities in Malaya and 
Borneo. 
7. Co-operation in all adminstrative matters requisite between Singapore and the 
Union will be ensured by particular agreements for joint consultation and action. 
8. It will be no part of the policy of His Majesty's Government that the Malay 
Rulers should lose their personal dignities in their State territories. Indeed it will be 
the intention that, by the association of their territories in the Union, the Rulers will 
have opportunities to take part in wider activities than hitherto for the general 
advantage of the country as a whole, and may thereby enhance their sphere of 
influence and prestige in Malaya. 
23 CO 825/42/3, no 7. 4 Feb 1944 
[Publicity for postwar policy]: letter from Admiral Mountbatten to 
Major-General H R Hone 
[At the time of Mountbatten's correspondence with London about giving publicity to the 
progressive aspects of the new Malayan policy (see also 26-30) the military tide was 
turning in favour of South-East Asia Command. Between Feb and July General Slim's 
14th Army repulsed the Japanese at Arakan and lmphal-Kohima, and forced them into 
retreat. On 15 Apr Mountbatten transferred his headquarters from India to Kandy.] 
I am writing this letter, as I promised I would, to embody the points I made in the 
paper I sent you on January 27th and to add a few thoughts on how those points can 
be presented to public opinion (both at home and in America and elsewhere) and to 
the people of Malaya themselves. 
When we re-occupy Malaya we shall have a golden opportunity, if we choose to 
take it, to put the place on a firmer and more rational footing than was the case 
before; and I am convinced that the way the military administration kicks off will 
make the whole difference to the prospect of our introducing a reasonable 
constitution in the future. 
To begin with, I feel very strongly that the whole of Malaya (that is the Unfederated 
and Federated Malay States as well as the Straits Settlements) should become one 
unified administration under some such name as "Union of Malaya". 
I consider that we should introduce some means by which the more educated 
classes can elect representatives to an Advisory Council, which would advise the 
C.C.A.O. during the military administration. This body would subsequently form a 
sound basis for a Legislative Council under a Civil Government. 
I am not in favour of reinstating the Sultans even as constitutional rulers, and 
certainly not as autocratic rulers. The Japanese have kept them in position and it is 
inconceivable that most of them have not been actively collaborating with the 
Japanese, even though the more clever ones, like Jehore [sic], may when the time 
I I 
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comes embarass [sic] us by turning round and siding actively with the victorious 
British armies. In any case, their prestige cannot fail to have been seriously impaired 
by the Japanese occupation. 
Btit we must be careful not to abolish the Sultans ruthlessly. I understand that 
they are regarded as the religious leaders in their states and this aspect of the matter 
we should of course in no way interfere with. I think that they should form a 
"Chamber of Princes", who would act as an Upper House to the Advisory Council. In 
this way, we should not only respect the religious feelings of the Malayans, but we 
should have during the military administration the benefit of the experience of the 
Sultans. 
A point which would require very careful consideration is what should be done 
with this "Chamber of Princes" when the military administration is transformed into 
a Civil Government. Personally, I think it would be the greatest mistake to give back 
to the Sultans any form of hereditary right, either to legislate or even to implement 
legislation in their States. Those who had proved themselves thoroughly competent 
and worthy might be appointed as Prime Minister of their own State; but in backward 
States, or in States where the loyalty of the Sultan had been called in question, a 
separate Prime Minister should be appointed, chosen from the elected members 
representing that State. 
In other words, the Prime Minister of each State should come either from the 
Upper or the Lower House, according to his suitability. 
Our intentions will have to be put over, of course, to our own people, to the world 
at large and to the Malayans, by the Press and by broadcasting, etc. I believe it would 
help enormously in the vital and difficult task of making our troops out here 
understand the necessity of continuing the war out here after the defeat of Germany, 
if it were clear to them that we have a constructive plan which their victory will 
enable us to put into operation: there has been so much written and said about the 
mismanagement of Malaya that I do not believe it is' enough to let them think they 
are fighting to restore the status quo. 
In the same way, public opinion in America and in the democracies in general, has 
been sharply critical of our handling of this part of the world. 
I do not think we need fear the reactions of the democratic peoples to a move 
which is designed to unify the present very loose agglomeration of administrations in 
Malaya. This move seems to me progressive, in the sound sense of the word and is a 
"rationalisation" which I feel could only be condemned on feudal or romantic 
grounds. It would have been a different matter to undertake this tidying up in 
peacetime, but there has been a clean break with the past, in the form of foreign 
occupation and it should be fairly easy to accomplish quite painlessly, merely by 
omitting to restore what was neither necessary nor beneficial in a previous set-up. 
I feel that we must take a firm lead now. Events in North Africa and in Italy have 
shown that it is essential to choose from the first the line which one will inevitably 
have to follow, so that one can lead public opinion, in fact, instead of having to 
modify one's plans, which one will then appear to be abandoning under the pressure 
of public criticism. 
Since the invasion, no part of the world had come in for so much criticism as 
Malaya has and condemnation of the pre-invasion state of affairs has come from 
many angles. But, although I realise that any action we take will be closely watched 
by the many people who are waiting for a chance to criticise, I do not think these 
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critics will condemn innovations if these are reasonably progressive and tend to tidy 
up what had degenerated into a most unsatisfactory situation. Our waiting critics, I 
think, are far more likely to suspect that we have not the vision or the will to prevent 
a return to the bad old days. 
Criticism from the Left will, I think, chiefly concern itself with the economic and 
financial aspects of the re-occupation. A great deal has been said about rubber, etc., 
and I imagine that the constitutional status of the Sultans will seem comparatively 
unimportant to those who are gunning for the vested interest, particularly as any 
modification in their hereditary and autocratic powers will seem a step in the right 
direction to those who are suspecting us of wanting to put the clock back. 
Criticism from the Right will perhaps be forthcoming from the "traditional" point 
of view; but such opinions sound very feudal nowadays and many people who hold 
them are shy of stating them. From the more realistic and constructive point of view, 
I do not see why there should be more criticism: we are depriving the Sultans neither 
of their possessions nor of their revenues: and we are actually giving them, if they 
choose to use it, a chance of constituting themselves into a powerful, united body 
which can defend their interests far more satisfactorily than in the piecemal [sic] 
fashion of the past. As regards British capital investment, I cannot believe that in the 
more closely knit post-war world of cartels and large-scale enterprises, it will not be 
of advantage to deal with a unified peninsula, rather than by a method of treaties 
more suitable to the days of Clive. 
As regards the people of Malaya themselves, it is of course hard to gauge what 
effect the Japanese occupation may have had on their attitude to us and to their 
rulers. But it has been widely suggested that the apathy with which the Malay 
watched us being turned out by the Japanese was chiefly due to our not having 
sufficiently interested ourselves in securing his co-operation. If it is true that the 
Malay regarded us largely as people who came to make money there, and who 
returned to England when they had made enough, any extersion of our interest in 
his government will be a good thing: and he will no longer feel that we are prepared 
to Jet his autocratic Sultans have a free hand so long as they do not impede our rights 
to the wealth of his country. Our new attitude can be presented to him as a form of 
"paternalism" and at all events he can be made to feel that he can no longer justly 
accuse us of a purely mercenary neglect and indifference towards him. 
You may use this letter as representing my considered views. 
24 CAB 98/41, CMB(44)1 22 Mar 1944 
[Future policy]: minutes of the War Cabinet Committee on Malaya and 
Borneo1 .,. 
The Committee had before them a Memorandum on the future constitutional policy 
1 The following were present at this first meeting of the committee: Mr Attlee (chairman, lord president), 
Mr Amery (India Office), Mr Stanley (CO), Sir J Grigg (War), Sir D Somervell (attorney-general), Mr 
Emrys-Evans (parliamentary under-secretary of state, DO), H Ashley Clarke (FO), G E J Gent (CO) and Sir 
G Laithwaite (War Cabinet Office). E HT Wiltshire and W B L Monson served as secretaries. 
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for British colonial territories in South East Asia (C.M.B. (44) 3);2 draft of a Directive 
on policy in Malaya (C .M.B. (44) 4);3 a Memorandum on the acquisition of 
administrative rights of the British North Borneo (Chartered) Company (C.M.B. (44) 
5)4 and a draft Directive on policy in Borneo (C.M.B. (44) 6). 5 
1. Draft directive for Malaya 
The Secretary of State for the Colonies said that the object of the draft directive for 
Malaya was to set out minimum conditions within which planning in relation to 
re-occupation should proceed, and to guide the military authorities while they were 
administering the country. No question arose of drafting a detailed constitution or of 
giving publicity to the policy proposed in the directives. 
The main purposes of the policy put forward (paragraph 8 of C.M.B. (44) 3) 
were:-
(a) To secure a greater unity in administration than had existed prior to the 
Japanese invasion by creating a Government at the centre with power to enforce 
its decisions while allowing latitude in local affairs to territorial sub-divisions. 
(b) To revise the treaties in such a way that while the social and religious position 
of the Rulers was unimpaired, the object at (a) should be achieved and the Rulers 
prevented from denying rights of citizenship to non-Malay elements in the 
community . 
The Secretary of State for India endorsed the draft Directive. He welcomed the 
proposal for growing participation in Government by all communities, while 
recognising the force of the special reservation regarding the rights of the Malay race 
in the last sentence of paragraph 1. He saw no awkward precedent either in relation 
to Burma or the Indian States. 
The Committee then discussed the extent to which the proposed Directive 
committed His Majesty's Government to supporting the rulers even though their 
subjects might oppose the maintenance of their rule. 
The Lord President of the Council felt that there was no evidence as to the present 
conduct of the Rulers or attitude of the people themselves, and the draft did not 
indicate an alternative course of action. The Directive was, however, mandatory, and 
the expression of an intention to re-negotiate treaties with the rulers might commit 
us to reinstate them whatever we or the people might wish. 
The Secretary of State for the Colonies said that there was no evidence from 
Malaya which suggested that the sentiments of the Malays towards the institution of 
the Sultanate had changed. The fact that certain rulers might be found to have been 
quislings, was not an argument against the institution and it should be remembered 
that actions which seemed democratic and progressive in the West might be very 
differently interpreted in the East. 
The Secretary of State for War said that the Military Commander must know what 
form of civil administration was intended. To this extent a directive was indispens-
able. He would not oppose amendments which took account of the contingency that 
the people did not want the ruler back. 
The Attorney General explained that the treaties were still valid; if the purposes set 
2 See 21. 3 See 22. 4 & 5 Not printed. 
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out by the Secretary of State for the Colonies were to be achieved the only alternative 
to re-negotiation was annexation. 
1 After a full discussion it was agreed that the Directive should be so qualified 
'X' as to take account of the contingency mentioned by the Lord President of the 
I Council. 
Further points which were raised in discussion were as follows:-
(a) The Secretary of State for War emphasised that if difficulty with rulers was 
apprehended, the right must be reserved to the Military Commander to advise the 
Secretary of State for the Colonies to delay an approach until the situation was ripe 
for it to be made, in the light of current military situation. 
(b) The Committee agreed with the statement of the Secretary of State for War 
that the area under discussion lay within the military sphere of His Majesty's 
Government and not that of the United States Government. 
(c) Mr. Ashley Clarke considered (i) that even a slight dimunition [sic] of the 
powers of the rulers would have to be carefully presented: and (ii) that it would be 
wise to bear in mind that Malaya might have to be fitted into a regional system, in 
the constitution of which other countries, particularly China would have a say. He 
recongnised [sic] of course that such a system would not give them the right to 
interfere in Malaya's internal affairs. The Lord President of the Council endorsed 
the view at (i) above. 
Mr. Emrys Evans said that the Dominions, particularly Australia and New Zealand, 
would expect to be informed of our policy at the forthcoming Prime Ministers' 
Conference. 
The Committee:-
(i) Took note of C.M.B. (44) 3 and 4 and were in general agreement with the 
policy set out in the latter, and 
(ii) Invited the Secretary of State for the Colonies to cause the draft directive to 
be amended in the sense of 'X' above, and to be circulated for the information of 
the Committee. 
2. Draft directive for Borneo 
The Secretary of State for the Colonies , in introducing C.M.B. (44) 5 and 6, referred 
to the difficulties of communication and diversity of population in the four territories 
which made a closer form of association than that now proposed impracticable. He 
did not anticipate that either the Rajah of Sarawak or the Sultan of Brunei would · 
raise any difficulties over the cession of jurisdiction to His Majesty. 
The Secretary of State for War referred to the division of military responsibility 
between the Americans and ourselves in the area. If a directive were issued to the 
Military Commander it would have under present arrangements to be trans-
mitted via the Combined Chiefs of Staff to an American Commander. For this 
reason the directive under consideration should be restricted to the use of our 
'Y' own planning authorities. A separate directive should be prepared in due course 
for transmission to an American Commander in which he thought it would 
be desirable to omit references to negotiations with the British North Borneo 
(Chartered) Company and the Rajah of Sarawak in case such an extention [sic] of 
His Majesty's Government's direct influence in this area would be unwelcome to 
an American Commander. 
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The Secretary of State for the Colonies emphasised that in any discussions with 
the Americans we had a safeguard in Article 6 of the Charter of the Combined Civil 
Affairs Committee. 
The Committee:-
(i) took note of C.M.B. (44) 5 and 6 and were in general agreement with the 
policy set out in them. 
(ii) Endorsed the observations of the Secretary of State for War set out at 'Y' 
above, and invited the Secretary of State for the Colonies to take action 
accordingly. 
25 CAB 66/50, WP(44)258 18 May 1944 
'Policy in regard to Malaya and Borneo': War Cabinet memorandum by 
Mr Attlee. Appendices: I 'Draft directive on policy in Malaya' and 11 
'Draft directive on policy-Borneo' 
[On 31 May 1944 the War Cabinet considered WP(44)258 and authorised the secretary of 
state for the colonies to do the following: firstly, to issue the directives at Appendices I 
and II to those responsible for planning civil administration in Malaya and Borneo; 
secondly, to open confidential discussi<;ms with the directors of the British North Borneo 
Company about the transfer of North Borneo to Crown control; and, thirdly, to open 
confidential discussions with the Rajah of Sarawak with a view to the preparation of a new 
agreement (see CAB 65/42, WM 70(44)3) .) 
We were appointed by the War Cabinet at its meeting on the 6th January (W.M. (44) 
2nd Conclusions) to consider the question of the constitutional policies to be 
followed in Malaya and in the British territories in Borneo on their liberation, and to 
recommend a directive on which the authorities responsible for planning the Civil 
Administration of these territories after liberation can work. 
The composition of the Committee was as follows:-
The Lord President of the Council (Chairman) . 
The Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs. 
The Secretary of State for India. 
The Secretary of State for the Colonies. 
The Secretary of State for War. 
The Attorney-General. 
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. 
2. Malaya.-A directive on the probable lines of future policy is indispensable for 
those who have the duty of planning the Civil Affairs policies and as a basis for the 
directive to be issued in due course on these matters to the Supreme Allied 
Commander, S.E.A.C.; and, on the understanding that no publicity is given to the 
policies contained therein, we are in agreement on the terms of the directive for this 
purpose, which form Appendix I to this report. 
3. Borneo.- The four British territories concerned (North Borneo, Sarawak, 
Labuan and Brunei) are at present in a United States sphere of command, the S.W. 
Pacific. His Majesty's Government are entitled, under the terms of the Charter of the 
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Combined Civil Affairs Committee, to provide the American Commander with 
directives on Civil Affairs policies in these British territories, and a directive on Civil 
Affairs will need to be framed at the appropriate time for issue to him. But it is not 
our function to examine the form in which any such directive for that purpose will 
need to be framed. We have concerned ourselves only with a directive on which the 
British planning staff should work. For this limited purpose we have agreed upon a 
directive in the terms of Appendix 11 to this report. 
4. It will be noted that the Borneo directive proposes the acquisition by His 
Majesty's Government from the British North Borneo (Chartered) Company of its 
sovereign and administrative rights in North Borneo. We are of opinion that 
confidential discussion for this purpose should be opened with the Court of Directors 
of the Chartered Company, though we recognise that in the present uncertain 
position as to the value of the Chartered Company's assets in the Far East it would be 
premature to reach any agreement on the financial terms on which such a 
settlement could be reached. 
5. In the case of the Borneo directive, as in that of the Malayan, there is no 
question of any publicity being given to the policies beyond the confidential 
discussions which will be involved with the Chartered Company and the Rajah of 
Sarawak. 
6. To sum up, we accordingly recommend, with the proviso that no publicity for 
these policies is involved, that the Secretary of State for the Colonies be authorised-
( a) To issue the directive at Appendix I to the authorities responsible for planning 
for the Civil Administration of Malaya on liberation; 
(b) To issue the directive at Appendix 11 to the British officials at present planning 
for Civil Administration in British Borneo after liberation; 
(c) To open confidential discussions with the Court of Directors of the British 
North Borneo (Chartered) Company with a view to coming to an understanding 
(without at this stage any financial commitment) as to the conditions on which 
the administration of North Borneo would be transferred from the Company's 
responsibility and control to that of His Majesty's Goverment; and 
(d) To open confidential discussions with the Rajah of Sarawak, who is at present 
residing in this country, with a view to the preparation of a new Agreement on the 
lines proposed in paragraph 3 (c) of Appendix 11 attached. 
Appendix I to 25 
1. The restoration of the pre-war constitutional and administrative system will be 
undesirable in the interests of efficiency and security and of our declared purpose of 
promoting self-government in Colonial territories. The first of these interests 
requires a closer union of the territories comprising the relatively small area of the 
Malay Peninsula; and the second requires that self-government should not merely 
develop towards a system of autocratic rule by the Malay Rulers but should provide 
for a growing participation in the Government by the people of all the communities 
in Malaya, subject to a special recognition of the political, economic and social 
interests of the Malay race. 
2. On general grounds, and more particularly in order that His Majesty's 
Government may be in a better position to ensure the development of the country on 
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the lines indicated above, it is necessary that the old position in which His Majesty 
had no jurisdiction in the Malay States should be remedied and that it should be 
possible to legislate for those States under the Foreign Jurisdiction Act. Immediately 
on the reoccupation of Malaya, direct authority will be exercised by the Military 
Commander, who will carry with him sufficient authority to enable him to exercise 
such direct powers and control over the territory as will be necessary during the 
period of military administration. This military authority will, however, not enable 
His Majesty to legislate for the Malay States under the Foreign Jurisdiction Act and, 
moreover, the jurisdiction of the Military Commander will not persist when the 
military administration gives way to a permanent civil administration. 
3. In considering the proper way to achieve these objects, it is necessary, on the 
one hand, to make certain basic assumptions and, on the other hand, to be prepared 
to meet a situation when the liberation of Malaya has been effected, on which those 
assumptions may be found to be wrong or incomplete and in consequence the 
prepared plans may have to be varied. The future position and status of the Malay 
Rulers in particular cannot finally be judged before liberation when it will be possible 
to assess not only their individual records but also and especially the attitude of the 
people of Malaya to the advantages or otherwise of maintaining the Sultanates as 
institutions in the several States. For the present we have no reason for any other 
assumption than that the Sultanates as an institution will continue to enjoy the 
loyalty and traditional respect of the Malays. 
4. On that assumption, it is considered that the proper way to achieve our 
purpose will be to make fresh treaties with the Rulers under which such jurisdiction 
would be ceded to His Majesty as would enable him to legislate for the States under 
the Foreign Jurisdiction Act. A fresh Treaty with each Ruler should for this single 
purpose be concluded on behalf of His Majesty as soon as feasible after reoccupation. 
The actual signatory of such Treaties on behalf of His Majesty would appropriately be 
the G.O.C., but the negotiations would be carried on under instructions frofu the 
Secretary of State for the Colonies by Civil Affairs Officers or special representatives 
of His Majesty's Government, subject always to be proviso that the actual time for 
opening negotiations with the Rulers must be governed by Military exigencies and 
left to the discretion of the Military Commander. 
5. The acquisition of this Jurisdiction by His Majesty will enable an Order-in-
Council to be made to provide for the future central and local government of the 
country. This jurisdiction will render unnecessary any further dependence on 
Treaties with Rulers in any future revision of the constitutional arrangements. 
6. The new constitutional arrangements for Malaya should provide for the special 
treatment of the port and Island of Singapore, in the early stages at any rate, in view 
of its distinctive characteristics in the Malayan picture. 
7. The rest of the peninsula, including the British Settlements of Penang and 
Malacca, should be constituted a Malayan Union. For the Malayan Union a 
constitution should be devised which would provide for a single united authority 
representing the States and the Settlements, subject to the jurisdiction of His 
Majesty under statutory powers. At the head of the Union Government would be a 
Governor with an Executive and a Legislative Council. The seat of this Government 
would conveniently be in or near Kuala Lumpur. 
8. The co-ordination and direction of the policies of Government in the Malayan 
Union and Singapore will be secured by the appointment of a "Governor-General" at 
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Singapore, with the power of control over the local Authorities in Malaya and 
Borneo. 
9. Co-operation in all administrative matters requisite between Singapore and 
the Union will be ensured by particular agreements for joint consultation and action. 
10. On the assumption explained in paragraph 3 it will be no part of the policy of 
His Majesty's Government that the Malay Rulers should lose their personal position 
in their State territories. Indeed, it will be the intention, that, by the association of 
their territories in the Union, the Rulers will have opportunities to take part in wider 
activities than hitherto for the general advantage of the country as a whole, and may 
thereby enhance their sphere of influence and prestige in Malaya. 
Appendix 11 to 25 
1. The restoration of the pre-war constitutional and administrative systems in the 
four territories will be undesirable in the interests of security and of our declared 
purpose of promoting social, economic and political progress in Colonial territories. 
These purposes require:-
(a) The direct assumption by His Majesty's Government of responsibility for 
administration in North Borneo. 
(b) The integration of Labuan with North Borneo. 
(c) The cession to His Majesty of full jurisdiction in Brunei and Sarawak. 
The purpose of political progress requires also that self-government in Brunei and 
Sarawak should not merely develop towards systems of autocratic rule but should 
provide for a growing participation in the Government by people of all communities 
in each territory. 
2. On general grounds, and more particularly in order that His Majesty's 
Government may be in a better position to ensure the development of the country on 
the lines indicated above, it is necessary that the old position in which His Majesty 
had not full jurisdiction in these territories, with the exception of Labuan, should be 
remedied and that it should be possible to legislate for them all by Order-in-Council. 
Immediately on the reoccupation of these territories, direct authority will be 
exercised by the Military Commander, who will carry with him sufficient authority to 
enable him to exercise such direct powers and control over the territories as will be 
necessary during the period of military administration. This military authority, even 
if it fell to be exercised by a British Commander, would, however, not enable His 
Majesty to legislate for the three States, North Borneo, Brunei and Sarawak, by 
Order-in-Council, and, in any case, the jurisdiction of the Military Commander 
would not persist when the military administration gave way to a permanent civil 
administration. 
3. It is considered that the most effective way to achieve our purposes will be:-
( a) To acquire from the British North Borneo (Chartered) Company the sovereign 
and administrative rights which they possess and have hitherto exercised; and 
thereafter to provide for the future government of the territory on its liberation by 
an Administration under the direct authority of His Majesty's Government. 
(b) To incorporate the present Settlement of Labuan in the New Administration 
for North Borneo. 
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(c) To conclude new treaties with the Sultan of Brunei and the Rajah of Sarawak 
at the earliest opportunity which will accord to His Majesty such jurisdiction in 
their States as will enable His Majesty to legislate for these territories under the 
Foreign Jurisdiction Act to the fullest extent. In the case of Sarawak, the new 
treaty should also secure the acceptance by the Rajah of a resident British Adviser 
whose advice must be sought and acted upon in all substantial matters of policy 
and administration. (The present treaty with Brunei already provides for a resident 
British Adviser.) 
3. The territories in Borneo are still comparatively undeveloped and they have 
few racial or other affinities . At this stage, therefore, the basis for closer union 
between them hardly exists. Community of policy and of administrative action can, 
however, be assured from the outset under the direction of the Governor-General at 
Singapore, whose appointment is recommended and the promotion of closer union 
should be a continuing matter of our policy. 
26 CO 825/42/3, no 21 13 June 1944 
[Future policy in Malaya]: letter from Mr Stanley to Admiral Mount-
batten 
Cranborne has passed on to me your letter of the 19th March about the future 
constitution of Malaya. I had actually already been shown by Hone on his return from 
India your letter to him of the 4th February1 on the same subject, but I have held up 
my reply as your letter reached me at a juncture in which proposals on this very 
subject were under consideration by the War Cabinet. These have now concluded and 
I have been authorized to issue a Directive on our Policy in Malaya for the 
confidential guidance of Civil Affairs planners.2 A copy of this will reach you officially 
through Service channels but I enclose another for convenience of reference. 
Let me say at the outset that I thoroughly share your conviction that the way the 
military administration kicks off will make the whole difference to the smooth 
development of a new constitution in future, and that as I am responsible for our 
future policy I was, if I may say so, very glad to see the realistic and co-operative 
spirit with which you have approached the delicate issues involved in setting up a 
military administration in Malaya. Moreover I was glad to see · that your ideas on 
policy were by and large on similar lines to those on which our minds had been 
working at this end during our consideration of the "directive" enclosed. 
There are however one or two factors in the existing and prospective situation of 
Malaya which do not seem to me and my advisers fully accounted for in your letter to 
Hone. 
In the first place your analysis of the position in Malaya does not seem to me to 
bring out fully the complicated situation introduced by the presence in the country 
of a plural society. You will realise that the presence in substantial numbers in 
Malaya of Chinese and Indians makes the future constitutional development a matter 
1 See23. 2 See 25, Appendix I. 
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of some delicacy, particularly as these communities are likely to demand a more 
intimate place in the constitutional set up in the future than they have been given in 
the Malay States in the past, while at the same time the great economic power which 
they have already secured has led to antagonism between themselves and the Malays. 
We must be prepared to face a risk of sectional antagonisms showing themselves 
more definitely in the settlement of a new constitution. 
As regards the Malays themselves, I am not sure from paragraph 16 of your letter 
to Hone whether you intended to give the impression that the average Malay 
resented us in the past because we were prepared to allow their autocratic Sultans to 
have a free hand. It is, of course, a fact that the autocratic powers of the Malay Rulers 
were most considerably curbed under our "advice" and direction to the undoubted 
benefit and the manifest security of the average Malay. 
As regards your suggestions for the future, I notice thatyou propose a completely 
unified administration for the whole of Malaya. We here have felt that if we are to 
secure a greater degree of unification which is clearly essential for the wellbeing and 
security of the country but which must to some degree depend on the consent of the 
Malays, we may have to exclude Singapore from any such union, at any rate in the 
early stages, because of the predominantly Chinese element in its population. I 
should have thought too, that such an exclusion would be likely to be desirable in 
view of the special reservation of military control which you may think it necessary 
to maintain in the case of Singapore for a prolonged period as a defence base. 
I also note that you suggest that the military administration should set up an 
elected advisory council to form the foundations of a legislative council and civil 
government. My feeling is that the introduction of a principle of election during the 
military period would certainly be a matter of considerable administrative difficulty 
and would very likely prejudice the implementing of plans for the post military 
period. For instance, the introduction of any system of an elected council would 
mean decisions on the basis and extent of a franchise and that would stir the main 
apprehensions of Malays, Chinese, and other communities. 
As regards the Sultans, I notice that you recognise that because of their peculiar 
status in Islamic society they cannot be ruthlessly deposed and that you suggest they 
might be created an Upper House of the advisory council to be set up in the military 
period. If we are to put through schemes for a closer unification of the country, the 
necessary political measures will inevitably have an effect on the relations between 
the Sultans and any British authority. We have derived our powers in the States from 
Treaties and Agreements with the Malay Rulers . The conception behind our Directive 
is that we must obtain from the Rulers similarly by fresh Treaties the further 
jurisdiction we shall need. If in fact the circumstances on liberation in any of the 
States, e.g. "quisling" conduct by the Ruler or a clear feeling amongst the people 
themselves, point to the desirability of our not according recognition to the ruling 
personage, our course of procedure in any such State to achieve our purpose there 
will have to take account of the local factors. But whatever the procedure suitable in 
any State I would personally regard it as a vital part of our plans for the future that 
the Sultans should derive from a central Malayan authority any temporal authority 
which they are to exercise in the post war arrangement, and that they should not be 
given any grounds for believing that they will have derived authority in the 
constitution-apart from their personal prestige and dignity- either by reason of 
delegation from any external British authority or by reason of their own royal status. 
_, 
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Finally, I note that it is your view that our new policy, if adopted, should be put 
over to the public here and abroad by the press and by broadcasting. Our feeling here 
is that we should go extremely easy on any publicity for our future plans at present, 
partly because our knowledge of developments particularly in the sentiment of the 
people of Malaya under Japanese occupation is so scanty, and partly because I feel 
that publicity in Malaya itself might be a double edged weapon. With the presence in 
the country of rival communities who have so far developed no strong common sense 
of nationality, it seems to me that there is a risk that a statement of our intentions 
might well provide the enemy in present circumstances with an opportunity to play 
off one community against another and to weaken their desire for our return. 
Now that the general basis of our policy has been approved by the War Cabinet, the 
resulting constitutional and administrative problems are being elaborated here with 
all the expert assistance available to the Colonial Office, and we shall continue, as 
now, to keep in close touch with the War Office and with Hone. 
27 CO 825/42/3, no 25 29 July 1944 
[Directive on policy in Malaya]: letter (reply) from Admiral Mountbat-
ten to Mr Stanley 
Thank you for your Top Secret and Personal letter to me dated 13 June1 enclosing an 
advance copy of the Directive on Policy in Malaya. 
I welcome the prospect which this affords of a single Malayan Union embracing all 
the States and Settlements of the peninsula, and of constitutional progress directed 
towards the development of democratic self-government. 
These are great points and I am not entirely convinced by the arguments which 
have decided you to keep them under a bushel. I should like to have seen them 
blazoned to the World. 
I also like the proposal in paragraph 8 of the Directive for regional co-ordination 
under a Governor-General at Singapore, which is a development I hope we may see 
repeated in other parts of the Colonial Empire. 
In some respects, however, the Directive is less far reaching than I had hoped and 
in two particulars leaves me with a feeling of uneasiness. I do appreciate the 
complications which we must expect to find on our return to Malaya, brought out in 
your letter, and it is considerations of just this kind which make me feel we should 
cultivate a new mind in our approach to them. 
Paragraph 3 of the Directive, which cautions against undue rigidity of intention, is 
my excuse for putting forward views which doubtless have already been considered 
but which I am sure in the changing situation we shall meet with will be found 
deserving of further attention. 
My first cause of uneasiness is in the proposal that as soon as feasible after the 
reoccupation we should set about negotiating fresh treaties with the Malay Rulers. I 
should have doubted the wisdom of that in any case but when I read that the avowed 
object of these treaties is the acquisition by His Majesty of new powers not hitherto 
enjoyed by him I feel sure that the procedure proposed is psychologically question-
1 See 26. 
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able. That acquisition of such powers is fundamental to continued constitutional 
progress is obvious, but I do feel we lay ourselves open to a charge of hypocrisy if in 
the first flush of our success, and with overwhelming force at our disposal, we invite 
the rulers in effect to sign or resign. 
I know that is a distorted view of what is proposed but I am sure it is how it will be 
represented. It will be said we used our force to extract cessions which would not 
otherwise have been granted, and what I should like to see done as an act of 
deliberate policy may, I fear, come to be represented by our detractors as a legislatic 
[legalistic] sham. 
Let me put my objection in this way. What happens if a Ruler, otherwise 
unexceptionable, declines to conclude a new treaty on the desired lines? Do we have 
to find a successor who will? Or do we have to forego our aims? 
What the constitutional solution should be it is beyond my province to suggest but 
I am in entire agreement with the statement in your letter that you personally regard 
it as a vital part of our plans for the future that the Sultans should derive from a 
central Malayan authority any temporal authority which they are to exercise and 
that they should be given no grounds for believing they have derived authority from 
any other source. I do not find this altogether compatible with the necessity for 
"opening negotiations" with them (para. 4 of the Directive) and I must admit I am 
not very happy at the prospect of my Commanders or my Civil Affairs Officers 
becoming embroiled during the military period in negotiations about the status of 
the Rulers, or their powers, or their futures. 
My second point refers to the sentence in paragraph 1 of the Directive which reads 
that participation in the Government by all the communities in Malaya is to be 
promoted, subject to a special recognition of the political, economic and social 
interests of the M a lay race. I cannot help feeling that in the long run nothing could 
perhaps do more to perpetuate sectional antagonisms, to the risk of which you 
pointedly refer in your letter, than the giving of special recognition to one race. 
I feel our objects should be to break down racial sectionalism in every way open to 
us, politically, economically and socially, and to endeavour to substitute for it the 
idea of Malayan citizenship. 
I incline to agree that I was premature in suggesting that the military administra-
tion should set up an elected Advisory Council and on further consideration I feel our 
efforts should be directed towards promoting responsible democratic institutions at 
the bottom by beginning with the village and the ward. In such modest beginnings, 
as it seems to me, may lie the key not only to future self-government but to the 
difficulties inherent in a plural society. 
If we can make a start in this way by getting people, whether Malays, Chinese or 
Indians, to combine together to deal as citizens (and not as racial communities) with 
the local problems of their village or ward we may hope that one day they will come 
to look at the wider problems of Malaya in the same light, and that at least 
Malayan-born and Malayan-domiciled Chinese will begin to identify themselves with 
Malaya instead of seeking political guidance and interference from China. If any such 
result is to be obtained increased recognition of the Chinese, and perhaps their 
increased employment in Government services, would seem necessary and although 
I am aware that the question bristles with difficulties I do feel that the sentence in 
the directive to which I have referred may add to them by conducing to the sectional 
point of view. 
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As regards the suggestion that publicity should not at present be given to our 
intentions, for fear of misrepresentation by the enemy, I deplore the idea that one 
should be deterred by such a consideration from making one's position perfectly 
plain to the whole world. I can think of no pronouncement one could make that 
could not be misrepresented by the enemy: that is his job, and is a permanent factor 
in his political warfare against us. What is far more damaging, and has done us an 
infinity of harm elsewhere, is that we can often be represented as afraid to admit 
what our designs really are. It is this which seems to me the greatest present we can 
make to enemy propaganda. 
I must apologise for having sent my last letter to Cranborne, but in a mental lapse 
I thought he was still Secretary of State for the Colonies, otherwise of course I would 
have addressed my letter direct to you. 
28 CO 825/42/3, no 27 21 Aug 1944 
[Directive on policy in Malaya]: letter (reply) from Mr Stanley to 
Admiral Mountbatten 
I am hastening to reply to your letter of the 29th July, 1 which I have read with the 
greatest interest. Thank you very much for this frank and stimulating expression of 
your views. 
As I see it, there are three main points on which you are · not fully satisfied about 
our present policy. The first point is the proposal to negotiate, immediately on the 
liberation of Malaya, fresh treaties with the Sultans in order to provide us with the 
jurisdiction we need. I have taken careful note of what you say, but I do not see that 
we have any alternative. We are advised that the treaty position and the constitution-
al rights of the State Governments are in abeyance only for the period of operational 
needs and military Government. It will therefore be too late if we do not obtain our 
fresh powers during the period of military Government. We need our new 
constitutional arrangements, which I am glad to see you entirely favour, to succeed 
immediately upon the termination of military Government. Any recalcitrant Sultan 
is likely to be far more of a problem and far more recalcitrant if allowed to regain his 
previous sovereign position before the change is made. The British relations with the 
Malay States rest solely upon our treaties. The only alternative course for securing 
jurisdiction is annexation. 
I should add that it is our intention that the negotiations with the Sultans should 
be carried out by a special mission on behalf of the Secretary of State for the 
Colonies. Your military staff would thus not be directly embroiled. 
Your second point of disagreement is on the proposals to safeguard the special 
position of the Malay race. The Malays are by general consent not at present capable 
of competing on equal terms, economically and educationally, with the "immigrant 
races"-Chinese and Indian. From the beginning of our relations with the States we 
have pursued in the Malay States the policy of taking positive measures to prevent 
the submergence of Malays in the public services and in the ownership of land by the 
1 See 27. 
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more energetic, competent, and resourceful Chinese. The most damaging criticism 
of our new policy will be precisely on these grounds, since we are endeavouring to 
admit non-Malay communities to a political equality with the Malays in the State 
territories. We shall make certain of estranging the Malays unless we can assure 
them of measures not only in the political and social field, which will prevent such 
"equality" inevitably resulting in their submergence, but also in such matters as the 
reservation of Malay lands, which otherwise will certainly pass into the hands of the 
ubiquitous Indian money-lender. Even Tan Cheng Lock, a leading Chinese of 
Malacca, admits this himself to a large extent. 
Thirdly you have a good deal to say about the arousing of communal antagonism. 
On this point too I think we have a satisfactory answer. For a long time at any rate, 
we must expect that the natural China and the India ties of the Chinese and Indian 
domiciled communities will tend to be stimulated by the nationalist politics of those 
two countries. Our pre-war experience offered hardly a sign of any conception 
amongst the three peoples that they were Malayans. Our plan is to proceed both 
from the top and the bottom in fostering the growth of such a conception-viz. by a 
single representative legislature at the top and at the same time the institution of 
local bodies which will not be purely Malay but more broadly based and representa-
tive of the people of the country. The social basis of Malayan society for some time to 
come cannot be expected to be other than communal, seeing that inter-marriage is 
virtually non-existent, and religion, language and domestic customs must be potent 
factors in maintaining the present distinctions. 
Finally I note, and to a large extent agree, with what you say about publicity. I 
believe however that Gater, in your recent talk with him, explained more fully our 
point of view on this matter. He gives me to understand that you are not in any 
immediate hurry in that respect provided that His Majesty's Government's policy is 
ventilated in good time before military operations to liberate Malaya are undertaken. 
29 CO 825/42/3, no 28 6 Sept 1944 
[Directives on policy]: letter (reply) from Admiral Mountbatten to Mr 
Stanley 
Thank you very much for your letter of 21st August, 1 which has interested me 
enormously. 
I feel that we are substantially in agreement: certainly in what we would wish to 
see emerging as the post-war Malayan state, and to a great extent, I think, in the 
means by which this can be achieved. I am sure you share my wish to see the country 
politically unified and racially united, since these are indispensable prerequisites to 
the building of a free and happy country there. 
I fully appreciate that the social basis of Malayan society cannot for some time to 
come be other than communal, and that the fostering in the three peoples of Malaya 
of the conception that they are in fact Malayans, will be an uphill business. But I feel 
sure that you are on the right track in aiming at reducing, and eventually 
1 See 28. 
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eliminating, these barriers by a single representative legislature at the top, 
accompanied by the institution of broadly based and representative local bodies. 
Since I wrote to you, I have received from the War Office copies of the Directives 
on Chinese policy, and on the Creation of Malayan Union Citizenship.2 It is essential 
that the Chinese and Indian elements should be legally assimilated, and should be 
made to feel committed, to local responsibility, instead of being merely a group of 
exploiters, or a source of cheap labour. While we are on the subject of citizenship, 
what is H.M.G.'s attitude to the responsibilities of the domiciled British community? 
Presumably we shall be equally debarred from local activities without statutory 
residence or formal naturalisation. Will you let me know about this[?] 
I am sorry to see from your letter that the Malays should by general consent be 
found incapable of competing on equal terms, "economically and educationally", 
with the Chinese and Indians. I have no reason to suppose that this opinion is not 
fully borne out; but it seems to me that indigenous peoples sometimes appear lazy 
and unambitious, largely because they are unwilling to compete with lower 
standards of living and wage conditions established by immigrants, who are without 
roots in the country, and cannot afford to turn down a standard of wages which those 
who have homes and relations on the spot are not forced to sink to. I do not suggest 
that the Malayan is at the mercy of cheap coolie labour imported from China; but it is 
so easy to give a dog a bad name that one is inclined to fear that an opinion of the 
natives' qualities may become an idee fixe, which will militate against a proper 
appreciation of their potentialities under improved conditions. But in any case I feel 
that your proposals, to which I have made allusion above, should go a long way to 
mitigate this difficulty, if it actually exists. 
It is the question of the Sultans that I am still not quite happy about. I quite 
appreciate that their legal position may present a problem; and if the treaty position 
and the constitutional rights of the State Governments are in abeyance only for the 
period of operational needs and Military Government, it certainly looks as though we 
should have to obtain our fresh powers during the period of my administration. But I 
still feel that it is most unfortunate that negotiations of this character should be 
entered into as an immediate consequence of our arrival in the country with 
overwhelming force at our disposal. Even though I whole-heartedly approve the use 
to which we intend to put these powers, and understand our necessity to have them 
in good time, it seems to me that our manner of obtaining them cannot fail to create 
a bad impression in Malaya, and anywhere else where we may expect hostile 
criticism. I feel, therefore, that we must not only have our answers ready if accused 
in press or parliament of using Military force to get a tighter grip on Malaya, but that 
we should forestall criticism by propaganda which the M. of I. should start to put out 
as soon as we have got Malaya back. 
I am glad to see that it is your intention that these negotiations shall be carried out 
by a special mission, and that I and my Military Staff will thus not be directly 
embroiled, but the British as a nation will still be involved. I am not clear as to the 
extent to which it is proposed that the Sultans should be utilised, and entrusted with 
a measure of authority, for the purpose of carrying out the Military Government 
under my orders. 
2 Copies of the long-term directives including those on the 'Creation of Malayan Union citizenship' and 
'Chinese policy' are at WO 203/5642, no 68/16/45. 
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The last thing I should wish to do would be to prejudice in any way the future 
intentions of H.M.G. qy any action during the military period. At the same time, it is 
clear that the military period will be used for gaining experience of the problems of 
the future, and for generally moulding the administration on the right lines; and it is 
likely that this will entail a system of trial and error. Since, presumably, everything 
which is found to be desirable, and which works, will be carried over and 
incorporated in the Civil administration, whatever is found to be mistaken or 
harmful will remain associated in the minds of the Malayans with the period of 
Military administration. The only way I can see of ensuring that this shall not 
redound to the discredit or unpopularity of the armed forces of the Crown, is that 
H.M.G. should announce their policy, unequivocally, so that these trials (and 
possibly errors) can be judged against that background. 
But the need for H.M.G. to announce their policy is a matter of urgency, in my 
opinion, for a much weightier reason. I am relieved to see, in the last paragraph of 
your letter, that H.M.G's policy is to be ventilated in good time before military 
operations to liberate Malaya are undertaken. Alas, this is coupled with your 
statement, that Cater has given you to understand that I am not in any immediate 
hurry in that respect. 
Since my discussions with th,e Chiefs of Staff in London, this is no longer the case. 
I understand that the general view is that the Japanese war may be over by the end of 
1945, and if I am given the resources, S.E.A.C. will certainly be back in Malaya before 
that. There is therefore now no more time to lose. I consider that the time to 
announce our policy, and to give it full publicity, is NOW, and that there is no time to 
be lost, if I am not to be asked to undertake a campaign against a part of the world 
which should have been prepared by suitable Political Warfare, but where on the 
contrary we will have again missed the bus.3 
I hope I can rely on your help in this matter. The political aspect of such an 
announcement is not a matter with which I feel I need concern myself; but the 
example of what the helpful attitude of the local populations in Italy and France has 
meant to our fighting forces makes me apprehensive at the thought that we may be 
neglecting to procure for ourselves a weapon which may not be as potent as in the 
European countries occupied by the Nazis, but which it seems to me that it would be 
folly to underestimate. Putting it at its very lowest, if we can expect but little help 
and sympathy from the Malayan populations (which I personally do not believe) we 
should at the very least be able to ensure their benevolent neutrality in our invasion 
of the country. 
I would be very grateful, if you are of my opinion, if you would use your influence 
to see that something is done about this very vital matter before it is too late. 
3 This paragraph has been boldly marked by the recipient with a large cross in the margin of the original. 
Mountbatten was looking forward to an invasion of Malaya from the sea; he did not, of course, know of the 
existence of the atomic bomb until he attended the Potsdam Conference in July 1945. 
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30 CO 825/42/3, no 30 17 Oct 1944 
[Implementation offuture policy in Malaya]: letter (reply) from Mr 
Stanley to Admiral Mountbatten 
I am sure that you will forgive me for having taken a little time before sending you 
my ideas on the points made in your letter to me of 6th September.1 We necessarily 
have to take a view of future arrangements and policies in Malaya in circumstances in 
which there is obscurity on some important factors in the situation. Nevertheless 
there are factors of at least equal importance which we may rely upon as constant, 
such as the communal division of the population and, on the other hand, the 
essential unity of the social and economic questions of the country as a whole. 
We can also expect to find a continued reluctance of the Malay Rulers to concede 
political equality to the Chinese and Indian inhabitants in any of the States. Your 
main uneasiness is that we should have to appear to choose the moment of our 
military strength to present our policies for the Rulers' acceptance. The question 
how far that position will be resented by public opinion in Malaya or elsewhere, is 
likely to be influenced by the local experiences of the Rulers' conduct and influence 
during the period of Japanese occupation; for instance, whether they have shown 
themselves, or have been able to show themselves, defenders of the people, and if so, 
whether of the Malay people only or of the Chinese and Indians in the States as well. 
But in any case we are, I am convinced, right in taking a long term view that the 
prospect of self-government in any real sense in Malaya must depend on the 
achievement of some constitutional unity in the Peninsula, and as it is our avowed 
policy that self-government is an important aim in Colonial territories, we should 
rightly be criticised if we fail to take this opportunity of achieving the basis of a unity 
which must then develop itself with our further assistance in the years to come. We 
shall have, I do not doubt, to exercise pressure on the Rulers or some of them in 
order to achieve the cohesion we believe to be in the general interest, if Malaya is to 
be capable in the future of standing on its own feet as a territory of substantial 
importance though of relatively small area. If in the last resort any recalcitrant Malay 
Ruler has to be coerced, I do not myself think that we should defer the process, or 
indeed could do so, until after the military administration had come to an end. 
I very heartily agree with you that the public presentation of our policies must play 
an important part in the smooth achievement of what we believe to be right, and I 
welcome the support which I know you will give me in ensuring that this is done in 
good time. As soon as I can see the way to making any general disclosure of policies 
in our territories in the Far East I shall write to you about it. 
I have concentrated on the main question in your letter as I am sure it is the one of 
prime importance. You did, however, mention in your fourth paragraph the position 
of the British community. I don't think this will be a difficulty as British subjects will 
not suffer any discrimination as compared with Malayan Union Citizens, according to 
the plans which we are working out. 
1 See 29. 
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31 CAB 66/60, WP(44)762 22 Dec 1944 
'Constitutional Policy in Malaya': War Cabinet memorandum by Mr 
Attlee 
[Mountbatten's demand that the new policy be widely publicised led Stanley to raise the 
issue with the Cabinet Committee on Malaya and Borneo chaired by Attlee. The 
committee accepted Stanley's recommendation that SACSEA should be furnished with a 
broad and brief statement for 'background use of restricted circles', but Cabinet, 
discussing WP(44)762 on 9 Jan 1945, found it an unsatisfactory compromise. Since 
Stanley was by then in the USA, any decision on publicity was put off for another six 
months (see 36 and also CO 825/43/15 and CAB 65/49, WM 3(45)2, 9 Jan 1945).] 
On the 31st May, 1944, the War Cabinet approved a directive on policy in Malaya to 
the authorities responsible for planning for the Civil Administration of Malaya on 
liberation. The War Cabinet's approval was subject to the understanding that no 
publicity should be given to the policies contained therein. 
2. Since the date on which the War Cabinet reached their decision, the Colonial 
Office and War Office have been moving forward with the necessary plans for the 
administration of these territories on the basis then authorised. These plans have, of 
course, been disclosed only to those directly concerned in them, but the increasing 
disadvantages of this secrecy have been urged with great weight from various 
quarters . The Secretary of State for the Colonies has been in correspondence with 
the Supreme Allied Commander, South-East Asia, who has strongly represented to 
him the importance of making known our future plans in general to the peoples 
whom those plans will affect. Admiral Mountbatten holds that the proper reception 
of our future policy in Malaya depends upon its being fully explained beforehand, and 
that the time is now ripe to do this. 1 
3. In advancing this point of view, the Supreme Allied Commander is thinking 
not only of long-term considerations, but also of the creation of a favourable 
atmosphere for the setting up of a military administration for which he will be 
responsible. Moreover, those responsible for present operations of a special character 
with in his Command have made the same case for their own reasons. So much so 
that the organisation in question has had to be given certain general guidance on the 
subject for the use of its agents. It has also been necessary to give similar guidance to 
the organisation engaged in similar operations in Borneo. 
4. Then again, the authorities engaged in Political Warfare and in the enlight-
ment of the public both in this country and in the United States of America have 
strongly pressed their need for a new Malayan directive which will be based on a 
forward policy and will reflect that policy. 
5. The Secretary of State for the Colonies is not yet convinced that the time has 
come for our plans to be divulged in full, since this would involve committing 
ourselves to every feature of those plans, at a time when many relevant facts are by 
force of circumstances unknown to us . Nevertheless, he attaches great weight to the 
Supreme Allied Commander's views, and believes that the essential needs of Admiral 
Mountbatten and others could be met for the present by the distribution to selected 
circles of a broad statement of the fundamental problems in Malaya which bear 
1 See 26-30. 
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directly upon the political, administrative and economic future of the country. At the 
same time there would be distributed, not for publication, but in confidence purely 
for the background use of restricted circles which can guide and influence thought 
and discussion of the subject, a brief statement actually setting out the main features 
of our proposed policy. Drafts of these statements and proposals as to their 
distribution are enclosed at Annexes I and II.2 
6. The Ministerial Committee on Malaya and Borneo have considered and concur 
in the Colonial Secretary's proposals and in the draft statements, which I submit for 
the covering approval of the War Cabinet. 
2 Not printed. 
32 T220/52 29 Mar 1945 
[Malaya reconstruction finance]: letter from S Caine to Lord Keynes 
[Colonial planners came under immense financial pressure in 1945 as, on the one hand, 
they sought to earmark funds for the rehabilitation and development of colonies while, on 
the other hand, they faced demands from those eager to channel colonial resources into 
domestic reconstruction. Keynes, for example, in his capacity as financial adviser at the 
Treasury, suggested that large amounts of colonial sterling balances should be appropri-
ated in order to reduce Britain's own problems. CO officials, not least Caine, recognised 
that such a policy would hamper post-war reconstruction of war-damaged dependencies, 
jeopardise schemes for development and welfare, and, consequently, create political 
unrest in the colonies. The debate was conducted at a number of levels; documents 
32-35, 37 & 38 relate specifically to Malayan matters. See also CAB 66/65, WP(45)301, 
note by the chancellor of the Exchequer enclosing 'Overseas financial policy in stage Ill' 
by 1 M Keynes, 3 Apr 1945.) 
Eadl mentioned incidentally in the course of conversation yesterday that you have 
expressed considerable scepticism about the estimate of probable expenditure in our 
Far Eastern Colonies of £200 millions, which I had mentioned in my letter to Eady of 
15th March on the general subject of Colonies' claims on sterling. When I included 
the figure in that letter, it was certainly a wild guess, but we have just had some 
rather carefully worked out estimates from the Malayan Planning Unit, which help to 
give a rather more precise idea of the position, and you may be interested to have 
them. 
The Malayan Planning Unit's figures have been compiled largely as a guide to the 
calls which may be made on Government finances, including the United Kingdom 
Exchequer, and I have therefore had to add to them such estimates as we have of 
probable expenditure from private funds on capital reconstruction. The principal 
items are as follows:-
Reconstruction and repair of"public utilities", 
i.e. Government owned railways, electricity, water, 
telecommunications, roads, etc. 
1 Sir W Eady was chairman of the Board of Customs and Excise, 1941-1942. 
£37,150,000 
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Administrative expenditure during first two years in excess 
of local revenue (including upwards of £20 millions 
for outstanding claims in respect to arrears of salary, 
pension, etc.) 
Relief supplies during initial emergency period 
Rehabilitation of industry:-
(1) Tin mines 
(2) Rubber estates (largely renewal of stocks of estate 
supplies and work of capital character in re-clearing 
overgrown estates) 
(3) Other industries 
Total: 
£24,000,000 
£22,825,000 
£26,000,000 
£12,000,000 
£5,000,000 
£126,975,000 
91 
These figures are for Malaya alone. We have also to consider Hong Kong, Borneo 
and the Pacific Islands, which are certainly smaller but would still require quite 
respectable sums. My guess of £200 millions may be a little on the high side but not, 
I think, wildly inaccurate if one is thinking, as one must in this kind of juggling, in 
figures accurate to the nearest hundred million. 
33 T 220/52 19 Apr 1945 
'Malaya reconstruction finance': memorandum by A J D Winnifrith1 
(1) We have at last got the promised Colonial Office memorandum. This shows 
the following broad picture: 
1st 2 Next5 
years years 
£m. £m. 
Capital Expenditure 36 20 
Budget Deficits 6 5 
42 25 
67 
Assets available 32 
Prospective Deficit £35m. 
(2) My first comment is that this shows the picture at its worst. Capital 
expenditure may very well not reach these figures, because Malaya will not be able to 
get the manufacturing capacity. Even more doubtful is the gloomy view taken of 
revenue prospects. It is assumed that, even on the austerity basis, the budget will not 
balance till after the fourth year. Obviously a lot hangs on the prosperity of rubber 
and tin, but given reasonable world markets one would hope for a far better revenue 
outlook than now is envisaged. 
(3) Analysis of the programme 
The problem in Malaya seems to be widely different from that in Burma. In Burma 
1 A John D Winnifrith, a Treasury official since 1934, rose to permanent under-secretary in the Ministry of 
Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, 1959-1967. 
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the cost of reconstruction is very largely made up of the restoration of private 
industries, with somewhat smaller expenditure on public utilities. Capital replace-
ment on Government Services accounted for a large part of the original programme 
but is reduced to quite small proportions in the revised austerity proramme. 
Outstanding liabilities were put at £8 millions and the budget deficit at £7.5 millions 
for each of the first two years. 
In Malaya, on the other hand, private industry is expected to look after itself. There 
is no scheme as in Burma for Government controlled projects and capital expendi-
ture is practically confined to Government owned public utilities, particularly 
Railways, which account for half of the total. The other main item is outstanding 
liabilities mainly on account of arrear of salaries and pensions which are put at a 
capitalised figure of £18 millions. Finally, there is the estimated budget deficit over 
the first two years which is put at £6 millions. Finance for private industry is 
virtually negligible at £0.170 million. The total of £42 millions is made up as follows: 
1. Capital finance for public utilities 
2. Outstanding commitments capitalised 
3. Capital Finance for private industry 
4. Budget Deficits 
(4) Public utilities 
£m. 
17.9 
18.0 
0.1 
6.0 
42.0 
The appendix to the Colonial Office memorandum shows how the £17.9 millions is 
spread among the main public utilities. The railways account for nearly half the total. 
The appendix also shows the percentage of restoration up to pre-war standards to be 
aimed at in the first two years. It will be observed that over the 7 year programme the 
aim is to achieve 100% restoration. My comment on this part of the programme is 
that the percentage of restoration proposed for the first two years is not unreasonable 
and that in a prosperous place like Malaya it is equally not unreasonable to aim at 
100% restoration over 7 years. Merely as a matter of estimating, however, I doubt 
very much whether they will be able to spend the full amount of £17.9 millions over 
two years. Capacity, especially for railway equipment, is going to be very short and 
they will be lucky if they get half of what they want. 
(5) Outstanding commitments 
These are estimated at somewhere between £16 millions and £20 millions. Clearly 
there can be no question of Malaya repudiating her legal liabilities, but with a total of 
54,000 claimants it would be very surprising if all claims were actually presented. 
Certainly some of them would not be presented at once. I should have thought that 
the actual cash required over the first two years might be considerably less than the 
full liability. 
(6) Capital finance for private industry 
This is a very small part of the programme, and I have no particular comments on it, 
except that Malaya will have to take good care to secure her title to the assets so as to 
be in a position to recover her expenditure as far as possible. 
(7) Budget deficits 
These are put at £6 millions over a period of two years . I have asked the Colonial 
Office what standard of Government services they aim at providing, and their answer 
is that the standard will be well below that of 1940. A good test is the number of 
[33) APR 1945 93 
European employees, and it is estimated that they will not have more than half the 
1940 strength in the first years. 
(8) The foregoing liabilities do not give the full picture. In addition to the 
expenditure listed in paragraph 3, there will be expenditure estimated at £29,825,000 
on Relief Supplies. The whole of this expenditure, however, is recoverable. The basis 
of procurement is the Young estimates, and I think we need not question the 
standard of provision since I understand that the Young Committee2 did not allow 
for anything particularly lavish. Furthermore, I think it is a reasonably sound 
expectation that the expense will, in fact, be recovered. 
(9) Dollar expenditure Of the total programme, only some £5,650,000 is expected 
to be spent in dollars. This is a far lower proportion than for Burma. 
(10) Other U.K. liabilities 
To complete the picture of U.K. liabilities, a note should be taken of two further 
items:-
(a) The cost of military administration during the military period. This might be 
put at £2 [sic] . 
(b) The fact that Malaya is not under the present plan continuing her contribution 
to Imperial Defence. This, before the war amounted to £ .3 
(11) Malaya's ability to pay for the above programme 
The memorandum states that Malaya holds free assets to a value of some £32 
millions. In addition, she has lent this country £2 millions as a war loan. O.F. will no 
doubt be able to comment on the question whether she has other assets not disclosed 
which could be realised. Finally, nothing is said in the Colonial Office memorandum 
about Malaya's ability to raise reconstruction loans on her own account. Her public 
debt position seems eminently satisfactory since for this very rich community it only 
amounts to £20 millions which will be extinguished by 1970. It seems to me that she 
should be able without any difficulty to raise substantial loans on her own account. 
(12) Questions for decision 
The following questions require a decision: 
(a) How far should Malaya finance her reconstruction expenditure herself? 
(b) Is her reconstruction programme reasonable or should it be pruned? 
(c) What degree of Treasury control over her programme is required? 
(13) How far can Malaya finance her programme herself? 
The assets which Malaya has immediately available amount to £32 millions. O.F. will 
no doubt say whether there is any objection to her realising these assets forthwith. 
Subject to there being no objection on this account, I should have thought that 
Malaya should exhaust these assets in the first place. Her immediate requirements 
are her capital expenditure of £18 millions starting now and going on for two years, 
2 Arthur Stewart Young MP was commissioner of the Treasury in 1942. 
3 This figure is left blank in the original. In 1939-1940 the Malay rulers of the Federated Malay States 
supported the British government's war effort with gifts totalling nearly £1.5 million. The Unfederated 
Malay States also made large financial contributions; for example, in 1940 the Sultan of Johore donated 
£250,000 and provided an interest-free loan of £100,000; in 1941 he made a further gift of £500,000 in 
1941. See CO 7171139, no 51888/1939, CO 717/143, nos 51888/1940, 51888/3/1940 and 51888/15/1940, 
CO 717/147, no 51888/15/1941. 
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and her Relief Supplies programme also extending over a period amounting to some 
£30 millions. This makes a total capital commitment of some £48 millions. If one 
discounts this total to allow for:-
(a) inevitable failure to secure the full amount of the programme 
(b) the spreading over of the payments into the 2nd or 3rd year, it might well be 
that only some £30 millions would be required in the next twelve months. By that 
time civil Government may have been restored in Malaya. Malayan Government 
would then be faced with outstanding liabilities under their capital programme, 
liabilities in respect of salaries and pensions and prospective budget deficits, but at 
that stage could set about raising the reconstruction loan. 
(14) We have already approached the Colonial Office on the question of the 
method by which any financial assistance to Malaya should be provided. The Colonial 
Office reply is given in Mr. May le's letter of 16th February. It will be seen that he asks 
for any financial assistance to be made as an advance on the understanding that at a 
later stage it should be decided how much of the advances should be converted into 
grants, and what terms of repayment should be arranged for any residue to be 
regarded as loan. 
(15) I do not think we can be content with such a solution. If the above 
appreciation is anywhere near the mark Malaya will be able to meet all that can be 
spent for the next twelve months out of her own resources. Until those resources are 
exhausted there can be no question of any assistance from the U.K. Exchequer. 
Furthermore, the Colonial Office should be told now that having regard to our 
difficulties in regard to overseas finance we shall expect Malaya as far as possible to 
finance her own requirements. She should not hesitate to raise reconstruction loans. 
Nothing is said in the memorandum about taxation policy, though the Colonial 
Office told me that the plan is to raise as much taxation as possible and to go on with 
the wartime device of income tax. At this stage I think we should say that we expect 
Malaya to raise all the revenue she can consistently with encouraging the return of 
prosperity to the country. 
(15) [sic] Is the present programme reasonable? 
I see no reason to suppose that the present programme is extravagant, and bearing in 
mind that we are asking Malaya to finance her own expenditure and remembering 
that she, unlike Burma, is a community with good economic prospects, I do not see 
that we should have any ground for insisting on an austerity programme. 
(16) Mlhat degree of Treasury control is required? 
If my suggestion about Malaya finding her own expenditure is agreed, I think the 
Treasury control should be very lightly exercised, and we should confine our action 
to getting information from time to time about the progress of expenditure from the 
standpoint that if, despite all efforts, Malaya cannot find all the finance herself, the 
U.K. Exchequer may have to come to her aid with a loan. 
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34 T 220/52 23 Apr 1945 
[Malaya reconstruction finance] : letter (reply) from Lord Keynes to S 
Caine 
My attention has been so much engaged in the last month in other directions that it 
is only now I have got down to answering your letter of March 29th1 about probable 
expenditure on relief and reconstruction in our Far Eastern Colonies. 
I find from your letter that your figure covers a much more comprehensive field 
than I had in mind. It is, in fact, the grand total of all public and private expenditure 
from the beginning to the end. I can well believe that your figure is not much on the 
high side to cover all this, including what is desirable as well as what is essential. But 
some of it might never happen and a good deal of it might have, inevitably, to be 
spread over a longish period. 
However that may be, I agree that it is your comprehensive figure which is 
relevant to our balance of trade problem. For, except in so far as we can get outside 
assistance, the cost will fall on our balance of trade whether the money comes from 
the existing sterling balances of the Colonies in question, or from a British grant, or 
from a British credit. 
What is your present idea 'of the sources of finance? Malaya and Hong Kong 
sterling balances are very substantial, some £130 million. How far do you 
contemplate drawing on these? Have any decisions been reached about the source or 
sources of compensation, if any, e.g. for the tin and rubber concerns? 
Have you given any thought to collecting an Imperial, British Commonwealth 
pool from which to draw contributions? 
It would be very helpful to me, in connection with Stage Ill plans,2 to know rather 
more clearly than I do at present how all this stands. 
1 See 32. 2 ie plans for the period after the defeat of Japan. 
35 T 220/52 28 Apr 1945 
[Malaya reconstruction finance]: letter (reply) from S Caine to Lord 
Keynes 
Thank you for your letter of the 3rd [sic] Apri11 about probable expenditure on relief 
and reconstruction in the Far Eastern Colonies. There has been a good deal of 
departmental correspondence about the sources from which the various items of 
probable expenditure ought to be met, and perhaps I ought to preface anything I say 
with the qualification that it is without prejudice to any argument the Colonial Office 
may have with the Treasury on the subject either in particular cases or generally. 
Obviously the three main sources of funds are the holdings of the Far Eastern 
Governments themselves, grants or loans from the United Kingdom Exchequer, and 
private funds including both private assets recorded in your figures as belonging to 
residents in the Far Eastern Colonies and other funds which business concerns 
interested in those Colonies can command or borrow in this country. 
1 See 34. 
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I have myself always assumed that at one stage or another the Far Eastern Colonial 
Governments will have to put in pretty well all their liquid assets . The recorded 
sterling balances held on Government account for Malaya and Hong Kong as at 30th 
September 1944 total £96,500,000. Of these, £49,200,000 consisted of currency 
·funds. Maybe some part of those currency funds will ultimately be found to be in 
excess of prudent reserve requirements, but we cannot at present regard any part of 
them as definitely available for non-currency purposes, particularly as there are all 
sorts of potential but at present unascertainable currency liabilities, e.g., in respect 
of forced issues of banknotes in Hong Kong. Actual liquid funds amounted to 
£19,000,000 held in Malaya, and other invested funds including loans to H.M.G. 
amounted to £28,300,000. Some part of these invested funds may be available, but to 
some extent at least they consist of sinking funds or other earmarked funds not 
available for general use. It would perhaps, therefore, be taking an optimistic view if 
we put down £40,000,000 as the possible contribution of the Far Eastern Govern-
ments themselves towards the total. 
The United Kingdom Exchequer is no doubt as usual likely to be called upon to fill 
in the residual gap, so that we should look next at the private funds which may be 
available. Our understanding is that the re-equipment and rehabilitation of the 
rubber industry is likely to be dealt with by the rubber companies themselves 
without calling on Government financial assistance, but most of the tin companies 
appear likely to ask for help, and some at least of the smaller industries in Malaya will 
need help also. In Hong Kong, there is good reason to hope that the Hong Kong and 
Shanghai Bank, which has substantial sterling holdings and is very deeply interested 
in the re-establishment of Hong Kong trade, will be prepared to finance a number of 
the enterprises, e.g., docks, electricity undertakings, etc., without asking for 
advances or guarantees from Government. I should expect also that there would be a 
good deal of other miscellaneous private financing by trading concerns either from 
their own reserves or from privately arranged bank advances. It is extremely difficult 
to put any total to this kind of private financing, and if I had to guess, it would be 
within the wide limits of £20 to £40 millions. 
It looks, therefore, as if the third partner, i.e. the Exchequer, will have to find the 
lion's share if finance is required on the scale indicated in my letter of the 29th 
March.2 Whether any such financing should be by way of grant or by way of credit is 
one of the issues lying between the Colonial Office and the Treasury. No doubt much 
of it, particularly any part which is attributable to the costs of rehabilitation of 
private businesses, would be on a loan basis, and the Treasury are at present insistent 
that any money found by the Exchequer should be treated as a repayable advance, at 
any rate in the first instance, until we can see the whole situation more clearly and 
decide whether the territories need assistance by way of grant. 
I am afraid we have not given very much serious consideration to the possibility of 
an Imperial or Commonwealth pool into which other parts of the Commonwealth 
besides the United Kingdom would pay contributions. The idea did receive a little 
thought indirectly when we were recently discussing arrangements for the winding 
up of Commodity War Risk Insurance funds in other Colonies where such schemes 
had been in existence under U.K. Government guarantee, but we felt in that small 
instance that it would not be practicable to ask the Colonial territories concerned to 
2 See 32. 
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make any contribution out of the surpluses on such schemes towards possible costs 
of war damage compensation in the Far East. If, however, it were thought that the 
wealthier members of the Commonwealth, i.e. the Dominions, would be willing to 
contribute, we should certainly see no financial objection, particularly if it rendered 
more likely the payment of satisfactory war damage compensation to the people who 
have suffered in the Far East. I should say, however, that it is possible that the 
political side of the Colonial Office might be a little suspicious of any such 
arrangement if it implied any recognition of political control over the Far Eastern 
Colonies by other members of the Commonwealth. 
36 CO 825/43/16, WP(45)287 7 May 1945 
'Constitutional policy in Malaya': Cabinet memorandum by Mr Stanley. 
Annex 'Draft statement of fundamental problems in Malaya' 
[This memorandum picks up the inconclusive War Cabinet discussion on 9 January (see 
31). On 8 May Churchill declared the war in Europe finally at an end and on 23 May 
formally resigned. He was then invited by the King to form what was to be a caretaker 
government until the general election, which was settled for 5 July. The Caretaker 
Cabinet considered Stanley's memorandum on 15 June and agreed that the statement in 
the Annex should be distributed to the official agencies listed in paragraph 4 of the 
memorandum (see CAB 65/53, CM 8(45)8).] 
invite the attention of my colleagues to Paper No. W.P.(44)762, of the 22nd 
December, 1944, which was a Memorandum by the Chairman of the Committee on 
Malaya and Borneo, dealing with future Constitutional Policy in Malaya.1 
2. The Memorandum contained proposals for a measure of publicity about our 
political plans for Malaya. The War Cabinet considered these proposals on the 9th 
January, and it was then felt that the proposals either went too far or not far enough. 
On the one hand, they did not offer the advantage which would result in publicity for 
a settled policy on which we were prepared to stand. On the other hand, they 
provided for a distribution of information wide enough to create a risk of leakage, 
and to entail embarrassing questions. Largely in view of these doubts, the War 
Cabinet did not reach a decision on the matter, but preferred to await my return 
from the United States. 
3. Since my return, I have carefully considered these criticisms. I feel that we 
should not contemplate, for the time being, a greater measure of publicity than that 
previously proposed, since we should thereby commit ourselves further than I 
consider necessary to a new and important line of policy which we may possibly wish 
to modify later on, at any rate as regards some of its details. I am still impressed, 
however, both by the need to prepare and influence general opinion both here and in 
the East amongst circles whose good will and understanding are important for us to 
secure, as well as the need to provide material for a progressive scheme of political 
warfare. 
4. In order to meet these needs I now propose a somewhat modified course of 
action which should, I think, for the present achieve the essential objectives of my 
1 See 31. 
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earlier proposals. I propose that only the broad statement of the chief problems in 
Malaya (in the terms recommended by the Ministers' Committee) should be issued 
(see Annex). Its distribution would be confined to the following official Agencies, 
viz.: all United Kingdom Government Departments and Representatives in Great 
Britain and abroad who are concerned with policy in Malaya, including S.E.A.C., 
United Kingdom High Commissioners in the Dominions, Political Warfare Missions 
and Ministry of Information Representatives, Colonial Governors and Diplomatic 
posts in the East. 
One of the purposes for which these agencies could use the statement would, of 
course, be to guide unofficial thought on the problems involved and direct public 
attention and discussion towards a political and social development of Malaya along 
the fresh and progressive lines of consolidation and unity which our provisional 
policy envisages. 
5. In due course we shall need to be more explicit, but when that time comes our 
course will have been aided, if my present proposal is approved. 
Annex to 38 
Malaya, though a geographical unity, is not in fact a single country, in the sense in 
which Great Britain or France are single countries. Malaya forms neither a racial nor 
a constitutional entity, and an appreciation of this fact is essential to any 
understanding of the problems we shall meet on our return. 
2. The Malay Peninsula, as organised under British control, consists of a British 
Colony (the Straits Settlements, the most important of which are Singapore, Penang 
and Malacca) and of nine Malay States, four of which are joined in a Federation. Until 
about 1870 the nine States remained entirely separate and entirely independent-
they were largely isolated by mountains and jungle-and British control was 
confined to the Colony. From then on, disturbances caused by pirates and by foreign 
(mainly Chinese) infiltration caused the several Malay Rulers, separately and at 
different times, to seek British protection. To this day the whole British position in 
the Malay States rests upon Agreements concluded with the individual Rulers-
agreements which in substance and interpretation provide for British advice (to be 
acted upon in all matters other than Malay religion and custom), but which leave the 
Rulers, from the legal point of view, as sovereign princes. 
3. The spread of British influence has brought co-ordination in many things, but 
the separate entity of the States remains none the less a reality. The Malays cherish a 
definite loyalty towards their Rulers, and this feeling conflicts with the development 
of any allegiance towards a larger unit than the State. There is no widespread 
conception amongst the Malays that they are "Malayans," with common duties and 
problems; and this is the first problem which must be faced in Malaya, if the country 
is to advance towards nationhood and self-government within the British Common-
wealth. 
4. The second problem is that of race. The extraordinary economic development 
which has accompanied the spread of British influence, and the extensive introduc-
tion of capital and enterprise from China and India has led to a situation in which the 
non-Malay population in Malaya now outnumbers the Malays, though the majority of 
the former still regard their original lands rather than Malaya as their real home. The 
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resultant problem presents special obstacles to the development of a sense of 
common citizenship in Malaya. On the one hand, the relations of the British 
Government with the Malay States are based on a recognition of the right of the 
Malay peoples to a secure position in their lands and in their educational and other 
facilit ies for progress. On the other hand the enterprise and capacity of the 
non-Malay peoples of the country, provided they be accompanied by a sense of civic 
responsibility, assert a claim that should exercise a due share in the moulding of 
Malaya's future. 
5. Mention has been made above of economic development. It must not be 
thought that racial or parochial factors have been allowed to hinder all progress. Far 
from it. The economic, social and educational record of Malaya under British control 
is unsurpassed in the Far East. In these fields the work of great research 
organisations, such as the Rubber Research Institute and the Medical Research 
Institute, is recognised throughout the East. Along with the task of guiding Malaya 
towards her political destiny, the duty of restoring these and other valuable 
institutions and adapting them to future conditions and needs will clearly rest upon 
the Government and industry. The economy of Malaya has in the past been founded 
on the two great industries of rubber and tin . The importance of these natural 
resources must be re-established, and also a healthy broadening of the basis of 
Malayan economic life will be a pressing need. 
6. The condition of the country and the temper of the people which we shall find 
on the eviction of the enemy after his prolonged period of occupation remain to be 
ascertained. But it is not too early to think and plan in terms of a forward policy in 
the country for the promotion of a growing cohesion and sense of political unity . If 
any of the features mentioned in this note are found to be obstacles to such a 
development, and if liberation is to be comprehensive and not merely related to the 
eviction of enemy forces, measures will need to be considered and concerted with all 
concerned to liberate the new Malaya from old barriers and prejudices, and it will be 
important that those who have the responsibility for the lines on which the new 
Malaya is built shall also be vested with the power to overcome any reactionary 
interests. 
37 T 220/52 18 May 1945 
[Malaya reconstruction finance]: minute by Lord Keynes to A J D 
Winnifrith 
(1) I return my correspondence with Caine to be added to your files .1 
(2) I find myself in full agreement with your memorandum of April 19th2 and 
your general line. 
(3) I note down a few random points which have occurred to me in looking 
through these papers. 
(i) I see no discussion of the currency problem. Presumably the inhabitants 
will have quite a quantity of Japanese military notes (or something of the kind) 
1 See 32, 34-35 2 See 33. 
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in their pockets. Is the intention to declare these valueless or to accept them at 
some prescribed rate? 
(ii) The decision here partly affects the question whether the currency reserves, 
which amount to £m35, do not provide an additional source of funds. The strict 
Treasury principle is, I know, that all the Currency Boards keep 100 per cent 
reserves in sterling against the outstanding note issue, and in fact the reserves 
often amount to more than 100 per cent. In other words, no fiduciary issue is 
allowed to the Colonies whatever. I am increasingly doubtful whether this is a 
position which can be sustained. Is it in fact reasonable that a Colony should be 
required to invest in U.K. the whole of the equivalent of their currency issues? I 
cannot see why. At any rate, the reconstruction of war damage would seem to 
me to be a good excuse for a breach in the principle, even if it is retained 
generally. I suggest, therefore, as a mild beginning that (say) one-third of the 
currency reserves might be covered by local Malayan Treasury Bills instead of 
British Treasury Bills. This would release a further £m10. From the balance of 
trade point of view, this comes to exactly the same thing as a British grant. But, 
at long last, it will turn out much more prudent from our point of view, if I am 
right in thinking that we cannot permanently sustain the present principle of 
pinching for our own purposes the whole of the currency reserves. If some 
liability has to be accepted in respect of locally-held Japanese notes, this would 
also constitute a charge that might properly be met by cr,eating a fiduciary issue. 
Even so, however, there might be about £m10 left, which could reasonably be 
taken for reconstruction purposes. I suggest that this line of thought deserves 
serious consideration. 
(iii) Railway reconstruction, which is I see a large item, inevitably and properly 
runs into improvements. Indeed, it would be only sensible that a fairly 
important element of improvement should be included in the programme of 
reconstruction. This is a further reason why if would be proper to cover the 
expense with a Malayan loan. 
(iv) I agree that, from the very start, any sums required should be in the shape 
of loans borrowed on her own credit or, at any rate, in her own name, covered 
with our guarantee, if this is unavoidable. You show beyond doubt that Malaya is 
well able to carry even an important increase in the burden of debt. 
(v) Do not overlook that Malaya might be quite a proper candidate for 
borrowing from the projected International Bank for Reconstruction.3 This 
would have the advantage of saving our balance of trade, since they would obtain 
dollars from this source. We could, at least, aim at covering dollar expenditure 
by such a loan. But I should go a little further than this and put in at an early 
stage for a loan of (say) $m50 from this source. 
(4) I note that the question of war damage compensation, is still very much in the 
air. But you are assuming that our liability under this head will be, at worst, fairly 
small. I agree with this policy, but feel that it will be very difficult to hold to. How far 
is the position appreciated and accepted by the principal companies concerned? If the 
pressure for assistance becomes strong, the first line of defence would be to advance 
3 The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, known as the World Bank, was set up, with 
the International Monetary Fund, by the United Nations Monetary and Financial Conference at Bretton 
Woods in July 1944. The Articles of Agreement of the Bank came into force in December 1945. 
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loans on easy terms rather than grant outright compensation. One way or another, I 
should expect that it will be necessary eventually to make some addition to the 
estimates beyond what is made already on this heading. 
38 T 220/52 [June 1945] 
'Malaya Reconstruction Programme': minute by A J D Winnifrith to 
A F B fforde1 
My letter and enclosed memorandum of 31st May gave the Colonial Office our views 
about U.K. responsibility and the degree of Treasury control over the programme. I 
told the Colonial Office (rightly I hope) that if they wanted to dispute our general 
point that U.K. assistance could only be provided as a last resort and then only by way 
of loan, they should take the matter up at a Ministerial level. News so far is that they 
are in a high state of indignation and are working themselves up into the required 
state of frenzy before seeking to get the support of their Secretary of State. 
I hope that we shall be able to maintain our attitude, and if it transpires that 
Malaya can finance this programme without U.K. support, then I suggest we can be 
rather more forthcoming on the degree of Treasury control. If, on the other hand, we 
have to provide even limited assistance, the case for proper Treasury control is 
undoubted. Until we know what the position on this matter will be, we cannot get 
any further on the question of control. But I am sending you this note not only to 
report on the general Colonial Office attitude, but also so that you may have time to 
think about the matter of control. 
The programme falls into three main categories. 
(a) Consumer goods which are bought for resale and in regard to which the 
intention is to operate without any final charge to Government funds, sales 
recouping the whole of the costs. 
(b) Capital equipment which for the most part will be ordered on Government 
account for the Government-owned public utilities, etc. such as the railways. 
Here, of course, the charge will be to the Government, whether local or U.K. 
according to the final decision. 
(c) Budget deficits and accumulated obligations like arrears of pay and pension, 
which again is a final charge to Government. 
The Colonial Office have taken up a complete non possumus attitude in regard to 
the production of detailed information such as we are getting from Burma. They 
say:-
( a) The programme is in any case not under the control of the Colonial Office, but 
of the Planning Unit of the territory concerned. (This Planning Unit is a body of 
men at present disguised in Military uniform who will form the Civil Affairs staff 
during the Military occupation, but who will thereafter assume their pre-war 
occupation of being local Civil Servants). The Planning Units are already in the Far 
1 A F B fforde was posted from his legal practice to be deputy director general at the Ministry of Supply in 
1940; he rose to under-secretary in 1943 and served as under-secretary at the Treasury, 1944--45. After the 
war he was headmaster of Rugby School, 1948-57, and chairman of the BBC, 1957-64. 
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East, so that any information we required would have to come from them. In any 
case they are not organised on the comprehensive Government of Burma scale and 
would not be able to produce the detailed information for which we have been 
asking. 
(b) In any case, the Treasury demand is in bad taste because the whole of the 
programme now in contemplation is based on the Ministry of Production's Survey, 
known as the Brett Report. The Treasury were represented by Mr. Copleston2 
when the Brett Report was being considered and we ought no to go back on it. 
As regards the consumer goods which are to be sold at cost, these were drawn up on 
the basis of the Young Enquiry and although we have had full details of the Burma 
programme, the information sent gave us no useful basis of criticism, and I should 
be quite content if we got no detail from the Colonial Office. For the rest of the 
programme I do not think we can accept the Colonial Office attitude. If the position 
is that there is no one in the future Malayan Government with a grasp of the financial 
programme comparable to that of Mr. Waight3 for the larger and more complex 
Burma programme, then it is time that such an appointment was made. And 
answering the Treasury questions will be a very useful piece of education for the 
holder of the new appointment. 
As regards the sanctity of the Brett programme, this was drawn up without any 
regard to financial considerations, in fact the recommendations were made in terms 
of quantities and not of cash. Furthermore, Brett himself recognised that his 
recommendation was made in the absence of up-to-date knowledge of what 
equipment might be found undestroyed. He therefore recommended that orders 
should only be placed for what was immediately required, and that the full 
programme should not be put in hand until information about actual conditions was 
available. 
The Brett items total some £17 million, of which £11 million are on account of 
immediate needs, and the Colonial Office would be content for authority to proceed 
with the £11 million alone for the present. This is something, but they are not 
apparently in a position to tell us how the £11 million is made up. 
I suggest that subject to any further thoughts when we know whether or not 
Malaya is willing to finance the whole programme, we should tell the Colonial Office 
that whilst we are willing to waive the production of any further information about 
the consumer goods programme, we must ask for details, under heads, of the £11 
million programme now in hand, and for arrangements to be made for us to be 
supplied with similar detailed information for any further orders to be placed in the 
future beyond these limits. Equally we shall expect information about the Budget 
Deficit and other liabilities consequent upon the restoration of civil Government. If 
the Colonial Office say that this cannot be done with the present staff, then we should 
press for the appointment of a Financial Adviser and any necessary staff working 
under him capable of producing such information. 
2 ER Copleston joined the Inland Revenue in 1932 and moved to the Treasury in 1942. 
3 L Waight was financial adviser to the governor of Burma from 1944. 
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39 CO 273/677/3, no 5 26 June 1945 
'Political co-ordination in South-East Asia': memorandum by M E 
Dening 
[While the CO had been planning the closer association of British dependencies in 
South-East Asia through the office of a regional governor general, the FO, urged by M E 
Dening (political adviser to Mountbatten since September 1943) contemplated the 
creation of a regional organization within the framework of SEAC.] 
The increasing importance which political and economic questions are assuming in 
the war against Japan make[s] it desirable to review the circumstances in which a 
Political Adviser was appointed to the Supreme Commander, South East Asia, in 
September, 1943, and to consider whether any change is desirable. 
2. When this appointment was made, it was not clear how the functions of a 
Political Adviser would develop, and his terms of reference (copy attached)1 were, in 
consequence, somewhat restricted, and related in the main only to his advisory 
capacity. Nor did the Political Adviser have any brief to act in matters concerning 
other Government departments such as the Burma Office and the Colonial Office. 
3. The office of Political Adviser has now been in existence for some eighteen 
months. In practice the Adviser tends to be regarded and treated as a senior Staff 
Officer of the Supreme Commander, though unlike Service Staff Officers he has 
independent cypher communication with the Foreign Office, to which he reports 
direct. 
4. It is questionable whether this situation, whereby the Political Adviser 
virtually serves two masters, should be allowed to continue, for while on the one 
hand a Staff Officer to the Supreme Commander should be solely responsible to him, 
there is on the other hand a need for the Foreign Office to have in South East Asia a 
representative who is responsible to the Secretary of State. 
5. But the matter does not end there, for it has been found that in practice 
questions frequently arise which, though of concern to the Foreign Office, are 
sometimes of primary concern to other Government Departments (e.g. the Burma 
Office and the Colonial Office) . Though the Government of Burma has established a 
practice whereby a senior civil servant visits the Supreme Allied Headquarters from 
time to time, questions of importance frequently arise when he is not there, with the 
result that decisions are sometimes reached without the prior consultation which is 
essential if political pitfalls are to be avoided. In the case of Burma there is at any rate 
the advantage of a civil government in being (even though inconveniently situated),2 
but in the case of Malaya there is no similar situation, with the result that the nearest 
consultative authority is the Colonial Office in London. But no direct channel of 
communication exists with that authority. 
6. One of the results of the present position is that political questions tend to be 
referred to the Chiefs of Staff who are then under the necessity of referring them to 
the political departments concerned in London. An added burden is thus imposed at 
the one end on the military staff of the Supreme Commander and at the other on the 
machinery of the Chiefs of Staff organisation without in any way obviating the 
1 Not printed. 2 It did not return to Burma until Oct 1945. 
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necessity of consultation with the political departments. As the tempo of military 
operations increases, this burden is likely to become increasingly irksome, while on 
the other hand the complexity and urgency of political and economic problems will 
grow progressively greater as territory after territory is liberated until the final 
problem of dealing with Japan herself has to be faced. 
7. There is another disadvantage in dealing with political matters through the 
official Chiefs of Staff channel, and that is that the Headquarters of the Supreme 
Command in South East Asia is an allied organisation and that the official SEA COS 
and COSSEA series of telegrams is known to and seen by American officers. Where 
British and American opinion does not necessarily coincide, or where it is known to 
differ on political questions, it is an embarrassment to an allied staff to have to deal 
with them, and they should more properly be handled through a political channel. 
The Supreme Commander is an allied commander who has, at any rate in theory, a 
dual allegiance to the Governments of Great Britain and the United States, and he 
should not be put into the position of having to take sides in any question where the 
policies of these two Governments may be at variance, as for example in relation to 
colonial territories. 
8. It would seem from the above that from the point of view of the chain of 
responsibility, of greater efficiency and of procedure some change should to made in 
the political representation as it is now established in the headquarters of the South 
East Asia Command. 
9. Two alternatives suggest themselves. The first is that the Political Adviser 
should be established outside the headquarters though in the closest possible 
relationship with the Supreme Commander and his Staff, that he should be given 
authority to advise the Supreme Commander on all political and economic 
questions, irrespective of the departments in London which they concern, and that 
he should be authorised to report direct to London and to refer such matters as 
require reference. In this event the Political Adviser would have to have an increased 
staff to cope with his enlarged responsibilities and it might be necessary to attach 
additional officers with the requisite experience to deal with matters affecting British 
territories, economic and financial questions and possibly also public relations. In 
view of the conditions prevailing in South East Asia it would still be necessary for the 
military command to be responsible for accommodation, transport, rations, security 
etc. 
10. If the above alternative is decided upon, it would seem necessary to issue 
directives to both the Supreme Commander and the Political Adviser which would 
regularize their position in relation to one another and define their responsibilities. 
11. The other alternative would be to follow the practice adopted in other 
theatres and to appoint a Minister of State for South East Asia. This is not a new idea, 
and it was discussed by the Foreign Office and India Office in 1943 when the South 
East Asia Command was about to be set up. But as the headquarters of the Command 
were at first to be set up in New Delhi, the India Office held that it was not 
constitutionally possible to appoint a Minister of State with authority over matters in 
India. In the event the Vicerory was given an extra-statutory capacity to deal with 
matters of administration affecting other than Indian interests, and Sir Archibald 
Rowlands was appointed, with a staff, as Adviser to the Viceroy on War Administra-
tion. 
12. With the removal of the Supreme Allied Command to Ceylon, this arrange-
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ment, which at no time had satisfied the political requirements of the situation 
external to India, fell into comparative disuse. It is not the purpose of this paper to 
discuss whether it should be maintained, but there is clearly an urgent need for a 
new arrangement which will safeguard our political and economic position through-
out the Far East. 
13. In 1943 no territory occupied by the enemy in South East Asia had yet been 
recovered. To-day the greater portion of Burma is in our hands and within the next 
year the recovery of further regions may be expected which will present problems 
affecting not only our political position and economy within the Empire, but also our 
relations with America, China, France, the Netherlands and Siam. In these questions 
the Dominions in general, and Australia and New Zealand in particular, are likely to 
display a strong interest. Finally Japan will have to be dealt with, and this will be a 
matter in which all areas of the British Commonwealth will be vitally interested as 
well as all the allied Powers including Russia. 
14. Before this war British territories east of Suez tended to be governed largely 
on parochial lines. Thus India, Ceylon, Burma and Malaya were all chiefly concerned 
with their own internal problems. They were largely unfamiliar with each other's 
problems, and still less with the problems of the non-British territories in the Far 
East (i.e. the Netherlands East Indies, Siam, Indo-China, the Philippines, China and 
Japan). That such a state of affairs was both strategically and politically undesirable 
was proved by subsequent events when Japan delivered her attack. To-day there is a 
danger that, with the preoccupations of reconstruction and rehabilitation and the 
major political problems affecting the internal structure of India, Burma, Ceylon and 
Malaya, we shall drift once more into the same position as we were before the 
outbreak of hostilities. 
15. While it is yet early to determine our post-war requirements in the Far East, 
there does seem to be an imperative need at the present and at any rate for the period 
until conditions are stabilised, for the appointment of a central authority who can 
report direct to the Cabinet and whose task would be to coordinate the views and the 
needs of all the British territories involved and to relate these with developments in 
other non-British territories as the war develops against Japan. 
16. The solution of this problem would appear to be the appointment of a 
Minister of State, on the precedent of the Middle East and the Mediterranean,3 with a 
staff of civil servants competent to advise him on the numerous problems with which 
he is likely to be confronted and adequately representing the various interests 
involved. 
17. A Minister of State, if appointed, would take over the functions of the Political 
Adviser as set out earlier in this memorandum, and his relationship with the 
Supreme Command would presumably be defined in his directive and in a similar 
directive to the Supreme Commander. 
18. It should be noted that the United States Government have not, up to the 
present, though fit to appoint a Political Adviser to the Supreme Allied Command in 
South East Asia, though there has been nothing to prevent their doing so as far as 
the Government of the United Kingdom is concerned. It would probably be desirable 
to notify the United States, as a matter of courtesy and to avoid misunderstanding, of 
3 Oliver Lyttelton, minister of state in Cairo, 1941-1942; Harold Macmillan, minister resident in NW 
Africa, 1942-1945. 
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any decision to alter the existing status of the Political Adviser to the Supreme Allied 
Commander, or to appoint a Minister of State who would absorb his functions. 
19. In considering the question of the appointment of a Minister of State, 
reference is invited to the report of Mr. Duff Cooper as a result of his mission to the 
Far East in 1941 (W.P. (41) 286 of 29th October 1941).4 
4
'British administration in the Far East', WP(41)286, 29 Oct 1941, is at CAB 661120. Duff Cooper, 
chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, 1941-1943, was sent to Singapore in Aug 1941 to examine 
co-ordination between the various civil and military authorities in the region. His report recommended 
the appointment of a commissioner-general for the Far East based at Singapore and supported by a War 
Cabinet and War Council. On the Japanese attack in Dec he himself was appointed resident minister in 
Singapore and was authorised to form a War Cabinet, but the arrival of General Wavell as supreme 
commander of the SW Pacific made his job redundant and he returned to Britain in Feb. 
40 CO 273/677/3, no 5 2 Aug 1945 
[Political co-ordination in SE Asia]: letter from Sir 0 Sargentl to Sir G 
Gater 
We had, before the change of Government,2 been giving some thought to the 
machinery, both within the Foreign Office and interdepartmentally, for dealing with 
Far Eastern questions in the political and economic spheres. The Far Eastern 
Committee had been reconstituted under the chairmanship of the Minister of State, 
steps were being taken to form a small political planning . staff for the purpose of 
preparing papers for the Far Eastern Committee, and the Overseas Reconstruction 
Committee had agreed to the extension of the work of the Economic and Industrial 
Planning Staff to questions affecting ex-enemy countries in the Far East. Within the 
Foreign Office the work of the Far Eastern Department has been somewhat 
re-organised. 
The Far Eastern Committee will no doubt have to be freshly re-constituted. 
Meanwhile a further important question is that of political liaison with the military 
commands in the Far East and the connected, if wider, question of political 
co-ordination in South-East Asia. Dening, Political Adviser to the Supreme Allied 
Commander, was recently in this country and, after consultation with various 
members of the Foreign Office, prepared a memorandum3 on this subject. I enclose a 
copy, but as it has not yet been seen by my Secretary of State I would ask you to 
regard it as a purely personal and unofficial basis for discussion. 
As you will see, Dening suggests that the time has come to make a change in the 
form of the political representation as it is now established in the Headquarters of the 
South-East Asia Command, and he expresses the opinion that the present arrange-
ment, whereby the Political Adviser virtually serves two masters and has no brief to 
act in matters concerning any Government Departments other than the Foreign 
Office, is one which involves several disadvantages on both the civil and military side. 
Dening puts forward alternative suggestions for improving the position, namely:-
1 Deputy under-secretary of state, FO; permanent under-secretary of state, 1946--1949. 
2 Attlee became prime minister on 26 July and appointed Philip Noel-Baker minister of state at the 
Foreign Office under Bevin. Noel-Baker was promoted to secretary of state for air in Oct 1946. 
3 See 39. 
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(a) to detach the office of Political Adviser from Admiral Mountbatten's staff, to 
make the Political Adviser responsible to London and to give him additional staff 
to enable him to advise the Supreme Commander not merely on questions of 
foreign affairs, as at present, but on political, financial and economic matters 
regardless of the Department in London which they concern, i.e., affecting British 
as well as foreign territories. 
(b) to appoint a Minister of State for South-East Asia. 
These suggestions are not mutually exclusive and acceptance of the first might 
possibly be the initial step towards the creation at a later date of a wider political 
organisation under a Minister of State. In our view the detachment of the Political 
Adviser from Admiral Mountbatten's staff is prima facie in itself a sound measure 
which need not involve any alteration in the present physical arrangements in 
S.E.A.C. but would merely mean altering the responsibility of the Political Adviser. 
We are doubtful whether it would be helpful now to appoint anyone with such wide 
powers and responsibilities as those contemplated by Mr. Duff Cooper in his report 
from Singapore of the 29th October, 1941,4 to which Dening refers in the final 
paragraph of his memorandum. But we think it would be most desirable to have in 
S.E.A.C. some political authority of high standing to undertake the local centralisa-
tion and co-ordination of matters affecting more than one Department of His 
Majesty's Government, and at the same time to relieve the Supreme Commander of a 
great deal of non-military work with which he should not be burdened. The best 
solution might be to appoint at an appropriate moment, perhaps immediately after 
the re-capture of Singapore, a Minister of State who would undertake clearly defined 
responsibilities in a prescribed area. This proposal would need to be considered in the 
light of possible changes in command boundaries, but there seems no reason why a 
Minister of State should not function in regard to the extended area of S.E.A.C. 
which is at present under consideration. 
We are now considering the preparation of a Paper for the Cabinet on the whole 
question for submission to the Secretary of State but before proceeding further we 
should like to know whether you are in general agreement with our views. We should 
also be grateful for any observations you may care to offer on Dening's memorandum 
generally. 
Meanwhile, if you should wish Dening, in his present capacity and in addition to 
his functions under his present directive, to hold a watching brief for the Colonial 
Office in Kandy, 5 we should be glad to discuss with you how this can best be arranged 
and how it would work in practice. 
I am writing similarly to Machtig, Monteath, Bovenschen, Markham and Street. 6 
4 See 39, note 4. 5 ie headquarters of SEAC. 
6 Sir Eric Machtig, permanent under-secretary for the Dominions (Commonwealth relations), 1940-1948; 
Sir David Monteath, under-secretary for India and Burma, 1941-1947; Sir Federick Bovenschen, joint 
permanent under-secretary of state for war, 1942-1945; Sir Henry Markham, permanent under-secretary 
at the Admiralty, 1940-1946; and Sir Arthur Street, permanent under-secretary for air, 1939-1945. 
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41 CO 273/677/3, ff 13- 14 7 Aug 1945 
[Political co-ordination in SE Asia]: minute by G E 1 Gent on the FO 
proposals1 
We have had much evidence ourselves both from Mr. Dening (at present Political 
Adviser to Admiral Mountbatten) and from Air Marshal Joubert (one of Admiral 
Mountbatten's Deputy Chiefs of Staff with the portfolio of "Civil Affairs") that the 
arrangements in S.E. Asia Command for ensuring full regard for political considera-
tions badly needed strengthening. Both the above mentioned officers are on Admiral 
Mountbatten's staff and have not sufficient independence to ensure that the Supreme 
Allied Commander does not take decisions on political matters until they have, if of 
sufficient importance, been referred to H.M.G. 
In the memorandum which he now submits, Mr. Dening advocates the detach-
ment of the Political Adviser from the Supreme Allied Commander's staff and giving 
him an independent responsibility to London; or, alternatively, the appointment of a 
Minister of State for South East Asia. 
Sir 0. Sargent considers that these are not necessarily alternatives, and we should 
agree with him in the sense that a decision to proceed with the first would not 
necessarily rule out later proceeding with the second; if, however, a Minister of State 
were now appointed with a political responsibility to H.M.G. in London, there would 
in fact seem to be no place for a distinct Political Adviser responsible to London. 
Sir 0. Sargent considers that prima facie the detachment of the Political Adviser 
from Admiral Mountbatten's staff is in itself a sound measure and one which need 
not involve any alteration in the presente physical arrangements in S.E. Asia 
Command but would merely re-align the Political Adviser's responsibilities. 
We agree with this view. 
Sir 0. Sargent goes on to doubt whether it would be helpful now to appoint anyone 
with such wide powers and responsibilities as those recommended by Mr. Duff 
Cooper in his report of 29th October, 1941. In that report Mr. Duff Cooper (who had 
then for some months been exploring the situation in the Far East and had not taken 
up his later appointment as Resident Minister) turned down the conception of a 
Resident Minister in the Far East and advocated instead the appointment of an 
official with the title of "Commissioner-General". The sort of man he had in mind 
would be "a former Ambassador or some exceptionally distinguished civil servant". 
His prime function would be to keep the War Cabinet furnished with a complete 
picture of the whole situation in the Far East and he would report direct to, and 
receive instructions from, the various Ministers whose Departments were repre-
sented at that time in the Far East on matters concerning them. Sir 0 . Sargent does 
not, however, refer to the fact that Mr. Duff Cooper's recommendation was expressly 
for an official and not a Minister, and he goes on to suggest that the best solution 
might be to appoint at an appropriate time (possibly after the recapture of Singapore) 
a Minister of State with clearly defined responsibilities in a prescribed region-
possibly the area of S.E.A.C. 
The experience of Mr. Duff Cooper as Resident Minister in Malaya was an unhappy 
one and unless it is certain that it can already be foreseen that there will be 
1 See 39 & 40. 
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overriding need for a Minister of State to be reappointed in the Far East, the decision 
would, I believe, be received with apprehension and criticism. 
We have ourselves in mind, under the plans provisionally approved by the War 
Cabinet, the appontment of a "Governor-General" with direct powers over the British 
authorities in Malaya, Singapore, North Borneo and Sarawak. Primarily he would 
need to be a first-rate and highly experienced administrator to direct the various 
fields of reconstruction, including local foreign relations of those territories. 
I should be inclined to suggest that the first and only step necessary now is the 
appointment of a Political Adviser in S.E. Asia Command, who is of greater weight 
and experience than Mr. Dening and is responsible directly to London. Whether it 
will be desirable to make any fresh decision in the future, e.g. after the recapture of 
Singapore, so long as S.E. Asia Command exists, had much better be left to be 
considered in the light of needs and events. Quite possibly there may be no 
appropriate place for a Resident Minister and, equally possibly, there may be need for 
a detached Political Adviser to continue with the "Governor-General" at Singapore 
after the S.E. Asia Command has ceased to exist as an allied military command. 
42 CO 273/677/3, no 6 13 Aug 1945 
[Political co-ordination in SE Asia]: letter (reply) from Sir G Gater to 
Sir 0 Sargent 
Many thanks for your letter of 2nd August (F 3944/149/G)1 which I have now had an 
opportunity of discussing with my Secretary of State. In the current situation in the 
Far East no doubt your own views and those of Dening will be recast but you may like 
to know our present reaction to the question of reforming the arrangement for 
giving political advice to Admiral Mountbatten. 
We feel that the first and only step necessary at the moment, is the appointment of 
a Political Adviser in S.E. Asia Command, who should be an experienced person of 
acknowledged calibre and who would be responsible directly to London. This 
responsibility could be exercised to the Foreign Office as regards your sphere and 
through the Foreign Office to ourselves and other Departments as far as our 
respective spheres are concerned. 
Whether it would be desirable to make any fresh decision in the future, for 
instance, after SACSEA is established in Singapore and so long as S.E.A.C. exists, 
should be left to be considered in the light of needs and events. Quite possibly after 
S.E.A.C. has ceased to exist as an allied military command and when civil 
government is re-established in Malaya, we may sef an appropriate place for a 
Political Adviser to be appointed to the staff of the proposed Governor-General, in 
view of the relations which the Governor-General may be expected to have in practice 
with neighbouring foreign territories.2 
1 See 40. 
2 On 15 Aug Emperor Hirohito surrendered. Discussion of regional co-ordination is resumed at document 
58. 
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43 WO 203/5642, no 7/16/45 13 Aug 1945 
'Directive to AJUF on conclusion of the armistice': signal from B A C 
Sweet-Escote 
[The Far Eastern branch of Special Operations Executive grew out of GSI(K)-part of the 
intelligence staff at GHQ India-and in Mar 1944 took the name of Force 136 under the 
command of Colonel Colin MacKenzie. On 23 May the previous year a reconnaissance 
party led by Lt Col John Davis arrived by submarine on the Perak coast. Further landings 
took place until Sept 1943 while a Malay group, led by Captain (later General Tan Sri) 
Ibrahim bin Ismail, was brought by Catalina flying-boat to an island off Kota Bahru. On 1 
Jan 1944 Davis, Captain Richard Broome, Major Lim Bo Seng of the KMT and Major (later 
Lt Col) F Spencer Chapman, who had stayed behind Japanese lines since the fall of 
Singapore in 1942, met Lai Tek and Chin Peng who between them represented the 
Chinese-dominated MCP, MPAJU and MPAJA. At this meeting it was agreed that, in 
return for arms, money, training and supplies, the resistance forces would accept British 
orders during the war and in the subsequent period of military occupation. Political 
matters were not touched upon. News of the agreement did not reach SEAC until a year 
later and its terms were confirmed on 17 Mar 1945 at a second meeting between Force 
136 and MCP representatives. Thereafter arms, supplies and men were parachuted in 
from SEAC HQ in Ceylon. What control Force 136 asserted over the MPAJA declined 
rapidly as the delay between the Japanese surrender and the arrival of British troops 
lengthened, see 46 and 47. SEAC forces landed in Penang on 3 Sept and Singapore on 5 
Sept but it was not until 12 Sept that Brigadier Willan set up the headquarters of the 
Malayan British Military Administration in Kuala Lumpur.) 
Object 
1. To prevent seizure of power in MALAYA by A.J.U.F. and to avoid unnecessary 
bloodshed before the arrival of regular forces. 
Information 
2. No regular forces will reach MALAYA for at least 14 days. 
3. There are, however, 80 Allied officers liaising with A.J .U.F. and communicat-
ing with CEYLON through about 40 WIT set[s]. 
4. A.J.U.F. is a body of some 3,000 guerillas, mostly Chinese Communists, and 
containing elements desirous of preventing a permanent return of British rule. All 
are, however, violently anti-Japanese, and have agreed to accept SACSEA's orders 
with the object of throwing the Japanese out of MALAYA. They are located mainly in 
the hills and more than 2,000 arms have been sent to them since May. 
Considerations 
5. Experience has shown, particularly in GREECE, that resistance movements 
must be given clear instructions what to do when their country is liberated. If they 
receive NO such instructions they will inevitably cause trouble, and may well attempt 
to seize power in the principal towns. 
6. At the same time, A.J.U.F. have been very nearly our only friends during the 
occupation. We are under an obligation to them, and do NOT wish to give them the 
impression that we are ready to drop them now that we NO longer have any use for 
them. 
1 BA C Sweet-Escott (1907-1981) served with Special Operations Executive in Western Europe, the 
Balkans, Middle East, and South-East Asia; from Jan to Dec 1945 he was chief of staff to Force 136 and 
acting commander during the absence of Colonel MacKenzie. 
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Courses open 
7. To do nothing pending the arrival of regular forces. This runs the risk of 
leading to the results described in 5 above. 
8. To tell A.J.U.F. to co-operate with the Japanese in the administration of the 
country, pending the arrival of Allied troops. This would NOT be understood, and 
would certainly NOT be accepted, for the reasons in 4 above. 
9. To instruct the Allied Liaison Officers:-
(i) to prevent contact between A.J.U.F. and the Japanese. 
(ii) to keep A.J.U.F. in the country districts where there are no Japanese. 
(iii) to give A.J.U.F. the task of keeping order generally in such districts. 
Recommendations 
10. It is recommended that the course in 9 above be adopted. A draft telegram in 
this sense to the Allied Liaison Officers is attached at Appendix A. 2 
2 Not printed. 
44 WO 203/564-2, no 14-/16/4-5 15 Aug 194-5 
'A proclamation to establish a military administration': British Military 
Administration, Malaya, proclamation no 1 issued by Admiral Mount-
batten 
[This document is also reproduced in F S V Donnison, British Military Administration in 
the Far East, 1943-46 (London, 1956) Appendix 3, pp 450-51.] 
Whereas by reason of military necessity and for the prevention and suppression of 
disorder and the maintenance of public safety it is necessary to place the territories of 
the Settlements of Singapore, Penang and Malacca, all islands and places forming 
part thereof and all British waters adjacent thereto, and the Malay States of Perak, 
Selangor, Negri Sembilan, Pahang, Johore, Kedah, Kelantan, Trengganu and Perlis, 
all islands forming part of such States and the territorial waters thereof (hereinafter 
called Malaya) under military administration: 
Now, therefore, I, Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten, Knight Grand Cross of the 
Royal Victorian Order, Knight Commander of the Most Honourable Order of the 
Bath, Companion of the Distinguished Service Order, Personal Aide de Camp to His 
Majesty the King, Honorary Lieutenant-General and Air Marshal, Supreme Allied 
Commander South East Asia, hereby proclaim as follows: 
Establishment of a military administration 
1. A Military Administration to be called the British Military Administration is 
hereby established throughout such areas of Malaya as are at any given time under 
the control of Forces under my command and shall continue 6nly so long as I 
consider it to be required by military necessity. 
Assumption of powers and jurisdiction 
2. I hereby assume for myself and my successors full judicial, legislative, 
executive and administrative powers and responsibilities and conclusive jurisdiction 
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persons and property throughout such areas of Malaya as are at any given time under 
the control of the Forces under my command. 
Delegation 
3. Subject always to any orders and directions which I may issue from time to 
time, I delegate to the General Officer Commanding Military Forces, Malaya, all the 
powers, responsibilities and jurisdiction assumed by me, and such General Officer 
Commanding is authorised to delegate such powers, responsibilities and jurisdiction 
as he may deem necessary to any Officer under his command and to empower such 
officer further to delegate any of such powers, responsibilities and jurisdiction. 
Orders to be obeyed 
4. All persons will obey promptly all orders given by me or under my authority 
and must refrain from all acts which impede the Forces under my command or are 
helpful to the enemy, from all acts of violence, and from any act calculated to disturb 
public order in any way. 
Existing laws to be respected 
5. (i) Subject to the provisions of any Proclamation of the British Military 
Administration and in so far as military exigencies permit: 
(a) all laws and customs existing immediately prior to the Japanese occupation 
will be respected:- -
Provided that such of the existing laws as the Chief Civil Affairs Officer considers 
it is practicable from time to time to administer during the period of military 
administration will be administered; 
(b) all rights and properties will be respected:-
Provided that rights and properties acquired during the Japanese occupation 
may be subject to investigation and to such action as justice requires . 
(ii) With regard to paragraph (a) of sub-section (i), the inhabitants of the said 
territories are advised to consult the nearest Civil Affairs Officer if in doubt as to 
whether any existing law is being administered. 
Suspension of courts 
6. All Courts and tribunals, other than military courts established under my 
authority, are hereby suspended and deprived of all authority and jurisdiction until 
authorized by me to re-open. 
Revocation of Japanese military administration proclamations 
7. It is hereby declared that all Proclamations and legislative enactments of 
whatever kind issued by or under the authority of the Japanese Military Administra-
tion shall cease to have any effect. 
Short title 
8. This Proclamation may be cited as the Military Administration Proclamation. 
Signed at Kandy, this fifteenth day of August, 1945. 
(Signed) LOUIS MOUNTBATTEN 
Supreme Allied Commander, South East Asia. 
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45 WO 203/5642, no 66/16/45 17 Aug 1945 
'Directive on civil affairs for Malaya to the supreme allied commander, 
South East Asia Command': directive from Mr Lawson1 to Admiral 
Mountbatten 
1. Upon the liberation of Malaya or within such territories thereof or adjacent 
thereto as are under the control of your forces you will set up a military 
administration for the government of the civil population of the territory. To this end 
you will assume for yourself by Proclamation such powers as are necessary for the 
administration of the liberated territories, and will also arrange for the delegation of 
such powers to the Military Commander designated by you, as General Officer 
Commanding, Military Forces, Malaya. You will likewise suspend the powers and 
jurisdiction of all existing courts and tribunals and in their place set up military 
courts which will derive their authority from your proclamation and deal with all 
offences committed by the civil population. Such courts will administer the laws in 
force in Malaya prior to the Japanese occupation modified or supplemented by 
proclamation as may be necessary for the security of the liberating forces and the 
maintenance of order. 
2. In order to enable you (or the Military Commander designated by you for the 
purpose) to carry on the Military Administration, a Chief Civil Mfairs Officer, Malaya 
(C.C.A.O.(M)) has been appointed. He will on your behalf and subject to your general 
directions (or those of the Military Commander) administer the civil population of 
the liberated territories during the operational phase in the name of the Military 
Commander, and subsequently in his own name. For all purposes in connection with 
military administration, the Military Commander referred to above will be formally 
designated "General Officer Commanding, Military Forces, Malaya". He will at no 
time assume the title of Military Governor. 
3. The C.C.A.O.(M) will be provided with a staff of military officers augmented, as 
may be necessary, by civilians and subordinate military and civil staffs. In so far as is 
possible, personnel for this staff will be made available by the Colonial Office from 
officials of the former Government of Malaya, who know the country, the language 
and the people. 
4. During the currency of the military period, military consideration will be 
paramount. The duties of the military administration (as distinct from those of 
C.C.A.O.(M) referred to in para 5 below) will be two fold. Firstly, in those territories 
under military administration C.C.A.O.(M) and the Civil Mfairs Officers under his 
direction will administer the civil population in such a way as to meet the 
requirements of local Military Commanders and to further the general well being of 
the territory. To this end, they will restore law and order among the civil population, 
distribute essential supplies and advise and act on behalf of the local Commanders in 
their dealings with the civil population. Secondly, C.C.A.O.(M) will (as soon as 
military exigencies permit) take the necessary steps to establish as far as possible the 
essential framework of administration within the liberated territories as territory is 
uncovered, and lay the foundations of stable future government. 
5. The liberation of Malaya necessitates the immediate resumption of H.M.G's 
1 John James Lawson, secretary of state for war, 3 Aug-Oct 1946; created 1st Lord Lawson 1950. 
I' ,, 
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responsibility to the peoples of Malaya for their protection and good government. 
This will, in addition to those measures indicated under para 4 above, call for 
energetic administrative action and involve a number of activities of government 
which have no military significance and for which the War Office has no responsibil-
ity to Parliament; these matters will be the responsibility of the Colonial Office. It has 
been decided, therefore, that C.C.A.O.(M) will have a dual responsibility which he 
will discharge in accordance with the decisions and directions of His Majesty's 
Government as recorded in the memorandum on this subject which has been 
communicated to you separately. 
6. In furtherance of your function under para. 4 you will during the period of 
Military Administration be responsible, subject to operational requirements, for the 
provision of supplies for the needs of the civil population, and for local industries and 
agriculture to a level necessary to prevent disease and unrest and to secure the 
maximum assistance for the progressive restoration of the territory. In addition you 
should render such assistance as is feasible to enable those natural resources of the 
territory as are urgently required to meet the general world shortage to be obtained. 
Sufficient supplies will be demanded for 6 months for the whole of Malaya. In 
addition you will demand additional supplies in the form of Inducement Goods for 
military labour employed directly for military purposes should you consider it 
necessary to do so to ensure proper supplies of labour. Other necessary supplies for 
the civil population of the liberated territory during the period of Military Adminis-
tration may be procured by the Colonial Office and for those you will provide such 
transportation and other facilities within your Command as may be possible in the 
circumstances of the case. All supplies for the civil needs of the territory for the 
periods following the 6 months military provisions are being procured through civil 
channels as a Colonial Office responsibility and for those, also, you will provide such 
transportation and other facilities within your Command as may be possible. 
7. It is the policy of His Majesty's Government that the Administration of the 
territories in question should be transferred to the responsibility of the Colonial 
Office as soon as possible as and in so far as conditions are such as to enable the latter 
to function. It will be for you to recommend when and in what areas such transfer 
can take place without embarrassment to military needs bearing in mind that so far 
as the Malayan mainland areas are concerned (excluding Singapore) it is likely to be 
impracticable for the Colonial Office to take over responsibility until the whole of 
that area can be so transferred. Subject to military exigencies, the Government of the 
civil population during the period of Military Administration in Malaya will be carried 
on in the various administrative spheres in accordance with long-term policy which 
the Colonial Office has in mind to pursue when it resumes responsibility for the civil 
administration of the territory. In order that you may be aware of this policy, and be 
in a position to pursue it so far as circumstances and military considerations permit, 
you will be supplied from time to time with long-term policy directives framed by the 
Secretary of State for the Colonies and transmitted to you through the War Office. 
8. If, in your judgement, a departure from these or any subsequent instructions 
is required for urgent and over-riding military reasons, you have discretion to 
authorise action accordingly and you will submit a report on the matter as soon as 
possible. 
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46 WO 203/5642, no 1116/45 19 Aug 1945 
'Force 136 Policy-Malaya': signal from BA C Sweet-Escott 
1. The following message has been recieved from Lt. Col. J.L.H. DAVIS, 1 D.S.O., 
who is head of Force 136 mission with MPAJA in MALAYA. 
"Your recent telegrams are disturbing. Following must of course be obvious 
to you. Controlled AJUF are soldiers under command of SACS EA. They expect 
and await specific orders and not vague directives. I am satisified they will 
obey such orders provided they are reasonable. Orders for them to remain 
half starved in the hills while the Allies leisurely take over the administration 
from the Japs will not be reasonable. Some arrangement must be made with 
the Japs for controlled AJUF to emerge during the interim period though they 
need not interfere with the Japs admin. AJUF must be given full share in the 
honours of victory. Controlled AJUF should now be limited to those already 
armed by us plus other armed men who will accept our control. They must be 
fully equipped rationed and used by us at the earliest opportunity until time 
for disbandment. Good treatment of controlled AJUF will have an excellent 
effect on uncontrolled AJUF many of whom may later be absorbed. Do your 
utmost to preserve arid strengthen central control otherwise discipline will 
collapse. The alternative to all this is chaos and anarchy which may take 
decades to eradicate. The matter is very urgent. There is serious risk of a 
disastrous anticlimax." 
2. The telegrams referred to in the first paragraph of this message include the 
following:-
"Victory is now at hand and your contribution has been important and is 
appreciated. 
Allied Troops will shortly arrive but meanwhile to avoid clashes and 
unnecessary bloodshed you and those under you should avoid all towns and 
other districts where Japanese are present." 
1 J L H Davis, entered Federated Malay States police, 1930; served in Force 136 rising to rank of It colonel; 
transferred to colonial administrative service in Malaya 1947; see 43, note. 
4 7 WO 203/5642, no 12/16/45 24 Aug 1945 
[Publicity for Malayan policy]: signal from C MacKenzie1 
The inevitable delay between the cease fire and the re-occupation of MALAYA is 
rapidly increasing the difficulties with which we shall be faced in connection with the 
A.J.U.F. 
2. It must be borne in mind that the A.J.U.F. is 
(a) Almost entirely composed of domiciled Chinese whose status as citizens has 
1 Colin Hercules MacKenzie, lost a leg at Passchendaele, 1917; served in SEAC, 1941-1945, and was 
commander of Force 136; British Economic Mission to Greece, 1946; see also 43, note. 
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been inferior to that of the Malays in various important respects, and 
(b) Contains within its ranks Communists who have undoubtedly widened their 
influence considerably during the last 3 years. The Communist Party was treated 
before the war as an illegal association and as such was subject to the attention of 
the police. 
3. The new Colonial Office policy almost entirely removes these two grievances. 
It is understood that the paper containing the policy of the future government for 
MALAYA is now again before the Cabinet. 
4. It is more earnestly urged that the SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER should 
be requested to send a further signal stressing the importance of an immediate 
authorisation to disclose the relevant details of the policy now. 
5. Every hour increases the danger of some occurrence which may place the 
A.J.U.F. irretrievably in the wrong and subsequently lead to the embitterment of 
relations after the necessary counter-action has been taken by the British. 
6. Moreover, any further delay in disclosing essential details of this policy will 
expose us to an increasingly serious risk of it appearing that the policy has only been 
extorted from us by fear of further A.J.U.F. activity which might be detrimental to 
order and good government. 
7. The best chance we have of avoiding these problems is to strengthen the hands 
of the Liaison Officers now with A.J.U.F. One of the best ways of doing this is to be 
able to authorise them to inform the members of A.J.U.F. of the Government's new 
policy. 
8. It is understood that one reason given for the delay in announcing the policy 
is that it is necessary first to inform the Sultans that the new policy will involve some 
loss in their powers etc. If, as we suppose, it is not a question of negotiating with the 
Sultans but simply of informing them for the sake of courtesy of the incidental effect 
on their position we urge that the information it is desired to pass to the Sultans be 
set out in a fixed form and communicated to the appropriate Force 136 officers who 
could quickly arrange for the communication to reach the various Sultans. 
9. We again urge the increasing and serious dangers of further delay. 
48 CAB 129/1, CP(45)133 29 Aug 1945 
'Policy in regard to Malaya and Borneo': Cabinet memorandum by Mr 
Hall 
[The sudden end to the war in Asia forced the pace of planning in the CO. On 13 Aug 
Bourdillon was instructed to prepare a draft Cabinet paper in which Hall would seek the 
final approval of his colleagues for the policy provisionally approved in May 1944 (see 25). 
A revised draft was discussed in the CO on 22 Aug at a meeting attended by Hall, Creech 
Jones, Cater, Gent, Duncan, Paskin, and Bourdillon. Hall wrote to Attlee on 27 Aug and 
the prime minister instructed the secretary of state to put the matter before Cabinet (see 
50; also CO 825/42/2 and PREM 8/459).] 
At their meeting on the 31st May, 1944, the War Cabinet gave provisional approval to 
certain proposals regarding the future policy of His Majesty's Government in Malaya 
and Borneo. These proposals had been formulated by a Ministerial Committee 
appointed for the purpose, and the Committee's report was circulated to the War 
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Cabinet on the 18th May, 1944, under the number W.P.(44)258.1 A copy of the report 
forms the Annex to this paper. 
2. As regards Malaya, the Committee expressed the view that the restoration of 
the pre-war constitutional and administrative system would be undesirable in the 
interests of efficiency and security, and of our declared purpose of promoting 
self-government in Colonial territories. The Committee went on to point out that His 
Majesty has at present no jurisdiction in the Malay States, and that his relations with 
the States rest upon treaties with the individual Rulers, under which the Rulers 
remain nominally independent, though bound to accept British advice on all matters 
except Mohammedan religion and Malay custom. As a necessary preliminary to all 
further changes in Malaya, the Committee recommended that fresh Treaties should 
be made with each of the Rulers, under which such jurisdiction would be ceded to 
His Majesty as would enable him to legislate for the States under the Foreign 
Jurisdiction Act. Thereafter an Order-in-Council would be made which would 
provide for the future central and local government of the country. There would be 
established a Malayan Union with a central legislature; a Malayan Union Citizenship 
would also be created, which would not be confined to the Malays, but would be open 
to persons of whatever race, who may have been born in the country or who have 
genuinely adopted Malaya as their home. Thus the existing racial and parochial 
barriers would be broken down. 
3. The Committee went on to recommend that the British Settlements of Penang 
and Malacca (at present part of the Colony of the Straits Settlements) should be 
incorporated in the Malayan Union, but that Singapore should for the time being 
(and without prejudice to the possibility of later amalgamation with the Malayan 
Union) be administered as a separate Colony under a separate Governor. Finally, the 
Committee envisaged that there should be appointed a "Governor-General," who 
would reside at Singapore and who would have the power of control not only over the 
Governor of the Malayan Union and the Governor of Singapore, but also over British 
Representatives in Borneo. 
4. War Cabinet approval for these proposals was only given provisionally and for 
planning purposes. Plans have now been proceeding on this basis for over a year, and 
Sir Harold MacMichael, until recently High, Commissioner for Palestine, has been 
provisionally selected as the special Representative of His Majesty's Government who 
will go out to Malaya to conclude the new Treaties with the Malay Rulers. Sir Harold 
has already paid a preliminary visit to India and S.E.A.C., and has thoroughly 
acquainted himself with the whole subject. 
5. It has been strongly represented to me by Admiral Mountbatten that a proper 
reception of His Majesty's Government's policy in Malaya and elsewhere depends 
upon its timely publication in advance. I find much force in Admiral Mountbatten's 
arguments, but I am not in a position to make any recommendation as to publication 
or policy so long as the proposed policy has merely received the provisional approval 
of the Cabinet, and that only for the confidential guidance of planners. 
6. I am aware that we cannot fully gauge the temper of the people in Malaya until 
our return has been actually effected, and that a final decision on all the .details of our 
future policy is therefore not yet possible. I am convinced, however, that the initial 
step of negotiating new Treaties with the Malay Rulers must be taken as soon as 
1 See 25. 
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possible, and that any delay on this cardinal point, particularly if it were to involve a 
return to the state of affairs existing before the Japanese occupation of Malaya, might 
result in the loss of a unique opportunity for setting the territory on the road to 
political progress. 
7. Accordingly I now seek the definite confirmation by my colleagues of the 
policy outlined above, and approval for Sir Harold MacMichael's appointment. I 
consider it essential that he should depart for the Far East in the very near future. If 
the policy is now confirmed, I shall make a separate recommendation as soon as 
possible regarding the question of publicity. 
8. As regards Borneo, the Ministerial Committee, as in the case of Malaya, 
reached the conclusion that the restoration of the pre-war constitutional and 
administrative system in the four territories involved would be undesirable in the 
interests of security, and of our declared purpose of promoting SQcial, economic and 
political progress in Colonial territories. The territories in question are the State of 
North Borneo, at present (as regards its internal affairs) under the independent 
administration of the British North Borneo (Chartered) Company, the small Island of 
Labuan, at present administered as one of the Straits Settlements, the State of 
Brunei, which is ruled by a Malay Sultan on the same lines as the nine States in the 
Malay Peninsula, and Sarawak, which (as regards its internal affairs) is under the 
control of an independent white Rajah of British nationality (S ir Vyner Brooke). The 
Committee recommended the direct assumption by His Majesty's Government of 
responsibility for administration in North Borneo, the integration of Labuan with 
North Borneo and the cession to His Majesty of full jurisdiction in Brunei and 
Sarawak. In the case of Sarawak, the Committee recommended that the new Treaty 
providing for this cession of jurisdiction should also secure the acceptance by the 
Rajah of a Resident British Adviser, whose advice must be sought and acted upon in 
all substantial matters of policy and administration. (The present Treaty with Brunei 
already provides for a Resident British Adviser). 
9. In approving the above recommendations of the Committee, the War Cabinet 
authorised my predecessor to open confidential negotiations with the British North 
Borneo (Chartered) Company for the transfer of their sovereign and administrative 
rights over North Borneo to His Majesty's Government. No financial commitment, 
however, was to be entered into without further authorisation. The War Cabinet also 
authorised my predecessor to open confidential discussions with the Rajah of 
Sarawak. 
10. Discussions with the North Borneo Company have in fact been proceeding 
since that date, but I am not at present asking for a Cabinet decision, since I am 
awaiting from the Company's Representatives an expression of their view on the 
terms upon which a settlement by arbitration might be based. 
11. As regards Sarawak, the Rajah has shown considerable reluctance to enter 
into any discussions with His Majesty's Government with a view to concluding a 
fresh Agreement. After many delays, he represented that, owing to the impossibility 
of consulting his people, he was not in a position to enter into a new engagement. My 
predecessor agreed, therefore, that discussions should be for the purpose of coming 
to an understanding on the terms of a new Agreement which, when the time came, 
the Rajah would be prepared to recommend for acceptance and which would be 
implemented in accordance with the appropriate procedure of the Sarawak Govern-
ment. The Rajah, however, was still hesitant and by October last progress had only 
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reached the point of securing his consent to consider a note of His Majesty's 
Government's proposals. 
12. In November, however, the Rajah decided to reinstate his nephew, Mr. 
Anthony Brooke, as Rajah Muda (a step which can be taken to mean that he must be 
regarded as heir-presumptive), and suggested that he should take part in the 
proposed discussions, which eventually began in March. 
13. The Rajah Muda and the two other members of the Sarawak Commission 
nominated by the Rajah to represent him have shown themselves opposed to the 
proposals which have been made to them on the basis of the decision of the War 
Cabinet and, since the fourth meeting, which was held on the lOth May, a state of 
stalemate has existed, while the Sarawak Government consult their legal adviser on 
His Majesty's Government's definition of the international position of Sarawak. My 
predecessor, therefore, wrote to the Rajah in July requesting that active considera-
tion should be given to the measures which were necessary on the Sarawak side for 
the resumption of discussions. The Rajah replied that the Rajah Muda was now 
administering the Government and that in accordance with the terms of the Sarawak 
Constitution, Colonel Stanley's letter had been passed to him for action. Nothing 
further has been heard from the Sawarak side. 
14. The Rajah Muda and members of the Sarawak Government have from time to 
time expressed the wish that Civil Government in Sarawak should be restored as 
soon as possible, and that the Rajah Muda, as a member of the Brooke family 
administering the Government, should be allowed to return to the country during 
the period of military administration. 
15. I propose that I should now be authorised to tell the Rajah that the relations 
with His Majesty's Government are governed by the Agreements of 1888 and 1941, 
and that so long as he remains Rajah His Majesty's Government cannot recognise any 
claim on his part to devolve his powers and prerogatives as Rajah on to an "Officer 
Administering the Government" or any other person. In this connection it is to be 
observed that Section 18(ii) of the Order of 1941 (providing for the future 
government of Sarawak) which enacts that "In the event of the Rajah having 
occasion to leave the State or to be temporarily absent from the seat of Government 
the Rajah in Council may appoint an officer to administer the Government and such 
officer shall forthwith assume all the powers and prerogatives of the Rajah (subject to 
the provisions of this Order)"-has local application only, and does not apply to the 
present position where the Rajah is in this country and capable of negotiating with 
His Majesty's Government. 
16. I should further propose to say that His Majesty's Government look to the 
Rajah to ensure that an agreement satisfactory to His Majesty's Government is 
reached within a period of two months and that, failing the conclusion of such an 
agreement within that time, it will be necessary for His Majesty's Government to 
consider what course they must take to ensure that they are in a position and have 
the necessary authority in the internal as well as the external policies of the Sarawak 
administration to carry out the responsibility for the territory which they bear to the 
British Parliament and in the international field. I should like to have authority to 
add that there can be no question of the Rajah or his Government being permitted to 
return to Sarawak until such arrangements as are satisfactory to His Majesty's 
Government have been made. 
17. The proposed future chan~es in the status of Labuan and Brunei are of 
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comparatively minor importance, and need, I think, present no difficulties. I should, 
nevertheless, be grateful if my colleagues could now give their final approval to the 
proposals as regards these territories which were considered by the War Cabinet on 
the 31st May last year. 
18. To sum up, I request the approval of my colleagues for the following 
measures:-
(a) the definite confirmation of the policy as regards Malaya which is described in 
paragraphs 2 and 3 above; the first step towards the implementation of this policy 
being the definitive appointment of Sir Harold MacMichael and his visit to Malaya 
to conclude new treaties with the Rulers of the several States; 
(b) a communication to the Rajah of Sarawak in the sense indicated in paragraphs 
15 and 16 above; 
(c) the proposed changes in the administration of Labuan and in the matter of His 
/ 
Majesty's jurisdiction in Brunei. 
49 T 220/52, IF 23/01 31 Aug 1945 
[Economic adviser for Malaya): letter from Sir G Gater to Sir H Wilson 
Smith1 
From the early days of our planning for the post-liberation administration of Malaya, 
we have had very prominently in mind the importance of securing first-class advice 
on the economic problems which are certain to beset that administration. The 
physical rehabilitation of the rubber and tin industries and the proper re-
establishment of Malayan production of those and other commodities in world 
markets will themselves raise problems of considerable difficulty, and inevitably they 
will be complicated by the difficulties of short supply of food and other consumer 
goods, with all the consequential problems of price control, anti-inflation measures, 
etc. We have therefore felt that the administration ought to have at its command an 
Economic Adviser of really first-class ability and of considerable experience in the 
task of economic administration. We have thought it wise to refrain from making any 
stop-gap appointment of a second-rate man, but so far we have not been successful in 
finding a man of the quality we want, who would be willing to take the appointment. 
We have given careful consideration to the possibility of getting somebody from 
the business world, which, in itself, might have advantages, as the holder of such an 
appointment would have many dealings with the business interests connected with 
tin and rubber. After various enquiries in connection both with this post and others 
of a similar character, we have, however, come to the conclusion that we are very 
unlikely to get a man of the quality required because this appointment is necessarily 
only temporary, and men of ability and energy in the business world are at present 
looking primarily to the establishment of permanent positions and would not be 
tempted into a temporary overseas post at this rather crucial stage in the reversion to 
peacetime business unless we were to offer some absurdly high salary. We have 
therefore come round to the view that we ought to try and secure the services of 
1 Sir Henry Wilson Smith, under secretary at the Treasury, 1942-1946; permanent secretary at Ministry of 
Defence, 1947-1948; additional second secretary at the Treasury, 1948-1951. 
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either a permanent civil servant or possibly a man from the academic world who has 
been in Government employ during the war, since a man of that kind, having a 
definite job to come back to, would not be deterred in the same way by the temporary 
character of the Malayan post. 
Major-General Hone, Chief Civil Affairs Officer in the military administration of 
Malaya, has pressed very strongly for an early appointment. He himself contemplates 
that the appointment should be for a period of five years, and suggests a salary of 
anything from £3,000 to £5,000 on the assumption that we should try and get a man 
from the commercial world. We are not ourselves convinced that an appointment for 
so long a period in the first place would be necessary, and if a permanent civil servant 
were appointed, we need hardly go so high in salary. 
We hope that we may secure the goodwill and the active assistance of the Treasury 
in filling this post in the manner I have suggested above. I am sure that it will be 
agreed that the re-establishment of the principal Malayan industries on a really 
sound basis is of very great importance not merely to the territory itself but to the 
Empire as a whole. As you know, Malaya was before the war probably the most 
prosperous part of the Colonial Empire and, what is no doubt more important at the 
present, was among the most important dollar earners in the sterling block. We 
believe that Malaya can be restored to that position, but to do so will require good 
management. As the Treasuryare well aware, the reconstruction of Malaya is likely 
to make quite heavy calls on British resources, both Government and private, and 
here again it is reasonable to hope that good management in the economic field 
could reduce those calls and do a good deal to ensure that any money spent was 
wisely used. I think, therefore, that we are justified in suggesting that the post in 
question has a high Imperial importance and ought to be ranked pretty high in 
priority among analogous posts in the whole sphere with which the United Kingdom 
is concerned. 
If you agree in principle that it would be justifiable to make some sacrifice in order 
to fill this post and to spare a really good man from the ranks of Government Service 
in this country, you will no doubt expect us to make some definite suggestion. I 
would suggest that the possibility might be considered that Archer of the Ministry of 
Supply, who, according to my information, has either terminated or is about to 
terminate his connection with the Ministry of Supply Mission in Washington, might 
be spared and might be willing to undertake this job. We should be grateful for your 
advice on that, and if Archer would not be available, to have any alternative 
suggestion which you feel able to make.2 
2 Since G Archer was unavailable , C J Pyke, principal assistant secretary in the Ministry of Supply since 
1942, was later seconded to be economic adviser to the government of Malaya. He arrived in Kuala 
Lumpur towards the end of 1946, see 105. In 1949 he was appointed head of the Finance and Economics 
Department, Foreign Office Administration of African Territories. 
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50 CAB 128/1, CM 27(45)3 3 Sept 1945 
'Malaya and Borneo': Cabinet conclusions authorising the MacMichael 
mission 
The Cabinet had before them a memorandum by the Secretary of State for the 
Colonies (C.P. (45) 133)1 submitting proposals regarding the future policy of His 
Majesty's Government in Malaya and Borneo. 
The Secretary of State for the Colonies recalled that, at their meeting on the 31st 
May, 1944 (W.M. (44) 70th Conclusions, Minute 3), the War Cabinet had provision-
ally approved for planning purposes proposals for the establishment of a Malayan 
Union with a central legislature. For this purpose it would be necessary to make fresh 
treaties with the rulers of the Malay States and it was now proposed that Sir Harold 
MacMichael should go to Malaya in order to conclude these treaties. 
With regard to Borneo, it had been proposed that His Majesty's Government 
should assume direct responsibility for the administration of North Borneo, which 
had hitherto been independently administered by the British North Borneo (Char-
tered) Company; that the island of Labuan should be integrated with North Borneo, 
and that full jurisdiction in Brunei and Sarawak should be ceded to His Majesty by 
their rulers. In the case of Sarawak it was recommended that the new treaty should 
secure the acceptance by the Rajah of a Resident British Adviser. Negotiations with 
the British North Borneo (Chartered) Company were proceeding satisfactorily and no 
difficulties seemed likely to arise with regard to Labuan and Brunei. The Rajah of 
Sarawak had shown great reluctance to enter into discussions, and the Secretary of 
State for the Colonies felt that he should now be authorised to tell him that, unless 
an agreement satisfactory to His Majesty's Government could be reached within a 
period of two months, His Majesty's Government must consider what course they 
must take to ensure that they were in a position to have the necessary authority in 
the internal as well as the external policies of the Sarawak administration to carry 
out the responsibility for the territory which they bore to the British Parliament and 
in the international field . He would also desire to inform the Rajah that neither he 
nor his Government would be permitted to return to Sarawak until arrangements 
satisfactory to His Majesty's Government had been made. 
In discussion there was general approval for the proposal that Sir Harold 
MacMichael should now take up the question of negotiating new treaties with the 
Malay rulers. With regard to the position in Sarawak, the question was raised 
whether it would not be desirable to take this opportunity to bring to an end the rule 
of the Rajah of Sarawak, subject to the payment of compensation on an equitable 
basis. In any event it was felt that, during the period of military occupation, we 
should have no hestitation in sending observers into Sarawak. 
The Chancellor of the Exchequer said that he hoped that the Treasury would be 
kept in close touch with the negotiations both with regard to Malaya and with regard 
to Borneo. He understood that the negotiations carried out by Sir Harold Mac-
Michael would be purely political, but he thought that consideration should also be 
given to pooling the financial resources of the Malay States.3 
1 See 48. 2 Dr H J N Dalton, chancellor of the Exchequer, 1945-1947. 
3 A Treasury minute on the colonial secretary's memorandum contained the following comment: 'There is 
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The Cabinet:-
(1) Confirmed the policy as regards Malaya set out in paragraphs 2 and 3 of C.P. 
(45) 133 and authorised the appointment of Sir Harold MacMichael and his visit to 
Malaya to conclude new treaties with the rulers of the several States. 
(2) Approved the proposed changes in the administration of Labuan and in the 
matter of His Majesty's Government's jurisdiction in Brunei. 
(3) Invited the Secretary of State for the Colonies to consider, in the light of the 
Agreements of 1880 and 1941, whether it would not be possible to bring to an end 
the rule of the Rajah of Sarawak. 
clearly a lot to be said for this proposal, which should secure a more efficient and progressive Government 
in this part of the world, but Treasury points arise in the following respects: (1) The Colonial Office have 
frozen the Treasury out of their preliminary discussions, and whether as a result of this or not, no mention 
has been made hitherto of the financial complications. Malaya is faced with a big and expensive 
Reconstruction programme. There is little doubt that the accumulated financial resources of Malaya as a 
whole will be able to meet a large part, if not the whole of the bill, but if Malaya is to be treated as a whole, 
arrangements will have to be made to ensure that the existing resources of the several units in the country 
are pooled. Sir Harold MacMichael's negotiations seem to be confined to the political aspects. At some 
stage the financial aspect will have to be included ... .' Further points raised in this minute concerned 
Borneo, see T 220/52. 
51 WO 203/5642 3 Sept 1945 
[Publicity for British policy and the aims of the Malayan Communist 
Party]: inward telegrams nos 433 and 434 from M E Dening to FO 
[Returning to the theme of publicity (see 23, 26-31, 36 and 47), Dening argued that the 
matter was made the more pressing by the political manifesto of the MCP.) 
Telegram 433 
When I was in London recently I discussed with GENT the question of publicity for 
British policy about MALAYA in connection with the plans for operation ZIPPER. 1 
2. With the surrender of Japan the situation has entirely changed. Our forces will 
be replacing the Japanese and our administration will be taking the place of the 
Japanese sponsored administration within a very much shorter space of time than 
was at that time contemplated. Furthermore the politically minded elements of the 
population have had notice of our return and time to prepare plans for our reception. 
At the same time the population have been given only the most general and 
non-commital outline of the policy that H.M.G. proposes to follow. 
3. It has now been reported that a declaration was signed by the Central 
Executive of the Communist Party in MALAYA on 25th August giving eight aims of 
the party. Text is contained in my immediately following telegram.2 The sentiments 
expressed in this manifesto are irreproachable. 
4. It will be seen that the Communist Party have rather stolen our thunder and 
that we have lost that element of surprise for our own progressive policy which 
would politically have been so valuable. Much of the programme could be subscribed 
1 Operation Zipper was the code-name for the military reoccupation of Malaya. 
2 Telegram 434, immediately following 433, is reproduced here as an integral part of document 51. 
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to by H.M.G. with very little amendment. The population is of course not yet ready 
for a full electoral system but our policy does envisage a larger measure of 
participation in the government by the people. The reference to "freedom of 
societies" reflects the anxiety of the Chinese as to whether the societies to which they 
belong will be declared illegal. A decision has already been taken on this point and it 
would be to our advantage to make this clear at once. 
5. It is not of course suggested that any sort of "reply" should be made to this 
declaration, but the very reasonableness of it makes it all the more important that 
the speediest and fullest practicable publicity should be given to our own plans lest 
uncertainty and distrust should lead the resistance movements (the great majority of 
whose numbers are Communists) to adopt an attitude towards the return of British 
Administration from which it might be difficult for them to withdraw and which 
might unnecessarily complicate our post-war tasks in MALAYA. 
6. It is the view of the Supreme Commander, which is shared by General HONE, 
that an early announcement of H.M.G's policy, even in the most general terms, is 
necessary if we are not to create for ourselves a very difficult situation upon re-entry 
into MALAYA. 
7. Please pass to Colonial Office. 
Telegram 434 
Following is text referred to in my immediately preceding telegram. Begins:-
Aims of Communist Party in Malaya. 
1. To support the United Nations of RUSSIA, CHINA, BRITAIN and AMERICA and 
new organisation for world security. 
2. To establish a democratic government in MALAYA with the electorate drawn 
from all races of each State and the anti-Japanese Army. 
3. To abolish Fascism and Japanese political structure laws in MALAYA. 
4. To enforce freedom of speech, publications and societies, and obtain legal 
status for anti-Japanese Army. 
5. To reform the educational system and improve the social conditions of the 
people. 
6. To improve living conditions, develop industry, commerce and agriculture, 
provide relief for unemployment and poor, increase wages to standard minimum and 
establish eight hour working day. 
7. To punish traitors, corrupt officials, hoarders and profiteers, and stabilise 
prices. 
8. To ensure good treatment for the members of the anti-Japanese Army and 
provide compensation for the families of those who died for the Allied cause. 
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52 CO 273/675/7 6 Sept 1945 
[Publicity for Malayan policy): minute by H T Bourdillon 
[Following Cabinet authorization of Malayan policy (see 48 and 50), officials turned to 
issues consequent upon it, amongst which was the question of how much publicity could 
be given to MacMichael's mission whose purpose was highly sensitive and whose success 
in obtaining fresh agreements with the Malay rulers depended upon an element of 
surprise.] 
I have attached as No. 4 a copy of the Secretary of State's recent Cabinet p(l.per about 
future policy in regard to Malaya and Borneo.1 The steps proposed in the paper (with 
a "rider" as regards Sarawak) were approved by the Cabinet on Monday September 
the 3rd,2 and my minute on 55104/45 above sets out the various consequential steps 
which are now necessary. 
2. One of the matters which now requires further consideration, as a question of 
immediate urgency, is the problem of publicity for the approved policy in so far as it 
concerns Malaya. In paragraph 7 of No. 4, the Secretary of State foreshadowed 
further action by himself on this point, and the question has now become 
particularly urgent in view of developments on the files attached beneath. 
3. The most important of these files for our immediate purposes is 50926/45, 
which deals with the handling of resistance movements in Malaya. The Secretary of 
State is already aware that Admiral Mountbatten has long pressed for a measure of 
publicity for our proposed Malayan policy, on the grounds that his power to utilise 
resistance forces in Malaya would thereby be greatly increased. 3 The history of his 
representations is set out at length in my minute of 9/8/45 on 50926/45. With the 
termination of hostilities in the Far East, the operational significance of this matter 
has of course ceased to exist, but it has taken on a new and very important political 
significance. In this connection, I would draw attention to the telegrams from Mr. 
Dening at 31 and 32 on 50926/45.4 These telegrams show the extreme relevance of 
our future Malayan policy to the aims and aspirations of the most influentia15 body of 
Chinese in Malaya, and the great advantages which we will secure in dealing with 
that body if our policy can be made known to them. We cannot of course send an 
immediate affirmative reply to Mr. Dening's telegrams without considering the 
whole question from a broader angle, but we can show him that we appreciate the 
value of what he has told us, at the same time finding out from him in greater detail 
the exact points in our policy which in his view require stressing. I submit drafts on 
50926/45. 
4. So much for that particular aspect of the matter. In considering publicity for 
our Malayan policy as a whole, we must first see what progress has already been 
made. The last page of the enclosure to No. 4 on 55140/52/45 shows that we have in 
fact authorised those conducting political warfare in the Far East to go a long way in 
the right direction. We know that the Political Warfare authorities made good use of 
this material, but authority to use it has of course been confined to them. The other 
1 See 48. 2 See 50. 
3 See 23, 26--31 and 36. 4 See 51. 
5 In a manuscript annotation, Bourdillon inserted square brackets around the word 'influential' and added 
the words 'politically difficult'. 
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important file in this connection is 55104/15/45. I would draw attention to the 
second enclosure to No. 22 on that file, which is a statement of fundamental 
problems in Malaya together with a general indication (in the last paragraph) of the 
direction in which a solution must be found. 6 With Cabinet approval, this statement 
has been issued to a wide range of official recipients at home and overseas, but these 
recipients have been told to be very guarded in their use of it pending a further move 
by the Secretary of State. 
5. The question now is, how much further can the Secretary of State go at this 
juncture towards meeting the genuine and pressing demand for publicity, without 
endangering the policy itself? Clearly, he cannot go the whole way. That is to say, he 
cannot make a public statement here and now, giving the details of our aims and the 
steps by which we hope to achieve them. This would be impossible if only because it 
would forewarn the Sultans of the purposes of Sir Harold MacMichael's mission/ 
which would thus lose that element of surprise which may be essential to its success. 
On the other hand, it seems equally clear that the situation calls for something a 
good deal more definite than has been done hitherto. I submit opposite a very rough 
draft, 8 which might be used as the basis for any form of announcement by the 
Secretary of State (or under his authority) in the near future. The draft is entirely 
taken from the two documents which have already been approved-that is, the 
Political Warfare material and the "Statement of Problems", but I wonder if these two 
documents do not in fact, between them, give us everything we want. 
6. If the Secretary of State would be willing to make or to authorise an early 
statement on these lines, it remains to be decided whether or not he should first seek 
Cabinet approval. When the War Cabinet gave provisional approval to our Malayan 
policy on the 31st May 1944, they imposed a condition that the plan should not be 
published without further reference to them. On the other hand, our affairs have 
moved a long way since then, and the draft statement involves little or no material 
which has not already been approved (for limited purposes) . If the question of 
publicity could be entirely dissociated from all other aspects of our Malayan policy, I 
should be inclined to suggest that further Cabinet sanction is not necessary; but we 
had an interesting discussion with Sir Harold MacMichael last night, at which the 
implications of publicity were considered, and I think these implications alter the 
picture. Sir Harold, ever since he was first provisionally appointed for this task, has 
been very anxious to know how far he can go in making it clear to individual Sultans 
that H.M.G. intends to bring the policy into effect, notwithstanding possible 
resistance by any or all of them. Sir Harold feels that unless he has firm backing from 
H.M.G. on this point, the whole purpose of his mission will be undermined. 
Naturally, it is to be hoped that the necessity for "a show of force" will not arise, and 
that the Sultans will be persuaded to agree freely to their new status. But this cannot 
6 See 36, Annex. 
7 When MacMichael's term as high commissioner of Palestine and Trans-Jordan ended in the autumn of 
1944, Gater invited him to prepare for a mission to negotiate fresh treaties with the Malay rulers as soon as 
possible after the British reoccupation of Malaya. In May and June 1945 MacMichael paid preliminary visits 
to Kandy, Calcutta and New Delhi . Accompanied by Bourdillon, he flew from London to Colombo on 27 
Sept and on 7 Oct boarded HMS Royalist for Port Swettenham where he disembarked on 11 Oct, a few 
hours after the secretary of state announced in Parliament the government's intention to introduce 
constitutional changes in Malaya. 
8 Not printed. 
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be taken for granted, and Sir Harold points out that unless he has a clear mandate to 
make it plain, the last resort, that the policy must in any case prevail, resistance on 
the part of one Sultan may ruin the whole programme. In that event, the last state 
will be worse than the first, since nothing would be more damaging for H.M.G. than 
to embark on the new policy and then withdraw in the face of opposition. 
7. The exact measures which H.M.G. might have to adopt in order to enforce 
their policy in the face of opposition by one or more Sultans would seem to be as 
follows: 
(a) The rejection of individual Sultans in favour of other claimants who would be 
ready to co-operate. Elaborate steps have already been taken to warn the Military 
Authorities, on entering Malaya, not to recognise the Sultan or pretending Sultan 
in any State as Ruler of that State, pending Sir Harold MacMichael's arrival. This 
makes it possible for recognition of any Sultan to depend upon that Sultan's 
willingness to co-operate in H.M.G's policy. 
(b) Simple annexation of the whole territory. 
The latter course is open to numerous and obvious disadvantages. As stated above, 
it is to be hoped that even the former course will not in fact be necessary, but Sir 
Harold MacMichael insists that the success of his mission may depend upon the 
authority to make it clear to ariy Sultan who may prove recalcitrant, that the policy 
will go through, whatever the obstacles. 
8. The connection of all this with publication of the new policy is easy to see. The 
use of a statement on the lines of the draft which I have prepared (see in particular 
paragraph 6 of the draft) would in fact commit H.M.G. to the implementation of their 
policy. Once we have said openly "each of the races forming the population of Malaya 
must have all the full opportunity of helping to build the country's future, and 
reaping the benefits of their efforts, provided they in fact regard Malaya as an object 
of loyalty", we are irrevocably committed to the policy. Such a commitment is of 
course exactly what Sir Harold MacMichael requires, but it does seem to require a 
further reference to the Cabinet. The fact that the Secretary of State, in paragraph 5 
of No. 4 hereon, has already foreshadowed further recommendation on the matter of 
publicity, gives us the opportunity which is needed, and I submit opposite, as a 
second draft,9 a draft Cabinet paper which the Secretary of State might circulate in 
the very near future. As shown, the draft statement referred to earlier in this minute, 
as amended in pencil, would be attached as an annex to the draft Cabinet paper. 
9. If the paper is approved by the Cabinet, and if a statement is thereafter issued 
on the proposed lines, the way would be open for us to give suitable publicity to Sir 
Harold MacMichael's mission either before or after he leaves this country .10 It could 
be stated simply that Sir Harold will be visiting Malaya in order to help m the 
arrangements necessary to implement the new policy. Sir Harold indicated last night 
that he would welcome something on these lines before he leaves the U.K. 
9 Not printed, but the final version of this paper see 56. 
10 To this point Bourdillon added the following manuscript marginalia: 'We shd. also, of course, have to 
forewarn the recipients of the "Statement of Problems", and Mr Dening, so that the full advantage of the S. 
of S's announcement could be secured.' 
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53 WO 203/5642, no 28/16/45 9 Sept 1945 
'Initial relations with Malay sultans on the liberation of Malaya': 
instructions from Admiral Mountbatten to General Sir M Dempsey1 
[Although the Japanese retained the Sultanates, they deposed Sultan Alam Shah of 
Selangor, replacing him with Tengku Musa-Eddin whom the British had barred from the 
succession in the 1930s. Elsewhere the deaths of rulers during the Japanese occupation 
had resulted in the accession of Raja Ali in Trengganu (1942), of Tengku Syed Hamzah in 
Perlis (1943), of Tengku Badlishah in Kedah (1943) and of Tengku lbrahim in Kelantan 
(1944). A priority of the British on their return was to investigate the wartime records of 
the rulers (see 57) and they subsequently deposed Musa-Eddin, Raja Ali and Syed 
Hamzah.] 
The initial attitude of the Military Administration and the British Forces generally to 
the Malay Sultans is one of paramount importance for reasons which are set out 
below. 
2. In the first place it must be appreciated that the Sultans of the nine Malay 
States who had been previously recognised by H.M.G. and were in office at the date of 
the Japanese invasion are not all still officiating. It is believed that some Sultans have 
died and have been replaced by Japanese nominees who may or may not be persons of 
repute and worthy of our recognition; while other loyal Sultans may have been 
deposed by the Japanese and replaced by puppets of pro-Japanese sympathies and/or 
ill-repute. 
3. It is, therefore, of vital importance that no course of action should be adopted 
by British Commanders in Malaya which might be construed as a formal recognition 
of any "Sultan" until the position has been carefully examined and H.M.G.'s 
directions have been received. Further, it should be noted that, for the general 
advancement of the peoples of Malaya as a whole, H.M.G. has in mind that certain 
constitutional changes may be desirable in the future government of the Malay 
Peninsula when the control of the territory reverts to the Colonial Office. These 
changes may considerably affect the post-war political authority of the Sultans and 
hence any officer who, by speech or conduct, leads any Sultan to believe that his 
status as ruler has received recognition from the Supreme Allied Commander and his 
Commanders, may prejudice the plans of H.M.G. 
4. Orders should therefore be issued to all concerned that when contacts with the 
Sultans (or soi-disant Sultans) in liberated areas are made, the above considerations 
will be borne in mind, and Commanders concerned should as far as possible be 
guided by the advice of the C.A. staff. Steps must be taken to ensure that a senior C.A. 
officer who is qualified to give such advice and who has been adequately instructed is 
available whenever the necessity arises. 
5. When contacts between the military authorities and Sultans are unavoidable, 
it should be laid down that they must be made only by a senior officer commanding 
the troops in the area, accompanied by a senior Civil Affairs Officer. Conversations 
should be strictly formal, courteous but non-committal; on no account should gifts 
be exchanged. Social interchanges will be prohibited and hospitality proferred by a 
1 Lt-General Sir Miles Dempsey succeeded Slim as commander of the 14th Army for the reoccupation of 
Singapore and Malaya and, in early 1946, as commander in chief ALFSEA; was commander in chief Middle 
East, 1946--194 7. 
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Sultan will be politely refused on account of pressure of military activities. If any 
request or petition is presented to a Military Commander by a Sultan or one of his 
high officials it should merely be acknowledged and passed without delay through 
the normal command channels to the formation C.A. staff for action. 
6. Special arrangements must be made for the D.C.C.A.O. or, failing him, a 
Senior Civil Affairs Officer selected for the purpose in each case, to make early formal 
approach to any "Sultan" who is located in territory occupied by our troops. 
Formations will be directed to issue clear instructions to all troops to report by signal 
and D.R., the location of any "Sultan" with the minimum of delay. 
7. In carrying on discussions with "Sultans", once first contact has been made, 
the C.A. staff will handle the matter exclusively unless for special reasons it is 
considered desirable to act in conjunction with G.S.1(b) . 
8. The method of handling a "Sultan" will depend on the personality involved; 
special instructions may be issued in individual cases by the DCA(M) but for general 
guidance, the Sultans fall into three categories as follows:-
(i) Pre-invasion Sultans still in office. 
(ii) Puppet Sultans known to be disloyal or otherwise unsuitable whom the 
Japanese have placed in office by deposing the legitimate Sultan. 
(iii) Sultans who have assumed or been appointed to office during the Japanese 
regime on account of the death, resignation or ill-health etc. of the legitimate 
Sultan. 
The method of dealing with these three categories is described in Appendices A, B 
and C.2 
9. Prompt reports of initial contacts with Sultans will be telegraphed to HQ 
ALFSEA, with copies to HQ SACSEA, to be followed by a full written record 
transmitted in duplicate without delay. 
10. In view of the intention of H.M.G. to send a plenipotentiary at an early date to 
interview each Malay Sultan (or the de facto Malay ruler or "rightful" successor in 
any State where the pre-invasion Sultan is no longer available) and arrange fresh 
agreements to govern their relations with H.M.G. the fullest information regarding 
certain matters must be obtained without delay by the C.A. Branch. Appendix 0 3 
contains a questionnaire which should be answered as soon as reliable information is 
available. The replies should be transmitted in duplicate to HQ ALFSEA and should 
be kept up-to-date by subsequent reports as more information is obtained. It cannot 
be overstressed that the reliability of these reports is fundamentally important to the 
Secretary of State for the Colonies in its bearing on H.M.G.'s policy. 
11. It may be added that these instructions cover only the initial period of 
contact, and it is appreciated that considerable modifications may be necessary in the 
light of experience. 
12. These instructions are issued in substitution of the instructions contained in 
memorandum No. 6/CA dated 21 July 1945 which is hereby cancelled. 
2 & 3 Not printed. 
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54 WO 203/5642, no 33/16/45 14 Sept 1945 
[Japanese surrender ceremony in Singapore]: inward telegram no 484 
from M E Dening to FO 
[On 15 Aug, when Japan agreed to unconditional surrender, SEAC's responsibilities were 
extended to include the Netherlands East Indies and Indo-China as far north as the 16th 
degree parallel. Reoccupation was delayed, however, partly through want of resources and 
partly because General MacArthur forbade any reoccupation until he had taken the formal 
Japanese surrender in Tokyo Bay on 2 Sept, see 81. The surrender ceremony in Singapore 
took place ten days later but SACSEA headquarters did not move from Kandy to 
Singapore until Nov.] 
I returned last night from Singapore where the surrender ceremony on Sept. 12th 
left nothing to be desired. It gave intense satisfaction to the prisoners of war and 
internees who witnessed it and will, I hope, have done much to obliterate the bad 
odour of our expulsion in 1942. There was no doubt about the welcome of the 
populace and the Chinese of Singapore were particularly vociferous. 
2. Though the auguries are good, it seemed to me that there is a great deal to be 
done to get Singapore going and I hope that generous financial support will be 
forthcoming where it is needed. I refer in particular to the restoration of earning 
capacity which is likely to necessitate Government assistance and without which the 
prosperity of Singapore is unlikely to be restored. I mention this problem because 
there are already indications that it is arising elsewhere (e .g. Siam) and applies in 
particular to British subjects in the Far East whose entire interests and earnings 
were out here and who have no resources in the United Kingdom or elsewhere in the 
Empire. 
3. The Sultan of Johore was allowed to attend the surrender ceremony in a 
private capacity. I gather that he is for the present subdued and docile and very 
anti-Japanese. I have already referred to the friendliness of the Chinese community 
of Singapore. It seems to me that we should be wise to take very early advantage of 
these favourable conditions. Otherwise we may find that disillusionment and distrust 
of our intentions may take the place of the friendly sentiments which our return has 
brought to the surface. 
4. The spirit of the prisoners of war and internees whom I met is beyond praise 
and the condition of many was better than one would have expected. But there are all 
too many ugly stories of atrocities and Japanese inhumanity, and I think that there 
will be a strong demand to know what action is being taken to bring those 
responsible to justice. 
55 CO 825/42/2 14 Sept 1945 
[Implementation of policy]: minute by H T Bourdillon of a CO 
departmental discussion about the Malayan Union [Extract] 
[Bourdillon's minute records a discussion of Far Eastern policy on 14 Sept between Mr 
Hall, Mr Creech Jones, Gater, Gent, Duncan and other officials . The greater part of the 
meeting was devoted to the Malayan Union and revealed the urgency of finalizing the 
explanatory memorandum for MacMichael to give the Sultans and the new treaties and of 
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securing the affirmation of either Cabinet or the prime minister that the government 
would stand by the policy 'in spite of possible obstacles'.) 
. . . 5. The greater part of the discussion was devoted to the proposal for the 
Malayan Union Constitution (see paragraph f of my minute of 5/9/45, on file No. 
50823/6/45 beneath. 1 The Secretary of State noted that it was proposed to allow the 
Sultans, with the help of the Advisory Malay Councils, to legislate on matters of 
Mohammedan religion and Malay custom. He wondered whether it would not be 
possible to define the field of Malay custom. He felt that the Sultans themselves, who 
in any case would be facing a great reduction in their power, would be likely to want 
such a definition as one of their few remaining safeguards. The extreme difficulty of 
defining "Malay custom" was explained. It was pointed out that no difficulty had 
arisen owing to the lack of definition in the past, and that the necessity of obtaining 
the Governor's assent to legislation on these subjects in the future would avoid 
confusion and conflicts. It was agreed that in the circumstances no further definition 
was possible. The Secretary of State, however, in pursuing his point about the 
proposed diminution in the status of the Sultans, requested that a comparative 
statement should be prepared, showing the position of the Sultans as it was before 
the Japanese invasion, and as it will be under the new Constitution. I attach the draft 
of such a Statement on 50823/6/45.2 
6. The Secretary of State then had to leave the meeting, and Mr. Creech Jones 
took the chair. He expressed anxiety lest the proposed Legislative Council of the 
Malayan Union should become a mere "talking shop", divested of all sense of real 
responsibility. He has studied this question in relation to other colonies, and he 
feared that the creation of Legislative Councils in the past, with all real power and 
authority confined to its official members, had led to a conflict between officials and 
unofficials and a growth of irresponsibility on the part of the latter. In particular, he 
wanted to know whether the Governor would be encouraged to appoint members of 
Legislative Council to the unofficial seats on his Executive Council. Sir George Gater 
supported this point, but remarked that the latest tendency in the Colonial Empire 
(e.g. in Jamaica) has been in the right direction. It was agreed that there was nothing 
to prevent the Governor from selecting his unofficial members of Executive Council 
from the ranks of the Legislative Council, and that this practice should be 
encouraged. 
7. Mr. Creech Jones was also anxious, in view of probable criticism in Parliament, 
in this country in general and in the United States, that we should be able to promise 
a future development towards a democratic system of election. It was agreed that 
such a development could with advantage be foreshadowed, but that in the very early 
stages an electoral system on full democratic lines would be premature. 
8. Mr. Creech Jones then referred to the probable criticisms, on traditional and 
sentimental lines, of the proposed dismemberment of the Straits Settlements, and to 
the inevitable feeling amongst people intimately concerned with the life of the 
colony, that a drastic change had been made without consulting them. This led to a 
discussion of the inherent advantages and disadvantages in the policy of splitting the 
Straits Settlements and attaching Penang and Malacca to the Malayan Union. 
1 & 2 Not printed. 
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Colonel O'Connor3 expressed the conviction that this policy would cause consider-
able local bitterness. Sir George Gater wondered whether the present Cabinet 
realised that, in approving our Malayan policy as a whole, they had approved this 
particular proposal with all its implications.4 Mr. Gent pointed out that the present 
Prime Minister had been Chairman of the Ministerial Committee under the War 
Cabinet which had considered the whole matter in great detail, and had concluded in 
favour of the present policy. It was further pointed out that Sir Harold MacMichael, 
who was expected to leave the United Kingdom by air for the East in 10 days from 
now (he was scheduled to leave London on Tuesday the 25th of September),5 would 
have to take with him a Memorandum for the benefit of the Malay Rulers, in which 
the essential points of our policy, including the splitting up of the Straits 
Settlements, would be set out. This made it impossible to defer the question of the 
future of the Straits Settlements, or to treat it as less urgent than the rest of the 
policy. Sir H. Duncan also observed that a Bill to repeal the existing Straits 
Settlements Act of 1866 would have to be introduced into Parliament iri the very near 
future. Mr. Creech Jones felt that if this part of our policy had been recommended by 
a Ministerial Committee, provisionally approved by the War Cabinet and now finally 
approved by the present Cabinet, there was no question but that it must go through. 
He was still very anxious, however, about the "Public Relations" aspect of the matter. 
What steps would be taken to explain our policy as regards the Straits Settlements, to 
disarm criticism and to enlist co-operation? 
9. At this point, Sir George Gater mentioned the matter of publicity for our 
Malayan policy as a whole. He was at present considering a draft Cabinet Paper 
submitted by the Eastern Department, in which it was proposed that publicity should 
be in two phases. The first phase would consist of an almost immediate statement by 
the Secretary of State, outlining our future policy in general terms. The second 
phase would consist of a further statement by the Secretary of State, timed to 
coincide with the opening of Sir Harold MacMichael's work in Malaya, which would 
go into greater detail on all points and would disclose the intention to split up the 
Straits Settlements. He himself was not happy about the proposal to split publicity 
into two phases. He was afraid the first phase, partial as it was, would merely arouse 
questions and criticisms which would not be answered. He would be much in favour 
of a single statement by the Secretary of State, to be made in Parliament immediately 
after it re-assembled on October the lOth, which would go the whole way.6 Mr. Gent 
said that if nothing was published immediately, it would be very hard to hold the 
position for the next month. The Chinese communists in Malaya had already 
declared their attitude. It coincided to a remarkable extent with our own policy, but 
unless there was a ready response, that attitude would harden. He felt that 
opportunities would be missed and difficulties created unless there was some 
immediate measure of publicity. 
10. It was agreed that in any case publication of the details of our policy must not 
be allowed to wait until Sir Harold MacMichael had proceeded some way with his 
negotiations. He would be bound to reveal our intentions to the Sultans, and this 
3 Kenneth K O'Connor, member of the MPU; attorney general , Malaya 1946 and Kenya 1948; chief justice, 
Jamaica 1951 and Kenya 1954; president, Court of Appeal for East Africa, 1957-1962. 
4 See 50. 5 In fact he left on 27 Sept. 
6 See written answer, H of C Debs, vol 414, cols 255-256, 10 Oct 1945. 
[56] OCT 1945 133 
would be bound to result in leakage. It would be most unfortunate if that leakage 
occurred before an authoratitive [sic] statement had been made by the Secretary of 
State himself. 
11. In this connection, it was pointed out that the draft Cabinet paper to which 
Sir George Cater had referred did not merely contain the proposal for publicity. It 
also contained the proposal that the Cabinet should strengthen Sir Harold Mac-
Michael's hand by now affirming their intention to carry through their policy for the 
future of Malaya, in spite of recalcitrance on the part of any or all of the Sultans. It 
was essential that Sir Harold should have this assurance "in his pocket" before he left 
the U.K. 
12. Mr. Gent mentioned that apart from the immediate urgency of getting things 
ready before Sir Harold MacMichael started his task, we should be under increasing 
pressure from the Military Authorities, who would very naturally be anxious to 
terminate the Military period in Malaya at the earliest opportunity. 
13. It was finally agreed that Sir Harold MacMichael's departure constituted the 
immediate "date" against which all our plans must be considered. I was instructed to 
draft a telegram to the Supreme Allied Commander, asking for a very early reply to 
the telegram already sent, in which we had asked him if the ground in Malaya would 
be ready if Sir Harold MacMichael left the U.K., as intended, on the 26th of 
September. Before I had time to draft, I was notified by the War Office of a telegram 
from the Supreme Allied Commander, saying that the ground would indeed be ready 
by that date, and urging that Sir Harold should leave without avoidable delay .... 
56 CAB 129/2, CP(45)199 4 Oct 1945 
'Policy in regard to Malaya': Cabinet memorandum by Mr Hall. 
Annexes: I 'Memorandum on future constitution for Malaya', 11 'Basis 
for publicity (phase 1)' 
[Although the Cabinet gave their final approval to the new Malayan policy on 3 Sept (see 
50), the approval did not in itself amount to a resolve on the part of government to 
proceed with the policy whatever obstacles might be encountered. In order to obtain such 
an affirmation, the secretary of state drafted a further Cabinet paper. In the event it was 
agreed that it would be simpler and quicker for Hall to settle the matter directly with 
Attlee and in advance of the Cabinet meeting. Accordingly the secretary of state saw the 
prime minister at 5.45 pm on 20 Sept, having first sent him a copy of the paper for his 
perusal. Attlee approved the lines of action on two conditions: firstly, that any questions 
of security arising from the proposals be cleared with the chiefs of staff, and, secondly, 
that Annex 11 be strengthened on the economic side. When the Malayan Union ran into 
vigorous Malay opposition after the publication of the White Paper on 22 Jan 1946, CO 
officials for a time comforted themselves with the thought of the categorical affirmations 
given the previous Sept (see CO 273/675/7 nos 5 and 6, and CO 537/1540, minute by H T 
Bourdillon, 4 Mar 1946).] 
At their meeting on the 3rd September, 1945,1 the Cabinet approved the policy in 
regard to Malaya outlined in C.P.(45)133.2 In connection with the question of the 
extent, method and timing of publicity for this policy, and in consultation and 
1 See 50. 2 See 48. 
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agreement with the Lord Privy Seal, as Chairman of the Colonial Affairs Committee, 
I represented to the Prime Minister the following views and proposals as being 
matters for very urgent decision in the current situation in Malaya. 
2. Publicity in any detail about our Malayan policy commits us to the fulfilment 
of that policy. This means that we cannot allow ourselves to be deterred by an 
obstinate attitude on the part of any or all of the Malay Rulers with whom Sir Harold 
MacMichael will have to deal in his forthcoming mission. I regard it, however, as very· 
essential, quite apart from the matter of publicity, that His Majesty's Government 
should now affirm their intention to carry through, in spite of obstruction on the 
part of any particular Malay Ruler, the policy which they have approved. All our plans 
for the Malay States depend upon the success of Sir Harold MacMichael's efforts to 
secure jurisdiction in each and all of the States. It is essential that his hand should be 
strengthened by the firm assurance that he can, if necessary, make it clear to any 
recalcitrant Sultan that we intend to carry our policy through. I attach as an Annex 
to this paper an explanatory memorandum, which I propose that Sir Harold should 
hand to each Sultan on opening discussions. It will be seen that this Memorandum 
leaves no doubt of His Majesty's firm intention to carry their plans into effect. This, 
then, is the first point on which definite assurance needs to be given. 
3. I then envisage three phases of publicity. The first phase will be a statement in 
general terms, designed to create public interest in the direction of that unity and 
common citizenship in Malaya which our policy will entail. I shall require some 
discretion as to timing, but I would propose to inaugurate this phase by a public 
reference, during the next fortnight, to these two points of unity and common 
citizenship. I attach, as Annex 11 to this paper, a brief statement which I would use as 
a basis. 
4. The second phase must be expected to follow after possibly only a short 
interval. This phase will involve a more explicit statement of our intention to form a 
Malayan Union and of certain contingent proposals, such as the securing of 
jurisdiction from the Malay Rulers and the splitting up of the present colony of the 
Straits Settlements. It will also involve an explicit statement about the separate 
treatment of Singapore. 
5. It will be best if this second phase of publicity can synchronise with Sir Harold 
MacMichael's work. Information as to our detailed intentions will inevitably be 
disclosed in Malaya as soon as he opens discussions with any Sultan, since it is 
necessary for the success of these discussions that he should give each Sultan an 
outline of the future Malaya and of their own place in it. It would be a mistake from 
the point of view of this country and of the Straits Settlements to let our policy leak 
out from the first of the Malay Rulers with whom Sir Harold MacMichael establishes 
contact; and therefore an authoritative expose of the second phase should be made by 
myself in London at or about the time when Sir Harold starts his work in Malaya. He 
is expected to do so during the first half of this month, and I therefore propose to 
make a statement in the House of Commons after it reassembles, in which I shall (a) 
outline the specific proposals referred to in paragraph 4 above, and (b) promise a full 
disclosure in the form of a White Paper as soon as circumstances permit. , 
6. This White Paper would constitute the third phase. It could not, of course, be 
laid until preliminary steps, such as the negotiation of the new Agreements with the 
Sultans, had been completed. 
7. In proposing the early inception of a programme of publicity, I am influenced 
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by very recent information as to the present political state of affairs in Malaya. This 
information indicates that politically the most difficult body of Chinese in the 
Peninsula (the main group of the Resistance Movement and largely Chinese 
"Communists") have set before themselves a goal which corresponds in very many 
respects with our own policy. It is not too much to say that the whole of our relations 
with the Chinese population of Malaya may be fundamentally affected by a timely 
statement of our intentions. 
8. To sum up, I recommended:-
(a) that we should affirm His Majesty's Government's intention to carry through 
the policy which they have approved, in spite of possible obstacles in the form of, 
for instance, recalcitrance by any or all of the Sultans. 
(b) that there should be a phased programme of publicity commencing with a 
public statement by myself in general terms, continuing with a more detailed 
statement by myself in the House as soon as it reassembles on the lOth October, 
and concluding with a White Paper as soon as circumstances permit. 
The Prime Minister approved my proposals subject to the Chiefs of Staff having no 
objection from the security angle. I have ascertained that they have no objection, and 
I am circulating this memorandum to my colleagues to keep them informed of the 
lines on which I am now proceeding in these Malayan affairs. 
Annex I to 56 
The Cabinet has finally confirmed the policy of creating a Malayan Union (as opposed 
to an extended Federation of Malay States) which will comprise all the Malay States 
in the Peninsula, together with the Settlements of Penang and Malacca. The 
Constitution of the Union will provide for a central authority (both Executive and 
Legislative) from which all other authorities in the Peninsula should derive their 
powers. (This postulate is inherent in the conception of a Union as opposed to that of 
a Federation.) 
2. Subject to this basic conception the nine Malay States and the Settlements of 
Penang and Malacca will be retained as geographical units with their present 
boundaries to deal with such local affairs as may be devolved upon them by the 
central authority. 
3. One of the most important matters to settle is the position of the Malay Rulers 
under the new Constitution. The idea that there should be an Upper Chamber of 
Sultans has been examined, but it is not felt that this would be appropriate. The 
possibility has been rejected partly because of the difficulty of devising satisfactory 
relations between the Lower and Upper Chambers, partly because the Sultans do not 
possess the necessary qualifications to perform the functions of a Second Chamber in 
any real and effective manner, partly because a Second Chamber of Malay Sultans 
would be an inappropriate organ in the Government of a country of which important 
areas will be parts of the present British Colony of the Straits Settlements, and partly 
because it would be out of keeping with the proposal that Malayan Union citizenship 
should comprise not only Malays but people of every race who have made Malaya 
their homeland. 
It is proposed, instead, that the Sultans collectively should form an Advisory 
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Council to the Governor. The subjects with which this Council would be concerned 
would be principally questions of Mohammedan religion (in relation to which the 
special position of the Sultans has always been recognised), but other subjects would 
also be open for discussion in the Council either at the instance of the Governor or at 
the instance of any of the Sultans with the Governor's consent. The functions of the 
Council are further described in paragraph 8 beneath. It would meet regularly under 
the presidency of the Governor and would be regarded as a permanent body. Its 
meetings would be attended by all the ceremony necessary to maintain the personal 
dignity of the Sultans. It would not, however, impair the right of direct access 
between individual Sultans and the Governor. It is felt that the new position of the 
Sultans should be defined in the Constitution itself. When the time comes to 
negotiate the new Treaties this will be necessary to satisfy the Sultans, who will not 
be content to be told vaguely that "an appropriate position" will be allotted to them 
by the new Central Legislature. 
4. Apart from the Governor, the three principal officers of Government will be 
the Chief Secretary, the Attorney-General and the Financial Secretary. The position 
of the British Residents or Advisers in each of the States should be modified. Before 
the war, the status of these officers was higher than that of any other officials save 
the High Commissioner, but with the establishment of the Union Government their 
importance will diminish and they should be made subordinate to the Chief 
Secretary of the Union Government. It is proposed that these officers, as well as the 
officers at the head of the two Settlements, should be uniformly styled "Resident 
Commissioners." 
5. It is proposed that Executive and Legislative Councils for the Malayan Union 
should be created with the following constitution:-
The Executive Council should have 5 official and 5 unofficial members, in addition 
to the Governor. Of the official members the Chief Secretary, the Attorney-General 
and the Financial Secretary should be ex-officio, while the other 2 would be 
nominated by the Governor. The unofficial members would also be nominated by the 
Governor. A racial basis should not be prescribed for such nominations, but in the 
first instance it would be desirable that there should be one European, one Malay, 
one Chinese and one Indian unoffical member, the Governor being left to nominate 
the most suitable unofficial to fill the remaining vacancy regardless of race. Save 
with the consent of the Governor, unofficial membership of the Executive Council 
would be confined to Malayan Union Citizens. 
The Legislative Council should have, besides the Governor, 21 official and 21 
unofficial members. Fourteen of the latter should represent areas on a population 
basis, and the remainder should represent important interests throughout the 
Union; there has hitherto been no experience of any system of elections in Malaya, 
and for an initial phase at any rate it would be desirable that the unofficial members 
should be nominated by the Governor, who would be required to select suitable 
persons on the above representative basis as far as possible. Five of the official 
members would be the official members of the Executive Council and the remainder 
would be nominated by the Governor. 
6. When Military Administration ceases and the new Civil Government is 
established in the Malay Peninsula, it is likely to be impracticable, even if it were 
desirable, to complete the formal instruments necessary to set up a Legislative 
Council immediately. To cover the interregnum between the end of the Military 
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Administration and the setting up of a Legislative Council, the new Constitution 
should specifically provide for the Governor alone to be responsible for legislation, 
and for the establishment of an Advisory Council to assist him in this task. The 
Governor would normally consult this Advisory Council before enacting Legislation, 
but would not be bound to accept the Council's advice. The instrument should not 
specify the precise number of official and unofficial members, but the Governor 
should be instructed to guide himself as far as possible, when making appointments 
by the intended composition of the Legislative Council as set out in paragraph 5 
above. 
7. The next question to be considered is the future of the State and Settlement 
Councils. In the past, the Sultans were Presidents of the State Councils, but the 
Councils were largely composed of Malays, and made scant provision for any 
representation of non-Malay interests. In the new constitutional arrangements it 
would be inappropriate that a Malay Sultan should preside, and it will be desirable 
that the President of the State or Settlement Council of the future should be the 
Resident Commissioner. Exact membership cannot be defined in advance, but 
members should be appointed by the Governor after consulting the Resident 
Commissioner. As regards the nomination of unofficial Representatives, all practic-
able regard should be paid to the racial proportions of the settled population of each 
State and Settlement, but broader public interests should also govern selections. 
The State and Settlement Councils should be empowered to legislate (a) on all 
matters which, in the opinion of the Governor in Council, are of a merely local or 
private nature in the State or Settlement, and (b) on all subjects in respect of which 
power is delegated to them by law by the Legislative Council of the Malayan Union. 
8. In each State side by side with the State Councils there should be established 
Advisory Malay Councils to the Sultans, which should be presided over by the Sultan 
and whose members, subject to the Governor's approval, should be appointed by the 
Sultan. 
The main functions of these Advisory Malay Councils would be in relation to 
matters affecting Mohammedan religion, but they would also advise the Sultan on 
other matters at the request of the Resident Commissioner and with the approval of 
the Governor. On matters of Mohammedan religion (with the exception of anything 
connected with the collection of taxes or tithes, which must be left strictly within the 
control of the Central Legislature or the State Councils), it is proposed that the 
Sultans should have powers of legislating in their individual States. In doing so, they 
would use their Advisory Malay Councils, which for these purposes would be virtually 
legislative bodies. Legislation resulting from this system would not, however, 
automatically and immediately become law, but would require the Governor's 
assent. The Governor would in no case grant or refuse his assent without consulting 
his own Advisory Council of Malay Sultans, though he would not be bound to accept 
their advice. It is felt that this proposal to leave legislative power on matters of 
Mohammedan religion in the hands of the Sultans individually and collectively 
(subject to the necessary checks as indicated above) should go a long way towards 
reconciling the Sultans to their new position, in that it would maintain their special 
status amongst their own Malay people in a field in which it has hitherto been always 
recognised. It is also felt that the proposal to refer legislation within this field to the 
Governor's Advisory Council of Sultans would lend reality to the deliberations of that 
body, which might otherwise be little more than a fac;ade. 
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9. It is proposed that the organisation of the Courts should be as follows: It is 
suggested that there should be a separate High Court of the Malayan Union with a 
Chief Justice at its head. In addition to the Chief Justice, there should be judges of 
the High Court stationed at various suitable centres throughout the Peninsula. In 
acordance with previous practice and the dictates of economy the Chief Justice and 
the Puisne Judges of the Supreme Court in Singapore should be declared ex-officio 
judges in the High Court of the Malayan Union and vice versa. In practice the Court 
of Appeal, whether sitting in the Union or in Singapore, would invariably be 
composed of the two Chief Justices and one Puisne Judge. There seems to be no 
reason for creating a separate Court of Appeal, which would involve the appointment 
of Appeal Judges. The new constitution should provide for Appeals to the Privy 
Council from the Court of Appeal of the Malayan Union. 
10. In order that the future Malayan Union may become a reality, it is felt that, 
subject to the exceptions noted below, all State and Settlement properties should be 
transferred to the Union Government, which should assume full liability for State 
and Settlement debts. The Union would take over all revenues from the States and 
the Settlements, their cash, bank balances, securites, &c., all State land, mines and 
minerals and all railways, ports and harbours (with the exception of the port and 
harbour properties vested in the Penang Harbour Board). The exception to this 
wholesale transfer of property relates to the residences and estates of the Sultans 
themselves and any buildings and land which are used for purposes of Mohammedan 
religion, as well as property pertaining to the endowment of Mohammedan religious 
institutions. It is felt that the above properties should be excluded from transfer to 
Union ownership, on the grounds that they are closely bound up with the Sultans' 
personal prestige, and with the position (which it is proposed to preserve) of the 
individual Sultans as leaders of their Malay subjects in their States in matters of 
Mohammedan religion. 
In making provision for the exemption of these properties from transfer to Union 
ownership, it is important to bear in mind that no commitment should be given to 
the Sultans which would prevent the Defence authorities from acquiring the 
necessary rights in property which they might require at any time for strategic 
purposes. Provided such commitments are not given, it is felt that this aspect of the 
matter need not be specifically mentioned in the new Constitution. The mere 
exemption from transfer to Union ownership does not place the property in question 
irrevocably beyond the control of the Service authorities. The new treaties with the 
individual Sultans will themselves give His Majesty the power to legislate in each 
State. It is important, in fact, to distinguish in this connection between exemption 
from transfer to Union ownership and exemption from His Majesty's jurisdiction. 
The latter is, of course, not proposed. 
11. In order further to safeguard the personal position of the Sultans, it is felt that 
special provision should be made as regards their emoluments. These cannot actually 
be exempted from transfer to Union control (i.e., left to be provided out of State 
funds), since under the new Constitution the States will have only those revenues 
which they may receive or collect by the decision of the central Legislature of the 
Union. But it should nevertheless be ensured that the Sultans' personal allowances 
are continued from year to year on a scale appropriate to their dignity and position. 
12. Finally, it is proposed that there should be express provision in the 
Constitution empowering the Courts to interpret it, and laying down that in case of 
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conflict. Ordinances of the Malayan Union must prevail over enactments of State and 
Settlement Councils. 
Annex 11 to 56 
The Japanese have now been evicted from Malaya, and the time has come to lay down 
the broad lines which our future policy must follow, if we are to fulfil our duty 
towards Malaya and its people. From now on we must think of Malaya as one country 
with one destiny, that of eventual self-government within the British Common-
wealth, a destiny to which all the inhabitants of Malaya can contribute. The 
conditions under which this goal can be reached must be fostered in Malaya. The 
essential rights of the Malays must be safeguarded, but henceforth each of the races 
forming the population of Malaya must have the full opportunity of helping to build 
the country's future, of developing and enjoying on a basis of common effort and 
common opportunity the great material wealth of the Peninsula, and of reaping the 
benefit of their efforts, provided they in fact regard Malaya as an object of loyalty. 
They must be citizens of Malaya, with all the rights and obligations which that term 
implies. No one must rely upon past privilege, or regard Malaya simply as a source of 
material wealth. While it is to the advantage of all the world, and not only Malaya, 
that the production of her mineral and agricultural resources should be restored and 
developed by industry and research, it is right that the Malayan people should be 
assured of their share in the rewards of their industry and should be able to feel the 
country's wealth reflected in their own fuller standard of life. 
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[Interviews with the Malay rulers]: report by Brigadier H C Willan 
[Willan, DCCAO Malaya, toured the Malay states from 8 to 29 Sept. He interviewed each 
Malay ruler in order to assess their roles during the Japanese occupation, their allegiance 
to the British and the credentials of those who had ascended their thrones during the 
Japanese occupation. His report prepared the ground for MacMichael's mission to 
conclude new treaties.] 
Interview with the Sultan of Johore 
Present: H.H. The Sultan of Johore; Brigadier H.C. Willan, D.C.C.A.O., Malay 
Peninsula; Colonel M.C. Hay, S.C.A.O., Johore. 
Date: 8th September, 1945. 
1. In accordance with the instructions contained in SACSEA Secret No. 6/CA of 
the 21st July, 1945, I proceeded to Johore Bharu on the 8th September, 1945, for the 
purpose of interviewing the Sultan. Col. Hay accompanied me. 
2. After informing Major-General Mansergh, commanding the 5th Indian 
Division, 1 of my intentions, and having obtained his approval and also that of the 
1 The 5th Indian Division under Major-General E C Mansergh was shortly to be despatched to Java arriving 
off Surabaya on 1 Nov 1945, a few days after Brigadier A W S Mallaby had been shot in confrontation with 
Indonesian forces . After fierce fighting with the nationalists, the British were in control of Surabaya by the 
end of the month. 
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C.C.A.O., I left Singapore at 1630 hours. I called on Brigadier Grimshaw, 161 Indian 
Infantry Brigade, on the way. He is in charge of the Johore Bharu Area. 
3. I arrived at Johore Bharu at 1725 hours. A Malay in the town informed me that 
the Sultan was in residence at Pasir Plangi Palace. (Note: The Sultan has three 
palaces in Johore Bharu-the Istana Besar in the town; Bukit Serene Palace about 
four miles out just off the main road North; Pasir Plangi Palace about three miles to 
the east of the town. The last named is the smallest). 
Col. Hay directed me to what he thought was Pasir Plangi Palace. On arrival there 
we found the building empty with four Japanese soldiers and a Malay in the porch. 
The Malay told me that the Sultan was residing at Bukit Serene Palace. 
I then proceeded to Bukit Serene Palace where I met Tungku Ahmed, the third son 
of the Sultan. Tungku Ahmed told me that the Sultan was at Pesir [sic] Plangi. 
Tungku Ahmed telephoned the Sultan and informed him that two British Officers 
wished to see him. He then guided me to Pasir Plangi Palace which was about a mile 
further than the first palace visited. On arrival the Sultan was on the steps to receive 
us. 
4. The Sultan showed Col. Hay and myself into the lounge where we were 
introduced to his Rumanian wife.2 After I had greeted the Sultan in the name of the 
Supreme Allied Commander the conversation became general. Within a few minutes 
a servant appeared with whiskies and sodas already poured out, and placed them 
beside Col. Hay and myself. I at once asked the Sultan if Col. Hay and myself could 
have a private audience with him. He led us into another room and thus, regretfully, 
we were able to leave our whiskies and sodas behind untouched without giving any 
offence. 
5. First I encouraged the Sultan to talk about his treatment under the Japanese. 
He was genuinely pleased to see us and not once throughout the interview even 
hinted that the British had let him down by losing Johore. He needed no prompting 
to talk, in fact we only had to sit and listen, prompting an odd enquiry now and then. 
The following are the main matters he talked upon. 
(I took no notes at the interview in order to keep it on a friendly and cordial level. 
This memorandum is compiled from notes made by me after the interview) . 
(A) , He expressed his hatred of the Japanese. His description of them in Malay was 
"They are neither human beings nor animals-God knows what they are" . 
(B) The Japanese had taken away most of his European clothes and used the 
Istana Besar as a boarding house. They had made no attempt to look after its 
furniture and fittings and the inside was filthy. 
(C) The Japanese had sealed up two of his wireless sets at Pasir Plangi but he had 
hidden one set and so was able to listen in to the B.B.C. and other Allied 
broadcasts. 
(D) The Japanese had at first paid him no allowance. Later they paid him 8,000 
Japanese dollars per month which they ultimately increased to 20,000 Japanese 
dollars, "which is the same as the British Government paid me". The words in the 
italics were actually used by him and are worthy of special note because his 
monthly allowance was paid from Johore State funds. Pre-war he would never have 
2 Having been divorced from Mrs He! en Wilson in 1938, Ibrahim married Marcella Mend! while in London 
in 1940. She was styled Lady Marcella lbrahim, Sultanah of Johore. Amongst Ibrahim's decorations was 
1st Class Order of the Crown of Roumania. 
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said that his allowance was paid by the British Government. 
(E) The Johore Civil Service Club had been used by the Japanese as their Gestapo 
H.Q. and a large number of people, mostly Chinese, had been beheaded there. 
Some of them were buried in the Club grounds. 
(F) Both he and his wife had had considerable difficulty in obtaining food and 
when they were able to obtain it the prices had been exorbitant. E.G. fish 400 
Japanese dollars per kati (one and one third pounds); chickens 400-500 Japanese 
dollars each; eggs 20 Japanese dollars each. 
(G) A Japanese General had visited him and demand all his jewellery. The Sultan 
asked him why he required it. The General replied he wanted it for its platinum 
contents to use in Japanese aeroplanes. The Sultan replied that all his jewellery 
was deposited in safe custody in London and that as far as he knew the only place 
available to the Japanese for platinum was Russia. 
(H) The Sultan went on to say that whatever speeches he had made during the 
Japanese occupation had been done on their orders. They always composed his 
speeches and he had merely been used as a mouthpiece as ordered by them. They 
were not his own words or sentiments and no speech was delivered voluntarily by 
him. 
(I) All the Sultans had been forced by the Japanese to contribute 10,000 Japanese 
dollars to the Japanese caose and they had done so on orders, not voluntarily. 
(J) Raja Musa-Addin, who had been installed as Sultan of Selangor by the 
Japanese, should be watched. He was living in the palace at Klang and the rightful 
Sultan was also living at Klang. The Japanese had placed a sword into the hand of 
Musa-Addin and ordered him to kill his brother, Alam-Shah-the rightful Sultan. 
The only good thing the Sultan of Johore knew about Musa-Addin was that he 
refused to do so. 
6. I explained to the Sultan the terms and implications of Proclamation No. 
1- i.e. The British Military Administration Proclamation. That is:-
(a) The Supreme Allied Commander, is Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten. The 
Sultan said he was very pleased to hear this because he knew Lord Louis 
personally. 
(b) That property, private rights, religious liberty and Malay customs would be 
strictly respected. 
(c) That all Japanese laws would be rescinded at once. 
I then explained that only a British Military Administration could bring help to the 
population because it was impossible to set up the Civil Government immediately. I 
added, however, that it was the policy of H.M.G. to revert to the Civil Government 
and to Colonial Office control as soon as possible. 
I then told the Sultan that it would not be possible for himself and his State 
Council to function during the period of a British Military Administration. 
The Sultan said he fully agreed to a British Military Administration. In fact, he 
welcomed it. 
7. The next day, 9th September, 1945 he wrote a letter to Col. Hay, S.C.A.O., 
Johore, stating that he was prepared to serve under the British Military Administra-
tion. The [emphasis] is mine. I have done so because it is remarkable in my view, for 
the Sultan to say he will serve under anybody. 
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8. The Sultan then said that he would like to go into Singapore occasionally and 
especially to see the parade of troops marking the formal Japanese surrender. He 
requested that he might be given a Union Jack to fly on his car. I informed him that I 
would bring his request to the notice of higher authorities, but meanwhile he should 
stay in Johore Bharu as we were responsible for his safety. 
The Sultan then said that both he and his wife wished to proceed to England as 
soon as possible. I suggested that after such a long spell in Malaya under difficult 
conditions it might be inadvisable to go to England during the winter months. The 
Sultan replied that he was certain he could stand the English climate in winter. I said 
the transport position was serious and that we should have our hands full for a long 
time sending some internees and prisoners of war. 
9. I finally informed the Sultan that it would be one of the duties of the British 
Military Administration to enquire into the conduct of Government Servants and 
State notables during the Japanese occupation. Their continued employment would 
depend on whether they had collaborated with the Japanese. I explained that a policy 
of clemency would be adopted, but, at the same time, ringleaders of collaborationists 
would be brought to justice and punished. 
The Sultan showed no signs of nervousness when I touched on this subject. He 
said that the only person he knew who had collaborated with the Japanese was Ungku 
Aziz, the Prime Minister of Johore, and that he had been 80% pro-Japanese. 
10. In concluding the interview I gathered the impression that if I had not said 
that I had urgent business in Singapore the Sultan would have liked to continue for a 
longer period. 
11. To sum up both Col. Hay and myself came away with the impression that the 
Sultan was delighted that the British had come back. That he dislikes the Japanese 
intensely. He appeared to have no guilty conscience when the question of collabora-
tion with the Japanese was mentioned. He was undoubtedly satisfied with the setting 
up of British Military Administration. . 
12. I would say that if the policy of the British Government is to proceed with the 
new constitution and the necessary new treaties, the sooner the Sultan of Johore is 
approached in his present state of mind the better. 
13. I concluded the interview by informing the Sultan that his second son, 
Tungku Abubakar,3 is at present well and in Madras. He said that he never wanted to 
see Tungku Abubakar again; that he had run away, whereas his first and third sons 
had remained behind; that he would not allow Tungku Abubakar to enter Johore 
again. 
14. After taking our leave, when both the Sultan and his wife came out to the 
porch to see us off, we took Tungku Ahmed back to the Bukit Serene Palace. As soon 
as we arrived there the first son of the Sultan, Tungku Mahkota, came rushing out to 
greet us. He asked us in for a drink. We refused on the ground we were overdue in 
Singapore. He appeared to both Col. Hay and myself to be very nervous at seeing us. 
(Note: He is marked as "Black" on the "Black and Grey Lists").4 
3 Between 1942 and 1945 Tunku Abu Bakar served with British forces in India and in the reoccupation of 
Malaya. Father and son feuded bitterly and it was rumoured that Abu Bakar left Malaya for India as much 
to escape Ibrahim as the Japanese. After the war he brought a legal action against Ibrahim over the matter 
of some land. 
4
'Black' and 'Grey' were security categories. 'Blacks' were irreconcilables and were security risks; 'Greys' 
were affected by enemy propaganda and could be security liabilities. 
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15. The interview took from 1805 to 1915 hours. 
Interview with H H the Sultan of Selangor 
Present: H.H. The Sultan of Selangor; Brigadier H.C. Willan, D.C.C.A.O.; Malay 
Peninsula; Colonel J. Shields, S.C.A.O., Selangor; Colonel H.B. Langworthy, Col. 
(Police) C.A. 
(Note: The interview was conducted mostly in the Malay language and Col. 
Langworthy did the interpretation where necessary). 
Date: 14th September, 1945. 
1. In accordance with the instructions contained in SACSEA Secret No. 6/CA of 
the 21st July, 1945, I proceeded to Klang on the 14th September, 1945, for the 
purpose of interviewing the Sultan. Col. Shields and Col. Langworthy accompanied 
me. 
2. I arrived at the Sultan's house at 12.55 pm and the Sultan came to the door to 
meet me. I had already sent word to him that I would arrive. I greeted him in the 
name of the Supreme Allied Commander. 
He was overcome with joy at seeing me. He had tears in his eyes and could not 
express himself for a few moments. 
3. I explained to the Sultan the terms and implications of Proclamation No. 
1-i.e the British Military Administration Proclamation. That is:-
(a) The Supreme Allied Commander is Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten. 
(b) That property, private rights, religious liberty the Malay customs would be 
strictly respected. (The Sultan said he was particularly pleased about this) . 
(c) That all Japanese laws had been rescinded. 
4. I then explained that only a British Military Administration could bring help to 
the population because it was impossible to set up a civil government immediately. I 
added, however, that it was the policy of H.M.G. to revert to civil government as soon 
as possible. 
I told the Sultan that it would not be possible for himself and his State Council to 
function during the period of British Military Administration and he replied he was 
perfectly content with that state of affairs . 
5. Having given time to the Sultan to regain his composure and get over his 
excitement at seeing three British Officers I encouraged him to talk of his 
experiences under the Japanese. 
He said:-
About one week before the Japanese entered Kuala Lumpur he, Raja Uda, Dato 
Hamzah and the Sultans's [sic] family went to stay in the Government Rest House at 
Dusun Tua. On the way they stayed one night in a deserted rubber planter's 
bungalow at Puchong. After staying 2 to 3 weeks at Dusun Tua they all returned to 
Klang. 
On my asking the whereabouts of Raja Uda the Sultan replied that he was on leave 
at Kuala Kangsar. He added that Raja Uda was a great friend of his. 
He said that Dato Hamzah was formerly his secretary and when Tunku Musa-
Addin was installed as Sultan by the Japanese, Dato Hamzah had gone to him as 
secretary. The Sultan saw nothing wrong in this because as Secretary to the Sultan 
Dato Hamzah should be with whoever was functioning as Sultan. 
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Last year the Sultan said he had been very ill with malaria and had been well 
looked after by Dr. Gabriel, who is a Eurasian Doctor in Klang. Apart from this he 
had not had any other illness. 
Col. Fujiyama, the Japanese Governor of Selangor, called the Sultan to King's 
House, Kuala Lumpur on 15th January, 1942. Also Tunku Musa-Addin, Raja Uda, 
Dato Hamzah and important Malays, including members of the Sultan's family. Raja 
Kamalazaram [Kamaralzaman] of Perak was also there. On arrival the Sultan was 
kept waiting for two hours before he was seen by Major-General Minaki. 
The Seating was as follows:-
Raja Uda 
MusaAddin 
General Minaki. 
The Sultan 
Col. Fujiyama 
The Sultan said that Col. Fujiyama had a moustache like a tiger. 
There were also present three other Japanese Officers, two Japanese Press 
Correspondents and a Japanese Interpreter. 
Gen. Minaki asked him who he was and what he did. The Sultan replied that he 
was Tunku Alam Shah, the Sultan of Selangor. 
Every Malay there was similarly questioned and Haji Osman, the Chief Kathi, said 
he was a Government pensioner. Minaki told him to go outside and get his pension 
from the King. 
Minaki told the Sultan that because of his pronouncement in the press (Malay 
Mail) on lOth December, 1941, he was no longer Sultan because he was pro-British. 
The Sultan said that after his pronouncement in the press, Mr. Jarrett, then Resident 
of Selangor, had asked him to do a broadcast on the same lines. He had done so 
because he thought it would bind the Malays together to resist the Japanese. 
Minaki then turned to Musa-Addin and said he would be Sultan. He told Sultan 
Alam Shah that he must remain in his own house. 
The Japanese at the same meeting produced a list of Malays whom they were going 
to put into official posts. Each name was considered in turn and senior posts were 
filled there and then. Everyone was then offered Saki to toast success to the Japanese. 
Musa-Addin, Raja Uda and Dato Hamzah were probably frightened and sipped a little 
of the saki and raised their glasses in a toast to the Japanese. The Sultan refused to do 
so. 
When the new Japanese Governor of Selangor went to Klang Musa-Addin asked the 
Sultan to go to his house to meet him. The Sultan went and this is the only occasion 
he has been to that house during the Japanese occupation. Otherwise he has only 
seen Musa-Addin in the mosque. 
On 27th January, 1942, Raja Uda, Dato Hamzah and Dato Abdul Hamid went to the 
Sultan's house and Raja Uda said Musa-Addin wanted the State Regalia. The Sultan 
gave it to him because it is government property. The Sultan told Raja Uda that so 
long as the Japanese remained Musa-Addin could retain it, but as soon as the British 
returned he must have it back again. 
The Japanese paid the Sultan no allowance. For a year they paid his 4 sons and 3 
daughters SO dollars per month each. After a year the Sultan refused to accept any 
more allowances for his family and thus they ceased to be paid. 
In order to get money to keep himself and 40 other Malays dependent on him, he 
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had sold jewellery to the Chinese worth 25,000 Straits Settlements dollars for 
100,000 Japanese dollars. 
The Japanese had taken away his wireless set and so he could not listen in to 
broadcasts. 
The Sultan said that Musa-Addin had made many Malays and Chinese Datos and 
had also made one Indian a Dato.5 
The Sultan produced a diary which he had kept in 1942. It is written in Jawi.6 He 
instructed his Secretary, Tunku Nong, to prepare an English translation of his diary 
and to send it to me. 
I showed the Sultan the new Straits Settlements currency notes and explained that 
the Japanese currency is now worthless. He was delighted to hear this and asked if he 
could have some money. I asked him what his allowance was per month and he 
replied eleven thousand two hundred and fifty dollars per month. I asked him how 
much he would require per month and he suggested ten thousand dollars. The 
Sultan went on to say he had no money and I said I would arrange to get him some 
within a week. 
I informed the Sultan that as we are now responsible for his safety he should not 
travel about the country and advised him to remain in Klang as much as possible. He 
fully appreciated this. 
I also told him that the British Military Administration would enquire into the 
conduct of Government officials and high State dignitaries during the Japanese 
occupation. He said he was glad to hear this would be done. 
I informed the Sultan that I had already seen Musa-Addin and that he was being 
taken away from Klang. The Sultan kept quiet but appeared very relieved to hear that 
Musa~Addin was being taken away. I told the Sultan that I had brought back his 
Rolls-Royce car which I had found in the possession of Musa-Addin. He was 
delighted. The Sultan then said that the State Regalia was in the possession of 
Musa-Addin and should be got back at once. I agreed and said I would do this before 
returning to Kuala Lumpur. 
Raja Nong, the Sultan's Secretary, said that he, Raja Uda and the Chief Kathi, Haji 
Osman were told by the Japanese that they were all three to be beheaded. Raja Nong 
promised to send me a written English version of this. 
The interview ended at 2.30 p.m. and on departure the Sultan shook me by the 
hand for about a minute. He was obviously overcome with joy and relief that the 
British are back again. As I was leaving he asked if a guard could be provided for his 
house. I said one would be arranged at once. The O.C. Klang Detachment is 
arranging for a guard. 
After leaving the Sultan I went back to Musa-Addin's house with the Sultan's 
Secretary, Raja Nong. There I enquired about the State Regalia. Dato Hamzah 
produced the two crowns-one for the Sultan and the other for the Sultana-and 
also a bejewelled pendant. Raja Nong examined them an~ expressed himself as 
satisfied these were all the State Regalia in the possession of Raja Musa. I then sent 
Raja Nong back to the Sultan with this regalia accompanied by Lt. Col. Girdler, O.C. 
Klang Detachment. I told Raja Nong that the Sultan would now be responsible for 
the safe-keeping of this State Regalia. 
5 A title of distinction. 6 Arabic-based Malay script. 
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DETENTION OF TUNKU MUSA-ADDIN 
1. On the 14th September, Col. Shields, Col. Langworthy and myself proceeded 
to Klang. There I met Lt. Col. Usman, a very tine type of Indian Officer, who was in 
charge of a guard consisting of two British Officers and twelve Indian other ranks, 
which had been pre-arranged the day previously. 
2. I proceeded to the house of Musa-Addin with Col. Langworthy followed by Col. 
Shields and the guard. On arrival there Col. Langworthy entered first and found 
Musa-Addin in the lounge upstairs, which was also occupied by a number of Malays. 
He told Musa-Addin that I wished to see him alone and Musa-Addin ordered the other 
Malays out of the room. I then entered the room followed by Col. Shields. 
3. I asked him if he was Musa-Addin and he replied he was. The interview was 
conducted in English, which he speaks fluently. I then informed him: 
(a) That under the orders of the Supreme Allied Commander he was detained and 
would be taken back to Kuala Lumpur by me where he would remain under house 
arrest. 
(b) In Kuala Lumpur he would not be allowed out of the precincts of the house 
nor would he be allowed to communicate with anyone outside. 
(c) That he was to be sent out of Malaya as soon as possible and to that end he 
would be allowed to take with him an entourage consisting of not more than three 
Malays. 
(d) He asked if he would be allowed to take with him his wife and family and I 
replied in the negative. (As he will leave Malaya by air this could not be arranged 
but I think that we will have to try and arrange for them to follow him to the Cocos 
Islands by sea). 
(e) That he must be ready to go back with me to Kuala Lumpur in one and a half 
hours with bed linen, cooking utensils and some . rice. That he could take two 
servants with him. 
(0 I asked Musa-Addin if the Rolls-Royce car which I had just seen in front of his 
house belonged to the Sultan and he replied that it did. I said in that case I was 
taking it with me as I was on my way to have an audience with the Sultan and 
would hand it over to him. 
No further conversation passed. 
4. I proceeded to the house of the Sultan where I interviewed him-see separate 
account. Having finished my audience with the Sultan I went back to Musa-Addin's 
house to take him back to Kuala Lumpur. He sat with me in the back of the car. Raja 
Wahid and the driver sat in front. Raja Wahid is his nephew whom he asked me, 
when I got back to his house, if he could take with him to Kuala Lumpur. I agreed he 
could do so. 
5. We proceeded to Kuala Lumpur preceded by Cols. Langworthy and Shields in 
the first jeep, the Guard Commander and one British Officer in the second jeep, with 
a 15cwt truck behind containing one British Officer, twelve IORs, Musa-Addin's two 
servants and his luggage, which consisted of two suit cases. 
On arrival in Kuala Lumpur we went straight to the house of the Sultan of 
Selangor, which had already been got ready for him. It is fully furnished, down to 
mosquito nets . 
I asked him how much rice he had brought with him and he said very little. I told 
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him that he would be provided with meat, vegetables, fruit and cheese and that any 
reasonable request he had to make could be made to the British Officer in charge of 
the guard and would be implemented. He expressed himself as satisfied with the 
arrangements. 
He then asked if he could send Raja Wahid back to Klang the next day to contact 
the three Malays he would like as his entourage when he was sent out of Malaya. I 
said this could be done and that transport would be arranged for Raja Wahid to go to 
Klang and back. 
6. The whole proceedings went smoothly without any unpleasantness. There was 
no fuss . I gathered the impression that Musa-Addin was very nervous at the 
beginning of the interview and showed signs of relief when I explained what was to 
happen to him. 
7. Before leaving him I arranged for the house telephone to be disconnected.7 
Interview with the Regent of Kedah 
Present: H.H. The Regent of Kedah; Brigadier H.C. Willan, D.C.C.A.O. (M.P.); Col. 
F.S. McFadzean, D.C.F.A. (M.P.); Major Hasler, Ag. S.C.A.O., Kedah & Perlis. 
Date: 17th September, 1945. 
1. Following the instructions contained in Secret S.A.e. 6/C.A. at 1630 hours on 
the 17th September 1945, I proceeded to the Palace at Alor Star, accompanied by 
Col. F.S. McFadzean and Major Hasler, Acting S.C.A.O., Kedah and Perlis. 
I found the Regent, who had been informed of my visit, waiting to meet me on the 
front steps. I greeted him in the name of the Supreme Allied Commander. He 
appeared overjoyed to see me. With him were three Malay members of the State 
Council and after a general conversation for a few minutes with the Regent and those 
members of the State Council I requested a private audience with the Regent. This 
was granted immediately. 
2. After expressing my condolences on the death of His Highness the Sultan of 
Kedah, which occured [sic] in 1943, I first encouraged the Regent to speak about his 
experiences under the Japanese and Siamese. He said that soon after the Japanese 
occupation he had to attend a ceremonial parade at which the Japanese Flag was 
lowered and the Siamese Flag hoisted in its place. The Siamese, when they took over 
Kedah, had allowed the Malay Government of Kedah to function as it did before the 
Japanese occupation and they interfered very little with the administration of the 
State. He was rather reticent about having been appointed Sultan during the 
Japanese occupation and so I did not press him on the matter. 
3. The Regent said that he could not think of any cases in Kedah of real cruelty by 
the Siamese or Japanese and, on the whole, though the people of Kedah had suffered 
under the Japanese, they had been fortunate. 
He said he could not understand the Japanese-Britishers, who are a Western race 
and Malays, who are an Eastern race, have never had any difficulty in understanding 
one another. 
He went on to say that he grew very tired of the Japanese veneration for their 
7 Musa-Eddin was deported to the Cocos Islands; in May 1946 he was brought to Singapore where he 
stayed for a time with relatives in Kampong Clam. 
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Emperor, giving him divine qualities because they alleged he could trace his descent 
back to a contemporary of Adam. 
He said there is a word "Jinn" in the Japanese language. He knew that in the Koran 
"Jinn" means a devil, which exactly describes the Japanese. 
On being asked about the furniture and fittings etc, in the Palace he replied that 
they were safe except for a few articles of cutlery and crockery which the Japanese 
had borrowed and failed to return. 
4. At first the Japanese ordered him to fly their flag at the Palace but later 
relented and allowed him to fly the Kedah flag. 
5. The Japanese had not made him any allowance at the beginning. Later they 
had allowed him 5,000 Japanese dollars per month which they increased eventually 
to 10,000 Japanese dollars per month. 
(Note: The Sultan of Kedah's allowance pre-war was $7,000 a month). 
6. The State Council had sat during the Japanese occupation but the Regent said 
it had not enacted any new legislation. The Regent added that Japanese school 
teachers had tried to teach him and members of his State Council Japanese. Two had 
died in their fruitless efforts and the third had retired with a nervous breakdown. 
7. The Regent constantly got back to the subject of how bad and evil the Japanese 
are and seemed puzzled to find words to accurately described their villainy. 
8. After I had given the Regent time to settle down I explained to him that it was 
necessary to set up a British Military Administration with the Supreme Allied 
Commander at its head. I added that the Military Administration would be staffed as 
far as possible, though few are available, with officers with previous experience of 
Malaya. 
I made it clear that all property, private rights, religious liberty and Malay customs 
would be strictly respected and that all Japanese laws no longer had any effect. I 
explained generally that a British Military Administration was necessary to restore 
law and order and that only the Army can obtain and bring into Malaya supplies 
necessary to rehabilitate the country. 
I informed the Regent that as a result of the setting up of a British Military 
Administration neither he nor his State Council could function at present but the 
intention is to revert to civil government as soon as possible, at the same time I 
warned him that it would be some months before this could be done. 
The Regent seemed a bit shaken by this. I reassured him that we would do all in 
our power to assist him in the rehabilitation of the State and provided the 
inhabitants remained law-abiding they had no reason to be afraid of the Military 
Administration. I added that we should require the co-operation of himself and his 
people and that on our part we would give him all the help and co-operation which 
lay within our power. 
9. On the question of collaboration I informed the Regent that the policy would 
be one of leniency, except in cases where investigation proved conclusively that there 
had been active and serious collaboration with the Japanese to the detriment of the 
Allied cause. In such cases the leaders would be brought to justice. 
10. As we were responsible for his personal safety I informed the Regent that we 
should be grateful if he would not travel about more than was really necessary. 
11. I told the Regent that His Majesty's Government could not recognise him as 
Sultan because the present policy is not to recognise any Sultan who had been 
appointed during the period of the Japanese occupation. I went on to say that this 
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was an added reason why he could not perform any functions of a lawful Sultan. He 
seemed nervous and disturbed when I told him this. Finally I told him that it was the 
intention of the British Military Administration to pay him an allowance, that this 
allowance could not in any event be as much as that which had been paid to the 
legitimate Sultan before his death. I asked the Regent if he would suggest a sum. He 
hesitated. I suggested $5,000 per month (the Sultan's allowance pre-war was $7,000 
per month). The Regent asked me for time to consider the matter and said he would 
give me his answer later. I agreed. 
(Later the same evening the State Secretary Tuan Haji Sheriff told me that the 
Regent left the amount of the allowance to my discretion. I informed him that this 
was generous on the part of the Regent, and added that I would recommend $6,000 
per month. Haji Sheriff said the Regent would be very pleased if I could make that 
recommendation). 
12. The interview ended at 1730 hours and the Regent still look worried. He had 
tea ready fo r us and during tea he recovered his composure and became more his 
normal self. When I left he came to the front to see me off and appeared much more 
cheerful. 
13. Later the same evening at 2130 hours the State Secretary Tuan Haji Sheriff 
telephoned Major Hasler and asked if he and other members of the State Council 
could come and see me. I told Major Hasler to inform them that I should be pleased 
to see them as individuals and not as members of the State Council (i.e. Tuan Haji 
Sheriff, State Secretary, Che Ismail Mericam, Legal Adviser, Che Kassim, State 
Treasurer, and Tungku Yacob, Principal Agricultural Officer). They arrived about 
2200 hours and said that the Regent had told them of my interview with him and 
what I had said. They expressed considerable concern because they wondered that 
since the State Council could not function whether this meant that all Government 
offices must be closed down and the staff told to go home. They said they could not 
think that this was our intention. I replied that it was certainly not our intention; 
that we require all the Government offices to keep open and all the Government 
officers to report back to duty. I added that later we would investigate to see if any of 
the staff had been active collaborators and if so they would be dealt with. 
Col. McFadzean who was present explained the financial policy with regard to the 
treatment and payment of all Government servants. 
They were obviously very relieved at these statements by Col. McFadzean and 
myself and said that they now understood the position more clearly and were entirely 
satisfied with it. They said they would go back and inform the Regent. 
They went away smiling and we parted on very friendly terms. 
14. It was a good thing Col. McFadzean and myself arrived in Alor Star on the 
17th September. Major Hasler was very worried as to what was the position because 
he was afraid that when the Japanese, who were still in occupation of the State 
withdrew and before British troops could arrive, the Chinese guerillas, of whom 
there were many, would take charge and probably Alor Star would be looted. Major 
Hasler said that all the leading Malays were wondering when the British were coming 
back. Col. McFadzean and myself were the first British officers to arrive at A! or Star; 
we were followed by a Company of the Sussex Regiment who arrived about 4 hours 
later. On their arrival I contacted their Commanding Officer and requested that he 
should arrange for his troops to patrol the streets to maintain law and order. He said 
this would be done. 
i.l 
I 
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I might add that within an hour and a half of my arrival the Japanese Liaison 
Officer came to see me and asked what instructions I had for the surrender of the 
Japanese troops in Alor Star. I informed him that he would receive his full 
instructions when the Commanding Officer of the British Troops arrived in Alor 
Star. 
Per lis 
Whilst I was in Alor Star on the 17th September, 1945, I saw Major Burr of Force 
136, who had come down from Kangar to meet me. I told him I had no knowledge of 
the political situation in Perlis. He told me that the Raja of Perlis Tungku Syed Alwi 
had died early in 1943 (subsequently in Kangar I obtained the exact date which is the 
1st February 1943) and that Syed Hamzah, half-brother of the deceased Raja, had 
been installed as Raja by the Japanese. I subsequently discovered he was so installed 
as Raja on the 2nd February 1943, i.e. on the day after the death of the Raja. 
There have been adverse reports about Syed Hamzah by successive British Advisers 
in Perlis. 
2. Major Burr advised that it would be best for me to see Syed Hussein, younger 
brother of Syed Hamzah, who was officiating as State Secretary. 
I asked Major Burr the whereabouts of Syed Putera, who in April1938 was, on the 
proposal of the Raja, nominated as Bake! Raja i.e. heir or prospective successor of the 
Raja by the votes of all the members of the State Council, except Syed Hamzah who 
did not vote but pressed his own claims in opposition to those of Syed Putera. Major 
Burr informed me that Syed Putera was living in a small shack near the Railway 
Station at Arau. On my instructions Major Burr returned to Perlis on the 17th 
September, 1945, called for Syed Putera atArau and took him on to Kangarwhere he 
arranged for him to be comfortably housed in Goverment quarters. At the same time 
he arranged that I should see Syed Hussein at 9 a.m. on the 18th September, 1945. 
3. On the 18th September, 1945, I left Alor Star by car at 8 a.m. with Col. F.S. 
McFadzean, D.C.F.A., and arrived at Syed Hussein's house at Arau at 9 a.m. Syed 
Hussein speaks English and so there was no need foran interpreter. 
He told me that prior to the Japanese occupation he had been Controller of 
Customs, Perlis, and that when Syed Hamzah had been appointed Raja by the 
Japanese on the 2nd February, 1943, he Syed Hussein, had been appointed State 
Secretary. I informed him that his appointment could not be recognised and he 
appeared to fully understand that. 
I asked him who was occupying the Palace at Arau and he said Syed Hamzah was 
living there. I informed him that Syed Hamzah must move out at once. 
Syed Hussein said Syed Hamzah would like to see me. I replied that I had no 
intention whatsoever of seeing him. Syed Hussein then said that Syed Hamzah 
wished to write a letter stating he had abdicated from the position of Raja. I replied 
that if Syed Hamzah wished to write a letter I would take it back with me but it must 
be understood that he did so of his own volition and not by any request or order of 
mine. I added that in my view Syed Hamzah could not in any case abdicate from a 
position he had never legitimately occupied. 
Syed Hussein said he would go at once and inform Syed Hamzah of what I had said 
and that if Syed Hamzah still wished to write a letter he would bring it back with 
him. I informed him that if Syed Hamzah did write such a letter he must sign it and 
that Syed Hussein must also sign it as a witness. 
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4. I then proceeded to Kangar where I interviewed Syed Putera in the presence of 
Col. F.S. McFadzean. 
Syed Putera speaks very good English. He is 25 years of age. 
First I encouraged him to talk of his experiences during the Japanese occupation. 
He said that in December 1941 he was Second Magistrate in the Criminal Court in 
Kuala Lumpur. 
On the 9th December, 1941, he received a telegram from the British Adviser, 
Perlis, to remain in Kuala Lumpur. Copy of telegraph attached and marked (A).8 
In January 1942, whilst he was still in Kuala Lumpur he received a letter signed by 
the Raja stating that he, Syed Putera, could no longer be recognised as Bake! Raja. 
This letter appears to have been written under the authority of the Japanese Military 
Authorities. Copy of the letter attached and marked (B) .9 
Syed Putera said that as regards the letter marked (B) it appeared to him that the 
Raja had signed the paper whilst blank and that the typing had been done later, 
probably at the instigation of Syed Hamzah. 
Syed Putera added that he did not return to Perlis because of receiving the 
telegram marked (A). 
5. When the Japanese forces came south and reached the outskirts of Kuala 
Lumpur Syed Putera went to Dusun Tua, near Kuala Lumpur, where he stayed in a 
Malay house for about a month. 
(Note: Dusun Tua is also the place where the Sultan of Selangor stayed for a short 
time after the Japanese reached Kuala Lumpur). 
After he had stayed at Dusun Tua for about a month Tengku Musa-Eddin (he was 
appointed Sultan of Selangor by the Japanese) sent his car to Dusun Tua and Syed 
Putera went to live in a house at Klang near to where Dato Hamzah (Private 
Secretary to the Sultan of Selangor) lived. 
Syed Putera remained in Klang for 3 months and then received a letter from 
Perlis, brought by Haji Mat, Penghulu of Arau, asking him to return to Perlis. On the 
advice of Tengku Musa-Eddin, Syed Putera returned to Perlis to see what circumst-
ances were like up there. On his way he stopped at Alor Star and saw the Japanese 
Military Authorities who appeared friendly towards him. He then went on to Arau 
where he saw the Raja who was very friendly. The Raja asked him to remain in Per! is 
8Annexure (A) reads:-
From: Adviser, Alor Star. 
To: ESSAR, Selangor, Kuala Lumpur. 
Date: 9th December, 1941. 
Following from adviser Perlis begins: tell Syed Putera to remain in Kuala Lumpur 
9 Annexure (B) reads:-
The Palace, Arau, Perlis. 
25th Dzi 'l-Hijjah 1360 A.H. 13 Jan. 1942. No. 2 in M.M.K. 51160. 
Under Command of the Japanese Military Authority 
Seal and Signature. 
To Tuan Syed Putera, son of the late Syed Hasan, at Arau, Per! is. 
We hereby inform Tuan Syed Putera that (according to the decision taken) in the session of the State 
Council which was held at the Palace Arau on 23rd of Dzi 'l-Hijjah 1360, we have deposed you, Tuan Syed 
Putera, from being the Bakal Raja (Heir or Prospective Successor to the Raja) of Perlis; and so you, Tuan 
Syed Putera, no longer has any claim in the matter of the Office of Bakal Raja. 
The words in the seal are: "Alwi Safi Jamal' 1-Lail, Raja of Perlis". 
H.H. the Raja Perlis. 
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and promised to give him his former post with the same salary and allowances i.e. 
Allowance 
Salary Malay Officer Class 11, Perlis 
Motor car allowance 
$400 p.m. 
195 
25 11 
Total $620 
Syed Putera agreed to go back to Perlis and returned to Klang for his wife and 
family and also his belongings. 
He, his wife and family went back by train from Klang to Perlis, where he at once 
saw the Raja who again promised to reinstate him in his former position. The Raja 
told Syed Hussein to arrange this. 
Syed Putera was not reinstated in his former post. He was merely given an 
allowance of $90 per month and he told me he was certain that Syed Hamzah had 
prevented him from being reinstated to his former position. 
He went on to say that when the Raja was ill he was prevented by Syed Hamzah 
from visiting him. Three days before the Raja died he was allowed to visit him and 
this was the only occasion after his return to Perlis that he did see the Raja. 
Syed Putera continued to live at Arau but even his allowance of $90 per month 
ceased when the Raja died. In order to live, he and a few local Malays started trading 
in local produce. He said that but for the help of those local Malays he would not have 
been able to obtain a livelihood. 
About 6 months ago, i.e. about April 1945, the Japanese ordered him to vacate his 
house at Arau and he went to live in a hut near the Railway Station at Arau. He lived 
there for about a month and then went to Kota Bharu, in Kelantan, together with his 
wife and family where he lived with his wife's father and mother. He remained there 
until the Japanese surrendered and returned to Arau on the 14th September, 1945, 
four days before I interviewed him. 
6. At the beginning of my interview I had greeted him in the name of the 
Supreme Allied Commander and told him that I was pleased to see him looking so 
well after his difficult time. 
I explained to him that there would be a British Military Administration which 
would continue until such time as the Civilian Government could take over. Under 
the British Military Administration full jurisdiction and powers were vested in the 
Military Authorities for the government of Malaya. 
I also told him that property, private rights, religious liberty and Malay Customs 
would be strictly respected and that all Japanese laws had been rescinded. 
Col. McFadzean then outlined in general terms the policy regarding currency and 
the payment of Government servants, and also measures which would be taken to 
bring relief to the civil population. 
I informed Syed Putera that he could not officiate as Raja at present and also that 
the State Council of Perlis could not function. 
I had already asked Major Burr to arrange to get a car for Syed Putera but I 
informed Syed Putera that as we are responsible for his personal safety I should be 
grateful if he would restrict his travelling. 
On the question of collaboration I informed him that full investigation would be 
made and that any one, especially State dignitaries, who had actively collaborated 
with the Japanese would be dealt with by law. I added that the general policy on this 
subject was one of leniency but if any persons in responsible positions had been 
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active collaborators then they must be dealt with. He expressed himself in agreement 
with this policy and showed no nervousness when I had described it to him. In fact 
the impression I got was that he welcomed it. 
7. He informed me that the State Council of Perlis before the Japanese 
occupation consisted of:-
The Raja 
British Adviser 
Syed Hamzah, Vice President 
Haji Ahmat, Chief Judge 
Wan Ahmat, Co-operative Officer and A.D.C. to the Raja 
Haji Mohamed Noor, Chief Kathi. 
After the Japanese occupation the last three had ceased to function. Syed Putera said 
that he trusted these last three Malays implicitly. 
Haji Ahmat, Chief Judge, was replaced by Che Mat, formerly Commissioner of 
Police. I saw Che Mat later and he appeared to me to be a very shifty individual. 
Haji Mohamed Noor, Chief Kathi, was replaced by Haji Ismail. 
8. I explained the system of Military Courts to Syed Putera and he expressed 
himself as satisfied with it. I added that the President of the Superior Court, who 
would be stationed in Alor St<ir, and who would have jurisdiction over Kedah and 
Perlis, must be a British Officer. Syed Putera agreed with this. He suggested that Haji 
Ahmat, Chief Judge and Che Wahab, formerly Magistrate, might be appointed as 
Presiding Officers in the District Courts. He said that neither of them had functioned 
during the Japanese occupation and they had his complete trust. I saw both Haji 
Ahmat and Che Wahab and was impressed by their demeanour. 
9. Syed Putera said that the members of the State Council during the Japanese 
occupation had been, up till the death of the Raja:-
The Raja 
Syed Hamzah, 
Syed Hussein 
Syed Alwi, formerly Clerk of State Council 
Che Abdullah, formerly Commissioner of Lands. 
10. On the question of an allowance for Syed Putera, he said he left it entirely to 
me. (The Raja's allowance was $3,200 per month) . I did not tell Syed Putera what I 
would recommend but having considered the matter I have decided to recommend 
that he should be paid an allowance of $2,000 per month. 
11. The interview was throughout conducted on a cordial and friendly level and 
there is no doubt that Syed Putera is very pleased to see the British back again. He 
thanked me profusely for going to see him. In my view he is an intelligent young 
man and also pro-British. 
12. Before I left Kangar on my return Syed Hussein came to me and handed me a 
letter signed by Syed Hamzah, witnessed by Syed Hussein, in which the former 
renounced all claims to the office Raja of Perlis. Copy of letter attached and marked 
(C) .10 
10 Annexure (C) reads:-
The Palace, Arau, Perlis. (continued overleaf) 
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Interview with the Sultan of Perak 
Present: H.H. The Sultan ofPerak; Brigadier H.C. Willan, D.C.C.A.O. (M.P.); Colonel 
F.S. McFadzean, D.C.F.A.; Colonel J.A. Harvey, S.C.A.O. Perak. 
Date: 19th September, 1945. 
On the 19th September, 1945, I arrived in Kuala Kangsar from Taiping at 6 p.m. I 
had already telephoned from Taiping to arrange an interview with the Sultan. I 
arrived at the Palace at 7 p.m. the same night. 
2. The Sultan who is personally known to me, was obviously pleased to see me 
and from the beginning the interview was conducted on a most cordial and friendly 
level. 
3. I commenced the interview by asking about his experiences under the 
Japanese. 
He was ready to talk on this subject and said that in Kuala Kangsar he had been 
more or less left to himself by the Japanese. He could not think of any atrocities that 
had been committed by the Japanese in or around Kuala Kangsar. 
He admitted he had attended several functions arranged by the Japanese and also 
that he had made speeches, but, like the Sultan of Johore, he said he had been 
instructed by the Japanese what he should say and had been merely a mouthpiece for 
them. 
He went on to say that the Japanese did not really trust him and that towards the 
end they suspected that he had been in touch with the British General in Burma by 
wireless. As a result of this suspicion the Japanese had stationed a Japanese officer in 
the Palace, who had lived there for 4 months, for the sole purpose of spying on the 
Sultan. 
Asked about general conditions in Perak the Sultan said that the matter he was 
most worried about was that of the Chinese Guerillas. He said that the one-star 
Chinese Guerillas were a law-abiding crowd but that the 3-star Chinese Guerillas 
were merely bandits. 
The Japanese had not interfered with his Palace which had remained intact. 
He said there had been no large numbers of Japanese forces in Kuala Kangsar but 
that the large Japanese Military Headquarters had been stationed in Taiping. 
4. I have omitted to mention that when I first met the Sultan I greeted him in the 
name of the Supreme Allied Commander, Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten, a 
relative of His Majesty the King. 
After his account as set out above, I informed the Sultan that the S.A.e. had 
assumed full jurisdiction and powers over the whole of Malaya during the period of 
Military occupation. I explained that it was necessary to have a British Military 
Administration, because the Army is the only body which can restore law and order 
and get in relief supplies of various kinds for the civil population. 
I went on to say that the British Military Administration would strictly respect all 
To: H.E. General Officer, Commanding British Forces at Singapore. 
On Tuesday 18th September, 1945, I, Syed Hamzah son of the late Syed Safi, do of my own free will and 
accord lay down the office of Raja of the State of Perlis, to which office I was raised by the Japanese Military 
Governor of Kedah on the 2nd of February 1943; and I shall not make any claim in connection with the 
Office of the Raja. That is all . 
Signed: Hamzah bin Syed Safi. 
Witness: Syed Hussin 18.9.45. He is State Secretary. 
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property, private rights, religious liberty and Malay Customs. The Sultan, who is a 
deeply religious person, expressed himself pleased with the statement especially as 
regards religious liberty and non-interference with Malay customs. 
I informed the Sultan that the Military Administration would be terminated as 
early as possible but that its termination would depend on when the civil 
Government could be re-established. 
The Sultan said that he appreciated the reasons for a Military Administration and 
agreed that it could be the only form of Government until the civil Government 
could be reinstated. 
Col. McFadzean explained to him in general terms the currency and financial 
policy and what measures would be taken for the relief of the civil population. The 
Sultan stated that he was somewhat concerned about the relief of Malays living in the 
kampongs. I said I agreed it would be difficult in the first instance to bring relief to 
them and to get currency notes to them. I added however that it was the policy of the 
British Military Administration to purchase rubber from small holders at a price of 
36 cents per pound (equals 48 cents per katty). I added that this would be started at 
once and that a Rubber Buying Unit was already in the country and would be 
followed as quickly as possible by stocks of coagulants and other accessories for 
rubber estates. The Sultan said that this would ease the difficult situation in the 
kampongs and would help to alleviate the distress amongst the Malays living there. 
I then informed the Sultan that one result of the British Military Administration is 
that neither he nor his State Council can function at present. He at once saw the 
force of this and made no demur. 
I then dealt with the question of the treatment of persons who had collaborated 
with the Japanese. I informed him that the general policy is one of leniency but that 
ringleaders who had been in responsible positions must and should be brought to 
justice. The Sultan showed no nervousness when I touched on this subject and 
agreed that it was the right policy. 
I informed him that as we are now responsible for his personal safety I should be 
grateful if he would not travel about more than is necessary. He agreed to this. 
On the question of his allowance he said that it was $12,500 per month. He said he 
had no money at present and would be pleased if his allowance could be paid at once. 
I said that as soon as I got back to Kuala Lumpur I would arrange for this to be done. 
Asked if the Japanese had paid him an allowance he said at first they had paid him 
nothing, then he was paid half his allowance i.e. 6,250 Japanese dollars per month 
which eventually they increased to his full allowance of $12,500 per month. 
5. The interview terminated at 7.45 p.m. on the same cordial and friendly level as 
it had begun. 
6. After the interview Col. McFadzean, Col. Harvey and myself had a cup of tea 
with the Sultan and I talked with several of his relatives and Palace officials. I 
remember many of them from the days I was stationed in Kuala Kangsar in 1925-26. 
The Sultan told me that Raja Uda of Selangor was staying with him in Kuala 
Kangsar for a change because Raja Uda had been ill. I did not see Raja Uda, he did not 
appear. 
7. I left the Palace at 8 p.m. and on leaving the Sultan asked me to sign his 
visitors' book. I did so. 
There is no doubt that he was genuinely pleased to see me and welcomed the 
British back again. I myself was well satisfied with the interview because I came away 
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under the impression that the Sultan has nothing to fear from us regarding his 
conduct during the Japanese occupation. 
Interview with the Yam Tuan of Negri Sembilan 
On the 23rd September, 1945, I went to Seremban from Kuala Lumpur for the 
purpose of interviewing the Yam Tuan of Negri Sembilan. I was accompanied by Col. 
Daniels, Chief Secretary, Malay Peninsula. We picked up Col. Calder, S.C.A.O., Negri 
Sembilan and Malacca, on our way and arrived at the Palace at Sri Menanti at 3.30 
p.m. Col. Calder had already informed the Yam Tuan that we were arriving and he 
was ready to meet us. 
2. Before describing my interview with him it is necessary to describe the 
preliminary interview which Col. Calder had with him at Sri Menanti on 14th 
September 1945 as soon as Col. Calder had arrived in Seremban. 
The following is the account of that interview given to me by Col. Calder:-
(a) This preliminary interview lasted from 11 a.m. to 12 noon on the 14th 
September, 1945. The Yam Tuan was slightly reserved (this is normal for him) but 
was at his ease at the end of the interview. He informed Col. Calder that things had 
not been too pleasant for him during the Japanese occupation. They had turned 
him out of his Astana in Seremban and he had to live in another house there. After 
living for a few months in that house the Japanese had allowed him to return to his 
Palace at Sri Menanti. The Japanese took away all his cars except one, including a 
Daimler which was practically new before the war. 
The Japanese had forced him to attend functions in Seremban and in attending 
those functions he had not been allowed to have his umbrella bearer with him. He 
admitted having made speeches in favour of the Japanese but claimed that he had 
done so under their orders and had no alternative except to appear to be friendly 
disposed to them. At all the functions he attended' he had been put down to sit 
amongst the clerks and the Japanese seemed to take a delight in humiliating him. 
The Japanese had not allowed him to fly his flag. 
(b) Col. Calder explained to him the general set up of the Military Administration 
and gave him copies of the first few Proclamations. 
(c) He informed Col. Calder that he had practically no food in the Palace and Col. 
Calder s{mt out a week's supply of rice and I.O.R. rations the next day. On the 19th 
September, 1945, Col. Calder took out $3,000 to the Yam Tuan and handed it 
personally him. (The Yam Tuan's allowance is $6,250 a month). 
(d) Col. Calder told the Yam Tuan that the British Military Administration would 
have to investigate the conduct of officials and State dignitaries and those whom it 
was found had actively collaborated with the Japanese would have to be dealt with. 
Col. Calder added that the Yam Tuan's Private Secretary Tungku Nasir and his 
A.D.C. Tungku Ahmat were under suspicion and also his son Tungku Jaffar. Col. 
Calder informed me that the impression he got when he told the Yam Tuan this 
was that the Yam Tuan knew all about it. 
(e) Col. Calder told the Yam Tuan if he had any difficulties he should bring them 
to him. The Yam Tuan replied that he was pleased to see Col. Calder because he 
knew that he had had previous experience in Negri Sembilan. The Interview ended 
with the Yam Tuan expressing regret that the relations between the Chinese and 
the Malays were somewhat strained at present. 
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3. On the 23rd September, 1945, at 3.30 p.m. I interviewed the Yam Tuan in his 
Palace at Sri Menanti together with Col. Daniels, Chief Secretary and Col. Calder. 
On my arrival I greeted him in the name of the Supreme Allied Commander and at 
that time there were present with the Yam Tuan the Tungku Besar (he is the uncle of 
the Yam Tuan and invariably referred to as the "Wicked uncle"), Tungku Laksamana, 
Tungku Suleiman, Tungku Nasir, Private Secretary, Tungku Ahmed, A.D.C., and the 
Tungku Muda. 
4. I first explained the necessity for the British Military Administration by 
stressing that the Army is the only body which can get in supplies for the relief of the 
civilian population and that in the absence of the civil Government the only form of 
government which is possible at the moment is that of a Military Administration. 
I continued by informing the Yam Tuan that the British Military Administration 
would strictly respect all property, private rights, religious liberty and Malay 
customs. The Yam Tuan was delighted to hear this because he is very religious and 
has always taken a keen interest in the Malay people in his State. 
He appreciated the need for the British Military Administration and saw no 
objection to it and when I informed him that neither he nor his State Council could 
function he expressed no apprehension. 
5. When I touched on the question of his experiences under the Japanese 
occupation he confirmed all that he had told Col. Calder, and which I have set out 
above, but to my mind he seemed more reserved on this subject and I was surprised 
he was not more forthcoming. 
6. In order to obtain money during the Japanese occupation he had to sell two of 
his houses in Seremban, one for $80,000 and the other for $70,000, both of which 
were bought by Chinese. The Japanese Military Authorities had taken away all his 
cars except one, which he still has, and for his Daimler car, which as I have already 
stated above was practically new just before the war, the Japanese paid him $17,000. 
7. I tried as much as possible to get further information out of him with regard to 
his experiences under the Japanese but he was so reserved on this subject that I 
dropped it. 
8. I told him that I was pleased that Col. Calder had taken out $3,000 to him and 
also that he had supplied him with food. I informed him that his full allowance of 
$6,250 per month would be paid. 
9. With regard to the subject of collaboration, I told him that the general policy is 
one of leniency but that ringleaders in responsible position[s) who had actively 
collaborated with the Japanese must be dealt with. He appeared to appreciate this to 
the full. The interview ended at a little after 4 o'clock and then Col. Daniels, Col. 
Calder and myself had tea with the Yam Tuan and the other Malays enumerated in 
para. 3 above. I noticed that the Yam Tuan did not sit Tungku Nasir, Private 
Secretary, or Tungku Ahmed, A.D.C., at the same table as myself and the main party 
but put them away at a side table. (On our way back from Sri Menanti to Seremban 
Col. Calder remarked on this and said this was undoubtedly due to the fact that he 
had already told the Yam Tuan at his preliminary interview that both these Malays 
are under suspicion). 
10. I would have expected of the Yam Tuan whom I know personally (I served in 
Ipoh some years ago as Deputy Public Prosecutor in the Supreme Court when he was 
Deputy Registrar in the same Court) to have been more forthcoming but I 
understand from various sources that he has been very quiet during the Japanese 
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occupation. On considering this matter although I was disappointed at the time, I 
think that it will take him a little time before he loses his present reserve. As I have 
stated, even pre-war he was more reserved than other Sultans, but I certainly found 
him much more reserved than I have ever found him before. I left the Palace at 4.30 
p.m. to return to Seremban and Kuala Lumpur. 
11. I should add that when I arrived at the Palace, his flag was already flying and 
he seemed pleased when I informed him that Col. Calder would fly on his office at 
Seremban the Union Jack and the Negri Sembilan Flag with equal status. 
Interview with the Sultan of Pahang 
On the 28th September, 1945, I left Kuala Lumpur with Lt. Col. D. Ambler 
(Education Department at present in Force 136) for Kuantan. I reached Kuantan at 
10 a.m. There I was met by Lt. Col. F.S. Chiipman11 of Force 136 who is carrying out 
the duties of Civil Affairs Officer, Kuantan, until relieved by the Civil Affairs Officers 
earmarked for Kuantan who are in Kuala Lumpur waiting for their transport. 
2. I left Kuantan by car for Pekan, where the Sultan lives, at 11.30 a.m. Pekan is 
about 28 miles from Kuantan. The journey in~olves passing the Pahang River twice 
by ferry and consequently I did not reach the Astana Saadah, where the Sultan was, 
until 1.10 p.m. 
(Note: The Sultan has three Astanas in Pekan of which Astana Saadah is the 
smallest). 
3. I had been informed by Lt. Col. Chapman that although the Sultan can speak 
English he prefers to speak Malay. As my Malay is somewhat rusty after an absence of 
8 years from Malaya, it was arranged that Tungku Mohamed, uncle of the Sultan, and 
also his Secretary, should be present at the interview as interpreter. Lt. Col. 
Chapman and Lt. Col. Ambler, both of whom know the Sultan personally, were also 
present. 
4. Arriving at the Astana I found the Sultan on the front steps waiting to receive 
me. He looked very well. I greeted him in the name of the Supreme Allied 
Commander. 
I reminded the Sultan that I had attended his wedding in Kuala Lumpur in 1926, 
when I was Assistant District Officer there . The Sultan replied that he remembered 
me quite well and was very pleased that a senior officer with Malayan experience had 
come to see him. 
5. I kept the conversation general for a few minutes and told him of the plight of 
members of the Malayan Civil Service who had been in internment in Singapore. I 
then proceeded to the main object of my mission. 
6. The Sultan, who has never been very talkative, seemed slightly nervous when I 
tried to encourage him to talk about his experiences during the Japanese occupation. 
I found it rather an up-hill task to carry on the conversation because he only 
appeared capable of answering direct questions. 
7. The Sultan said he had kept aloof from the Japanese as much as he could and 
had only come into contact with them when he had received orders from them to 
attend their functions at Kuala Lipis and elsewhere. He said he could not refuse to 
obey their orders but admitted that the Japanese had not ill-treated him and had 
allowed him to attend their functions in ceremonial Malay dress. 
11 See 43, note. 
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He also admitted having made speeches in favour of the Japanese but said that he 
was forced to do so by them. These speeches had either been composed by the 
Japanese themselves with the Sultan merely as a mouth-piece or he had been told by 
the Japanese what he should say and he had no alternative but to obey their orders. 
He had been forced by the Japanese to attend their functions in Kuala Lumpur and 
once he was taken to Singapore for a meeting which was attended by all the Sultans. 
Asked what this meeting in Singapore was about he seemed quite vague, except that 
the Japanese had suggested to each Sultan that it would be a good gesture on their 
part to contribute funds to the Japanese cause. He admitted having subscribed 
$2,000 on two occasions to the Japanese cause making a total of $4,000 in all. 
8. At first the Japanese had forced him to fly the Japanese Flag but later they 
allowed him to fly his own personal standard. 
9. On the question of allowances the Japanese had paid him $4,000 per month in 
the first instance raising it to $8,000 later. (Note: The allowance of the Sultan of 
Pahang is $8,000 per month) . 
10. He said that the Japanese Governor of Pahang was very angry with him 
because he did not obtain information for the Japanese as to the whereabouts of a 
Pahang Dato who was supposed to be operating with the Malay Guerillas. The 
Japanese forced the Sultan to telegraph to see if he could get the Dato to appear 
before them but the Dato never did appear. The Japanese Governor considered that 
the Sultan was responsible for the non-appearance of the Dato and was very angry 
with him after questioning him closely on the matter. The Sultan made no allegation 
that the Japanese had slapped his face and in fact he inferred that they had not. I 
particularly questioned him about this because I had heard rumours that the 
Japanese had treated him in that undignified manner. 
11. He seemed very concerned about the Chinese Guerillas operating in the 
jungle in Pahang and said that they are terrorising the Malays in the kampongs. 
12. I explained the set up of the British Military Administration to the Sultan and 
also the reasons for a Military Administration. I also informed him that the Military 
Administration would strictly respect all property, private rights, religious liberty 
and Malay customs. 
I then went on to say that one consequence of the British Military Administration 
is that neither he nor his State Council can function at present. 
He replied that he quite understood the position and is fully content with it. 
I added that it is the intention of the British Government that the Military 
Administration shall be as short as possible in order that the Civil Government can 
be re-established without undue delay. 
I then touched on the question of collaboration and informed him that the general 
policy is one of leniency. At the same time I said that persons in responsible positions 
who had actively collaborated with the Japanese would be dealt with according to law 
and the Sultan said he quite agreed with that policy. He showed no nervousness at all 
when we discussed this question of collaboration. (From all reports which I heard 
from persons in Pahang it appears that the Sultan has in no way actively collaborated 
with the Japanese-in fact the members of Force 136 in Pahang all speak well of his 
conduct during the time they were in Pahang whilst the Japanese were still in 
occupation) . 
13. I told the Sultan that since we are responsible for his personal safety I should 
be grateful if he would not travel about too much. He said he had only one small car 
. ! 
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of his own and would be grateful if he could be supplied with another car. I said that a 
British car suitable for him would take a long time to obtain and he then said he 
would be content with any reasonable car which could be found in Malaya. He also 
gave me a list of cutlery, crockery, linen etc. which he requires for his Astana and 
also a list of the spare parts required for his electric light engine. These are attached 
and marked "A" and "B".12 
14. I informed the Sultan that his full allowance of $8,000 a month would be paid 
with effect from the 1st. September, 1945 and instructed Lt. Col. Chapman to pay at 
once. The Sultan was delighted when he heard this . 
15. I was well satisfied with the interview which was kept at a cordial level 
throughout. The Sultan pressed me to stay to lunch. I informed him I regretted I was 
unable to accept his kind invitation but I had to get back to Kuantan where I had a lot 
of work to do and I was proceeding on to Kuala Trengganu. The Sultan said he fully 
understood how busy I was and hoped that next time I paid a visit to Kuantan and 
Pekan I would have more time and would then be able to have lunch with him. 
16. The Sultan has 8 children-5 daughters and 3 sons. The eldest child is a 
daughter and the second child a son, Tungku Ahmed, age 16. The Sultan's wife is a 
daughter of the late Sultan of Perak, Sultan Iskandar Shah. 
17. There is no doubt whatsoever that the Sultan is genuinely pleased to see the 
British back and at present is 100% with us. 
Trengganu 
I left Kuantan by air on the 29th September, 1945 at 9.05 p.m. and arrived at Kuala 
Trengganu at 10.20 p.m. where I was met by Lt. Col. D. Headley [Headly], Senior 
Civil Affairs Officer at Kuala Trengganu. Col. Headley has previously had consider-
able experience in Trengganu, knows the State like a book and has the full 
confidence of the Malay population. 
2. I ascertained that Sultan Suleiman, the legitimate Sultan of Trengganu, died 
on the 25th September, 1942, of blood poisoning and that his son Raja Ali was 
installed as Sultan during the Japanese occupation on the say day. 
Sultan Suleiman had at least 3 sons:-
Raja Ali the eldest son age about 31 or 32 years. 
Tungku Aziz about 23 years of age. 
Tungku Abdul Rashid about 16 years of age. 
I ascertained from Col. Headley that the Siamese took over the Government of 
Trengganu from the Japanese on the 18th October, 1943, and immediately allowed 
the Malay Government to function as it did prior to the war. Estimates have been 
prepared and passed each year just as they had been prepared and passed prior to the 
war. 
3. Col. Headley told me that Raja Ali had married a daughter of the Sultan of 
Pahang. In addition he had married a Malay prostitute named Tuan [sic] Nik. She is 
said to be about 29 years of age and his official wife, the Sultan of Pahang's daughter 
about 18 years of age. He had a son by his official wife about 12 to 18 months ago and 
a daughter by the Malay prostitute about 6 months ago. Col. Headley told me that 
Raja Ali had given several parties in the Astana to Japanese officers and said he 
12 Not printed. 
[57] OCT 1945 161 
thought it would be a good thing if I had a talk with Dato Jaya, the Mentri Besar, who 
is absolutely reliable and very pro-British. 
4. Col. Headley said that Dato Jaya told him that if the British had been in 
Trengganu and could have seen how Raja Ali behaved they would not have for one 
moment allowed him to be considered for the position of Sultan. In Trengganu it 
appears that the succession between the Sultanate goes from father to son. Thus if 
Ali were passed over Aziz would be the next claimant. Col. Headley said that Aziz 
appeared to have behaved well during the Japanese occupation and is not a bad 
fellow. 
Col. Headley said the feeling of the people of Trengganu is that they would like 
Tungku Paduka the late Sultan's younger brother, who speaks English, to be Sultan. 
He is very much respected by everybody in Trengganu but of course if he were made 
Sultan it would not be in accordance with the "adat" [custom] and Col. Headley 
could not say what the reaction locally would be if Tungku Paduka were declared 
Sultan. 
5. Col. Headley told me that Raja Ali is still living with his Malay prostitute in a 
house called "Telaga Panchor" in Kuala Trengganu. The information is that he only 
goes to his official palace occasionally to visit his official wife. 
6. At Col. Headley's suggestion I first saw Dato Jaya, Mentri Besar, in whom Col. 
Headley has implicit trust and has always been regarded by us as entirely pro-British. 
I had an exploratory talk with him to find out the political atmosphere. 
Dato Jaya does not speak English and so Col. Headley interpreted for me. 
Dato Jaya began by saying how pleased he and the other Malays are that Col. 
Headley is back again in Trengganu because he knows Trengganu and its people 
intimately. 
He went on to say that when Tungku Ali was installed as Sultan on the 25th 
September, 1942, he, the Dato Jaya, was ill. 
The Japanese custom was that if a Sultan died his eldest son, where there was one, 
must succeed despite any disabilities. 
After Tungku Ali was installed as Sultan the leading Malays sought Dato Jaya's 
advice as to what should be done. He advised that Tungku Ali should be given a trial. 
His advice was written out by one of the leading Malays and put before a 
representative assembly of Malay notables. They agreed with the Dato's advice. 
According to Dato Jaya many of the younger Malays in Trengganu were opposed to 
the appointment of Tungku Ali as Sultan, they would have preferred to have seen 
Tungku Paduka as Sultan. Dato Jaya advised them to wait and see how Tungku Ali 
conducted himself. 
As time went on the population became more and more disgusted with the 
conduct of Tungku Ali and his Malay mistress. His Malay mistress is the illegitimate 
child of a Chinese man and a Malay woman. Tungku Ali married her but 
subsequently owing to pressure brought to bear on him by the British Adviser he 
divorced her but still continued to keep her as his mistress. The divorce was properly 
registered in the office of the Religious Affairs Officer, Kuala Trengganu, and he 
confirmed the divorce. 
Ali on several occasions asked some Japanese Military Officers for presents such as 
cigarettes and other comforts. This is against the "adat" that no Sultan should ever 
ask for presents. Tungku Ali was extremely friendly with the Japanese and invited 
several of the Japanese Military Police officers to banquets at the Astana where 
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ronggengs [dances] were held. 
Dato Jaya also stated that Tungku Ali had reported those Malay officials who were 
pro-British. 
Tungku Ali is heavily in debt. He took possession of a piece of open ground in the 
town of Kuala Trengganu which he had fenced and then leased it out to a Chinese for 
$6,000 at first, later $10,000, per month as an amusement park. Heavy gambling 
took place there every night. 
When the Japanese were themselves in control of Trengganu before it was handed 
over to the Siamese Tungku Ali's conduct disgusted every one. When the Siamese 
took over they allowed the Government of Trengganu to function as it was before. At 
first under the Siamese, Tungku Ali's conduct improved a little but later he reverted 
to his former habits and still continued to entertain any Japanese troops who 
remained in Kuala Trengganu. A certain number of new laws were enacted during 
the Siamese regime, they were all signed by Tungku Ali as also any Rules and 
Regulations made thereunder. Dato Jaya was appointed Tungku Ali's Secretary and 
he signed all State documents except Laws, Rules and Regulations. He signed them 
for President of the Council, which is the title the Siamese gave Tungku Ali. 
The Japanese regarded Dato Jaya as British Spy No. 1 and often had guards placed 
around his house and also searched his house on several occasions. 
(Note: I was very impressed by Dato Jaya. He is obviously a man of great character 
and undoubtedly very pro-British). 
After I had seen Dato Jayo I saw Tungku Ali at 1.55 p.m. My interview with him 
was short and concluded at 2.10 p.m. 
I told him that H.M.G. could not recognise him as Sultan and that he must at once 
take down the Sultan's personal flag which he was then flying at his house and also 
on his motor car. 
I explained briefly to him the set up of the British Military Administration. 
I also told him that the conduct of all Government servants would be inquired into 
to see if any of them had actively collaborated with the Japanese and that a similar 
investigation would be made into his own conduct and also that of the State 
dignitaries. He was very nervous when I told him this and became somewhat pale. 
I told him that in no circumstances would he receive an allowance equivalent to 
that of a Sultan. He admitted having been paid an allowance of $6,000 a month by 
the Japanese. 
I asked him what the position was in 1941 with regard to his allowances. He said 
he received a political pension of $270 a month and worked as a learner in the Court 
of Kuala Trengganu on a salary of $75 per month making $345 a month in all . 
I told him he should continue to live in the house in which he is at present living 
and that we would allow him not more than 5 servants which would be paid by the 
Senior Civil Affairs Officer. His light and water would be supplied free and that his 
only expenses would be food and clothing. I said in my view an allowance of $450 a 
month was sufficient which is the $345 he was getting in 1941 plus an extra 331J3% 
on it. I informed him that his allowance of $450 a month would be paid from the 1st 
September, 1945. He appeared to be considerably shaken when I told him this was 
the only allowance he would get. 
7. After I had finished interviewing Tungku Ali I addressed all the Government 
clerks etc. at the Government Offices and received a warm welcome. 
Individually I met:-
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(a) Tungku Paduka, the younger brother of the late Sultan who impressed me 
very favourably. 
(b) Che Hashim, a Perak Malay, now Commissioner of Lands, Trengganu, and 
formerly District Officer, Dungun. 
(c) Che Yeop Osman, a Perek Malay, Assistant Commissioner of Police. 
These three Malays according to Col. Headley, are extremely reliable and all of them 
are pro-British. 
Ke/antan 
On the 29th September, 1945 I left Kuala Trengganu by air at 4.30 p.m. and arrived 
in Kota Bharu at 5.45 p.m. where I was met by Lt. Col. D. Somerville, S.C.A.O., 
Kelantan. 
Having had a talk with Col. Somerville he advised me it would be a good thing if I 
met Tungku Hamzah, the State Secretary and Nik Ahmed Kamil bin Haji Nik 
Mahmood, the Deputy Prime Minister. 
I saw both these Malays in the British Adviser's house and Col. Somerville was 
present at the interview. 
They informed me that the late Sultan Sir Ismail died on the 20th June, 1944, of 
T.B. The Raja of Kelantan, Tuhgku Ibrahim, was installed as Sultan on the same 
date. According to them he was officially installed with the usual coronation 
ceremony. No approval from the Japanese was sought because it was not necessary. 
The Siamese agreed to Tungku Ibrahim becoming Sultan. The official papers were 
signed and kept in the usual way and these will be made available to Col. Somerville. 
These two Malays told me that from the time the Japanese came in on 8.12.1941 they 
continued to govern the country until October, 1943, when the Siamese took over. 
At first, government was by Japanese military authorities alone but on 31st 
December, 1941, they governed the country by means of Japanese civil affairs 
officers. The later Sultan was still officiating and the Japanese more or less let him alone. 
In February, 1942, a Japanese military governor arrived and then the Japanese 
governed directly without any reference to the Sultan except on matters of 
Muhammadan religion and Malay custom. 
In May, 1942, the Japanese re-organised the departments and Malay officers and 
clerks were changed about from department to department. 
When the Siamese took over in October, 1943, they allowed the Kelantan 
Government to function as it did in pre-war days. 
These two Malays told me that the Japanese did not like the Raja of Kelantan, 
Tungku Ibrahim, and they smashed up all the furniture in his house for no apparent 
reason whatsoever. 
They told me that the late Sultan gave $10,000 to the Japanese cause because the 
Japanese told him it would be a good gesture and he did so. 
Nik Ahmed Kamil at the end of the interview informed me that he was sent to 
Japan by the Japanese in August 1943 and remained there for about 5 or 6 weeks to 
learn propaganda. He said it was an absolute waste of time, he learned nothing, and it 
took him 45 days in a ship to return to Kelantan. 
At first Japanese flags were flown on official buildings in Kelantan, and when the 
Siamese took over they flew their own flags in the place of the former Japanese flags. 
The Siamese did not allow Kelantan flags to be flown. 
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The Siamese handed the whole Government back to the legitimate Kelantan 
Government on the 25th August, 1945, and only then allowed the Kelantan flags to 
be flown. 
Before they left they told me that the late Sultan's allowance was $6,000 a month 
and that Tunku Ibrahim, now 47 years of age got $1,500 a month as Raja of Kelantan 
and that he has a son aged 31 years who was installed as Raja Muda when the Raja of 
Kelantan was installed as Sultan. 
I thanked them both for their information and said I was going to see the Raja of 
Kelantan the same night. 
2. I arrived at the Raja of Kelantan's house, he is not living in the Astana, at 9.10 
p.m. and interviewed him in the presence of Col. Somerville and the son of the Raja 
himself. 
I first of all explained to him the set up of the British Military Administration and 
the reasons why a military administration is the only possible form of government at 
the present time. I told him that it is the policy of the British Government that 
Malaya should revert to civil government as soon as possible. 
I said that the British Military Administration will respect all property, private 
rights, religion and Malay customs. 
I then encouraged him to talk of his experience during the Japanese and Siamese 
occupation. He told me about the Japanese going into his house and smashing up all 
his furniture. He also told me that the local Japanese Gestapo took him to their 
headquarters where they questioned him for 5 hours sometimes at the point of the 
pistol because they said they suspected he had something to do with the looting of 
Chinese banks. He added that when the late Sultan was called down to Singapore by 
the Japanese for a meeting with all the other Malay Sultans, the Sultan was too ill to 
travel to Singapore and so he, Tungku Ibrahim, went there as his representative. On 
arrival at the Singapore Railway Station he was searched by the Japanese before 
leaving the Station. 
There is no doubt that Tungku Ibrahim hates the Japanese and in my view he has 
avoided contact with them as far as he possibly could. 
I told him that we could not recognise him as Sultan because we could not 
recognise anything done during the Japanese occupation. I said on that account I 
should be grateful if he would cease flying the Sultan's personal flag at his residence 
and on his motor car. I said there was no objection to him flying the Kelantan State 
flag and he readily agreed to my request. 
3. I then explained to him the policy which will be adopted regarding collabor-
ationists i.e. that the general policy is one of leniency but that responsible persons 
who had actively collaborated with the Japanese will be brought to justice. He said 
this was a fair policy and he entirely agreed with it. 
4. I asked him not to travel about too much as we are responsible for his personal 
safety and that when he does travel about he should let the S.C.A.O., Col. Somerville, 
know where he is going. He said he would do so and added that he was very pleased to 
see Col. Somerville back again in Kelantan because he was well-known there and 
trusted by the local population. 
5. I said that we could not allow him the full allowance of $6,000 a month which 
was the Sultan's allowance but we would make him an allowance of $4,000 per 
month. I said that Col. Somerville was authorised to pay him this from the 1st 
September and payment would be made the next day i.e. 30th September, 1945. He 
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cheered up a lot when I told him this. 
6. I found this an easy interview, he was very friendly, genuinely pleased to see 
me and was agreeably surprised when I was able to carry on a certain part of the 
conversation in Malay. In my view he is very friendly to us and at the moment will 
take any advice we give him. 
The interview ended at 10 p.m. when the Raja of Kelantan thanked me most 
profusely for coming to see him and said he hoped I would visit Kota Bharu again in 
the very near future. 
Brigadier Willan :s- views after interviewing the Sultans 
1. Johore 
In view of the difficulties which the Sultan of Johore has caused to Government in 
the past13 and also because of reports regarding his co-operation with the Japanese, I 
considered this would be the most difficult interview of all. In fact it turned out to be 
a very friendly and cordial one. I had never met the Sultan of Johore previously. 
On arrival at his Istana I met his Rumanian wife, whom I summed up to be a very 
intelligent and attractive woman with pro-British sympathies. The Sultan seemed to 
be very fond of her and told me how grateful he was to her for standing by him 
during the period of the Japanese occupation. 
The Sultan is undoubtedly much more pro-British than he ever was before as 
shown by his joy at the return of the British; his request to fly the Union Jack on his 
motor car; and his statement that he welcomed the British Military Administration 
and is prepared to serve under it. 
He is certainly very much perturbed at the activities of the Chinese Guerillas in his 
State and in my view realizes that without British aid he cannot regain his former 
control over the State of Johore. 
He has three sons:-
(a) Tungku Mahkota--elder son. 
(b) Tungku Abubakar-second son. 
(c) Tungku Ahmed-third son. 
In my view it would be wise to approach the Sultan of Johore first with regard to 
the negotiations for the new treaties. I think in his present state of mind he will sign. 
He is a realist and is fully aware that he is dependent on H.M.G's support. 
If he refuses to sign considerable care must be exercised as to which of his three 
sons should then be approached. 
Tungku Mahkota should not be approached without fi rst making full investigation 
as to his activities during the Japanese occupation. He is listed as "Black" on the 
"Black and Grey" lists. He certainly appeared very nervous when I met him for a few 
moments on the evening of the 8th September 1945, after I had interviewed the 
Sultan. 
If Tungku Mahkota's proves to be "Black" then Tungku Abubakar is the son to 
approach first regarding negotiations of the new treaty. He is at present a Major in 
the B.M.A. carrying out the functions of Chairman, Sanitary Board, Kuala Lumpur. 
13 Sultan Ibrahim ibni Almarhum Sultan Abu Bakar (1873-1959); succeeded his father in 1895; accepted a 
British general adviser most unwillingly in 1914 and throughout the 1920s and 1930s had asserted Johore 
autonomy and points of personal prestige. 
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At my interview the Sultan was emphatic that he would not allow Tungku 
Abubakar to enter the State of Johore again because he had fled the State at the time 
of the Japanese occupation. 
In my view Tungku Abubakar might well be willing to sign the new treaty which 
would put the prize of the Sultanate into his hands and thus allow him to return to 
the State of Johore. In such an event it would however be necessary to remove the 
present Sultan out of the State and also out of Malaya; it would be too dangerous to 
leave him there with Tungku Abubakar installed as Sultan. As regards the third son, 
Tungku Ahmed, he has not a sufficiently strong character to fit him for the office of 
Sultan. 
2. Selangor 
With the removal to the Cocos Islands of Tungku Musa-Addin, the first son of the late 
Sultan of Selangor, who was appointed Sultan by the Japanese when his brother 
Tungku Alam Shan, the legitimate Sultan, was removed by them, the way is now 
clear for direct negotiations with the legitimate Sultan. 
He is a pleasant person with not a very strong character and at present is so 
overjoyed at the return of the British and re-recognition of himself as Sultan, that in 
my view, he will sign the new treaty. I suggest he be approached next after the Sultan 
of Johore. If he refuses to sign it is a matter for serious consideration whether it 
would be wise to negotiate with the late Sultan's second son, Tengku Panglima 
Besar, who was passed over by H.M.G. in favour of the third son, Tungku Alam Shah, 
the present legitimate Sultan. 
There is no doubt that this action of H.M.G. was opposed by a large section of the 
Selangor Malays at that time, and the late Sultan resented H.M.G's action so much 
that he petitioned the Secretary of State for the Colonies and even went to England 
to interview him. His mission proved unsuccessful. 
I must however mention that the second son Tengku Panglima Besar, has been 
largely under the influence of Tungku Musa-Addin and is somewhat stupid. In fact 
some people think that he is so stupid as to be incapable of directing the affairs of 
State. This opinion was expressed at a time before a new constitution was being 
considered and with the powers of Sultans considerably reduced under the new 
constitution this lack of intelligence is not such a material factor for the position of 
Sultan of Selangor. 
If the legitimate Sultan does not sign-I think he will-Tengku Panglima Besar 
might well be persuaded to do so with the Sultanate as the prize. In such a case it 
would be essential to keep Musa-Addin permanently out of Malaya. 
3. Negri Sembilan 
In my view the Yam Tuan of Negri Sembilan should be approached next. In his 
present state of mind he is somewhat depressed and appears to me to be perplexed as 
to how his State can recover itself and would welcome directions rather than advice. 
Being a lawyer he will appreciate better than any other Sultan the reasons behind the 
new constitution and having done so I think he will sign the new treaty. 
The constitution of Negri Sembilan is such that the approval of the Undang is 
necessary and not having talked to them I have no idea what their reaction will be to 
a new treaty. 14 
14 Negri Sembilan was a confederation and, in addition to the agreement of the Yam Tuan (or ruler), that 
of the four Undang (or lawgivers) would also be required before any constitutional change could be made. 
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4. Pahang 
If success is achieved with the Sultans of Johore and Selangor and also with the Yam 
Tuan of Negri Sembilan the Sultan of Pahang should be approached next. 
He should not prove difficult if those three have signed. His eldest son Tungku 
Ahmed is only 16 years of age. 
5. Perak 
If all the above four mentioned have signed I do not see how the Sultan of Perak can 
refuse to sign. 
After my interview with him which was most friendly and cordial-I know him 
personnaly [sic]-I came away with the impression in my mind that he might prove 
the most difficult of all. He is a deeply religious man and would weigh up more than 
any other Malay Ruler the effect the new treaty would have on the Perak Malays. 
If he does not sign then the only course open is to deal in turn with the Raja Muda, 
a somewhat simple person, failing him with Raja Bendahara and finally with the Raja 
di-Hilir. This is the adat of Perak.15 
6. Kedah 
Once the Sultans of Johore, Selangor, Perak, Pahang and the Yam Tuan of Negri 
Sembilan have signed there will be no difficulty with the four northern States where 
there are no recognised Sultans due to all four having died during the Japanese 
occupation. 
Tungku Badlishah, the Regent of Kedah would undoubtedly be swayed by the 
opinions of his State Council and he would be bound to consult it on account of a 
clause in the Kedah treaty. The most astute member of the State Council is Tuan 
Haji Sheriff, State Secretary, and once he has consented there should be no further 
difficulty. The Regent is a nervous and timid individual and left to himself would, in 
my view, readily sign. If Johore has signed Kedah will not hold out. He is the heir 
presumptive selected by the State Council in March, 1938, but on the British side the 
stipulation was made that His Majesty's acceptance must await the time of actual 
succession and that should Tungku Badlishah suffer or evince any disability or 
disqualification in the meantime, the choice would be [sic) in the interests of the 
people need to be referred back to the State Council for reconsideration. 
Tungku Yacob is the most progressive of the Royal Family of Kedah but he was 
selected by the Japanese to go to Japan to learn their agricultural methods (he is 
Principal Agricultural Officer in Kedah) and was in Japan during the Japanese 
occupation of Malaya for a few weeks. I have not had the time to ascertain what the 
local reaction is to this. 
7. Per/is 
The heir apparent is Syed Putera who was chosen as such by the Per! is State Council 
in April, 1938. He is the son of Syed Hasan, half nephew of the late Raja. Syed Hasan 
died in 1935. 
Syed Putera is only 25 years of age. He is of a pleasant disposition and very friendly 
disposed to the British. He has had a very hard time during the Japanese occupation 
15 The adat or custom of Perak was for the succession to rotate between three leading families. Raja Muda 
Yussof was the son of a former Sultan, Abdul Jalil, and came to the throne in 1948 on the death of Sultan 
Abdul Aziz. The Raja Bendahara and Raja di-Hilir were major chiefs. 
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and I have little doubt that he himself will sign a new treaty. As in the case of Kedah 
he is bound to refer the matter to the State Council. I met the loyal members of the 
State Council who had not been allowed to function during the Japanese occupation 
and they struck me as pleasant, easy persons who would not create difficulties. 
8. Trengganu 
In Trengganu the succession is from father to son. Sultan Suleiman died during the 
Japanese occupation leaving three sons:-
Raja Ali the eldest about 31 years. 
Tungku Aziz about 25 years. 
Tunku Abdul Rahman about 16 years. 
On account of the conduct of Raja Ali during the Japanese occupation he cannot 
possibly become Sultan. 
According to the adat the next in succession is the second son Tungku Aziz who 
appears to have behaved well during the Japanese occupation. There is no doubt 
however that many people in Trengganu would prefer to see Tungku Paduka, the late 
Sultan's younger brother, installed as Sultan. This would mean breaking the adat 
and before it is decided to do this the important local Malays would have to be 
consulted. To that end I advise that a preliminary discussion should take place with 
Dato Jaya who is very pro-British and much respected by the Trengganu Malays. If he 
agrees with the new constitution then I anticipate no difficulty in obtaining the 
signature of either Tungku Aziz or Tungku Paduka, whichever . one is approached. 
9. Kelantan 
In Kelantan the next in succession to the Sultan, who died on the 20th June, 1944, is 
his brother Tungku Ibrahiin, the Raja of Kelantan. He is a pleasant person with not 
much strength of character and should not prove difficult. I have little doubt he will 
sign. He is only too anxious to be properly confirmed as Sultan and to get his son 
confirmed as Raja Muda. They were both elevated to these respective positions after 
the death of the Sultan and in my view the Raja will sign anything to get both himself 
and his son firmly entrenched in those positions. 
In Kelantan there is a school of younger Malays who are very progresssive in ideas 
and are pro-British. One of them is Tungku Mahyiddeen16 who is a Major in Civil 
Affairs and is now stationed in Kota Baharu. He is the second son of the former Raja 
of Patani. In my view he would agree with the new constitution and would be a good 
propaganda agent in its favour if the Raja of Kelantan proved unexpectedly to be 
difficult. 
10. I have been bold enough to hazard the above opinions because they may be of 
some assistance to Sir Harold MacMichael. I felt it is my duty to do so even though 
events may prove me to be 100% wrong. I await the result with great interest. 
16 Tengku Mahyiddeen, son of the last Raja of Patani (a Malay kingdom absorbed by Siam), had been 
director of education in Kelantan before the war. During the Japanese invasion he escaped to India and 
was engaged in propaganda work on behalf of the allies; in 1943 he wrote a memorandum favouring some 
kind of Malayan union and Malayan citizenship and British planners regarded him as 'an enlightened 
Malay'. He returned as a major in the BMA but was bitterly disappointed that the British did not take the 
opportunity of post -war reconstruction to wrest Patani from Thailand. 
(58) OCT 1945 169 
58 PREM 8/189 9 Oct 1945 
'Political organisation in the South East Asia Command': memoran-
dum by J C Sterndale Bennett 
[Stemdale Bennett here takes up the problems of political and economic co-ordination 
which Dening had brought to the attention of Whitehall on the eve of the Japanese 
surrender (see 39-42).) 
The difficulties which we are meeting in various parts of the South East Asia 
Command, e.g. Burma, Malaya, Siam, Indo China and the Netherlands East Indies 
raise once more the question whether South East Asia Command is at present 
adequately organised to deal with the various political and economic problems which 
are bound to arise in increasing degree now that fighting against the Japanese has 
ceased. 
2. Admiral Mountbatten is responsible for an immensely wide area. His Chief 
Political Adviser is a member of the Foreign Service, Mr. Dening. He is an expert on 
Japan and was primarily appointed to advise the Supreme Commander on questions 
arising out of the war against Japan. He had no authority to speak on behalf of other 
Government Departments such as the India Office, Burma Office or Colonial Office. 
3. No doubt Admiral Mountbatten now receives advice about individual British 
territories through the Civil Affairs Administration in these territories. The system of 
Foreign Office representation is also being extended by the attachment of Foreign 
Service officers to the Force Commanders in Siam, Indo-China and the Netherlands 
East Indies. Apart from Mr. Dening however Admiral Mountbatten has no civilian 
advisers for the area as a whole. Mr. Dening has created for himself a position of 
considerable influence and some independence. But though appointed by the 
Foreign Office and corresponding direct with the Foreign Office he is still technically 
a member of Admiral Mountbatten's staff and responsible to him. 
4. Mr. Dening himself when in this country in June last raised the question 
whether the situation in which he, as Chief Political Adviser, virtually served two 
masters should be allowed to continue. 
5. Just before the Japanese surrender the Foreign Office circulated Mr. Dening's 
memorandum to various Departments in London with two alternative 
suggestions:-
( a) to detach the office of Political Adviser from Admiral Mountbatten's staff, to 
make the Political Adviser responsible to London and to give him additional staff 
to enable him to advise the Supreme Commander not merely on questions of 
foreign affairs but on political, economic and financial matters generally. 
(b) to appoint a Minister of State for South East Asia. 
6. I attach (a) a copy of Mr. Dening's memorandum, (b) a copy of the Foreign 
Office letter to the various Government Departments, and (c) a memorandum 
summarising the replies of the various Departments.1 These replies show that, with 
the exception of the War Office who felt that action might be postponed until the 
situation was clearer and until it could be seen whether the various Departments in 
1 For (a) and (b) see 39 and 40; (c) is not printed. 
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London were in a position to resume direct control within their respective spheres, 
all the Departments favoured going at least as far as to make the Political Adviser 
directly responsible to London and not to Admiral Mountbatten.2 
7. Apart from the various political questions now arising, Mr. Dening has 
separately drawn attention to the serious problems of supply which are going to arise 
in South East Asia Command and to the need of some better coordinating 
machinery. 
8. There is a third point. Unless some action is taken soon the tendency will be 
for the various territories concerned to drop back into working in more or less 
water-tight compartments. The existence of South East Asia Command does provide 
an opportunity for working on a regional basis and perhaps for laying the foundation 
of some kind of regional organisation when the immediate military tasks of South 
East Asia Command are over. 
9. It is not at all clear that the appointment of a Minister of State would be the 
ideal arrangement and it may be thought that such an appointment would be 
difficult to reconcile with the responsibilities of the Supreme Commander and of the 
Governments which will in due course take over from him the responsibility for the 
administration of the various territories. 
10. But if the appointment of a Minister of State is either undesirable or not 
feasible it seems necessary to provide at South East Asia Command Headquarters a 
panel of experts on political, financial, economic and particularly supply questions 
who can coordinate the needs of the whole area. The relation of these various experts 
to the Supreme Allied Commander needs some consideration. It seems desirable that 
although nominally members of his staff they should have a responsibility towards 
their parent Departments in London and should be in direct correspondence with 
those Departments. It is perhaps desirable that there should be a Chief Adviser 
responsible to London. 
11. It is suggested that this matter might be discussed generally in the first place 
by the Secretary of State with the Ministers concerned, namely the Secretary of State 
for the Colonies, the Secretary of State for Burma, the Secretary of State for India, 
the Secretary of State for the Dominions and the Secretary of State for War. It would 
then seem a suitable subject for full discussion at the Conference of Far Eastern 
Representatives which the Secretary of State [for foreign affairs] has in mind; and in 
the meantime Ministers may wish to refer it to the Far Eastern Offical Committee 
with the idea of working out some draft scheme for the consideration of the 
Conference.3 
2 For the CO response see 41 and 42. 
3 On 18 Oct a meeting of ministers, which was chaired by Attlee and attended by Morrison (lord president), 
Cripps (Board of Trade) , Addison (Dominions), Pethick-Lawrence (India and Burma), Hall (Colonies), and 
officials (Sir E Bridges, Cabinet Office; Sir 0 Sargent, FO: J C Sterndale Bennett, FO; E A Armstrong, 
Cabinet Office), concluded that the appointment of an official of ambassadorial status directly responsible 
to the foreign secretary should be made a matter of 'the first urgency' for the co-ordination of both 
economic and political matters in the region. Sir H MacMichael was mentioned as 'a very suitable 
candidate' and Hall undertook to consider whether he could be released from his Malayan mission. By the 
end of Nova draft directive on a 'Special Commissioner responsible to the foreign secretary in South East 
Asia' was approved; the final version was sent to Mountbatten in Feb (see 71) and Lord Kill earn took up the 
appointment in Mar. See CAB 2111954, GEN 97/lst meeting; PREM 8/189; and CO 273/677/3. 
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59 CO 273/675/19, no 1 22 Oct 1945 
[MacMichael mission]: letter from Sir H MacMichael to Sir G Gater. 
Enclosures: notes of interviews with His Highness the Sultan of Johore 
(Following Willan's visits to the rulers (see 57), MacMichael, accompanied by Newboult 
and Bourdillon, toured the Malay States, starting with Johore on 18 Oct and concluding 
with Kelantan on 21 Dec. Only a selection of MacMichael's accounts of his meetings with 
the rulers is printed here: Johore (59), Selangor (60) and Kedah (64) . Ibrahim of Johore 
was the senior sultan and one who had caused the British embarrassment in the past (see 
57, note 13) . It was felt, consequently, that once his agreement to a new treaty had been 
secured, the other rulers would prove compliant. In his published account, MacMichael 
admitted to running into a groundswell of Malay antagonism only in Negri Sembilan 
(whose Yam Tuan belatedly tried to reopen the issue two weeks after signing, see CO 
273/675118) and Kedah (see 64) .] 
I am sending you herewith copies of the notes I made of the two interviews which I 
had with the Sultan of Johore on 18th and 20th of October respectively. These notes 
were made immediately on my return to Singapore from the Sultan's palace and, I 
think, adequately reflect the uniformly friendly and frank atmosphere which 
pervaded our conversations. I do not think they call for any further comment on my 
part. 
The Treaty was signed on 20th October at 4.25 p.m. in duplicate. One signed copy 
is being locked up here pending your instructions: the other has been retained by the 
Sultan. 
The witnesses to the Sultan's signature were his third son Tungku Ahmed and his 
Secretary Abdul Kadir. My own signature was witnessed by H.T. Bourdillon. 
After the signature of the Treaty the Sultan produced a Memorandum enumerat-
ing various points to which he wished the attention of His Majesty's Government 
particularly drawn. I have thought it right to send this Memorandum to you under 
cover of a formal despatch because I gave the Sultan a formal promise that it should 
be sent at once to the Secretary of State. I have sent a copy of it (and of the despatch) 
to Hone as C.C.A.O. and he will no doubt furnish you with his detailed comments in 
due course. Newboult is, in fact, preparing a note upon the various points raised and 
sending it to Hone. 
The dignity and courtesy with which the Sultan of Johore conducted our business 
greatly impressed me: his "touch" was perfect and there was never a hitch (I may 
mention that I have just written him a personal line of appreciation and thanks). I 
only hope that the rest of the Rulers will prove equally amenable, but I am quite 
prepared for some of them, perhaps lacking his experience and background, to be a 
little tiresome. 
I am not attempting to prepare any rigid programme of procedure for the future, 
beyond having arranged to see the Sultan of Selangor at Klang tomorrow afternoon. 
It seems to me that the essence of the stage-management (which is of considerable 
importance to Sultans) is that I should feel my way along from day to day according 
to varying circumstance and personality. For instance there is some trouble about 
the Dato Mentri Jelebu in Negri Sembilan, which leads me to defer dealing with that 
State until a later stage where otherwise I might have taken it sooner. Similarly there 
is some doubt about the rightful successor in Trengganu, which may lead to delay. In 
the other cases all appears at present to be reasonably plain sailing but I "touch 
wood" as I write this. 
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Newboult and Bourdillon are living with me and in constant touch with me. Their 
assistance, in their different spheres, is being of the greatest value to me at every 
stage. Willan is also close at hand as a very valuable counsellor. Both SACSEA 
himself and General Dempsey have been most cooperative upon the few occasions 
when I have needed their assistance. General Dempsey moves up to Kuala Lumpur 
on 1st November and Hone (who is getting married on 25th October at Singapore) 
accompanies the party. 
The most vivid impressions I have formed so far (apart from such points as the 
overwhelming greenery, the absence of wild-flowers, and the magnificience [sic] of 
the buildings and the roads) are the general atmosphere of toleration and amiability 
among the various "men in the street" of all races: they all seem to be bustling and 
meandering about together on their various businesses-though naturally there are 
some feuds and recriminations in the background which are apt upon occasion to 
come to the surface-and the overwhelming Chinese atmosphere of the townships 
through which one passes. So far I have been unable to bring myself to any 
understanding of why the present policy has not materialised long before now. Its 
rightness seems to me completely obvious, but I realise that I am hampered by 
ignorance of the conditions of the past. Anyhow, the way in which the new policy has 
been received seems to bear out the contention that there is nothing revolutionary in 
its concept. The numerous organs of the press have all given it a mention and had a 
leading article or two, but they are clearly more interested in the cost of living, the 
price of rubber, the merits and demerits of various groups of" collaborators", events 
in Java, etc. This is all very much to the advantage of my mission. The contrast to 
Palestine is quite remarkable! 
With kindest regards to yourself and Gent. 
Enclosure 1 to 59: note of first interview (4 pm, 18 Oct 1945) 
As previously arranged through Colonel Hay, the Senior Civil Affairs Officer, I drove 
from Government House Singapore on the afternoon of the 18th of October, with an 
escort of Military Police provided by General Sir Miles Dempsey, General Officer 
Commanding in Chief Fourteenth Army, to see the Sultan of Johore at his palace at 
Pasir Pelangi. I was accompanied by Brigadier Newboult and Mr. Bourdillon. 
His Highness and Lady Ibrahim, accompanied by Colonel Hay, met us on arrival 
and at once invited us to take tea with them. I was seated next to His Highness (who 
was obviously suffering from gout) . The conversation, which was all in English, was 
animated and easy: for the most part it consisted of stories told by the Sultan of his 
experiences during the period of Japanese control, and it was quite evident that his 
rancour and detestation of these "sub-human creatures" was deep and had left a 
lasting mark on his mind. 
The only approach to "shop" was an enquiry by the Sultan as to whether I had 
discussed business with the Rulers of Selangor and Negri Sembilan. I replied that I 
should not have thought of doing so until I had first conversed with himself. 
After awile [sic] the Sultan asked me whether I should like to come and talk things 
over in the adjoining room. I welcomed the suggestion and Brigadier Newboult, Mr. 
Bourdillon and I moved with the Sultan from the drawing room to the dining room, 
where His Highness asked me to occupy the chair at the head of the table, himself 
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sitting on my right. 
I opened the proceedings at once by saying that His Highness might like me to 
recapitulate the general background and reasons for my visit to Malaya, although in 
fact these had been made very clear by the Secretary of State in his speech of lOth 
October. 1 In doing so, briefly, I took the opportunity to allude in passing to such 
points as that the policy represented the considered decision of His Majesty's 
Government, that it was directed to the welfare of the country, and that my own task 
was strictly limited to the congenial (and I hoped easy) task of obtaining the 
cooperation of the Rulers. I also explained quite frankly that, in order properly and 
efficiently to carry out the policy decided upon, His Majesty's Government needed 
powers of jurisdiction which at present they had not got, and that the Treaty, which 
was simply directed to the grant of that jurisdiction, would then be followed by the 
issue of an Order in Council ordaining such steps as His Majesty's Government 
deemed necessary for the purpose required. 
His Highness said little at this stage and appeared to regard matters in general 
with a mixture of goodwill and philosophy, though he asked one or two questions to 
which he reverted later. 
I then told him that I had got an explanatory note printed strictly for his personal 
and confidential information, which would acquaint him more fully and better with 
the details of the case, and asked if he would care to read it now. He agreed and Mr. 
Bourdillon handed him the document the text of which had been prepared for this 
purpose by the Colonial Office, together with the Malay translation of the same made 
in Kuala Lumpur. (I would add in parenthesis that these documents had been printed 
at very short notice and with really remarkable efficiency, together with the text of 
the Treaty all ready for signature, by the Government Printing Office at Kuala 
Lumpur before my departure for Singapore). 
The Sultan then proceeded to read the English version-ignoring the Malay-
slowly and with great care, and to ask periodic questions. His first remark, in fact 
before he had begun to read the documents, was an emphatic expression of opinion, 
surprising to those who knew him in pre-Japanese days, that the real essential 
requisite was that there should be a British official at the head of every department to 
ensure that it was properly conducted: he had, he stated, lost all faith in the Malay 
and only knew about five men in his State whom he could trust. 
Other points to which he made early reference were:-
(a) the position as regards the earlier Treaties (I referred him to clause 2 of the 
new Treaty,2 and explained its meaning); 
(b) the question of the postage stamps to be used (I told him that as far as I knew 
nothing had been settled, but that I thought that the old distinction between State 
1 See written answer, H of C Debs, vol 414, cols 255-256, 10 Oct 1945. 
2 Each treaty MacMichael concluded with the rulers contained two key clauses. In Johore's case they read 
as follows: '(1) His Highness the Sultan agrees that his Majesty shall have full power and jurisdiction 
within the State and territory of Johore. (2) Save in so far as the subsisting agreements are inconsistent 
with this Agreement or with such future constitutional arrangements for Malaya as may be approved by 
His Majesty, the said agreements shall remain in full force and effect.' lbrahim had signed a treaty with 
Britain in 1914 agreeing to the appointment of a general· adviser; an exchange of letters at the same time 
had safeguarded certain features of Johore's 'special status'. MacMichael's Report on a Mission to Malaya 
contains the explanatory note issued to the rulers (appendix 1) and the text of each agreement (appendix 
2). The explanatory note was a considerably revised version of 56, Annex I. 
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and State would be maintained in the designs with something added to denote 
unity); 
(c) the question of police badges (I said that I could not answer this: it was a 
matter for discussion and decision at a later stage). 
The Sultan the passed to the financial position of Johore under the new system, 
and expatiated in some detail upon the theme of its solvency and surpluses as 
compared with some of the other States. Was Johore expected to finance these less 
fortunate States? (I explained that it was essential to the whole conception now 
envisaged that the rich should assist the poor in a reasonable measure and that I did 
not think Johore would suffer to any serious extent having regard to the benefit 
accruing to the whole, but that this, and indeed most of the problems arising, would 
have to be the subject of full consideration by the Governor and his Councils after the 
return to Civil Administration). 
The Sultan appeared to find a little difficulty in disentangling the various Councils 
proposed but his most pressing query related to the provision made for proper 
representation of Chinese and Indian opinion. He had, he said, always had an 
Executive Council of his own, 3 upon which these parties were fully represented, and 
it was not very clear to him in what form and by what means this healthy 
manifestation was to continue. He dilated at some length, in this connection, upon 
the nationalist aspirations of the Chinese and the farsighted and ambitious policy of 
their rulers in China in respect of Indonesia in general, and he referred to the need 
for a statesmanlike provision of means whereby there could be some outlet for any 
grievances they felt or views they wished to express. It seemed to me that his views 
on this matter were well-considered and genuine, but their expression may, 
presumably, have been to some extent influenced by a desire to find out to what 
extent non-Malays in Johore would continue to be subject to his control. 
In conclusion His Highness said he would like to study the papers further, and 
enquired as to the next move to be taken. I said that I had ventured to hope that 
when he had had a day or two in which to study the documents, he would feel able to 
sign the Treaty giving His Majesty's Government jurisdiction. His Highness nodded 
and said that he would like to prepare a memorandum expressing his views on the 
various points raised. I welcomed this suggestion cordially but added that I sincerely 
trusted that he would not think it necessary to put those views in the form of 
conditions. He categorically disclaimed any such intention, using the words-which 
he applied equally, by a wave of the hand, to treaty and explanatory note 
alike-"these are all right by me". 
It was finally agreed that we should come and have tea again with him on Saturday 
the 20th October, by which time he hoped to have completed his memorandum and 
be ready to sign the Treaty. I gave him full assurance that all the points he cared to 
raise would receive the fullest consideration from His Majesty's Government-to 
whom I would at once refer them-and we parted on very cordial terms after an 
interview which had been marked at every stage by great dignity, courtesy and 
reasonableness on the part of His Highness. I reported the result very briefly to Sir G. 
Cater by telegram on my return to Singapore (See telegram No. 117 of the 18th 
3 The Johore Constitution of 1895, promulgated by Ibrahim's father (Sultan Abu Bakar), provided for a 
Council of Ministers and a Council of State. 
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October from South East Asia Command.), repeating the telegram to the Supreme 
Allied Commander for his information at the same time. 
Enclosure 2 to 59: note of second interview (4 pm, 20 Oct 1945) 
As arranged at our first interview on the 18th October, Brigadier Newboult, Mr. 
Bourdillon and I, excorted [sic] as before, visited the Sultan at 4 p.m. on the 20th 
October at his palace at Pasir Pelangi. His Highness and Lady Ibrahim met us with 
great cordiality on the porch, and after introducing his third son Tungku Ahmad and 
explaining that his eldest son, Tungku Makhota, was ill, His Highness took us into 
the drawing room. His first question was whether we would like to clear off business 
first and then have tea, or vice versa. Lady Ibrahim pleaded for the latter, and I 
supported her contention. 
After tea we adjourned, as before, to the dining room, where the Sultan produced 
the Secretary who, with his son, was to witness the documents, and the great seal of 
Johore, and Mr. Bourdillon produced the documents for signature. These formalities 
had been very satisfactorily settled beforehand with the Sultan by Brigadier 
Newboult, who called upon him for this purpose on the 19th October. There was no 
hitch or awkwardness at any stage and we signed forthwith without formality or 
discussion and with a running commentary of an almost convivial nature. At the 
close the Sultan heaved a sigh of relief and I said "praise God" in Arabic, to which His 
Highness replied in kind. I should add that I told the Sultan that I did not intend to 
mention that the Treaty had been signed until the Secretary of State had announced 
the fact, and hoped he would follow suit. He at once agreed. 
It was only then that His Highness produced his promised Memorandum 
containing suggestions for the future dispensation of things in Johore.4 He did so 
with an almost deprecatory air, remarking that I must take the Memorandum for 
what it was worth, and that if I saw fit I could throw it in the waste paper basket. I 
replied that I would not dream of such a thing; I would make it my personal care to 
forward the Memorandum to the Secretary of State with all speed. 
I then expressed the fervent hope that we might meet in England, mentioning that 
General Hone had told me at lunch-time that he had wired the Supreme Allied 
Commander, South East Asia, urgently requesting provision of passages for His 
Highness and Lady Ibrahim. I also asked the Sultan to grant me the personal favour 
of a signed photograph. He was pleased at this and gave me three (two of himself in 
different uniforms and one of Lady Ibrahim): he also gave each of the other members 
of the party three other photographs. We then parted with many protestations of 
friendship-which were as sincere on my part as, I firmly believe, they were on that 
of His Highness. 
I reported the result to the Secretary of State at once on my return to Government 
House Singapore by telegram No. 142 from South East Asia Command Headquarters 
Camp, copies of which have been transmitted to the Supreme Allied Commander and 
General Dempsey (General Officer Commanding in Chief, Fourteenth Army). 
4 Ibrahim's memorandum contained three categories of points: (1) those relating to the Sultan's personal 
prestige over which the CO was prepared to make concessions; (2) those reaffirming the pre-war position 
of Johore which the CO could not allow; and (3) miscellaneous matters which, in the CO view, did not 
require answers. See CO 717/148, no 52038 for 1945 and 1946. 
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60 CO 273/675/18, no 5A 25 Oct 1945 
[MacMichael mission]: letter from Sir H MacMichael to Sir G Gater on 
his interview with the Sultan of Selangor 
I send you herewith, in confirmation of my letter of 22nd October1 forwarding the 
notes of my interviews with the Sultan of Johore, a similar set of notes regarding 
Selangor.2 The Treaty with the Sultan was signed at 12.15 on 24th of October at 
Klang in an atmosphere of great friendliness. 
The Sultan of Selangor, whose age is apparently in the early forties, struck me as a 
simple-minded little man with an excitable temperament. One might be tempted to 
dismiss him as a nonentity, but from this criticism I fancy he is saved by his very 
deep devotion to religion. I can imagine his becoming a religious recluse, or an 
ardent fanatic, but I do not see him consenting with cynical resignation to any 
measure which he regarded as derogatory to his faith. His fussy nervousness cannot 
commend itself to the philosophic dignity of the East, but his obvious sincerity 
would always carry some counterweight in the eyes of his people. I should not judge 
him acute or particularly able, but here again sincerity and common sense leave him 
in credit on the balance. 
I am, of course, sending a copy of the notes of my interview to Hone. The Sultan's 
points appear to me very well taken and full of substance. It is worth remarking that 
he never once mentioned finance (except once, in passing reference to tithes), and 
neither he nor the Sultan of Johore raised any difficulty about the omission of "adat": 
in fact it is quite obvious that, as I anticipated, they regard it as covered by the phrase 
"matters relating to religion."3 
1 See 59. 2 Not printed. 
3 Replying on 17 Nov, Gater wrote:-
'Once again I would like to express my very warm admiration of your skilful handling of the Sultan. It 
seems to me to have been a well-conceived operation carried out with perfect taste, and to have secured all 
our objectives. 
I greatly enjoyed reading your fascinating description of the scene on both occasions. I am submitting 
the papers to the Secretary of State who, I know, will read them with great delight. 
I send you all good wishes for equal successes in the remaining negotiations. While I do not want to 
hurry you, from our point of view here the sooner they can be completed the better' (CO 273/675/18). 
61 CO 273/675/5, no 4 31 Oct 1945 
[Post-war rehabilitation]: British Military Administration, Malaya, 
fortnightly report no 4, for the period ending 31 Oct [Extract] 
General.-The rate of progress in general rehabilitation is so accelerated that a great 
strain has been put on the available staff during this period. Though the machinery 
of the Administration has now settled down to efficient working, the volume of work 
and the variety of problems have made the tasks of the Administration very difficult. 
The first excitement and relief consequent upon the surrender of the Japanese 
Forces having evaporated, the bulk of the people find that their lot has not yet 
materially improved as an immediate result of victory. Prices are high, foodstuffs 
(particularly rice) are scarce, wages have been re-established in terms of British 
[61) OCT 1945 177 
dollars at pre-invasion levels, profiteering is occurring, there are few piece-goods and 
cigarettes, and unemployment exists on a considerable scale. Conditions of peace, a 
sympathetic Government and charitable relief alone do not satisfy the desires of the 
people which demand, on the economic side, an immediate return to pre-war 
prosperity. Stories of the sufferings of other countries, of the general world shortages 
of all essential commodities and of shipping and other difficulties provide very small 
consolation to five and a half million people who have already suffered enough under 
the Japanese. The man in the street most requires regular work, sufficient wages and 
enough to buy at reasonable prices. It is clear that these desiderata cannot be 
achieved over-night but there is bewilderment because of the apparently slow 
progress towards normal conditions. There is uncertainty, too, as to the future 
course of events. Is there going to be enough rice for the next month's ration; are 
wages going up or prices coming down? 
This state of anxiety in the minds of the people provides a fertile field for the 
agitator and the extremist and they have not been slow to try to exploit their 
opportunity; they do this covertly but none the less with determination. Conse-
quently there have been sporadic occurrences of labour stoppages, strikes, political 
meetings, demonstrations and minor disturbances during the past fortnight in 
various parts of the territory. All have petered out before assuming serious 
proportions but they are 'indicative of the general feeling of uncertainty and 
bewilderment which exists. Though the B.M.A. by press statements and other forms 
of publicity has endeavoured to counter this state of affairs, the fact must be faced 
that the population is involved in a tiresome struggle to return to normal times when 
the world is still in a state of upheaval even though it is now at peace. 
Certain sections of Malays and Chinese have become, as a result of Japanese 
occupation, increasingly politically conscious and articulate, and now that they are 
permitted to organise themselves and to express their feelings freely, wild talk and 
over-statements, some of a seditious nature, are apt to be indulged in on the Chinese 
side. Many of the youths of the country have been imbued with Communist 
sentiments, though with very little knowledge of the exact tenets of Communism. 
These young Chinese were a thorn in the side of the Japanese particularly during the 
latter part of the enemy occupation of Malaya, either as party agitators or active 
guerillas. They organised themselves into local Committees and societies and many 
are still armed and most are arrogant. They resort to the intimidation of others 
(including those of their own race) and by a show of force and threats extort rice and 
money in local areas where police or troops are thin on the ground. 
Despite these disturbing factors it is clear that the articulate agitators have no real 
following though many people are nervous of their activities. However it is clear for 
all to see that the country is making remarkable progress and the power of the 
Administration for good is rapidly making itself felt. Wherever the Administration is 
firmly established, lawlessness is speadily diminishing and the lot of the people 
improving. But it is against a background of considerable uncertainty and dis-
quietude, due entirely to adverse economic factors, that the following report must be 
viewed .... 
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62 WO 203/5642, no 74/16/45 8 Nov 1945 
'Heads of agreement between Colonial Office and War Office': CO note 
on the steps required to facilitate the transition from military to civil 
administration in Malaya, Borneo, and Hong Kong 
1. The Colonial Office will endeavour as early as possible to resolve the 
constitutional problems in Malaya and Borneo. 
2. It is recognized that the continuation of the military administration in any of 
these territories would have to be justified by circumstances in the territory which 
might necessitate its continuance. 
3. The Colonial Office will appoint Civil Governors and have them briefed and 
ready for consultation in good time before the target dates mentioned in paragraph 
10 below. It would be desirable that they should be available for consultation in 
London at least two months before these dates. 
4. The War Office will endeavour to build up the Military Administration of the 
territories as envisaged by approved War Establishments as far as possible with 
personnel acceptable to the Colonial Office and suitable to continue serving under 
the Civil Administration when set up. It is agreed that the Colonial Office will 
endeavour to accelerate recruiting for all those territories on a civilian basis and 
should endeavour progressively to build up the civilian personnel as far as possible to 
the full complement required for the Civil Administration. The War Office agrees 
that all the personnel recruited by the Colonial Office for the eventual Civil 
Administration can be attached to and commence work under the Military Adminis-
tration pending the transfer to Civil Administration. 
5. The Colonial Office agrees to press on with the creation of the necessary 
machinery of civil government and to prepare the necessary legislation required to 
give effect to any constitutional changes which His Majesty's Government may 
decide to effect. 
6. The War Office and Colonial Office agree to press on with detailed arrange-
ments whereby suitable military officers serving with the Military Administration can 
be released or otherwise made available for service under the eventual Civil 
Administration: and whereby civil officers can be appointed to and absorbed in the 
Military Administration pending the transfer to Civil Administration. 
7. The Colonial Office and War Office will do their utmost to carry out their 
existing undertakings in regard to the procurement and delivery of supplies. The War 
Office will also facilitate the introduction and distribution, during the military 
period, of supplies and stores beyond the "disease and unrest" standard. 
8. Borneo. The War Office will initiate discussion with G.H.Q. for the handing 
over of the Australian Military Administration in Borneo by the B.B.C.A.U. (responsi-
ble to the Australian Commander) to a British Military Administration by No. 50 
C.A.U. (responsible to His Majesty's Government through the War Office) keeping 
SACSEA and the Colonial Office informed. 
9. Meetings. It is agreed that representatives of the War Office and Colonial Office 
will continue to meet every fortnight to report progress and consider outstanding 
difficulties. 
10. Target dates. It is agreed that for the purposes of planning and without 
prejudice to the eventual transfer dates which must be subject to military require-
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ments, the local situation and recommendation by Theatre Commanders and civil 
arrangements, the War Office and Colonial Office should endeavour to work to the 
following target dates for the transfer:-
Malaya 1st March, 19461 
Singapore 1st March, 1946 
Borneo 1st March, 1946 
Hong Kong 1st February, 1946 
1 The resumption of civil government was later postponed from 1 Mar to 1 Apr, see 70. 
63 CO 273/67517 16 Nov 1945 
[Reactions of Rubber Growers' Association to British plans for 
Malaya]: minute by J J Paskin to Sir G Gater about a meeting with T B 
Barlow1 
I had a visit on Wednesday from Mr. Barlow, the Chairman of the Rubber Growers' 
Association, to talk about the announcement about the new constitutional arrange-
ments proposed for Malaya. 
He said that Sir Frank Swettenham,2 at a recent meeting of the R.G.A., had 
expressed great concern about these proposals and had urged that they should be 
fought not only on the grounds that they constituted a breach of faith with Malaya 
and were intrinsically bad, but also on the ground that, from the point of view of 
bodies like the R.G.A. they were "bad business" since they would be bound to give 
rise to unrest in the country, and that this would be bad for business. Mr. Barlow, 
speaking for himself and not merely echoing the views of Sir Frank Swettenham, 
thought that the proposals would be very unpalatable indeed to the Malays, that 
therefore the old friendly atmosphere in Malaya would be destroyed, and that on 
these grounds it would be very much more difficult than in the past to carry on such 
industries as rubber planting. 
I assured Mr. Barlow that so far as our information went the proposals have not 
met with the adverse reception in Malaya which he feared. Mr. Barlow thought this 
might perhaps be the case amongst the "high" circles with which Sir Harold 
MacMichael had mixed, but what about the generality of the population? I replied 
that we had had reports not only from Sir Harold MacMichael but also from the 
Military Administration whose officers were in touch with the general population. 
As regards the suggestion that, by displeasing the Malays we should be creating a 
bad atmosphere for the conduct of business in Malaya, I reminded Mr. Barlow that 
there were other races in Malaya and that the rubber industry in particular depended 
largely on Indian labour and that the attitude of the Government of India had been 
adverse to the recruitment of Indian labour unless Indians were given equality of 
political rights in Malaya, which would in fact be achieved under this statement of 
1 Thomas Bradwell Barlow, chairman of the Rubber Growers' Association in 1945-1946. 
2 Sir Frank Swettenham (1850-1946); served in Malaya 1870--1904; resident general Federated Malay 
States, 1896--1904; governor and high commissioner 1901-1904; during his retirement he joined the 
boards of a number of rubber companies. 
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policy. Mr. Barlow was not very much impressed by this. He thought if we could have 
brought ourselves to hold out a threat to the Government of India that, unless they 
were co-operative, Indian labour would be replaced by Javanese, they would have 
come to heel. I contented myself with saying that this problem was not quite so 
simple as that. 
As regards the general idea underlying the statement of policy, I reminded Mr. 
Barlow that all the political parties are committed to the advancement of dependent 
territories, such as Malaya, towards self-government and that it seemed clear that 
this goal could never be reached by Malaya unless it could be unified and unless the 
people of that country, of all races, could be brought to a sense of common 
citizenship and loyalty to Malaya as a country. I gathered the impression that Mr. 
Barlow was not himself a devotee of the ideal of self-government for dependent 
peoples. 
Mr. Barlow then reverted to the theme that, before coming out with a strong 
positive statement of policy H.M.G. should have set in motion machinery for 
ascertaining the wishes of the local inhabitants; and in this connection he again 
mentioned the old "pledges" which had been given in the past. As to these pledges I 
reminded him that times and circumstances have changed and that after full 
consideration of what had happened in the past, H.M.G. had come to the conclusion 
that the declared policy was not only an enlightened one and offered virtually the 
only means by which Malaya could achieve political progress, but also that it would 
be recognised to be so by the inhabitants of the country. 
As regards the form of the announcement, Mr. Barlow said that he would have had 
less quarrel with it if it had started off by saying that Sir Harold MacMichael was to be 
sent out to explore the ground with a view to securing the agreement of the local 
populations to the declared policy. To this I replied that the whole matter had been 
most carefully considered and that the conclusion had been reached that a statement 
on the lines of that issued provided the best atmosphere for Sir Harold MacMichael's 
mission. 
I do not think I am able to flatter myself that Mr. Barlow was convinced that we 
have set about this matter in the right way, but at least he was good enough to 
recognise that the matter had received the fullest consideration and that all 
conflicting points of view had been taken fully into account before the policy was 
decided upon. 
64 CO 537/1541, no 18 30 Nov- 3 Dec 1945 
[MacMichael mission]: notes by Sir H MacMichael on interviews with 
the regent (later sultan) of Kedah 
[Having obtained the signatures of the rulers of Johore, Selangor, Pahang, Negri 
Sembilan and Perak, MacMichael turned to the four northern states where the 
incumbents, who had succeeded during the Japanese occupation, yet lacked British 
'recognition'. After Kedah, he went to Perlis, Kelantan and Trengganu in turn. In his 
letter of 8 Dec accompanying these notes, MacMichael told how Kedah 'gave considerable 
difficulty' and that 'the Regent (now Sultan) was obviously moved to the very depths of his 
rather shallow being by what he seemed to regard as the surrender of proud independence 
to a state of ignominious subjection.' MacMichael described Badlishah as being 'of the 
small shy and retiring "failed B.A." type, unstable and inclined to be introspective and 
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lonely. At times he presented rather a pathetic figure.' Be that as it may, on 29 Jan 
Badlishah despatched a cablegram of protest to the secretary of state and followed this up 
with a long letter on 11 Feb (see CO 537/1555, no 19). He also wrote to former Malayan 
civil servants in Britain such as Sir Richard Winstedt (see 73, note 1) and a letter of 
protest from the sultan was read out in the House of Commons by Leonard Gammans (see 
ibid) during the debate on 8 Mar, see H of C Debs, vol 420, col 659. On the death of 
Badlishah in July 1958, the then secretary of state (Lennox-Boyd), minuted: 'I think the 
Sultan of Kedah (for whom I had great respect as a hard working & honourable Ruler) 
was quite right in being wholly opposed to the MacMichael proposals. This makes me 
even more anxious to say I'm sorry he's dead.' See CO 1030/766.] 
Note of first interview (4 pm, 29 November 1945) 
It is only a few minutes' drive from the house where the Senior Civil Affairs Officer 
(Colonel Day) resides to the Regent's Palace outside Alor Star. My party arrived by 
appointment at 4 o'clock preceded by Colonel Day, who was on the steps with His 
Highness to greet me. (It had originally been intended and arranged that the Regent, 
still not having been recognised as Sultan, should come and see me at the Residency, 
but I altered the arrangement, with the full agreement of Brigadier Newboult and 
Colonel Day, by telephone before leaving Taiping, on the grounds that the cause of 
courtesy was better served by my calling on one whose status as Regent was 
accepted) . 
After introductions we went upstairs to a large, comfortable drawing room, where 
we had some preliminary conversation on general subjects. 
The Regent is a small man, stockily built, and his figure hardly permits him any 
great natural dignity, but he impressed me as a man of sense and honesty, courteous 
and friendly, and possessed of considerable self-assurance. The conversation was 
mostly about the Mohammedan religion and the Arab world, and he discussed these 
subjects with lively interest and good judgement. 
After some twenty minutes we went downstairs to tea, and thereafter, on the 
initiative of His Highness, returned to the drawing room for our discussion. I was 
accompanied, as usual, by Brigadier Newboult and Mr Bourdillon, and also by 
Colonel Day, whose long personal friendship with the Regent made his presence 
particularly valuable. 
I began, with the Regent's concurrence, by explaining the reasons for my visit and 
by outlining the policy upon which His Majesty's Government had decided. My 
remarks followed the general lines which I had pursued on previous occasions in 
other States, save in two respects, in which the position in Kedah warranted some 
variation. First, I pointed out that in addition to my task of seeking his co-operation 
in the new policy (at this point I named in confidence the five Rulers who had already 
signed fresh Treaties), I had been granted discretion by His Majesty's Government in 
the matter of recognising him as Sultan of Kedah, his appointment to that office 
having taken place during the Japanese occupation. I expressed the hope that this 
would present no difficulty. Secondly, having been informed that opposition in 
Kedah, which in the past has prided itself on its separatist tendencies, might be 
directed against the proposal for Union rather than against that for common 
citizenship, I dealt with the latter point first and then devoted special emphasis to the 
former, making no bones of the fact that its implementation would of course call for 
a departure from the existing Treaty. 
My explanations concluded, I handed the Regent a copy of the new Treaty and of 
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the Explanatory Note. 1 He read both very carefully and without comment and I then 
said that I hoped he found nothing unpalatable in them. He replied that they were 
"very devastating", and subsequent discussion revealed his reasons for so describing 
them. The point which disquieted him most, and to which he constantly returned, 
was the surrender of power by the Rulers. The previous position, he said, was being 
suddenly reversed. Hitherto the British Advisers or Residents, under the authority of 
the High Commissioner, had advised the Rulers. Henceforward it would be the 
Rulers who would advise the Resident Commissioners and the Governor, who need 
not take their advice; and moreover, even with this diminished status, the scope of 
the Rulers would apparently be restricted to religious matters. I contested this 
interpretation, and pointed out that on the contrary the field of the Rulers' influence 
would be greatly increased by their membership of the Governor's Advisory Council, 
which would discuss many matters of pan-Malayan importance and would by no 
means confine itself to religious questions. It was true that the final executive power 
would pass into the hands of the Governor, but this was no more than a de jure 
recognition of an already existing state of affairs. It was idle to deny that the 
Governor had previously exercised the real power, in that the Rulers had been bound 
to accept the advice of the Residents (or Advisers) and it was only right that the 
power and the overt responsibility should be in the same hands. His Highness 
demurred to the suggestion that the Rulers had always been bound to accept the 
advice of the Residents and referred to the right of appeal, under the existing Treaty ,2 
to the High Commissioner or the Secretary of State. I responded that in future not 
only would this right be preserved but contact with the Governor would be greatly 
strengthened through the medium of the Governor's Advisory Council of Rulers. I 
went on to say that, if I might presume to offer His Highness a word of advice, I 
thought he had a great opportunity which it would be very foolish to miss. It was 
fortunate that His Majesty's Government had not concluded-as would have been 
consonant with modern conceptions of democratic government-that the Sultanates 
were altogether out of date. They had not done so. They had realised that the Rulers 
were a loyal body of men whose service to the country, and particularly in support of 
their own comparatively backward Malays, could be invaluable; but were the policy to 
be modified, the change would not be in the direction of greater power for the 
Rulers. 
In spite of all reasoning, it was evident that the Regent, naturally jealous of his 
personal prestige, could not readily accommodate himself to the surrender of 
nominal power. His line of thought, as was to be expected, was fortified by arguments 
about the independent status of the Unfederated Malay States in general and Kedah 
in particular. Thus he persisted in comparing the Governor's Advisory Council to the 
Durbars of the past, for which he evinced no particular affection and which, he said, 
had rarely been attended by the Rulers of the Unfederated States. He also drew a 
sharp distinction between these Rulers and those of the Federated States, saying that 
the former had not, like the latter, handed over their executive authority to the 
Residents. And when, at an early stage in the conversation, he remarked that Malaya 
would now be "just like a Colony", (to which I replied that he could surely not find 
fault with the forms of Colonial Administration, since the whole purpose of the 
1 See 59, note 2. 2 ie clause 5 ofKedah's 1923 treaty with the British. 
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changes was to make Malaya fit for self-government) it was plain that he was 
picturing a loss of autonomy not for Malaya as a whole but for the State of Kedah. 
Brigadier Newboult asked him what alternative he could envisage to a Malayan 
Union. Kedah could not progress-could not even survive- as an isolated enclave. I 
endorsed this view, remarking with a smile that His Highness was perhaps thinking 
of the alternative of returning to Siamese control.3 Luckily, I added, Malaya was a 
rich country, with a great future if only she could unite. I went on to say that, had 
His Highness's qualms been well-founded, they would surely have been voiced by the 
Sultan of Johore. When the Regent objected that he was not bound to follow Johore's 
example, I answered that I had not intended to suggest such a thing. I had merely 
pointed out that if the degradation of the Rulers' status were in fact implied in the 
new policy, it was most unlikely that the Sultan of Johore should have failed to notice 
the fact and raise strong objections. 
The above paragraphs summarise the main part of our discussion. There was one 
brief reference to citizenship, when His Highness expressed the usual fears about 
Chinese immigration. I said that future immigration would be controlled in 
accordance with the economic needs of the country, and added that the citizenship 
proposals would safeguard the effective Malay majority. 
Finally, the Regent said that he would consult the members of his State Council 
(whose assent is necessary under the existing Treaty).4 I welcomed this proposal, and 
suggested for his consideration that Colonel Day's assistance in explaining matters to 
the members of the Council might be of value to him. It was agreed that this point 
should be left over, as would the date and time of my next visit, for subsequent 
arrangement by telephone. 
The friendly way in which His Highness, at the end of the proceedings, led me to 
an inner room and showed me the lavish wedding regalia of the Kedah Ruling House, 
indicated that he did not allow his feelings on the subject-matter of our conversation 
to affect his personal courtesy. But of the strength of his feelings there can be no 
doubt. Colonel Day remained behind for a few minutes after I had left, and the 
Regent again expressed to him the sense of shock which he had sustained, adding 
that although the manner was much more polite, the technique adopted by His 
Majesty's Government appeared to be not unlike the familiar Japanese technique of 
bullying. 
Note of second interview (4.30 pm, 2 December 1945) 
Foreword. The whole of November 30th, December 1st and most of December 2nd 
was devoted, so far as can be judged, by the State Council (and maybe the Regent) to 
an elaborate series of manoeuvres, intrigues and procrastinations. The dominant 
motive on the part of all alike was unquestionably a deep reluctance to agree to any 
course which would result in any diminution of the degree of independance [sic] 
exercised by Kedah in the past both under British rule before the Japanese conquest 
and under the purely nominal rule of Siam between 1942 [1943] and 1945. The 
difficulty, equally obvious to all, was to visualise any alternative to acceptance of the 
3 Kedah, having been transferrred from Siamese to British suzerainty in 1909, was handed back to Siam by 
the Japanese in Oct 1943. Thai occupation had not been a happy experience for the Kedah royal family. 
4 ie clause 3 of the 1923 treaty. 
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new policy short of a flat refusal of which one consequence would clearly be the 
non-recognition of the Regent as Sultan. 
Efforts to evade the issue and assert self-importance almost to the point of 
discourtesy took many forms:-Friday (November 30th) was unsuited to the 
discussion of business; Saturday morning Uustifiably in this case) necessitated the 
presence of some of the Council at the farewell ceremony in honour of the A.J .A. 
(Anti-Japanese Army); Saturday afternoon was devoted to preliminary discussions 
between the Regent and his Council, but no attempt was made to avail themselves of 
the services of Brigadier Newboult or Colonel Day though these were offered; 
telephonic enquiries as to progress addressed to Haji Sheriff, . the State Secretary 
(who seems to have been the real protagonist of obstruction) elicited replies 
suggesting that though he, Haji Sheriff, was working hard for the cause of reason, 
the Regent felt very deeply on the whole subject; a visit by Colonel Day to the Regent 
left the impression that while His Highness was prepared to sign, the State Council 
felt grave difficulties; no fixed time could be given by which any meeting was likely to 
be over; all attempted arrangements were obscured by a cloud of hopes and 
probabilities unlighted by any ray of certainty about anything. The final effort at 
evasion (mid-day December 2nd), when Colonel Day again visited the Regent while 
his Council was with him, consisted in the production of doubts, juridical in basis, 
(a) as to whether the State Council could be said to be properly constituted when 
there was no British Adviser, (b) as to whether there could be a Regent when there 
was no Sultan. The latter point was not difficult to answer, and the first was 
adequately met by the terms of the Interpretations Proclamation (No. 4 of September 
22nd, 1945) which makes it clear that a Senior Civil Affairs Officer is empowered to 
exercise the functions of an Adviser (among which is membership of the State 
Council). This last hurdle cleared and the Regent and Council having assured 
Colonel Day that they would sign since they saw no alternative open, I was prepared 
to go at once and clinch matters (1.30 p.m.), but was met by a suggestion, 
transmitted by Colonel Day on the telephone, that signature should be deferred till 
tomorrow. This, in the absence of any perceptible cause for delay, I declined on the 
ground of other engagements. By way of counter I was told His Highness had not yet 
eaten anything today and hoped I would not come before 4.30. To this I at once 
agreed on the understanding that there would be no further hitch in the proceed-
ings. 
At 4.30 I arrived with my party at the Palace. As before, Colonel Day had preceded me 
and was at the entrance with His Highness when I drove up. They were accompanied 
by Haji Mohamed Sheriff, Tunku Yaacob and Che Kassim, the members of the Kedah 
State Council, to whom I was introduced. Tunku Yaacob is the full brother of His 
Highness and the Principal Agricultural Officer of the State. Haji Sheriff holds the 
office of Secretary of Government, and Che Kassim that of Under-Secretary. 
Thereupon we proceeded upstairs to the scene of our previous conversation, and 
seated ourselves at the round table. I began by outlining, as I saw it, the programme 
before us. I observed that under Clause 3 of the existing Treaty the written consent of 
the State Council was required before the new Treaty could be signed, and added that 
I had already caused a draft Council Minute to be prepared, which the members of 
the Council, if they concurred in its terms, could sign forthwith. (In fact the terms of 
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the draft were already known to the Regent and the Council members, having been 
shown to them by Colonel Day the same morning). 
The next step which I envisaged was my formal recognition of His Highness as 
Sultan (on his assurance that he was prepared to sign the Treaty), and thereafter the 
signature of the Treaty could take place. 
No sooner had I finished than His Highness pointed out that the Adviser was a 
member of the State Council, and questioned the validity of a Council Minute to 
which the Adviser, not being in existence, could not subscribe. The re-emergence of 
this juridical objection, which had already once been settled, necessitated my 
actually showing His Highness a copy of the Interpretations Proclamation which 
confers on the Senior Civil Affairs Officer all the powers and functions of the Adviser. 
The text of the document satisfied the Regent, and Haji Sheriff remarked in 
extenuation that His Highness had not previously seen it. 
Next it emerged that the Sultan of Kedah is President of the State Council, and it 
was represented that the recognition of His Highness must therefore take place 
before the State Council could be properly constituted and could conduct business. I 
replied that I saw no objection to this, and proceeded at once to ask the members of 
the Council whether they were ready to sign the Minute, and His Highness whether 
he was ready to sign the Treaty. To both questions the answer was in the affirmative, 
though Tunku Yaacob said that he gave his consent "because there was no 
alternative". 
I then rose to my feet, the rest of the company following suit, and announced that 
I had much pleasure in formally recognising His Highness on behalf of His Majesty's 
Government as Sultan of the State of Kedah. I added my good wishes for himself and 
his State. His Highness bowed, and we sat down again. The question next arose 
whether the Sultan himself as President of the Council, should sign the Minute, but 
it was concluded that this was unnecessary, since his signature of the Treaty itself 
would constitute his written assent. The Minute was thereupon signed in duplicate 
by the other members of the Council, including Colonel Day. One signed copy has 
been retained by the Sultan and the other by myself, pending the Secretary of State's 
directions. A third copy is attached to this record as an Appendix.5 
I now asked Mr Bourdillon to produce the Treaty itself for signature, but at this 
point the Sultan said he would like to say a few words. He then delivered, standing, a 
short speech which he had obviously prepared with the minutest care and 
memorised. He said that this was the most distressing and painful moment of his 
whole life. Henceforward he would lose the loyalty, the respect and the affection of 
his subjects, and he would be pursued with curses towards his grave by the 
ill-informed. He called upon Allah to witness his act and to protect him for the 
future. He would sign because no other course was open. 
I felt that I could not let the proceedings terminate on this note, so as soon as the 
Sultan had sat down I rose to my feet for the second time and replied, beginning with 
an expres?ion of my deep regret that he had felt bound to take so pessimistic a view. 
He had referred to the curses of the ill-informed. Surely he would be unwise to pay 
attention to these. Nobody could prevent fools from talking; they would do so until 
the end of the world. What was infinitely more important was that the well-informed, 
those who knew and understood the facts, would appreciate that what had been done 
5 Not printed. 
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was-as I myself was entirely convinced-for the benefit and prosperity not only of 
Kedah, but of Malaya as a whole. it was a thousand pities, I continued, that he had 
forced me to report the expression of his reluctance to the Secretary of State, as I 
must now do. His Majesty's Government had asked for His Highness 's co-operation, 
and it would have been much better had he trusted their assurances that they would 
maintain his prestige and continue to protect his people. However, I appreciated his 
feelings and would faithfully report them, in accordance with my duty. 
The Treaty was then signed at 5.10 p.m. (Tunku Yaacob , and Haji Sheriff 
witnessing His Highness's signature and Mr Bourdillon my own), and after we had 
partaken of tea downstairs I took my departure. The one relieving feature of an 
unhappy episode was the fact that the Sultan, during tea, emerged from his gloom 
and spoke with cheerful animation, and without a vestige of personal rancour 
towards i:nyself, of his experiences under the Japanese. Before leaving I again 
expressed to him my good wishes, and asked if I might call on him again before I left 
the neighbourhood to say farewell. He bowed in acknowledgement and said that in 
any case he hoped I would have a pleasant journey home. 
65 WO 203/5302 3 Dec 1945 
'Malaya's political climate', IV for 10-30 Nov: report by V W W S 
Purcell from Singapore [Extract] 
... It cannot be disguised that the Forces in Malaya are at present very unpopular 
with the people. The latter welcomed them at the beginning but the early goodwill 
has largely passed and there is a growing resentment. This is reflected in the current 
rumours and comment, in allusions in the Press (e.g. a skit in which sailors go away 
without paying) and some of them are no less damaging because they are witty 
(Asiatic wit, of course, being understood). The criticism differs with the various 
classes of Asiatics, but in Singapore the rudeness and the high-handedness of some 
officers, the careless way in which vehicles are often driven, and the ill discipline of 
many troops are common subjects of conversation. Robbery by troops is alleged to be 
widespread, and according to talk up-country rape by Indian soldiers is far 
commoner than reported cases suggest. The impression is that the authorities are 
very lenient with the offenders and take no pains to trace them. The huge Black 
Market in stolen Service stores is the subject of marvel. Chinese merchants say that 
the ricketty economy of Malaya is threatened with dislocation by the surfeit of 
currency due to the presence of the Army. But perhaps more acute and bitter than 
any other resentment is that there are so many civilian buildings and houses 
occupied by the Services. In particular there is not a single Chinese girls' school open 
because their premises are occupied. They cannot receive grants-in-aid, the teachers 
are unemployed, the children roam the streets. 
It is very hard for the newcomer to detect this attitude among a population who 
are masters of restraint-indeed of self-repression-until they explode in uncontrol-
led hysteria. They vent their grievances however to myself and my staff to whom they 
feel that they can speak without reprisal. (The eloquent invective of the Headmistress 
of the Nanyang Girls' School would blister the ear drums of the officer responsible 
for the continued occupation of her school, whoever he may be.) 
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Regulations, presumably framed in London, lay down that civilians serving with 
B.M.A. shall have the same status as officers for rations and amenities-unless they 
happen to be Asiatics. Thus the Managing Director of the Overseas Chinese Bank and 
Mr. H.S. Lee1 who is doing such good service in Selangor cannot get rations, 
cigarettes or any other N.A.A.F.I. supplies. All the diplomacy and political skill in the 
world cannot avail against such crass stupidities. 
The unpopularity of the Services extends to the B.M.A. It is disconcerting to an old 
Malayan temporarily in uniform to see an expression of stolid defensiveness dissolve 
into a smile when its owner realises that he is dealing with a friend who knows his 
language and not with the Army of Occupation. 
It may seem ungrateful that the natives should feel in this way towards the Army 
that has liberated them. But they do not look at it like that. In their minds they make 
no distinction between the heroes of Burma and the parasites and camp followers. 
They judge people merely as they find them. 
The Leftist Press intersperses the shrill vituperation of the crapulous street-walker 
with articles of surprising reasonableness. The steadier Nanyang Siang Pau2 even 
dares to admonish the communists in a very excellent article (17.11.45). This is the 
first time a newspaper has had the guts to do it. .. . 
1 H S Lee (Lee Hau Shik) (?1899/1901-1988); a Malayan-born Chinese; educated at St John's College, 
Cambridge; possessed extensive interests in tin mining and rubber estates in Selangor; a staunch KMT 
supporter in Kuala Lumper; during the Japanese invasion Lee escaped to India and became a Liaison 
Officer in negotiations between the Chinese government and the British, with the rank of colonel in the 
Chinese army; was president of the Selangor Chinese Chamber of Commerce, 1946-1948, and later 
became a principal leader of the Malayan Chinese Association. 
2 Nanyang Siang Pau, Chinese-language newspaper based in Singapore, 1923--1981, and strongly 
influenced by the KMT after the war. 
66 CO 273/675/18, no 20 31 Dec 1945 
'Political position in Malaya with regard to the new policy proposals': 
memorandum by Brigadier A T Newboult 
[By the turn of the year Newboult (in this document), Mountbatten (see 67), and Hone 
(see 68) were urging London to be flexible in the implementation of policy. In response 
Hall reassured SACSEA that flexibility and local consultation were built into the 
constitution (see Hall to Mountbatten, 4 Feb 1946, CO 537/1528, no 42).) 
As the conclusion of my secondment to Sir Harold MacMichael there are certain 
impressions which stand out very clearly and I have written these notes and made 
some suggestions in order to assist the Colonial Office in the final stage of 
preparation before the Civil Government is restored in the Malay Peninsula. All our 
discussions were with the Rulers themselves and in some cases with some of the 
leading Malays who were called in for consultation by their Ruler. These Malays 
varied from the died-in-the-wool conservatives of the old school and the progressive 
and intelligent men of the younger generation. Not only amongst the Rulers but 
amongst the leading Malays is the wide range of mentality manifest. 
2. It would be fair to say that the most noticeable common ground was the trust 
reposed in the British Government. As the Sultan of Kelantan said 'You only give a 
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power of attorney to a person you trust'. The most difficult case was Kedah and for 
some unknown reason we were kept at arms length and all our discussions were kept 
on a strictly formal (and painful) level. Kedah has always prized what it has regarded 
as a greater degree of independence, fostered by the clause in the former agreement 
requiring the State Council's written consent to any form of merger with another 
State. That this feeling of independence was a false one has not been admitted by 
them and I think that they seriously consider themselves capable of setting up an 
independent State subject only to assistance from the British Government in matters 
concerning relations with States outside their borders. It is all the more remarkable 
that this should be possible in a State which is in many respects more advanced than 
any other. The local Government managed to keep its machinery in working order 
very efficiently with practically no interference in detail by the occupying powers, 
and nothing would have pleased them more than a substitution of the corrupt but 
disinterested Siamese administration by the just and incorruptible British. Govern-
ment, as long as this Government did not interfere more than its predecessor in 
purely local administrative routine. On our re-occupation, the new policy came as a 
ruder shock than elsewhere because their hopes of independence suffered a greater 
set-back. Kedah is parochialism 'in excelsis'. We must take some of the blame for 
this, but we must make allowance for this feeling in our dealings in the future and 
direct special efforts at correcting their misapprehensions and fears. With the 
material available this should not be impossible. 
3. For the rest, the Union proposal met with very little criticism. In some cases it 
received support: in others it was regarded as inevitable, but not accepted without 
misgivings. No State has forgotten the excessive centralisation in the Federated 
Malay States in the years up to 1930 and their misgivings are that Union spells 
centralisation. It is most important that this point should be corrected in authorita-
tive statements on policy. The States will wish to retain control in matters of local 
administration and stress should be laid on the fact that there will be a delegation of 
such powers from the central government "as can best be exercised" by local bodies. 
The extent of this delegation can only be determined in actual practice, but a 
moment's reflection will show that it will be physically impossible for the central 
government to exercise powers of local detailed administration. There is a human, 
and universal, tendency in any central authority to take unto itself too much work 
and responsibility and this tendency will have to be combated. I am sure that States 
will not remain silent if they consider that powers which should be exercised by them 
are being usurped. 
4. On the formation of a Union there will be a mass of problems arising from local 
variations which cannot be solved by a single stroke of the pen. This will all take time 
and I have no fears that they cannot be solved as long as the urge for uniformity is 
kept within reasonable bounds. In no instance will the existing variations be more 
evident than in the personalities and capabilities of the people who will now be 
thrown together on Union Councils and Boards. Every presiding officer will have to 
exercise the greatest tact in encouraging the shyer and less intelligent members to 
come foward in debate and not allow themselves to be submerged by their more 
forceful brethren. This applies equally amongst Malays themselves as amongst 
Malays and other races. 
5. This variation in personalities is very noticeable amongst the Rulers. The 
range extends from the Sultan of Johore to the new Raja of Perlis. The success of the 
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Advisory Council of Rulers will depend largely on how far the newer and less forceful 
Rulers take their place in debate. The scope of the Council is at the Governor's 
discretion, but I am convinced that it will form not only a useful Council for advice 
on subjects of common interest but a valuable index of the progress of thought in the 
acceptance of the new policy. It is worthy of remark that the added weight which will 
inevitably be derived from the views of the Sultans in Advisory Council was not 
appreciated, though it was repeatedly stressed. I formed the idea that this Council 
was generally regarded as window dressing and the increased influence it would give 
Sultans on questions of common interest was not fully appreciated. 
6. At the moment the Rulers have signed the new agreements in the knowledge 
that His Majesty's Government intends to put into effect the new policy. It cannot be 
claimed that the idea of a Union or Common Citizenship has been properly 
appreciated by the majority of people. So far discussions have taken place with the 
Rulers only and public comment on the proposals has been noticeable by its absence. 
As further details are announced and as the time for the return of the Civil 
Government gets closer there will be more and more discussion. We must not expect 
a universal acceptance of the proposals as they stand. Little thought has been given 
locally to th ·· implications of the new policy. We are, in fact, far in advance of general 
public opinion. After all it has taken over three years of hard thinking by a number of 
people at home to arrive at the policy as announced. During that time the people of 
the country were cut off from all outside communications and few of them gave the 
future constitutional set-up a second thought. Sufficient unto the day was the end of 
the Japanese occupation. The result is that we are far ahead of the rest of the country 
and it is essential to give them a chance of catching up. This will require a proper 
publicity campaign and careful nursing. It also demands insistence at the moment 
only on essentials to the working of a Union. Other steps will follow automatically in 
due course and by common consent, whereas the use of force now would only cause 
resentment and arouse fears and suspicions. There is sufficient common sense in the 
country to warrant this hope. It must always be remembered that in addition to 
introducing a radical change in policy (and it is a radical change and should be 
admitted as such) we are trying to restore a country which has with difficulty 
survived three and a half years occupation by a ruthless enemy. At the moment the 
strongest propaganda weapon would be the import of food and consumer goods to 
the available absorptive capacity of the country. Promises of good things to come, of 
a bright political future do not mean so much to a hungry underfed man, dressed in 
rags and snort of the necessities of home and trade. When these have been met he 
will be ready to think of future policy. 
7. The Malayan Citizenship proposal has caused far more heartburning than that 
for Union. This is largely on the score that no one can hazard a guess as to the 
number of aliens who will be automatically admitted to citizenship, and there is no 
certainty whether aliens admitted under the 10 years residence qualification will in 
fact either make a permanent domicile here or put the interests of Malaya before 
those of their country of origin. In order to try and inculcate the ideal of common 
citizenship amongst all and to avoid placing any obstacle in its path, it may be 
necessary to admit people by a flat rule. But the argument on the Malay side is that, 
having granted the privilege of citizenship, it is too late to draw back when it is 
discovered that those who are admitted have not in fact adopted this country as their 
domicile. It is a gamble and on a matter of such importance to the future of Malays is 
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it right to gamble on such an uncertain factor? 'Let us go slow in the beginning'. A 
property qualification, however desirable, would exclude many it is desired to 
include. In one case it was suggested that all intending citizens, except Malays, 
should apply individually for admission. Here there is the difficulty over Javanese and 
Sumatrans who have no claim for easier facilities than Chinese or Indians and in any 
case it is most important not to include any definition by race. The qualifications 
must be made regardless of race. A scheme for universal application would be 
administratively out of the question. As a result of much consideration I have come 
to the conclusion that the right solution is to admit automatically all people born in 
Malaya, and to admit others on application, after scrutiny and an oath of allegiance. 
Why should those who qualify under the 10 years rule come in without making any 
profession of allegiance? That is the kernel of the matter-'realloyalty to Malaya' and 
a perfectly equitable basis on which to argue. If a man is prepared to be loyal to 
Malaya let him say so: after all it is those people whom we want as citizens. What 
guarantee have we that those with the ten years residence qualification are not really 
birds of passage? Those born in the country start with Malaya as a background and it 
is up to the country of their birth to foster a loyalty to Malaya as part of their 
education. A birth qualification will be easy to prove with the registers of births. The 
ten years qualification would involve enormous labour when proof was required. I 
therefore recommend that the citizenship qualification be amended to admit:-
(a) automatically, all those born in Malaya. 
(b) by application, those with 5 years residence who wish to do so and after careful 
examination are considered suitable and take an oath ofallegiance. 
Under this scheme there is no denial of the privilege of citizenship but only a right 
and proper scrutiny of those to whom it is given. To this I can see no objection. I 
realise that it is an alteration in the proposal; it is no departure from the general 
policy. But we have all had time to think further, especially in the light of local 
reactions, and there would be no loss of respect if it is announced that after further 
reflection the alteration had commended itself to His Majesty's Government and had 
been so accepted. In fact there would be a great political advantage in strengthening 
the trust in His Majesty's Government and raising the hopes that in the future the 
people of the country will have a say in their development and government. His 
Majesty's Government was far sighted enough to announce its policy in advance of 
consulting the people: in the circumstances there was no alternative except 
protracted and acrimonious negotiations. I see every advantage in saying that after 
considering representations which have been made, a modification has been 
accepted. 
67 CO 537/1528, no 40 4 Jan 1946 
[Implementation of the Malayan Union]: letter from Admiral Mount-
batten to Mr Hall on the need for local consultations 
It has been my habit to write to your predecessor from time to time, and the 
successful completion of Sir Harold MacMichael's mission gives me an opportunity 
to write to you about Malaya. 
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I am grateful to Sir Harold for the important work he has done and equally for the 
way in which he has accomplished it without friction, retaining the good will of the 
Sultans, and I am naturally anxious that the introduction of the new policy for 
Malaya which has begun so auspiciously should proceed stage by stage with the same 
success. 
An announcement will presumably be made in Parliament at an early date of the 
creation of the Malayan Union and of the institutions that will enable it to be 
administered. It is intended, I understand, that there shall be a Legislative Council 
for the Union with an official majority and unofficial members either nominated by 
the Governor or appointed by him on the election of certain public bodies. 
If the announcement of the creation of the Legislative Council on these terms is 
made without an intimation that it is to be purely provisional, I fear that its reception 
by Malayan and world public opinion will be most unfavourable. I feel that a small 
unofficial majority with an over-riding authority of the Governor would not be likely 
to impair the functioning of the Council, and, if this is so, an announcement of an 
unofficial majority would have a mitigating effect on any unfavourable public 
reaction to H.M. Government's present proposals. 
However, whether the majority is official or unofficial, I am satisfied that unless 
the detailed organisation of the new constitution is represented as a purely 
temporary expedient, it will be considered to be a constitution autocratically imposed 
from London without prior consultation with local opinion out here; and, as such, 
will be stigmatised as a return to the old type of Colonial government and a denial of 
democratic principles. 
I realise that the need for an immediate constitution, as an interim measure, has 
made any prior consultation with local opinion impracticable. But I would urge that, 
simultaneously with the announcement of the creation of the Union, a statement 
should be made to the effect that it is the intention of H.M. Government to appoint a 
Royal Commission to come to Malaya within the current year. 
This Commission (which would of course be bound by the terms of the explanatory 
memorandum handed to the Sultans by Sir Harold MacMichael) would ascertain the 
views of individuals and public bodies out here, so as to recommend a constitution 
both suitable to the Union and in keeping with the spirit of His Majesty's 
Government's long-term policy for Malaya. 
I am convinced that it is only in this way that the Malayan Union proposals have a 
chance of being welcomed by Malaya, and the world in general, as a progressive 
measure. 
68 CO 537/1528, no 41 7 Jan 1946 
[Implementation of the Malayan Union]: letter from Major-General 
H R Hone to Sir G Gater on the need for local consultations 
I have not had the chance to write to you sooner since my return from England for I 
have been extremely busy. I want to thank you again for all your help and kind 
consideration to me during my visit. 
Since MacMichael completed his mission, Newboult and I have had many talks 
with him as regards the organisation and the details of the future constitution in the 
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light of the discussions I had in London. I also had many talks with McKerron and 
others in the Administration. We have all found the greatest difficulty in fitting the 
projected Governor-General into the constitutional picture and gradually crystallise 
our ideas on the subject. I was unexpectedly summoned to Supreme Headquarters 
where Admiral Mountbatten recounted to me the talks he had with the C.I.G.S.1 
regarding the future military set up and the views which he held regarding the 
co-ordination of British diplomatic, financial and economic interests in the Far East. 
MacMichael was also brought into these discussions and as a result I sent you a 
telegram a few days ago urging that at least there should be some delay in reaching 
final conclusions regarding the appointment of a Governor-General. I was anxious to 
say in the telegram that I hoped that you would not think that I was exceeding my 
brief but the general consensus of opinion was that this was an important matter on 
which you would be glad to have my personal views in a personal telegram. Since the 
telegram was despatched, however, I have been feeling that you might well think that 
I had committed an impertinence and if this is so I trust you will accept my 
apologies. It seemed to me, however, in our conversations that you are not entirely 
satisfied with the original proposals and saw various difficulties which were also 
evident to me. 
You may be sure that the arrival of the Supreme Commander in Singapore has 
caused him to interest himself much more directly in the affairs of the Administra-
tion; this has not proved an embarrassment but in relation to our very acute food 
problem his interest has been of considerable assistance. Despite all my representa-
tions at various levels regarding the slowness of essential imports, very little 
improvement has been effected but I hope that the Supreme Commander will 
appreciate more and more our urgent needs for supplies and transport and that his 
special influence will make the machine move more quickly. In the meantime we are 
going through a very anxious period indeed. 
The Supreme Commander has just written a further letter to the Secretary of 
State.2 I wish that it could have been expressed a little more clearly for although I 
persuaded him to make several alterations in the draft, I had to leave a great deal of it 
in the form in which he had prepared it himself. I do, however, fully agree with the 
fundamental point which he was trying to make and in this I have the support of 
Newboult, McKerron and Puree!!. You will remember that in the very early drafts 
that were prepared for the Cabinet, it was suggested that after the Treaties had been 
signed, a Royal Commission should come to Malaya to advise on the framing of the 
new constitution. At that time I resisted this proposal since it meant either a 
temporary return to the pre-war constitutional arrangements or an undue prolonga-
tion of the Military Administration while the Foyal Commission visited the country, 
made its report and the Secretary of State arrived at his conclusions. Such a delay 
would have been intolerable and in consequence all reference to a Royal Commission 
was omitted from the Cabinet papers. 
You will have gathered from our various reports that the country is now far more 
politically conscious than ever before, particularly among the Chinese and the 
Malays. So far there has been a fairly general acceptance of the major policy of the 
Union on the Mainland and a segregation of Singapore under a separate Governor. 
But we do feel that there is a consideraol'e air of expectancy as to what the next steps 
1 LordAlanbrooke, GIGS, 1941-1946. 2 See 67. 
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are going to be. It is important that the detailed Constitution should not appear to be 
merely evolved in the Colonial Office and imposed upon the people willy-nilly. At the 
same time every one realised that with the resumption of Civil Government (which 
they all favour) some sort of temporary constitution must be framed. I think most 
people realise also that prior consultation with public bodies etc. would take too long 
and would delay the return of Civil Government with unfortunate results. The only 
point that the Supreme Commander is really anxious to make is that the new 
Constitution should not be issued with an implication of finality. I am sure that we 
all realise that experience will inevitably show the need for modifications at a fairly 
early date but unless we announce the new Constitution as being interim in its 
details and subject to revision and modification in the light of experience and in 
response to considered local opinion, the Supreme Commander feels very strongly 
(and I agree) that the inauguration of the new system may start in an era of suspicion 
and mistrust. No doubt you and the Colonial Office may have already determined 
that the Secretary of State should be advised in this sense and indeed I told the 
Supreme Commander that I felt that this must be so. He thought however that it was 
his duty to bring this point to the Secretary of State's notice and I saw no reason to 
advise him otherwise. The point which he made regarding an unofficial majority on 
the Legislative Council of the Union Government is of course far more controversial 
and certainly would be unwise at present. 
I am most grateful for the action that has already been taken on a number of 
matters which I discussed during my visit. Above all I am delighted to think that the 
services of Willan and Newboult have been recognised and that their appointments 
together with that of McKerron have been approved.3 They have all done first class 
work and Malaya has every reason to be grateful to them. 
Again, thank you for your kindness to me. 
3 On the resumption of civil government on 1 Apr, Willan and Newboult became respectively chief justice 
and chief secretary of the Malayan Union, while McKerron was appointed colonial secretary in Singapore. 
69 CAB 128/5, CM 4(46)3 10 Jan 1946 
'Malaya: future constitution': Cabinet conclusions on the draft White 
Paper 
[On 7 Jan 1946 Hall approached the Colonial Affairs Committee for its immediate 
sanction of the new policy and three days later Lord Addison (secretary of state for the 
dominions, 1945-1947, for Commonwealth relations, 1947) presented a draft White 
Paper to Cabinet (see also CAB 134/52, C(46)1; CAB 129/6, CP(46)9, 8 Jan 1946; CO 
537/1528; PREM 8/459) .) 
The Cabinet had before them a memorandum (C.P.(46)9)1 submitted by the 
Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs acting Chairman of the Colonial Affairs 
Committee, covering a draft White Paper containing a statement of policy regarding 
the future constitution of the Malayan Union and the Colony of Singapore. 
It was proposed that the White Paper should be presented as soon as Parliament 
1 Not printed. 
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reassembled so as to be available when the Straits Settlements (Repeal) Bill2 was 
taken. The draft White Paper amplified a statement already made in the House of 
Commons on the lOth October, 1945.3 
In discussion, the Prime Minister suggested that the reference to a Governor-
General in the final paragraph of the White Paper should be either elaborated, so as 
to give some indication of his duties and responsibilities, or omitted altogether. 
The Cabinet:-
(1) Invited the Secretary of State for the Colonies to amplify paragraph 13 of the 
draft White Paper on the lines suggested and to settle the terms of the revised 
paragraph in consultation with the Prime Minister. 
(2) Subject to this amendment, approved the terms of the draft White Paper 
annexed to C.P. (46)9 and authorised the Secretary of State for the Colonies to 
present it to Parliament at the earliest opportunity.4 
2 This was the only piece of legislation necessitated by the new policy. 3 See 59, note 2. 
4 On 22 Jan the White Paper was published simultaneously with the first reading of the Bill as Malayan 
Union and Singapore: Statement of Policy on Future Constitution (Cmd 6724, 1946). 
70 CO 53711528, no 39 4 Feb 1946 
[Resumption of civil government in Malaya): letter from Sir G Gater to 
SirE Speed1 
As you may be aware, Lord Addison has recently introduced into the House of Lords, 
on behalf of our Secretary of State, a Bill to repeal the Straits Settlements Act of 
1866. The new Bill is necessary to enable us to split up the Colony of the Straits 
Settlements and to attach Penang and Malacca to the new Malayan Union, and is thus 
fundamental to the whole of our present Malayan policy. 
The second reading of the Bill in the House of Lords took place on Tuesday, the 
29th of January, and this was made the occasion for a Debate not only on the 
immediate implications of the Bill but on the policy in general. The tone of the 
Debate was favourable, but the Leader of the Opposition made one very strong 
demand which it has been found impossible to resist. He pointed out that the 
proposals were at present only known to Parliament through Lord Addison's own 
opening statement at the Debate, and through the White Paper (Cmd. 6724) which 
had been issued a week previously. He said that both these exposes, though clear and 
satisfactory, gave no more than the outline of the policy, and insisted that Parliament 
should be allowed to examine and comment on the Orders in Council in which the 
proposals would be set out in full detail. 
This request, if acceded to in full, might have meant that the Orders would have to 
be laid before Parliament for the space of forty days, and this would involve very long 
delay. In conversation since the Debate, however, Lord Cranborne has made it clear 
that he requires nothing as drastic as this, and that he will be satisfied if a White 
Paper is laid before Parliament, summarising in some detail the contents of each of 
the Orders which it is proposed to issue. 
1 Sir Eric Speed, permanent under-secretary at the War Office, 1942-1948. 
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We have known for some time that we would be faced with the general problem of 
a demand from Parliament to examine Colonial Orders in Council, but we hoped to 
avoid the difficulty in this particular case. In the event there has been no alternative 
but to accede to Lord Cranborne's request in its modified form. But even in this form 
it will involve much time and effort. There might even be a demand for a further 
debate. It is therefore now quite clear, I am afraid, that we shall be unable to 
complete our plans by March the 1st. 
There are to be three Orders in Council, the first introducing the Malayan Union, 
the second creating the Colony of Singapore and the third inaugurating Malayan 
Union citizenship. The drafting of these Orders is a very big job, and is not yet 
complete. The preparation of a White Paper-which cannot be laid before the 
drafting of the Orders is finished-will mean extra time spent and in addition the Bill 
still has to run its full course in the House of Commons. On top of that, we shall have 
to make all the arrangements with the Privy Council for the actual issue of the 
Orders. 
The request to which I am leading up is obvious. It is that the termination of 
military administration and the return of civil Government both in the Malayan 
mainland and in Singapore should be delayed until the 1st ofApril.2 I should have 
greatly preferred not to have had to make this request, but the reasons for it, as I 
know you will appreciate, are as much beyond our control as they are imperative. 
There is the additional very important point that those officers of the future Malayan 
administrations who are still with us in the Colonial Office are working overtime on 
these very problems, and will undoubtedly still be doing so on the 1st of March. I feel 
we cannot ask them to take up their new and arduous duties in the Far East without 
a short rest. 
We shall have many arrangements affecting personnel to make and I shall be 
grateful therefore if you can let me have a very early reply to this letter. 
P.S. Since this letter was drafted I have seen a telegram from Admiral Mountbatten 
(SEACOS 631 of the 31st January) strongly recommending that midnight 31st 
March-1st April should be taken as the date for the resumption of Civil Government 
in both Singapore and the Malayan Union. 
2 See 62. 
71 CAB 2111954 13 Feb 1946 
[Appointment of special commissioner in SE Asia]: outward telegram 
no 656 from the Cabinet Office to Admiral Mountbatten 
[According to the terms outlined in this document, Lord Killearn was appointed special 
commissioner in South-East Asia in March 1946 when Dening ceased to be chief political 
adviser to SACSEA. For Dening's report to Bevin on regional developments before 
Killearn's arrival, see 81. After three months in post Killearn sent London a survey of 
regional co-ordination, see 95.] 
Personal for Admiral Mountbatten. 
Following is sent to you at request of Foreign Office as a summary of considera-
tions governing the appointment of a Special Commissioner to South East Asia to 
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co-ordinate civil and political affairs. Draft directive to Special Commissioner is 
contained in our immediately following telegram. 
2. Problem is still under consideration between Foreign and Colonial Office but 
your comments are requested as quickly as possible for discussion before final 
decisions are taken. 
Begins 
Before the war South East Asia was a comparatively unimportant and little known 
area. The war has demonstrated its political, economic and strategic importance. At 
present the existence of South East Asia Command provides a link between the 
various territories which did not previously exist. But the functions of South East 
Asia Command are dwindling as the various civil governments prepare to take over. 
2. The tendency will be for the individual territories, each occupied with its own 
problems of rehabilitation and reconstruction, to pursue their individual courses 
without much regard to, or knowledge of, each others [sic) problems. 
3. Yet there will be many problems of common concern to some if not all of the 
territories in the area, and consideration has therefore been given to the desirability 
of some representative of His Majesty's Government who can look at the problems of 
the area as a whole and who can promote the co-ordination of the views and needs of 
the British territories involved and relate them with developments in the non-British 
territories in the area. 
4. The first project considered was the appointment of a Minister Resident or 
Minister of State. It was felt, however, that the appointment of a Cabinet Minister 
with executive powers would be difficult to reconcile with the responsibilities of the 
Governors of British territories and might encourage suspicion as to our intentions 
in relation to foreign dependent territories within the area. The more appropriate 
course has seemed to be to appoint someone of ambassadorial status who would 
promote co-ordination by maintaining close liaison-with the Governors of British 
territories and British Service Commanders and with the administrations of foreign 
dependent territories without infringing the prerogatives and independent responsi-
bilities of any of them. 
5. It is in the sphere of foreign affairs that the need for treating the area as a 
whole is most obvious. Nationalist movements throughout the area will react one 
upon the other and there will be advantage in having someone who from the point of 
view of foreign affairs can keep track of racial questions throughout the area (e.g. 
Chinese penetration) and watch the tendencies of the Nationalist movements which 
the war with Japan has let loose. There is need also of someone who will survey the 
area as a whole from an economic point of view and will report on regional economic 
developments which may affect the conduct of foreign affairs as well as the 
economies of the individual British territories in the area. These will be the main 
functions of the Special Commissioner in South East Asia. He will be responsible to 
the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. He will build up the closest contacts with 
the Governors of British territories in the area and with the administrations in 
French Indo-China and the Netherlands East Indies. He will direct the activities of 
Foreign Service Officers in these territories. He will be available to give advice on 
foreign political questions to SACSEA or to any inter-Service headquarters which 
may succeed SEAC headquarters at Singapore, and will keep in touch with the 
Governor-General of India, with the Commander-in-Chief or Governor of Hong 
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Kong, with any representatives of the Dominions, India or Burma in Singapore, with 
the United Kingdom High Commissioners in Australia and New Zealand and with His 
Majesty's diplomatic representatives in China and Siam. 
6. The terms of reference of the Special Commissioner are still under discussion, 
but a draft provisionally agreed upon towards the end of December follows . It will 
require slight verbal modifications to take account of the subsequent appointments 
of a Governor-General of Malaya and a Minister to Siam. 
7. A question still under consideration is whether the Special Commissioner shall 
have any economic functions apart from the collection of information on economic 
developments in South East Asia. SEAC headquarters is at present concerned with a 
good many matters of economic administration arising out of military government 
or the care of prisoners and internees. It is particularly concerned, for instance, with 
the procurement and distribution throughout the area of rice and coal. It is not yet 
clear to what extent there will be a continued need of some organisation for dealing 
with such problems as and when civil government becomes established in the 
individual territories and as private trading revives. The present proposal is that the 
Special Commissioner shall be invited (not in his formal directive but in a 
supplementary letter or even orally) to make recommendations on the following 
points:-
(1) Whether the existing machinery in South East Asia is sufficient to deal with 
economic questions arising within the area at the moment; and 
(2) what arrangements if any should be made for the period immediately after the 
military authorities have handed over control to the civil governments. 
8. A third point on which discussion is still proceeding is whether he should be 
asked to make recommendations relating to long term international regional 
co-operation. The Colonial Office have urged delay on this point, since it involves 
many difficult questions of general policy, more particularly in regard to the 
relationship of any regional machinery with the United Nations Organisation, which 
the Colonial Office are still considering with a view to submission to Ministers. The 
Foreign Office, on the other hand, consider that there is a good case for having the 
problem investigated by the Special Commissioner, whose recommendations might 
afford a concrete and up-to-date basis for inter-Departmental discussion. 
9. Questions of staff and accommodation have still to be decided. Ends 
72 CO 537/1581 23 Feb 1946 
[Local reactions to the White Paper]: HQ Malaya Comm~nd weekly 
intelligence review, no 17 [Extract] 
[The publication of the White Paper on 22 Jan provided a focal point for what had been 
hitherto diffuse Malay political activity . On 24 Jan a call from Dato Onn for a Pan-Malayan 
Malay Congress was printed in the Malay-language newspaper, Majlis. After some 
discussion over choice of site-some favoured Malacca for historic reasons, others Kuala 
Lumpur for its better facilities-a committee of Selangor Malays (chaired by the Malay 
literary figure Za'ba or Zainal Abidin bin Ahmad) prepared to play host to representatives 
from many Malay associations which were kept informed of arrangements by announce-
ments in the press.) 
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... 4. Reactions to the Malay[an] Union 
This week the interest of all politically minded Malays has again been centred around 
the Government's proposed Malay[an) Union White Paper. On the whole reaction has 
been unfavourable and criticisms have been more outspoken. This criticism has been 
particularly noticeable in JOHORE and KELANTAN, and has been along the lines 
which were outlined in last weeks' [sic) Summary. 
A very large number of Malay political parties have been springing up all over the 
country recently, and it is now intended to co-ordinate all these bodies, decide on a 
common policy, and unite all Malays into one powerful unified party. The White 
Paper on the Malay[an) Union is probably the chief item to be considered, but the 
Malays must also formulate some policy towards the Chinese, with whom they have 
got to live peacefully in this country, whether they like it or not. 
With these ends in view an all Malayan Conference is planned for the 1 - 4 March. 
However, it is still not certain where it is to be held; reception committees are 
preparing for the Conference at both KOALA LUMPUR and MALACCA, and there 
seems a general lack of organisation about the whole affair. Moreover, there is 
certain to be a clash of personalities, for many of the prominent men hold widely 
differing views, and they are mostly leaders of newly raised parties in their own 
states. 
Among those attending are probably Dato Onn himself, who is a moderate; Haji 
Wan Ahmad, leader of the Malay Association in KELANTAN, where there has recently 
been much outspoken criticism, coupled with some-what violent religious agitation; 
Raja Muda, son of the Sultan of KELANTAN, who has very definite and strong anti 
White Paper views; Dato Abdul Rahman who in a recent meeting expressed strong 
disapproval of the Sultan of JOHORE's action in originally signing the White Paper/ 
and Tengku Abdul Rahman son of the Sultan of KEDAH. 
Latest reports indicate that the more liberal views of Dato Onn's JOHORE Malay 
Association are being widely supported in opposition to the others' more violent 
tendencies. He is alleged to have a following, in JOHORE State alone, of some 
100,000 people as well as very wide support in KELANTAN, SELANGOR, MALACCA 
and NEGRI SEMBILAN. 
A disturbing feature of the agitation is the strong religious theme which is being 
brought into the question. Again the main centre of this trouble appears to be in 
KOTA BAHRU where a certain Hyde Bin Khatib has been delivering speeches against 
the Malay[an) Union using militant passages from the Koran and stressing the 
religious aspect. 
The MCP has shown little interest so far in the agitation but it will almost certainly 
try to use the political unrest and criticism of the Government to further its own 
ends. In only one place, again KOTA BAHRU, has any definite connection been 
established between the Malay Association and the Communist Party. Chin Yew the 
local MCP organiser has proclaimed that he has made contacts with Malay 
1 Ibrahim signed the MacMichael treaty, not the White Paper, see 59. DatoAbdul Rahman bin Mohd Yasin, 
pre-war state treasurer and member of Johore's executive council and council of ministers, was president 
of the Persatuan Melayu Johore (Johore Malay Association) which organised a meeting at the Abu Bakar 
Mosque, Johore Bahru, on 2 Feb 1946 protesting that Sultan Ibrahim had signed the MacMichael treaty in 
contravention of the Johore constitution of 1895. Dato Abdul Rahman's sons, Ismail and Suleiman, were 
later federal ministers in Tunku Abdul Rahman's cabinet, and Ismail rose to deputy prime minister of 
Malaysia. 
[73) FEB 1946 199 
Association, with the object of actively assisting in the agitation against the 
Government White Paper. Whether this is his own local policy or whether he is 
acting in accordance with central instructions remains to be seen. Chin Yew, himself 
is not interested in the Malay[an] Union agitation, except as a means of making 
difficulties for the Administration and increasing the prestige of his party. As already 
mentioned the Communist Party have also held a meeting in JOHORE to discuss the 
Malay[an] Union, but it does not appear that any firm Party policy has been decided 
on as yet. 
In general then, the agitation against the Malay[an] Union plan has gathered 
strength in the last week and, although it is evident that while a large proportion of 
uneducated Malays still have little interest or knowledge of the subject, they are 
liable to be affected by propaganda of a religious nature, and can easily be swayed by 
the leaders and elders of this community. But the educated classes and political 
parties are genuinely perturbed and are trying to form the Malays into a firm party to 
oppose not only the White Paper, but also the Chinese and Communist infiltration of 
which they are very much afraid. 
The results of the conference next week should do much to clarify the situation, 
and on its results much of the future of the Malay community may depend .... 
73 CO 537/1528, no 44 23 Feb 1946 
[Malay reactions to the White Paper]: minute by HT Bourdillon 
[Extract] 
[In this assessment of Malay reactions Bourdillon refers to specific communications from 
Malaya; these have not been reproduced here) . 
The urgent matter, as I see it, is to put up an objective appreciation, on the 
documents before us, of the importance and tenour of all these re-actions taken in 
the aggregate. When and if the S. of S. sees the "prominent ex-Malayans" who have 
been provisionally invited for Tuesday afternoon, it is certain that some of them will 
come armed with their own (highly coloured) accounts. We already know that Sir 
George Maxwell more or less regards the whole of Malaya as on the point of bursting 
into flames, and we also know that a rather inflammatory letter has been sent by the 
Sultan of Kedah to Sir R. Winstedt, who is fruitful soil for such letters. 1 It seems 
essential that the S. of S. should be in a position to meet these accounts with the 
nearest possible approach to the truth. 
No. 3 on this file finishes with the following assessment by Brig. Newboult:-
"abundantly clear that active and intelligent propaganda required in Malay 
peninsula to put White Paper before all communities affected. Much pressure 
being put on the Sultans by their own subjects". 
1 Prominent former members of the MCS campaigned against the Malayan Union by writing letters to the 
national press and lobbying the CO. Hall invited leading 'old Malayans' to a meeting on 22 Feb, later 
postponed to 26 Feb, which was attended inter alia by Sir George Maxwell (chief secretary FMS, 
1920-1926), L D Gammans MP (MCS, 1920-1934), Sir Frank Swettenham (see 63, note 2), Sir Cecil 
Clementi (governor and high commissioner, 1929--1934), Sir Richard Winstedt (MCS, 1902-1935, general 
adviser Johore, 1931-1935) and AS Haynes (MCS, 1901-1934). See CO 273/676/4. 
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Coming from Brig. Newboult, I think this can dispel from our minds any idea that 
the various reactions need not be taken seriously, or that they are merely the work of 
certain Sultans and their entourage with a pretence of popular support. On the 
contrary, we are told that the Sultans are the object of popular pressure. It is clear, 
then, that the White Paper made a direct impact on the more reflective Malays, 
whose responding protests were perfectly genuine though they varied in size and 
intensity from State to State. Nowhere do we find the universal conflagration seen 
from afar by Sir George Maxwell. On the other hand, the Selangor Malay Association, 
which is reported to be a considerable body and to reflect Malay opinion in Selangor 
generally (see Nos. 8 and 17) protested vigorously and spontaneously-we have had 
no word from the Sultan of Selangor-against the White Paper and in particular the 
citizenship proposals. The "Perlis Malays" also protested spontaneously, and were 
only supported after the event by the Raja[ .] The "Trengganu Malay Association" (No. 
9) did the same, as did the "Pahang Malay Association" (No. 16). The latter, it must 
be said, is reported to include "mainly Government servants and literary persons" 
and not to have a large membership. We have heard nothing either from the Sultan 
of Pahang or from the Sultan of Trengganu. ' 
The local reaction in Johore ,(No. 22A) has been reported not to be very substantial, 
but there is a new telegram from Johore which I have now attached as No. 25. I have 
also attached, as No. 24, an ALFSEA situation report which speaks of Dato Onn, 
reported as a restraining influence in Johore, as a centre of resistance (albeit 
moderate resistance) to the White Paper in Malay[a] generally. The same telegram, 
incidentally, says that Malay feeling against the Union is increasing in Trengganu, 
though apparently without anti-British feeling, and that in Kedah "all Malays except 
the Malay Nationalist party are writing under Dato Onn to oppose the White Paper." 
So far, I have tried to cover popular reactions as opposed to those of the Sultans. 
There is little very recent news about the latter, except the important telegram at 23. 
This is most encouraging about the Sultan of Perak, who should, I think, be very 
largely satisfied by the latest proposed concessions on the religious question. It is less 
encouraging about the Sultan of Kedah, who is sending us a letter which we are 
advised to await. 
To sum up, I think we must admit a genuine and fairly widespread Malay revulsion 
against the White Paper. I have no doubt the White Paper has been misunderstood, 
but that does not make the revulsion any less real. In almost all the reactions from 
popular bodies, as opposed to Sultans, it is citizenship which is attacked. The only 
concrete reference in the Selangor, Pahang and Trengganu messages is to the 
citizenship proposals. At No. 4 on the Kelantan sub-file (50823/34/9 beneath) is a 
despatch from the C.C.A.O. forwarding a petition from "some Malays in Kelantan". 
The despatch contains the following interesting passage:-
"I learnt afterwards that the petition is thought to have been inspired 
principally by Government servants who feared that the new policy of 
citizenship would result in nearly all the Government appointments being 
filled either by Europeans or Chinese". 
This passage reinforces my impression that popular reaction amongst Malays is 
based almost entirely on fears, exaggerated but real, of the citizenship proposals. 
The only other "bone of contention" (apart from the religious question, which has 
now, I hope, been cleared) is the loss of prestige and power by the Sultans. I cannot 
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find anything like the same popular feeling on this score. If this were the only 
grievance, I could well believe that the trouble had no popular roots. It is a very real 
grievance in the mind of the Sultan of Kedah, but I doubt if even his own Kedah 
Malays would follow him far. When I was in Alor Star in December, Malay posters 
were already appearing on the walls saying "Support Malayan Union; reject common 
citizenship". 
I would judge, then, from the documents on this and the attached files, that the 
surrender of jurisdiction by the Sultans and the creation of the Malayan Union are 
not the subject of deep Malay protest. Indeed, I know that many intelligent Malays, 
e.g. in Kelantan, would support the latter. On the other hand the citizenship 
proposals are regarded with genuine fear and dislike .... 
7 4 CO 537/1528, no 43 23 Feb 1946 
[Local reactions to Malayan Union citizenship]: inward telegram no 
08009 from Major-General H RHone to War Office 
[By the Order in Council on Malayan Union Citizenship two categories of people would 
automatically be eligible for citizenship: (1) those born in the territory of the Union or of 
the colony of Singapore, and (2) those ordinarily resident in those territories for 10 out of 
the preceding 15 years (excluding the period of the Japanese occupation). In addition, 
provision would be made to enable a person to acquire citizenship through naturalization 
on application after 5 years' residence. It was also laid down that British subjects who 
acquired Malayan Union citizenship would not thereby lose their British nationality. 
Although Singapore was not part of the Malayan Union it was included in the qualification 
area for Malayan Union citizenship.) 
Pass following to Colonial Office from Hone. 
One. Present estimate of local reactions to proposals for creation of Malayan Union 
citizenship is as follows. Chinese and Indians appear generally indifferent neither 
applauding nor criticising them. Malay circles strongly oppose as they distrust future 
repercussions. Better informed Malay opinion probably does not dispute that full 
political rights should be conferred on all who are truly domiciled in Malaya but this 
section feels most strongly that proposed qualifications for citizenship throw net far 
too wide. 
Two. While Newboult and I do not repeat not suggest that citizenship proposal 
should be dropped, we do strongly feel that it is neither necessary nor desirable to 
issue citizenship order in council on eve of resumption of civil government if this 
should be your intention; we consider Malay criticisms are substantial and that new 
Governors [of Malayan Union and Singapore] should take time to devise formulae to 
meet them. We feel that we stand to lose much good will of Malaya by being too 
precipitate. 
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75 CO 537/1528 25 Feb 1946 
[Malay reactions to the White Paper]: minute by H T Bourdillon of a 
CO departmental meeting [Extract] 
[Officials considered their response to the growing Malay opposition to the Malayan 
Union, and especially its citizenship provisions, at a meeting in Cater's room on the 
morning of 25 Feb.] 
... It was agreed without hesitation that there can be no question of retracting from 
the fundamental policy as outlined in the White Paper. Subject to this all-important 
proviso, however, it was felt that two alternative courses must now be considered:-
(a) The Secretary of State might refuse to let the Malay reactions to the White 
Paper affect his actions in any way, and might proceed as if nothing had happened, 
notwithstanding the contrary advice in the second paragraph of No.43. 1 In support 
of this, Sir Edward Gent argued that any deviation from the policy, or any delay 
over its implementation (particularly in the matter of common citizenship) would 
be likely to arouse far more dangerous antagonism from the Chinese, and to a 
lesser extent the Indians, than the antagonism which we were now meeting from 
the Malays. In this connection, Sir Edward doubted the accuracy of the statement 
in the first paragraph of No.43, that the Chinese and Indians "appear generally 
indifferent to the citizenship proposals, neither applauding nor criticising them". 
He said that, on the contrary, there was much recent evidence to show that the 
Chinese and Indians had taken a considerable, and favourable, interest in the 
proposals. 
(b) The Secretary of State might hold up for the time being the implementation of 
the citizenship proposals, at the same time proceeding with all other aspects of the 
policy in the manner already planned. This would mean that work would 
immediately be completed on the Malayan Union Order in Council and on the 
Singapore Order in Council, but that the Malayan Union Citizenship Order in 
Council should be held back for the time being. We should still aim at a debate in 
the House of Commons next week,2 and should still issue in advance of the debate 
a White Paper summarising the two Orders,3 but the Secretary of State should 
announce during the debate his intention of withholding the introduction of the 
citizenship Order pending further local consultations. It was agreed, I think, that a 
commission as requested in No.42(a) would be neither necessary nor advisable, 
and that the consultations in question should be carried out by the Governor (or 
rather by the two Governors, for Singapore is also concerned). It was also felt that 
it must be made abundantly clear from the outset that there is no intention of 
abandoning the principle of common citizenship. On the contrary, the Secretary 
of State should be invited to say that he regards this principle as one of the 
essential foundations of the whole policy. He would add, however, that he had 
1 See 74. 
2 The Commons debate actually took place on 8 Mar on the occasion of the second reading of the Straits 
Settlements (Repeal) Bill (see H of C Debs, vol 420, cols 639-729) . 
3 Malayan Union and Singapore: Summary of Proposed Constitutional Arrangements (Cmd 6749, 4 Mar 
1946). 
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received a number of representations which led him to believe that the policy in 
this respect was not fully understood in Malaya, that he appreciated that the 
problem of citizenship was of vital concern to the whole people of the country, and 
that he had therefore decided to postpone the introduction of the citizenship 
proposals for some six months. During this period, the two Governors would be 
instructed first to ensure that the proposals were fully understood in Malaya, and 
secondly to consult local opinion on the exact provisions which would best achieve 
the fundamental objective. 
I do not think that opinion on the respective merits of these two courses was 
unanimous. Sir Edward Gent, in favour of the former alternative, stressed the 
argument which I have already described. On the other hand Mr. Lloyd and Mr. 
Paskin felt that we could not disregard the advice in paragraph 2 of No.43, and 
argued that there were other points on which it had already been decided to withhold 
a decision pending local consultations by the Governors. The matter was not resolved 
at the meeting, and I was instructed to prepare a draft Cabinet Paper setting out the 
two alternatives, but omitting the final paragraph which would contain the Secretary 
of State's recommendation .... 4 
4 As a result of discussion with ·Creech Jones and Cater, Bourdillon's draft was revised and a 
recommendation was added favouring the first alternative outlined in this minute, ie immediate 
implementation of the whole policy, see 76. 
76 CAB 129/7, CP(46)81 26 Feb 1946 
'Malayan policy': Cabinet memorandum by Mr Hall 
I would invite the attention of my colleagues to Command Paper No. 6724, entitled 
"Malayan Union and Singapore", which was issued in January of this year, and which 
summarises the policy of His Majesty's Government towards these territories. 
2. It will no doubt be recollected that the main features of the policy are:-
(a) The creation of a Malayan Union (to exclude Singapore in the first instance, 
but to include the Settlements of Penang and Malacca). 
(b) The establishment of a Malayan Union citizenship, with the purpose of 
granting full political rights in the Malayan Union to all those, of whatever race, 
who regard Malaya as their true home and as the object of their loyalty. 
3. This Command Paper was the sequel to the conclusion by Sir Harold 
MacMichael of new agreements with the Rulers of the nine Malay States, whereby the 
latter agreed to cede full power and jurisdiction in their States to His Majesty, thus 
enabling His Majesty's Government to bring the new policy into effect. The contents 
of the Command Paper have, of course, been made known in Malaya, and I am bound 
to inform my colleagues that I have received a number of representations and 
protests from Malay organisations and individual Malays in various parts of the 
Peninsula. Some of these protests come from the Rulers themselves, notwithstand-
ing their signature of the new Agreements and their full knowledge, at the time of 
signature, of the intentions of His Majesty's Government. Thus I have received 
protests or expressions of anxiety from the Sultan of Perak, the Sultan of Kedah, the 
Sultan of Kelantan, the Sultan of Johore and the Rajah of Perlis, and I have now 
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received a request, addressed to me jointly by the Rulers of Perak, Kedah, Pahang, 
Selangor and Negri Sembilan, that an independent commission should visit Malaya 
to consult the Sultans and people before any decision is taken on the Malayan Union 
proposals. 
5. I attach less importance, however, to these representations from the Rulers, 
some of whom are no doubt animated largely by considerations of their own 
prerogatives, than to the fact that the publication of the Command Paper appears to 
have caused a wide-spread and spontaneous reaction amongst the more reflective 
sections of the Malay population itself. I have received direct representations from at 
least one Malay Association in the majority of the States, and there is evidence of 
feeling in all . This evidence tends to show that antagonism amongst the Malay people 
(as opposed to the Malay Rulers and their immediate circle) is not directed against 
the conception of a Maiayan Union, which many intelligent Malays, according to my 
information, would support, but against the citizenship proposals in particular. 
These have caused apprehension amongst the Malays on the ground that they open 
the door to a Chinese and to a lesser extent Indian predominance in the political field 
(there has long been a Chinese predominance in the commercial field). 
5. I am confident that these anxieties on the part of the Malay population are 
based on a misunderstanding of the proposals, whose intention is certainly not the 
submergence of the Malays in their own country: but the anxieties are none the less 
real, and deserve consideration, I am convinced that the main policy, which has been 
the object of such careful consideration over so long a period by His Majesty's 
Government and which, in my view, is as necessary as it is just, must go through. 
Subject, however, to this all-important proviso, two courses appear open:-
(a) The first course is to refuse to let the Malay reaction to the Command Paper 
deter us in any way from the immediate implementation of the whole policy which 
we have judged to be right and fair as an essential foundation for political progress 
in Malaya. We must not forget that in Malaya Chinese and Indians between them 
outnumber the Malays, and that any step which the members of these races could 
regard as a withdrawal of the political rights already held out to them in the White 
Paper could be expected to evoke from them an antagonism as strong or stronger 
than that which we are now facing from the Malays. 
(b) The second alternative is to proceed, as already planned, with all other aspects 
of the policy, but to defer the implementation of the citizenship proposals for a few 
months. If this latter course were adopted, it would have to be made clear from the 
outset that His Majesty's Government have no intention of abandoning the 
principle of common citizenship, which they regard as an essential feature of the 
whole policy. It would be stated, however, that His Majesty's Government realise 
the vital importance of this particular proposal to all the inhabitants of Malaya, 
and have therefore decided to suspend action in this regard for some few months, 
during which period steps will be taken first to ensure that the proposal is fully 
understood in Malaya, secondly to consult local opinion as regards the exact 
provisions best designed to achieve the fundamental objective. The adoption of 
this second course would correspond with the advice given me by the Chief Civil 
Affairs Officer, Malaya, who feels strongly that it is neither necessary nor desirable 
to issue the Citizenship Order in Council immediately upon the resumption of 
civil government, who considers that the Malay criticisms are substantial, and who 
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represents that we stand to lose much goodwill in Malaya by being too precipitate 
on this matter. 
6. If we are to be ready for the restoration of civil government in Malaya on the 
1st April, it is necessary for the second reading of the Straits Settlements (Repeal) 
Bill to be taken in the House of Commons at a very early date, with a view to the issue 
thereafter of Orders in Council establishing the Malayan Union and the Colony of 
Singapore. I therefore submit this question to my colleagues as a matter of great 
urgency. My own recommendation, after considering the matter carefully from all 
angles, is that the first of the two courses outlined in the preceding paragraph should 
be adopted. We have announced our intentions clearly and firmly in the White Paper, 
and it would be most inadvisable for us now to appear uncertain of our policy in the 
judgement of world opinion. Moreover, Civil Government, when restored in Malaya, 
will in any event be faced with an extremely difficult task, and it appears to me that 
the difficulties will be increased by local doubts or uncertainty regarding the exact 
intentions of His Majesty's Government on the all-important question of citizenship. 
In this above all matters, I think we must start on a firm foundation and build on that 
foundation as best we may. I have nevertheless thought it necessary to bring the 
issue to the attention of my colleagues, in view of the substantial reactions which the 
White Paper have caused .amongst the Malays-a reaction which is by now 
well-known to certain members of both Houses of Parliament.1 
1 On 28 Feb the Cabinet, having considered Hall's memorandum, decided that 'any such opposition which 
might develop in Parliament should be resisted' and that the policy outlined in the White Paper should be 
maintained 'in spite of the opposition which had since developed in Malaya'. In the week that followed, 
however, events moved so fast that, with the agreement of Attlee and Arthur Greenwood (lord privy seal 
and chairman of the Colonial Affairs Committee), Creech Jones adopted a more cautious approach and 
deferred citizenship pending consultations in Malaya. See 80; also CAB 128/5, CM 19(46)7 and CO 
53711529. 
77 CO 537/1528, no 46 1 Mar 1946 
[Malayan Union citizenship]: outward telegram (reply) no 99586 from 
War Office to Major-General H R Hone 
Following from Colonial Office. Begins. 
Your 08009 cipher 23rd Feb. 1 
ONE. Your recommendation for postponement of Citizenship Order in Council 
has been considered here at highest level, but it has been decided to maintain 
programme as previously planned. Matter will be debated in House of Commons on 
Friday 8 Mar, and decision cannot of course be regarded as final while proposals are 
still before Parliament. 
TWO. Present view taken here is that, whilst strength of Malay reaction to 
citizenship proposals as set out in White Paper must be admitted, we stand to lose 
more than we would gain by postponement. Even if in reply to my 99153 cipher 
C.A.l of 26 Feb you should advise that there is little or no likelihood of immediate 
adverse reactions by Chinese and Indians to deferment of citizenship Order it is felt 
1 See 74. 
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that period of some six months during which opposing points of view would be 
canvassed up and down Malaya might cause racial discord rather than avoid it. 
THREE. Nevertheless recent intensification of Malay opposition, especially to 
citizenship proposals, increases necessity for effective local publicity which will 
explain the true purpose and effect of citizenship proposals, with a view to 
convincing the Malays in particular (e.g. Kelantan Government employees who 
imagine that they will henceforward be swamped by Europeans or Chinese) that their 
fears are groundless. In this connection further White Paper2 which summarises 
contents of the three Orders in Council is to be published here early next week in 
readiness for debate on Mar 8. You will be informed of exact time as soon as possible, 
and meanwhile copies are being sent to you by fast air mail in proof form. White 
Paper should help you in preparing publicity, since it gives more detail about 
citizenship and other proposals than previous White Paper. For instance, it may not 
hitherto have been understood by Malays that acquisition of citizenship by five year's 
[sic] residence is based on U.K,. naturalisation practice and is thus limited to 
individual cases, each of which will be carefully scrutinised, Governor retaining 
discretion in all cases. Misunderstanding of this point may well have led to 
exaggerated Malay fears, and I trust you will do everything in your power, with help 
of new White Paper, to convince them that true purpose of citizenship proposals, is 
not (repeat not) to submerge the Malays but to associate all those with real loyalty 
towards Malaya in building the future of the Union. 
FOUR. New White Paper also shows that further concessions have been made 
regarding ultimate control in Muhammadan religious matters (see your telegram 
04809 cipher 23 Feb) and that there is now no question of Governor's assent to 
religious Bills being even formally required. Furthermore, appointments by Rulers 
to Malay Advisory Councils are not now to be subject to Governor's approval. Should 
be grateful if you would stress these points also in publicity henceforward. 
FIVE. In general, force of Newboult's opinion that active and intelligent propagan-
da is required to put issues correctly before all communities affected (see last 
paragraph of your 04958 cipher 7 Feb) is fully appreciated here. We must at all costs 
avoid following two dangers:-
(a) that of encouraging e.g. Malays to unite in antagonism towards Chinese, 
thereby causing racial discord, 
(b) that of rendering Government suspect by too obvious direct propaganda. 
When Bourdillon was in Malaya, Newboult spoke to representative Malays in Ipoh 
and again in Kelantan on lines which avoided both these dangers and which should 
be admirably suited towards present needs. Main points which Newboult made 
were:-
(a) Malays must think for themselves, and in their own interests must not rely 
indefinitely on British protection to maintain them in a position of privilege. 
(b) Malays must realise that the world has changed fundamentally during the war 
and that as isolated communities Malay States have no hope in the future. 
(c) Malays must accept as their fellow countrymen all those who have established 
their claims to the rights and duties of citizenship. 
2 See 75, note 3. 
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Throughout, Newboult stressed necessity of Malays thinking out their own problems. 
Should be grateful if you would inform me as soon as possible whether you consider 
that publicity can be usefully pursued on these lines (bearing in mind dangers noted 
above), and if so, what actual measures you propose to take. 
SIX. As soon as you receive proof copies of new White Paper, please inform all 
Rulers of latest religious concessions. In doing so should be grateful if you would:-
( a) inform Rulers of Perak, Kedah, Selangor, Negri Sembilan and Pahang that 
Secretary of State has carefully considered their request for an independent 
commission to visit Malaya, but does not feel that this would be advisable in 
present circumstances 
(b) acknowledge in suitable terms telegrams received by the Secretary of State 
from the Sultan of Kelantan see your 04974 cipher 11 Feb and the Rajah of Perlis, 
(a brief telegram of protest sent through commercial channels on Feb 16th) and 
the letter now received from the Sultan of Kedah. Letter is dated 11 Feb and a 
fuller reply will be sent to it as soon as possible. 
In communicating with all Rulers, please assure them that the Secretary of State is 
convinced that policy is necessary for Malaya's future, and adduce further concession 
on religious point as indication of his continued respect for their views. [Emi5] 
78 CO 537/1548, no 31 5 Mar 1946 
[Pan-Malayan Malay Congress]: inward telegram no 08312 from HQ, 
British Military Administration (Malaya) to War Office 
[This telegram came hard on the heels of telegram 08392 of same date (CO 537/1548, no 
30). No 30 contained the text of the resolutions passed at the Pan-Malayan Malay 
Congress; no 31 provided an appreciation of their significance. Bourdillon assessed the 
first as 'a very important new development' and the second as 'a very important 
document' confirming 'the depth and breadth of feeling amongst the Malays and the fact 
that citizenship (sic) is their main grievance'. It was, he minuted, 'most important that 
Mr Creech Jones should know of this development' in advance of the Commons debate on 
8 Mar (see CO 537/1548, minute by Bourdillon, 6 March 1946). Standing in for Hall who 
was indisposed, Creech Jones won the agreement of Attlee and Greenwood to postponing 
the introduction of the citizenship Order in Council until local consultations had taken 
place. Later more detailed reports became available on the Pan-Malayan Malay Congress 
held in Kuala Lumpur on 1-4 Mar, eg CO 537/1581, HQ Malaya Command weekly 
intelligence review, no 19.] 
Pass following to Colonial Office. Reference our telegram 08392 dated 5th March. 
Following are our comments on resolution passed by Malay Congress. 
1. Congress was composed by Representatives from all over Malaya. It had been 
much advertised and was fully attended. Proceedings have been widely criticised. 
Resolution passed far more hostile to new policy than anticipated. This due to depth 
of feeling among those present. Those who favour Union will not support it 
wholeheartedly until they know what they are committing themselves to. Those who 
oppose union do (? so solely) from fear of implications of new policy which they do 
not understand, and from way they were faced with fait accompli before they had 
opportunity for discussion. Given time and patience, bulk of opposition could 
probably be won over. 
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2. Citizenship proposals are chief bone of contention and very unpopular. 
Opposition is not so much to conception of common citizenship as to qualifications 
for admission. They consider it has been drawn too wide. 
3. Rulers signed new agreements ceding jurisdiction which we are convinced 
they mean to stand by. MacMichael consistently emphasised that they were not being 
asked to sign explanatory note, but to show willingness to co-operate with H.M.G. 
They had objections to some of the specific proposals which they registered in 
writing, honestly believing that these would be subject of further consultation with 
responsible authority. They now strongly feel that this opportunity for discussion 
had not been granted. They find themselves in difficult position as their subjects are 
questioning their action in signing. 
4. Majority of Government servants, including Police, are Malays and we are very 
dependent upon retention of their goodwill. 
5. We can only implement new policy successfully with co-operation of Malays, 
which we have not (repeat not) at present got, but can get given further time for 
discussion with new Governors. 
79 CO 537/1669 8 Mar 1946 
[Local reactions to the Malayan Union]: minute by W S Morgan1 
[This minute, and particularly the last paragraph emphasizing the public relations 
opportunity provided by the imminent resumption of civil government, was brought to 
the attention of Gent who was due to be installed as governor of the Malayan Union on 1 
Apr.] 
Mr. Bourdillon yesterday drew Mr. Creech Jones' attention to these ALFSEA 
intelligence telegrams for February, as they related to Malay reactions to the White 
Paper policy. 
Altogether these telegrams give a disturbing picture of continuing political and 
economic troubles in Malaya. The picture is complicated and difficult to appreciate 
since the reports are localised in detail and do not attempt an over-all survey. The 
following are the salient points to which attention should be drawn. 
(a) The various movements- Malay, Chinese, and Indian- appear to be unrelated 
and to pursue their activities quite separately, but altogether they show that the 
Malayan scene is seething with political activity, though how far the mass of the 
population are interested or responsive it is hard to say. 
(b) The issue of the White Paper has led to considerable opposition amongst the 
Malays, as is well known. From the telegrams the main centres appear to be 
Kelantan, Trengganu, Kedah and Johore, and the prime mover in organising the 
recent All Malay Congress at Kuala Lumpur was Dato Onn, the able and 
well-known Johore Malay, who is said however to be moderate in his views and is 
probably the progressive type that likes the idea of the Union but wishes it to be 
predominantly Malay. There is evidence (see Land J)2 that religion is being used to 
1 W S Morgan entered the Malayan Education Service, 1931; fought in the Malaya campaign, 1941-1942; 
was appointed principal in the CO, 1947. 
2 The papers with the literal references F - L have not been printed with this document. 
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rouse opposition to the policy. 
What is so striking about these telegrams is that there is no indication that the 
policy has provoked any reaction whatsoever amongst the non-Malays. 
(c) The Malayan Communist Party and its close relation, the General Labour 
Union, continue to be openly opposed to the Military Administration and to foster 
strikes in widespread localities, including Singapore, Pensang, Kelantan, Ipoh and 
Province Wellesley. Their efforts have not been very successful, and the B.M.A., in 
taking a firm line, appear to be gaining public approval (see K). 
It is significant, for instance, that in Penang (L), the G.L.U. were kept out of 
strike negotiations and that in Singapore Indian workers were forming a separate 
union outside the Chinese dominated G.L.U. (H). 
(d) The telegrams at F and G point to Indonesian attempts to organise propaganda 
in Malaya. 
(e) There have been a number of violent incidents, the most serious being at Batu 
Talam in Pahang, where Malays attacked Chinese in a clash which led to over 50 
casualties, including 27 killed. 
It may be wrong to be alarmist but it cannot be disguised that Malaya has not 
settled down under the Military Administration and the new policy has added a 
complication to an already confused scene. It is the heterogenity of Malaya's political 
activity which is, in my view, the most dangerous aspect because it can only lead to 
chaos. Some strong effort should be made to rally the moderate and responsible 
leaders to the support of the new administration. The success or failure of the 
Malayan Union should be the issue on which attention should be focussed, not 
communism, or China, or India, or Indonesia, and I should suggest that the 
installation of the Governors should not pass off as a piece of formal ceremonial but 
should be the occasion of speeches, eloquently and warmly phrased, explaining the 
new policy, stressing the hopes and aspirations of the civil government, and calling 
to the people to sink their divergencies and to unite to make a success of the Union 
(and the Colony of Singapore). This event will mark the passing of the not very 
popular Military Administration and the resumption of a much anticipated civil 
government. Hopes will run high for at least some message of hope, promise, and 
reassurance, and if it is not forthcoming there will be great disappointment and the 
Governors may have lost a useful and rare opportunity for winning support for the 
new regime. I do feel this suggestion is worthy of serious consideration. 
80 PREM 8/459 15 Mar 1946 
[Postponement of citizenship]: minute by Mr Creech Jones to Mr 
Attlee 
[Encountering strong opposition during the second reading of the Straits Settlements 
(Repeal) Bill on 8 Mar (H of C Debs, vol 420, cols 637-727), Creech Jones agreed to 
postpone the implementation of the citizenship Order in Council to allow local 
consultation. Probably not least because the prime minister was being lobbied by 'old 
Malayan' representatives, such as Lords Elibank and Marchwood, the CO was anxious to 
reassure itself of Attlee's continuing support for the essence of the Malayan policy and the 
way it was being handled.) 
'' i 
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Prime Minister 
In the debate on Malayan policy in the House of Commons on March 8th, I 
maintained the essential basis of Government policy regarding Union and Common 
Citizenship and undertook to postpone for a few months the Order in Council on the 
latter principle so as to allow further local consultation. I agreed that the 
Government would consider certain points of detail. This was in harmony with your 
instructions and the advice of Lord Addison. The Opposition, I gather, is still not 
satisfied that our action is sufficiently conciliatory to The Sultans. But to go further 
is to jeopardise the whole policy. Some concessions on minor points can, of course, 
be made but the Opposition demand that the principal Order in Council, setting out 
the framework of the Constitution be omitted. That must I feel be resisted. Besides 
the question of citizenship many other matters will be left for further consultation 
between the Governors and all sections of local opinion, particularly the question of 
the composition of the Legislative Council and Local Councils and the degree of 
authority delegated to the Local Councils. It is unreasonable of the Opposition to 
demand more. I attach a listl of the few minor modifications we can concede, and I 
shall be glad to know that you agree with this line of action. On that assumption, I 
have discussed with the Lord Privy Seal the statement for the Committee Stage on 
Monday next.2 
1 Not printed. 
2 Attlee agreed with this course on 17 Mar. During the third reading on 18 Mar, Creech Jones reaffirmed 
the concession on citizenship and, in addition, announced three concessions: the Council of Rulers would 
be allowed to discuss secular issues without the Governor's prior consent; the Malay Advisory Councils 
would be empowered to advise Rulers on secular issues; and a nominee of the Sultan should sit on the 
State Council. Although he agreed to hold in reserve details of the composition of various councils until 
local consultations had taken place, Creech Jones refused the demand for their excision from the Orders in 
Council. The Bill was then passed without a division (see H of C Debs, vol 420, cols 1540-1565) and the 
Orders-in-Council were made on 27 Mar. The postponement of citizenship was not, however, sufficient to 
conciliate the sultans. On 29 Mar Hall informed Attlee that they had asked John Foster MP (a lawyer who 
had been retained by the Malay rulers) for advice as to the legal action they could take to prevent the 
Malayan Union coming into existence on 1 Apr, 'it being their intention to secure an interval for further 
consideration in the hope that His Majesty's Government would agree to a policy of federation (which 
would not involve the cession of jurisdiction to His Majesty) instead of a policy of Union' (CO 53711548, no 
63, emphasis in original). 
81 CAB 2111954, F 5093/87/61 25 Mar 1946 
'Review of political events in South-East Asia 1945 to March 1946': 
despatch from M E Dening to Mr Bevin. 1 Enclosure 
On the 2nd March, 1945, I forwarded to the Foreign Office a review of political events 
as they affected the South-East Asia Command from its inception to the end of 1944. 
2. With the appointment of a special commissioner in South-East Asia my 
functions as chief political adviser to the Supreme Commander have come to an end. 
It seems appropriate, therefore, to forward a further report covering events during 
1945 and up to the present day, which I hope may also be of some use to Lord 
Kill earn. 
1 Secretary of state for foreign affairs, 1945--1951. 
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3. The report is, I fear, rather long in these days when there is too much to be 
read. But a great deal has happened in the period. While the war continued political 
events were subsidiary to the main conduct of the battle. When the war ended it was 
the political situation which influenced military events. 
4. Long though the report is, I have done no more than to give the general trend 
of events, except where, as in the case of Java, the picture had become so distorted as 
to require some correction of detail. 
5. In the summary of my previous report I concluded with the words: "But the 
conclusion of hostilities will give rise to a host of intricate problems." That has 
proved to be true. 
6. This report was shown in draft to the Supreme Allied Commander, who has 
received a copy, though I would in no way wish to suggest thereby that he assumes 
responsibility for any views I have expressed. Copies have also been sent to the 
Viceroy of India, the Governor of Burma, His Majesty's Ambassadors at Washington, 
Paris, Chungking and The Hague, to the Special Ambassador at Batavia, to His 
Majesty's Minister at Bangkok and to His Majesty's Consul General at Saigon. 
Enclosure to 81 
This review covers the year 1945 and the period up to the abolition of the office of 
chief political adviser to the Supreme Allied Commander, South-East Asia on the 
15th March, 1946. 
2. Up to the collapse of Japan in August the year 1945 was one of steady defeat for 
Japanese arms in South-East Asia as elsewhere. The greater part of Burma, including 
Rangoon, was captured the hard way, with heavy loss of life and material to the 
enemy, and when Japan surrendered a major assault on Malaya was about to take 
place. 
3. As the year wore on, the campaign in South-East Asia became more and more 
a purely British-Indian affair. Towards the end of 1944 the decision had been made by 
the Sino-American command in China to withdraw two Chinese divisions from 
Burma to avert the possibility of an apparently imminent collapse. This was followed 
early in 1945 by a decision to transfer the remainder of the Chinese forces from 
Burma, and later the whole of the United States air forces operating with the 
South-Asia Command. The sole American brigade which had operated in S.E.A.C. in 
conjunction with the Chinese forces in Northern Burma was also transferred to 
China. 
4. American strategy, in so far as the Asiatic mainland was concerned, was, in 
fact, concentrating upon China to the exclusion of South-East Asia, whereas the 
strategy of S.E.A.C. was directed towards opening the Malacca Straits and gaining 
access to the South China Sea. In so far as the diversion of Sino-American forces to 
China created gaps in the S.E.A.C. order of battle, the operations of the latter were 
hampered. The subsequent decision to provide a British Commonwealth force to take 
part in the main American assault on Japan would have placed further restrictions 
upon the S.E.A.C. effort. 
5. Militarily there can be no doubt that the Pacific strategy as a means of bringing 
the war with ' Japan to an early end was sound. Whether the China strategy, which 
was also an American concept, was equally sound is more doubtful. Historians may 
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well argue that a combined, instead of a divided, effort might have led to an earlier 
opening of the Malacca Straits and thus greatly have facilitated redeployment at the 
close of the European war, whereas it was very doubtful whether the state of China 
would have admitted of any effective campaign through Chinese territory. 
6. These military considerations are mentioned because they were not without 
their political cause and effect. The United States had come to regard the Japanese 
war as something peculiarly their own, just as they came to regard China as their 
particular protege. Though commanders might or might not see eye to eye with their 
British counterparts (and on the mainland, on the whole, they did not), it is doubtful 
whether, in American eyes, there was any fundamental conception of a joint 
Anglo-American effort in the war against Japan, whatever might be declaimed from 
public platforms. In part there was resentment at the alleged unwillingness of Britain 
to do her share. But far more there was the feeling this was an ali-American show in 
which American arms both could and would demonstrate both their superiority and 
their authority over all others. 
7. In this American conception of the Far Eastern war, which was little realised in 
Europe, S.E.A.C. was always a poor relation. It was the unnecessary front, and as 
such could always be deprived of resources or have them withheld. The slow progress 
of its operations, which was due in part to the withholding of resources, and, in part, 
to American insistence on securing the air route through North Burma to China, was 
always regarded as a legitimate target for criticism. 
8. In spite therefore of the fact that S.E.A.C. was an integrated Anglo-American 
command, and in spite of the cordial relations between the integrated staffs, it 
cannot be said on balance that the campaign in South-East Asia resulted in a better 
understanding between Great Britain and America. Nor was the existence of the 
American "India-Burma Theatre" within the command conducive to good under-
standing. On the contrary, though through no fault of ours, S.E.A.C. was a constant 
potential source of friction. At the root of the matter lay the fact that America always 
suspected British Far Eastern policy, and that, in her new-found strength, she was 
satisfied that her own policy was not only the right one, but also the more 
disinterested. Whether it was so right or so disinterested remains to be seen. 
9. However that may be, the end of the war with Japan found the British forces of 
S.E.A.C. and the Sino-American forces of China apart from one another and faced 
with entirely different sets of problems. 
10. From those problems which now confront S.E.A.C., America has remained 
aloof. At the same time she has maintained through O.S.S. (now transformed into 
S.S.U.) detachments in various places, posts of observation which not improbably 
combine the task of economic penetration, while in Siam she has a strong foothold, 
including an air staging post, which is no doubt intended to be the forerunner of a 
commercial air line. For the rest, she retains and exercises the right to continue to 
suspect us and to criticise us. Individual relations, however, remain cordial. 
11. As regards China, the not unexpected troubles ensuing from the presence of 
her forces in Northern Burma continue. With the resumption of civil government 
over the greater part of Burma from the 1st October, 1945, and over the whole from 
the 1st January, 1946, the problem of the Chinese in Burma has become the 
responsibility of the Burma Government. In the rest of South-East Asia the large 
Chinese populations present a series of varying problems which, however, have not 
up to date become acute. In Siam there is a prospect of the early establishment of 
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diplomatic relations between that country and China, which heretofore had not 
existed. In Malaya at the moment the chief problem is that of the Malayan 
Communist party, of Chinese origin, but independent of the so-called Chinese 
Communist party in China proper. In the Netherlands Indies the Dutch are at 
present inclined to view the Chinese with favour as a counter-balance to the 
Indonesian independence movement, and the chief concern of the Chinese Consul-
General is for the safety of the large Chinese communities and their property in the 
present state of turmoil. 
12. With the exception of Burma, it may therefore be said that in general there 
are not, at any rate as yet, any major Chinese problems in South-East Asia to 
complicate relations with the Chinese Government, which itself is obviously much 
preoccupied with events in China proper and in Manchuria. 
13. Before proceeding to review the problems of South-East Asia by countries in 
their intricate detail, it is well to consider the position of S.E.A.C. when hostilities 
ceased. The end of the war with Japan found the Command militarily readier than 
any other to take immediate action. But General MacArthur,2 who had to take the 
initial occupation of Japan with comparatively slender forces, and who had by then 
been appointed Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, was anxious lest any 
incidents in outlying areas might render his task more difficult. He therefore forbade 
any reoccupation until he had taken the formal Japanese surrender in Tokyo Bay, an 
event which did not take place until the 2nd September, 1945. A delay was therefore 
imposed upon S.E.A.C., which had important consequences, particularly in Indone-
sia. 
14. On the very day that Japan agreed to unconditional surrender, namely, on the 
15th August, 1945, Admiral Mountbatten became the unwilling inheritor of a large 
portion of the former South-West Pacific Command, including Java-unwilling 
because he was given no additional resources to meet his largely increased 
commitment. Indo-China as far as the l6°N. parallel was also placed finally in his 
Command. He had thus an area of 1,500,000 square miles, with a population of 128 
million to deal with, in addition to some 750,000 Japanese. As for the forces under 
his command, the additional formations and shipping from Europe which he had 
been led to expect were no longer forthcoming now that the war was at the end, 
while there was a steady depletion of the ranks of trained and experienced officers 
and men by the inexorable demands of release and repatriation. 
15. It is important to remember these military facts, because they were largely 
responsible for the situation which subsequently arose and which has given rise to 
widespread misunderstanding as well as to widespread criticism. Admiral Mount-
batten was not, in fact, given the tools to finish the job. It is not suggested that there 
were not good reasons for this. But the results were inescapable. 
16. One of the liveliest targets for criticism has been the continued employment, 
months after the Japanese surrender, of Japanese troops for the purpose of 
maintaining law and order. There could hardly be anything more repugnant to the 
world at large or to the populations which, after years of Japanese occupation, are 
still compelled to obey Japanese orders (even though they be delivered in a somewhat 
different voice). 
2 General Douglas MacArthur, c-in-c, Allied Forces, South-West Pacific, 1942; c-in-c, US Forces, Far East 
Command, until 1951; supreme commander, Allied Forces in Japan, until 1951; c-in-c, US Forces in 
Korea, until 1951. 
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17. But there was never any likelihood that the forces available to the Supreme 
Allied Commander could stretch to every hole and corner of the vast area allotted to 
him. Except in Siam, there was no Government exercising administration, while the 
organised police forces which existed in South-East Asia before the war had 
disintegrated under Japanese rule. The best that could be hoped for was that stable 
administrations could be set up at an early date in the areas to be occupied, and that 
the Japanese could thereafter immediately be disarmed and concentrated for 
ultimate repatriation. In the event, things turned out quite differently. 
18. It was not only the absence of police forces which enlarged the task of the 
South-East Asia Command. Throughout the area there were already larg~ quantities 
of arms in the hands of unauthorised persons. In addition, vast ammunition dumps 
and stores of arms and military equipment had to be guarded until they could be 
disposed of. There was thus plenty of material to put in the hands of an enormous 
population which, in the years of Japanese occupation, proved in the event to have 
suffered a serious decline in public morals. 
19. The causes of this decline are not far to seek. Prior to 1941 the peoples of 
South-East Asia had lived in conditions of security and comparative plenty. Whatever 
the critics of colonial government may be pleased to say to-day, it is a fact that in 
South-East Asia the age between the wars was one of security, of comparative 
stability and of gradual development. 
20. With little or no warning to the average person, his world was rudely 
shattered and his erstwhile governors and protectors ignominiously dispersed. All 
that he had looked up to had vanished without any immediate prospect of return, and 
in its place he was confronted with the harsh and inconsiderate rule of the Japanese, 
who, while they did nothing to improve the lot of the population, were indefatigable 
in their efforts to humiliate the white man and to prove that not only was his rule at 
an end, but that his return was something to fight against. These efforts were by no 
means entirely successful, but to a varying degree they left behind an unwelcome 
legacy which added to the already heavy burden of the S.E.A.C. 
21. While the Japanese did their utmost to destroy what had been, they put 
nothing in its place and there grew up amongst native populations a spirit of 
resistance which manifested itself in covert attempts to evade Japanese regulations 
and to outwit them in devious ways. This spirit indeed formed the kernel of the 
resistance movements which were encouraged by our clandestine organisations, and 
which, in Burma and Malaya, rendered active assistance to the Allied cause. 
22. But by its very nature this spirit of resistance encouraged a law breaking as 
opposed to a law-abiding temperament, and what was born of duress has to some 
extent become a habit difficult to eradicate with the disappearance of that duress . In 
particular this applies to the youth of the areas concerned, and even in Malaya, which 
compares very favourably with any other part of South-East Asia in its progress 
towards rehabilitation, juvenile delinquency is at a premium. Youth was neglected 
during the occupation except where it was deliberately cultivated to evil ends by the 
Japanese, as in the case of Java. There will be no complete cure until youth has 
found, or been given, a new orientation. 
23. The tasks allotted to S.E.A.C. were to disarm and concentrate the Japanese 
forces and to succour Allied prisoners of war and internees. Together with these tasks 
there was the somewhat ill-defined responsibility for maintaining law and order, 
which, however, with the strictly limited forces available, could for practical 
[81) MAR 1946 215 
purposes not extend beyond the areas of actual physical occupation. The preceding 
paragraphs have shown to what extent the vast quantities of arms and ammunition, 
the generally prevailing atmosphere of unrest and lawlessness and the absence of 
organised police forces added to the difficulties of the tasks which were set to the 
Command. These difficulties were general and not entirely unforeseen. The difficul-
ties likely to be encountered in Indo-China were also not unforeseen. But it was the 
situation in Java, which was only included in the Command on the day of Japan's 
collapse, which upset all previous calculations. 
24. It was the necessity to divert much larger forces to Java to cope with a 
politico-military situation which had not been foreseen which delayed the concentra-
tion and disarmament of the Japanese and made it obligatory, in the absence of any 
stable administration, to continue to employ them on guard duties and even on 
occasion to use them in a defensive operational role. 
25. The conditions described in the preceding paragraphs were general to the 
situation as a whole. From the date of the Japanese surrender it was the political 
situation in the various areas which influenced the military situation and to a much 
greater extent the situation in non-British than in British territories. The following 
paragraphs deal with developments in Siam, French Indo-China and the Netherlands 
East Indies . .. _3 
Economic factors 
147. The sudden end of the war with Japan brought S.E.A.C. face to face with 
economic conditions which, though they were not entirely unforeseen, yet deman-
ded measures which the command was not equipped to undertake. Whereas in 
Europe elaborate planning had preceded the collapse of Germany, in the case of 
Japan planning was, almost up to the moment when the last shot was fired, based on 
the premise that the war would end in November 1946. The results of this 
unpreparedness, for which S.E.A.C. was in no way responsible, were unhappy. In the 
circumstances it is surprising that things have gone as well as they have. 
148. The conduct of the war in South-East Asia had demanded the setting up of 
civil affairs organisations and of planning against the day of reoccupation. But while 
hostilities were in progress reoccupation envisaged no more, at any rate in the initial 
stages, than the prevention of disease and unrest amongst the population, and 
rehabilitation and reconstruction only to the degree that they facilitated the conduct 
of military operations. With the end of the war, however, rehabilitation and 
reconstruction are no longer of secondary, but of primary importance, and special 
machinery is required to bring conditions back to normal with as little delay as 
possible. 
149. In the case of S.E.A.C. the sudden end of the war meant that there were only 
the war staffs to deal with the host of economic problems which were to descend 
upon them. Not only were the military staffs not reinforced; they became more and 
more depleted as time went on with the demands of retrenchment and demobilisa-
tion. The civil requirements of tens of millions of civil population had to be screened 
by the Principal Administrative Officer's staff. The military administrations, known 
somewhat misleadingly as civil affairs, which had always been starved of man-power, 
were called upon to perform superhuman feats, while the Economic Intelligence 
3 Paras 26-147 on Siam, Indo-China and Netherlands East Indies, omitted. 
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Section of the Directorate of Intelligence, originally created for a totally different 
purpose, was saddled in the early stages with the task of collecting the data without 
which future requirements could not be estimated. Great credit reflects on those 
who, with little or no warning, readily undertook new and in many cases 
unaccustomed labours. 
150. But with the best will in the world the military command, with its 
operational commitments and the responsibility for the welfare of large military 
forces could do no more than devote part-time attention to what is unquestionably a 
whole-time job. The lesson to be learned from this is that it is as necessary to plan for 
the end of the war as it is for the beginning and for the conduct of it. Once again 
S.E.A.C. had not been given the tools. 
151. The main economic problems confronting the command did not differ from 
those prevailing in other war-stricken areas. They were, and still are, shortage [sic] of 
food, of transportation and of inducement goods. In addition, Burma has been 
shattered by war; Siam is in the throes of a fearful inflation, while the political 
situation in Indo-China and the Netherlands Indies has prevented the movement of 
goods and the restoration of economic life, though in the latter area certain islands 
(such as Celebes) have made greater progress than others. Only in Malaya has there 
been steady progress towards recovery, though much remains to be done. 
152. Rice being the staple diet of South-East Asia, the shortage of it is likely to 
have most serious consequences. Burma, the largest surplus producer of all, has 
been able to furnish a negligible quantity. In Siam, where there is known to be a 
considerable surplus, the political situation, inflation and general inefficiency have 
together conspired to prevent more than a trickle from flowing to deficit areas. In 
Indo-China, the arbitrary division of the country for military purposes, and the 
general unrest make it impossible to estimate at present whether any surplus will be 
available for export. Java, which was at one time self-supporting, has now become a 
deficiency area. The prospect is not an encouraging one. 
153. Two immediate problems present themselves. The first is to extract and 
distribute available stocks. The second is to ensure maximum planting in the coming 
season. It is in connexion with this second problem that we come up against the 
question of inducement goods. The result of the introduction of Japanese currency 
and the debasement of existing currencies by the Japanese has been to destroy the 
faith of the peasant in money. That faith can only be restored if he is able to buy for 
the money which he receives in payment for his products the goods which he 
requires. Until he can do this he is unconvinced of the value of paper and will tend to 
grow only for his own requirements. The need, therefore, to provide goods, and in 
particular textiles, which will induce the farmer to grow a maximum crop, is an 
urgent one. 
154. As was to be expected, the end of the war found South-East Asia in financial 
chaos. In Burma and Malaya it was found possible to ban Japanese currency with the 
entry of our troops. This somewhat drastic step cannot have failed to cause some 
temporary hardship, but it was effective. It has, however, had a curious after-effect in 
contributing to the lack of faith in paper money which still prevails amongst the 
ignorant, who reason that if one currency can become valueless overnight, what is to 
prevent the same thing happening to any other paper currency. 
155. In Siam the note issue is eight times that of pre-war days, and Herculean 
steps will have to be taken to provide a remedy. Whether the Siamese are capable of 
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Herculean steps remains to be seen. 
156. In In do-China the French maintained the value of the piastre. But in view of 
the division of the country is is likely to be some time before the financial picture 
becomes clear. 
157. In the Netherlands Indies the Dutch successfully introduced a new N.E.I. 
guilder issue in many of the outer islands. But in Java and Sumatra the Indonesians 
murdered anyone found in possession of Dutch notes, and as our position was for 
many months so insecure even in the areas nominally under control, the Japanese 
guilder continued to circulate, without any foreign exchange value at all. Only in 
March 1946 was it found possible to introduce the N.E.I. guilder within a limited 
area, while the Japanese guilder was given a temporary exchange value of 3 Dutch 
cents until it could be withdrawn. It is as yet too early to estimate the effect of this 
measure. The exchange rate of 2s. 7lfzd. to the new N.E.I. guilder is considered by a 
British financial expert to be too high, since that in Holland is understood to be only 
1s. 10lfzd. 
The Japanese 
158. Even to those who knew the Japanese before (if anyone knows a Japanese), it 
could only be a matter of conjecture in August 1945 how they would behave in 
defeat, since they had never oeen defeated before in living memory. It was, therefore, 
with mingled sentiments of curiosity, suspicion and doubt that a party set out with 
Admiral Mountbatten's Chief of Staff in August to meet Field-Marshal Count 
Terauchi's Chief of Staff, who had been summoned to Rangoon to discuss the 
implementation of the surrender terms. 
159. In the event the Japanese were correct, if ill at ease. Though as an act of 
courtesy they were allowed to retain their swords (since the formal surrender was not 
to take place until the 12th September in Singapore), for which they rendered formal 
thanks, their escorts and their close surveillance can have left them in no doubt of 
their defeat. 
160. From the outset-though on our part suspicion naturally died slowly-it 
became evident that the Japanese, having been ordered by their Emperor to 
surrender, intended to obey that order to the letter. Indeed, except for isolated 
instances and more particularly in Java, the Japanese have carried out their 
obligations. 
161. From the first they pleaded that they should carry out the surrender 
voluntarily themselves. That is to say, having received the orders of the Supreme 
Allied Commander, the Japanese High Command would then convey these orders to 
subordinate commands and accept responsibility for their execution. They also asked 
that all orders given by the Allies should be in the name of the Supreme Allied 
Commander. Both these requests were granted, and in practice, with only few 
exceptions, the procedure has worked very well. 
162. It has already been explained in this report why it was necessary to continue 
to use armed Japanese for defensive and guard purposes in certain areas. At times 
they became involved in hostilities and on occasion displayed as much gallantry and 
devotion to duty at the behest of the British as they had in the days of their own 
arrogant domination. 
163 . Elsewhere the Japanese were employed as labour, and here, too, they 
performed the tasks assigned to them without question and with an efficiency which 
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often compared favourably with the performance of local native labour. 
164. The effect of all this has been vaguely disturbing. The Japanese have, in fact, 
been carrying out their "defeat drill" with the same discipline and determination 
which characterised their aggression. It is a mistake to assume that the spirit which 
animates them is not the same. But their general behaviour has been such as to give 
rise to a sneaking sense of almost admiration amongst the citizen-soldiers of a nation 
which notoriously cannot hate for long. 
165. Fraternisation with Japanese is fortunately not in question, for the customs 
and habits of our two nations are so different as to render anything of the sort 
distasteful. But the orderly behaviour of the Japanese in the midst of disorder; their 
efficiency, which is without doubt incomparably greater than that of most of the 
indigenous inhabitants of this part of the world, and their ready acquiescence are 
liable to give rise, even if only sub-consciously, to the thought that "they are not so 
bad after all." 
166. Nor would they be, if they were animated by a different spirit. But there is no 
convincing evidence that the Japanese in South-East Asia are changed in spirit. At 
any rate at first they did not even admit defeat. The vast majority of them had not 
been in Japan for a long time and had not witnessed its destruction. Their view was 
that they were undefeated, and that they were merely obeying the orders of their 
Emperor, who, in order to avoid further bloodshed in the world, had told them to lay 
down their arms. 
167. To-day most Japanese in this area are probably conscious of their defeat and 
to this the efforts of our former political warfare organisation have without doubt 
largely contributed. But what next? It is not difficult to change the words which issue 
from the lips of a Japanese-one could occasionally accomplish that even in the bad 
old days-but it is quite a different thing to change his way of thought. And it is far 
from being an advantage to have him under one's control far from his own country, 
since it is only in Japan that his regeneration can take place-if at all. However 
excellent our propagandists, they are too few in number even to begin to know what 
three-quarters of a million Japanese scattered over a wide area are thinking. 
168. The Japanese in South-East Asia have, in the main, not been defeated in 
battle (except those who were in Burma) . They may be convinced of their defeat, but 
they may equally well be determined to do it again when opportunity offers. 
Segregation in remote areas will do nothing to convince them to the contrary. They 
will be outcasts in an alien land with much time for thought, which may well breed a 
spirit of revenge. 
169. There is another danger and that is that present discipline may break down. 
This may, in non-British territories, lead to reprisals, or it may, particularly in the 
case of Siam, lead to a restoration of Japanese confidence as a result of their ability to 
defy authority. 
170. Everything, therefore, points the same way, namely, that the Japanese 
should be repatriated to Japan as soon as possible. But S.E.A.C. has not the resources 
and the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers has so far not proved helpful. At 
the present rate, repatriation will take several years, with consequences which can 
only be bad. The problem is an extremely serious one, which must be tackled 
resolutely-and soon. 
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82 CO 537/1548, no 66 1 Apr 1946 
[Boycott of governor's installation]: inward telegram no 1 from SirE 
Gent to Mr Hall 
[This telegram, which was despatched in the early hours of the morning of 1 Apr local 
time and received in the CO at 9.30 am, refers to events that took place on the previous 
day. Gent arrived in Kuala Lumpur on 31 Mar. The rulers had foregathered at the Station 
Hotel, but an emergency meeting of the PMMC on 31 Mar passed resolutions calling upon 
Malays to boycott the Malayan Union and inviting Dato Onn to request the rulers to 
absent themselves from the inauguration ceremony.] 
On the arrival of Gent this afternoon, all Sultans requested interview with him with 
reference to their decision not (repeat not) to attend the swearing in ceremony. See 
Sultan of Perak's telegram to the Secretary of State of 30th March. Gent endeavoured 
to convince them that the decision could only give the impression of discourtesy to 
H.M. Government and His Majesty's representative and that, while H.M. Government 
had decided Ol! policy of Union, nevertheless the whole detailed scheme of the 
structure of the new Union Constitution was deliberately left for full consultation in 
Malaya. At the interview, the Chief spokesman was the Sultan of Perak, who insisted 
that, while H.M. Government had satisfactorily met the requirements regarding 
religious affairs, the position and prestige of the Sultans required also that their 
[secular] state of affairs was not removed as Union policy necessarily involves. He 
gave particular assurances that no mark of disrespect to His Majesty or H.M. 
Government or the Governor was intended. After adjourning for discussion amongst 
themselves, the Sultans returned at 11.30 pm. for further interview with Gent to 
report that they were unable to vary their decision not to attend tomorrow's 
ceremony and repeated their assurance of no disrespect. On this occasion, the Sultan 
of Kedah acted as spokesman and referred to telegram which had been sent to the 
Secretary of State a few days ago stating that the Sultans would accept Federation 
but not Union. Sultans are objecting to attending the formal meeting of the Council 
of Sultans arranged for 2nd April, but it is hoped that they will consent to attend at 
the same time and date if the meeting takes the form of informal meeting with the 
Governor personally. Gent recommends that reply be telegraphed for communica-
tion to the Sultan of Perak in the following sense. 
First. Secretary of State greatly regrets their decision regarding the swearing in 
ceremony. 
Second. Policy of the Union has been decided by H.M. Government with the 
approval of Parliament and has been implemented by Order in Council. 
Third. Within that policy, the Sultans will have the fullest opportunity to advise on 
details of constitutional provisions which, in their view, will best serve Malay 
interests no less than those of Malaya as a whole.1 
1 The secretary of state replied accordingly, outward telegram no 4, 1 Apr 1946. 
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83 CO 537/1548, no 69 _ 2 Apr 1946 
[Boycott of governor's installation]: inward telegram no 13 from SirE 
Gent to Mr Hall 
Your telegram No. 4. 1 
Sultans. 
1. I am writing to each Sultan as directed and I note your instructions regarding 
publication. So far, the text of the telegram of 30th March from the Sultan of Perak 
has not (repeat not) been published. 
2. Sultans declined to attend even the informal meeting on 2nd April mentioned 
in my telegram No. 1, but yesterday evening asked to come to King's House2 to say 
goodbye before leaving Kuala Lumpur (with the exception of the Sultan of Selangor 
who has private residence here). I welcomed this gesture and saw each of them 
separately for few minutes personal talk. All extended to me cordial personal 
invitation to visit them in their States and the rulers of Perak and Negri Sembilan 
gave me the impression that, as soon as your reply was received definitely disposing 
of the question of Union versus Federation, we might hope to make headway with 
matters as to constitutional provisions necessary to satisfy their feelings and 
(? ensure) their position. 
3. Probable basis of the Sultans embarrassment and difficulty is that they have 
put themselves in the position of responsiveness to the new political Malay 
organisation known as Malay Congress, of which Dato Onn of Johore is the 
President, and the attitude of this organisation is not at all promising at present. 
1 See 82, note 1. 
2 King's House was the governor's residence; Carcosa, which had been built for Swettenham as first 
resident general of the FMS, was the chief secretary's house. Sine~ the Malay states had been sovereign 
territories until the war, the residence of the high commissioner in Kuala Lumpur had been named King's 
House not Government House. When, in the pre-war period, the high commissioner of the Malay states 
switched roles to function as governor of the colony of the Straits Settlements he had occupied 
Government House in Singapore. 
84 CO 537/1548 8 Apr 1946 
[The Pan-Malayan Malay Congress): minute by Mr Creech Jones 
The development among the Malays of some Malay organisation was to be expected 
and the prospect of a movement throughout the peninsula need not be bad if it is 
handled now with understanding & discretion. The agitation over here by the 
ex-Governors & the Conservative M.P.s in an area not remote from "Indonesia" has 
encouraged it just as the Sultans under similar influences have renounced their 
earlier stand and gone into opposition. Now, the Sultans are aware that their people 
are sceptical of them and are turning from them to the Malay Congress. So the 
Sultans, to curry the popular favour they are in danger of losing, are demonstrating 
an obstinacy to Britain in the hope that leadership of the Malays shall not pass to the 
Congress. At the same time the Malays through Congress are evolving a new 
leadership & Dato Onn will exploit his opportunity. He will undoubtedly be joined by 
the discontents, impatient youth & the ambitious but they will not find political 
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satisfaction either by backing the Sultans or by demanding Federation. An outlet for 
the Congress then might be found through the new political institutions where the 
Malays are likely in most to be dominant. The Malays need to know that they are 
"lost" in a measurable time unless British policy is broadly accepted. 
85 CO 537/1528 25-26 Apr 1946 
[Malay opposition to Malayan Union]: minutes by H T Bourdillon, J J 
Paskin and Sir G Gater 
... During the past few weeks, the attitude both of the Malay Sultans and of leading 
Malays, as represented by Dato Onn's organisation, has steadily hardened. As regards 
the former, we may take up the story from the point at which they telegraphed the 
Secretary of State, announcing that they could not recognise the MacMichael 
Agreements as effective. The telegram is registered at (64) on 50823/34/46. It goes on 
to say that the Rulers require further time for consultation with their State Councils 
and people, and that they are axious to re-open negotiations regarding the future of 
Malaya, on the basis of a Malayan Federation in place of a Malayan Union. The 
telegram was sent on the 30th of March, and since that date the Sultans have adopted 
a perfectly firm and clear attitude. They have been at pains to deny any intention of 
personal discourtesy towards the Governor, or of disrespect towards His Majesty or 
His Majesty's Government (see No. 66Y They have behaved cordially towards the 
Governor in private, but have refused to meet him publicly or to attend his swearing 
in ceremony, on the grounds that this would imply an acknowledgment of the 
existence of the Malayan Union, which they do not recognis!,!. They had assembled at 
Kuala Lumpur at the time of the Governor's arrival, but they left soon afterwards 
(No. 69)2 and since then their actions have been in keeping with the position they 
had already adopted. They have acted throughout as a united body, and have 
maintained contact with the Sultan of Johore in this country. On the 15th of April, 
they held a meeting at Kuala Kangsar (the Headquarters of the Sultan of Perak-(see 
No. (85) on this file) as a result of which they wrote to the Governor (No. (88) on this 
file), expressing their desire to proceed to England at the earliest opportunity, in 
order to lay personally before the King their request that Federation might be 
substituted for Union. In the meanwhile they had received, through the Governor, 
the Secretary of State's reply to their "repudiation telegram", and in their letter they 
expressed great regret at the terms of this reply, which had evidently failed to move 
them from their attitude. It will be recollected that the Secretary of State had told 
them (No. (67) on 50823/34/46) that he was aware of no circumstances attending the 
signing of the Agreement with Sir Harold MacMichael which would justify the 
Sultans in refusing to recognise these agreements as effective, and that he could not 
admit the right of one party to withdraw from engagements solemnly entered into. 
That, then, is the present position as regards the Sultans. In response to his own 
suggestion, Sir Edward Gent has been asked (see Nos. (89) and (90) on this file) to 
keep them in play for the time being by seeking to elicit their ideas on the distinction 
between Federation and Union, and on the form of machinery which they have in 
1 See 82 . 2 See 83. 
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mind for the former. He is due to proceed to Perak today, and we shall probably hear 
further in the near future. In the meanwhile, though we have no detailed indication 
of what happened at the Sultans Conference at Kuala Kangsar, it is plain that the 
result of the Conference has been to strengthen their resolve and to confirm their 
unity of purpose. There is some indication (see No. (90) on 50823/34/46) that they 
used the occasion to elaborate a federal scheme for Malaya. 
As regards Dato Onn and his organisation (the Malay Congress) alternatively 
known as the U.M.N.O. , (which presumably stands for United Malay Nationalist 
OrganisationV there is less direct evidence of recent activities, though it is clear that 
the Congress has indeed been active and has exercised a powerful influence. As I 
reported in my minute of 5/4/46 on 50823/34/46, our earlier impressions of the 
extreme moderation of the Organisation were dispelled some time ago. No. (69) on 
that file (see also No. (65) as regards Dato Onn's personal attitude) speaks of the 
position adopted by the Congress as "not at all promising" and indicates that the 
Sultans are to a considerable extent under its influence. This influence is also, 
without doubt, to be detected in the last minute failure of the Malay members to 
attend the first meeting of the Governor's Advisory Council. The hardening of 
attitude on the part of Dato Onn himself is said to have been due to the second White 
Paper, whose contents he apparently regards as "tantamount to annexation". 
There is one further development which must be recorded though its importance 
cannot be gauged at present. According to information received from Dato Onn at 
the end of March a strong youth movement with Indonesian sympathies has been 
gaining ground among Kampong Malays. 
It is clear from the above, first that the Sultans are now more than ever united in 
an attitude of polite but catagorical [sic] non-cooperation, and secondly that there is 
a large measure of unanimity, in the same sense (though possibly not so polite?) 
amongst the more thinking Malays. The former of these developments cannot be 
entirely regarded as due to the influence of prominent ex-Malayans here and the 
advice received from Mr. John Foster,4 though these factors have undoubtedly played 
a large part in influencing the Sultans' attitude. It must be emphasised that the 
Malays themselves are uniting as they have never united in the past, and are uniting 
against the present policy of H.M.G. We had hoped that Malay opposition would be 
won round by the modifications of the policy on religious and other matters, and 
particularly by the deferment of the citizenship Order in Council. But this has not 
proved to be the case. 
In the present deadlock, which means that Sir Edward Gent can expect no 
cooperation either from the Rulers or from the Malays in his task of elaborating and 
establishing the machinery of the Union, two alternatives seem to present them-
selves. The first is to proceed on the lines at present laid down, and to do without this 
cooperation until and unless the Sultans and the Malays see that it is useless to resist 
further. It can be held that Sir Edward Gent has been at pains to offer full 
opportunities for cooperation, and that if these opportunities are rejected, the 
dissenters have themselves to blame for any disadvantages which the Malays may 
thereby suffer in the future . If this line is adopted, we shall presumably inform Sir 
Edward Gent accordingly. The Sultans will then reiterate their demand to come to 
3 The United Malays National Organisation was formally inaugurated at the Pan-Malayan Malay Congress 
in Johore Bahru, 11- 13 May 1946, see 90. 4 See 80, note 2. 
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this country in a body, and it is difficult to see how this demand can be refused 
indefinitely. 
The second alternative is to see whether we cannot, without in any way 
undermining the conception of the Malayan Union or the efficacy of the central 
legislature, take certain steps to grant the Sultans a strictly constitutional place in 
the Union system. Enclosed in No. (84) is a memorandum by Mr. Hone, in which he 
has embodied the outcome of his reflections on this subject during the last few 
months. Mr. Hone has, of course, had an unrivalled opportunity to study the 
situation as it has developed, and he suggests that it is not only possible but desirable 
to bring the Sultans right into the picture, on a strictly constitutional basis, rather 
than leaving them right out of it (except on strictly religious questions) as has been 
the doctrine hitherto. The emphasis, of course, is on the word "strictly constitution-
al" and the pre-requisite of any action on the lines suggested would be that the 
Sultans would undertake in all cases to accept the advice tendered to them. The most 
important individual suggestions made by Mr. Hone are as follows: 
(a) That the Sultans, as well as the Governor, should assent to State Council 
enactments, and that, as a corollary to this re-introduction of the Sultans into the 
constitutional affairs of their States, they should be in constant contact with the 
Resident Commissioners and-should be very active in making themselves known 
through the State and in visiting hospitals, schools, etc. 
(b) That the Sultans as well as the Governor should assent to Ordinances passed 
by the Central Legislature (with present facilities for communication, Mr. Hone 
doubts whether this would involve very much waste of time, and suggests that 
draft Ordinances might in certain cases be circulated in adv'ance). 
(c) That the Sultans should be mentioned in sanctions, approvals, issues of orders 
etc. under some such formula as "His Excellency the Governor and their 
Highnesses the Rulers have been pleased to etc." Mr. Hone considers that this 
would be a substantial improvement on the practice previously followed in the 
Federated Malay States, where it was made abundantly plain that the Heads of the 
local Governments were the Residents, and the [sic] where the formula "the 
British Resident has been pleased to etc." was all too familiar. 
It will be observed that in his telegram No. 136 ((87) on this file) Sir Edward Gent has 
a suggestion on the same lines, but he only covers part of the ground. One point 
about Sir Edward Gent's proposal is that we cannot tell how much this would mean 
in practice (if anything), since the whole relationship of the State Councils with the 
Central Legislature remains to be decided. Until local consultation has been 
comple~ed and Sir John Maude5 has come home, we cannot say whether the State 
Councils will be granted any substantial legislative powers. In any event, it seems 
important not to tackle this problem piece meal. Either we must stand pat or we 
must frame comprehensive proposals for bringing the Sultans within the constitu-
tion on a purely constitutional basis. The first part of Mr. Hone's memorandum (the 
second part deals with citizenship) is a reasoned plea for the latter course. 
If this course is favoured, at least as a possibility worthy of exploration, the first 
step would be for the Department to elaborate a definite scheme which could be put 
5 Sir John Maude, lawyer, KC 1943; Conservative MP 1945-1951; appears to have been observing the 
procedure in Malaya by which consultation with respect to citizenship was being conducted. 
224 MALAYAN UNION TO FEDERATION [85] 
to Sir Edward Gent for his views. If his reactions were favourable, the scheme could 
be put to the Sultans forthwith; and according to our advice (see for instance 
paragraph 3 of No. (86)) there is reasonable hope that the cooperation of the Sultans 
and of moderate Malay opinion could be secured. Certainly the present emphasis of 
the Sultans themselves on federation as opposed to Union is dictated by their 
prospective disappearance, under the latter, from a formal position in the organisa-
tion. 
Since everything we have heard hitherto has been from the Malay side, the above 
appreciation does not mention Chinese or Indians. It might be held that any 
departure from-the lines at present laid down would merely antagonise the other 
sections of the community and create a stronger opposition than that which we have 
experienced hitherto. It should be noted, however, that action under the second 
alternative outlined above would in no way prejudice or affect the status of these 
communities under the new policy. And it is noteworthy that Sir Edward Gent, who 
has always been very much alive to these considerations, is in favo~r of some further 
move in the direction suggested. 
H.T.B. 
25.4.46 
I agree generally with Mr Bourdillon's appreciation of the position as it has developed 
in Malaya since Sir E. Gent's arrival there. The present position, as he points out, is 
one of deadlock: & the question for decision is whether, in order to secure the 
cooperation of the Malays (N.B. not only the Sultans), there shd. be any modification 
of the constitution as promulgated in the 0-in-C. I have no doubt that it would be 
possible to devise some means of giving the Sultans some formal & strictly 
constitutional place in the structure, without detracting from the effective authority 
of the Gov. & the central legislature of the Union (&without changing the Union to a 
Federation), which would save the face of the Rulers & secure the cooperation of the 
Malays. 
What formal changes wd. be required to produce this effect would require careful 
[consideration], & wd. probably differ in form from those suggested by Mr Hone. 
If we are to make an attempt to placate the Malays in this way, it wd. certainly be 
best for a coherent scheme to be prepared in the C.O. rather than to proceed 
piecemeal as Sir E. Gent seems disposed to do. 
On one point I would differ substantially from the suggestion made both by Sir E. 
Gent & Mr Hone, i.e. as regards the State Councils. I think it wd. be a great mistake 
to "boost" their legislative functions by associating the Sultans directly with them. 
I imagine that the S. of S. will wish to discuss the present position & the line now 
to be taken on it. 
Secretary of State 
J.J.P. 
25.4.46 
Mr. Bourdillon has at my request prepared in his minute of 25/4/46 an appreciation 
of the present position in Malaya in regard to the new Constitution. I have nothing to 
add to what he and Mr. Paskin have said except that I should like to stress two points. 
The first is, that I think it is essential to take a decision now between the two 
alternatives set out by Mr. Bourdillon, as it is most important that Sir Edward Gent 
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should be in no doubt of the attitude taken here. A decision between these two 
alternatives must obviously govern the attitude of Sir Edward Gent in dealing with 
the Sultans and with the Malay Congress. The second point is that I strongly endorse 
Mr. Paskin's observation that if any concessions are to be made, they should be made 
comprehensively and not piecemeal. 
I am sending this direct to you to save time but when you have read the papers 
perhaps Mr. Rogers6 could send the fi le to Mr. Creech Jones. Is it possible for you to 
discuss the matter with the Department on Monday afternoon?7 
6 Philip Rogers was private secretary to the secretary of state. 
G.H.G. 
26.4.46 
7 Despite Gater's advice that a decision should be taken immediately. Hall concluded on 29 Apr, after 
further discussions with Creech Jones, Gater, Lloyd, Paskin and Bourdillon, that he must await further 
developments before even considering any modification of the sultans' position in the new constitution. 
86 CO 537/1528, no 95A 4 May 1946 
[Sultans' constitutional proposals]: inward telegram no 222 from SirE 
Gent to Mr Hall recommending conciliation 
My telegram No. 216 of 3rd May. 
1. My immediately following telegram contains text of proposals for Federal 
system which the Sultans brought to me this afternoon. 
Sultan of Perak was their spokesman and explained that, if His Majesty's 
Government would agree in principle with the constitutional system on these lines, 
all details could then be matters for further discussion, including the citizenship 
issue which though important was secondary to agreement on the independent 
status of the States under His Majesty's protection and consequent Federal system. 
2. There is general consensus of opinion strongly held by unofficial as well as 
official opinion (?independently) in touch with Malay feeling in towns and villages 
that it is essential to satisfy Malay feelings (accurately reflected by the Sultans in this 
matter) which have certainly been widely stirred and (corrupt group), 1 but so far 
earnestly seeking the restoration of happy relations with His Majesty's Government, 
which was expressed by the Sultan of Perak today in words to the effect that Malays 
had only been under British help and care for 60 or 70 years and had no other great 
power to rely upon in the difficult years ahead to ensure their preservation and 
development as Malay States and peoples. 
3. Officer in charge of Security Services Malayan Union,2 who has long and 
extensive experience of Malaya, discussed the position and prospects with me this 
afternoon with his (?this intended) conclusion:-
(! ) Malayan opposition (not only the Sultans but generally) must be satisfied if 
we are to avoid very serious likelihood of organised and widespread non 
1 ie phrase garbleddn transmission. 
2 Lt Col J D Dalley, director, Malayan Security Service, 1946--1948. 
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co-operation and disorder on the part of Malay people, which would (?actively) 
assist (corrupt group):-
(a) Malayan Communist Party 
(b) Indonesian political organisations. 
(2) At present, both (a) and (b) are resented and rejected in Malay political circles. 
(3) We shall have such opposition to any course as M.C.P. are able to muster, but 
their influence is not at present substantial. 
(4) Local Chinese and Indian feeling would not become antagonistic if Federation 
replaced Union and if fairly stringent qualifications were decided for Malayan 
citizenship. 
4. Advice on these lines is almost universal here and, even in circles in which the 
principle of Union is favoured, it is (?impressed) on me that:-
(1) Value in practice depends upon agreement with Malays. 
(2) Essential and progressive advantages of Union can be equally obtained by 
Federal system covering the whole territory. 
5. In the light of this advice and my own intensive study of public opinion which 
is in accord generally, I do advise you that the main principles of the Sultans' 
proposals deserve to be most sympathetically received by His Majesty's Government, 
with a view to our essential long term purpose being attained as stated by His 
Majesty's Government in the House of Commons on 8th March, viz. "Co-operation 
and unity of purpose so that self-government can become reality". We shall have 
achieved surprisingly early and with Malay consent that unity which was the ultimate 
object of democratic policy. 
The political interest and cohesion exhibited by all ranks of Malays is surprising 
but real, and extends to rural as well as urban district.s. Administration and revenue 
would be effective (corrupt group) increasing Malay non co-operation, which is to be 
expected from any policy which does not meet substantially these conclusions, which 
the Malay rulers have put forward with the unquestionable support of popular Malay 
opinion. You will observe that radical Malay opinion has been accommodated by 
'provision for unofficial majority in the Council. 
6. His Majesty's Government's own policy for constitutional unity in all impor-
tant (?fields) can, in my opinion, be essentially fulfilled under the Federal system to 
which Malay opinion has come to attach the greatest importance. I believe that if His 
Majesty's Government were to make favourable response with expression of confide-
nce and goodwill to Malay opinion, there would be ample room to secure agreement 
here on many points in present proposals which need revision, e .. g. financial 
arrangements and scope of Federal authority. · 
7. You will notice that on two matters of procedure:-
(!) MacMichael agreement 
(2) Journey to London to petition His Majesty,3 
3 The rulers first asked Gent for facilities to travel to London on 13 Apr. Three days later they formally 
withdrew from the MacMichael treaties and resolved to send a delegation. On 28 Apr Sultan lbrahim of 
Johore (who had arrived in London in Jan) made the first of several requests for an audience with the King 
all of which were courteously refused. See CO 717/148, no 52048/46. 
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the Sultans' proposals now deal with the first in more reasonable manner than 
"repudiation", and as regards the second are willing to await His Majesty's 
Government's response to the Federation proposals. 
8. Propsals are under close study here. I shall telegraph comments on certain 
particulars as soon as possible. 
87 CO 537/1529, no 98 8 May 1946 
[Sultans' constitutional proposals]: outward telegram no 366 from Mr 
Hall to Sir E Gent requesting a detailed appreciation of the local 
political situation 
[This telegram was drafted by Bourdillon and sent after consultation with Creech Jones 
and Hall.) 
Your telegram Nos. 222/ 223 and 225. Sultans' Constitutional proposals. 
I appreciate that you have submitted your latest recommendations in the light of 
evidence of local feeling which has forcibly impressed you, but I confess that your 
sudden and fundamental change of attitude has come as a great shock to me. I find it 
hard to believe that it has been possible for you to reach a complete assessment of 
public opinion in so short a time. Moreover, as recently as 19th of April (see your 
telegram No. 136) you advocated a solution to our present difficulties on the lines of 
certain purely formal concessions to prestige of Rulers within (repeat within) 
framework of Union. Your present recommendations, if I understand them aright, 
not only cannot fall within that framework but will involve the abandonment of the 
basic principles upon which we had always thought the political progress of Malaya 
must depend. 
2. As you know, H.M.G. made a thorough examination of Malayan political 
problems after the fall of Singapore to the Japanese, and were forced to the 
conclusion that no (repeat no) solution was possible on the basis of the existing 
Treaties. The possibility of adjustments within the framework of those Treaties was 
considered and abandoned. It was felt that, as the prerequisite of any real political 
development in Malaya, new Agreements must be negotiated under which His 
Majesty would acquire full jurisdiction in each of the Malay States. Only by this 
means would H.M.G. be able to act on vital matters affecting the whole of Malaya in 
time of emergency, or to initiate progressive measures in the future without having 
to negotiate a new Agreement with each Malay Ruler on each occasion. Furthermore, 
it was decided that this jurisdiction, once acquired by His Majesty, must be used to 
bring into force a full constitutional Union, which would provide for a strong central 
authority with powers to delegate to local bodies on a local government basis matters 
of purely local concern, and which would enable other racial communities side by 
side with the Malays to take their full share in the political rights of the country. 
3. This policy was elaborated and approved for planning purposes by Coalition 
Government. As soon as present Government came into Office, proposals were 
submitted to the Cabinet and received their final approval. On October the lOth last I 
1 See 86. 
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outlined the new policy in Parliament. Since that date, policy of Union has been fully 
debated in both Houses, and has been approved without a division in either House 
after long discussions in the course of which even the strongest critics of the 
Government hardly hinted at changes so radical as those which you now advocate. 
Lastly, Order-in-Council has been passed by His Majesty giving effect to Malayan 
Union Constitution. 
4. In these circumstances, it would be very wrong if I were to conceal from you 
that I feel quite unable, at present to contemplate any course which would involve 
abandonment of fundamental principles of Union. I should like to have from you a 
much more detailed appreciation of the local political situation and a reasoned 
presentation of the arguments by which, in your view, so complete a change of front 
could be justified to the Cabinet and in Parliament. In particular, your political 
appreciation 
(a) should state clearly the nature and reliability of any evidence that the Malays 
generally, as represented by e.g. Dato Onn's organisation, are firmly behind the 
Sultans, 
(b) should show what proportion of Malays are, on best possible estimate, still 
favourable to Union, provided that minor modifications are made within existing 
framework, and 
(c) should include comprehensive account of attitude of Chinese and Indian 
communities which have hitherto received only a bare mention in paragraph 3 of 
your telegram No. 222, 
(d) should include a more detailed appreciation of the significance in the life of 
Malaya of (1) the Malayan Communist party (2) the Indonesian political organisa-
tions. 
5. Possibility of further formal modifications within (repeat within) framework of 
Union, with object of satisfying Malay opinion, is of course an entirely different 
matter. Proposals as put forward in original White Paper have already been 
considerably modified in this sense, and I would not rule out reasoned suggestions 
from you along these lines. 
6. I am most anxious to discuss Malayan policy with Governor-General2 before he 
leaves, and his departure is . being postponed for a few days for this purpose. I will 
address you separately regarding his movements, but in order that I may acquaint 
him fully with my views before he leaves, I should be grateful if you would furnish 
me, by most immediate telegram to reach me not later than Monday, May the 13th 
with such comments as you feel able to provide on this telegram in the short time 
available. 
2 In Apr MacDonald returned to London from Canada, where he had been high commissioner since 1941, 
to prepare for his new appointment as governor-general, British territories in South-East Asia. He arrived 
in Singapore on 21 May. For the record of a discussion between Hall and MacDonald on 16 May, see 91, 
minute. 
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88 CO 537/1529, no 100 11 May 1946 
[Sultans' constitutional proposals]: inward telegram no 267 from SirE 
Gent to Mr Hall on the strength of the Malay opposition to the Malayan 
Union ' 
[This telegram and the one that followed (see 89) were received simultaneously in the CO 
at 7.15 am on 12 May.] 
Personal for the S. of S. 
My secret telegram No.268.1 
2. I want to assure you of my personal regret that I have had to form the 
conclusion that almost universal Malay political opinion here gives no basis for 
expecting effective operation of constitution on Union basis of present Orders-in-
Council. Strength and organisation of Malay opinion and their free criticism of their 
own Rulers has surprised all who have experienced Malaya, including especially the 
Rulers themselves. There is no doubt of its depth and extent and there are signs of its 
beginning to apply itself in practical ways, such as police rank and file resignations 
on very small scale at present. Security sources as well as Senior Administrative 
Officers expect growing scale of Malay non-co-operation and former apprehend that 
substantial Indonesian elements in West coast states may develop acts of violence 
against non-Malay communities. Main point is general agreement that Malay leaders 
and people will not come to accept "Union" and the situation will deteriorate with 
consequent frustration in every essential object of unity and political progress. But 
advice I have felt it my duty to convey to you is based on equal general expectation 
that, if the Governor would go so far as to meet Malay request in principle to 
substitute federal system, we should have Malay goodwill and co-operation, without 
alienating non-Malay opinion, and should achieve our two essential objects in 
practice by a different road acceptable to Malayan opinion. There are many matters in 
the Sultans' present proposals which must, of course, be modified in consultation, 
and we must especially secure satisfactory form of Malayan citizenship. 
1 See 89. 
89 CO 537/1529, no 101 11 May 1946 
[Sultans' constitutional proposals]: inward telegram (reply) no 268 
from Sir E Gent to Mr Hall advocating a federal system as a means to 
achieve closer unity 
Your telegram No. 366.1 
Constitutional proposals. 
1. I do not fail to appreciate the present feeling, which you expressed in 
paragraph 4, of the inability to contemplate any course involving abandonment of 
the fundamental principles of Union. I agree that my recommendations would 
1 See 87. 
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involve abandoning "Union" in return for securing basically unified system on federal 
principles. Briefly, my reason is that I am now convinced that insistence on Union as 
essential principle of progress of constitution on all-Malayan basis will not (repeat 
not) result in achieving the object of H.M. Government in the face of Malay 
resistance whereas "co-operation and unity so that self-Government can become a 
reality" can be expected under the alternative form of a federal system covering all 
territories in the existing Union, I appreciate that a federal system was considered 
before the Union was decided upon and I still have no doubt that the latter would be 
more direct and satisfactory if it had been possible to secure agreement of the major 
local leaders and people. 
2. I have most carefully reviewed the information from my expert advisers on the 
generaf and particular questions mentioned in your paragraph 4, supplemented by 
my own observations in the six intensive weeks following my arrival in circumst-
ances which could not fail to impress me forcibly. I offer my appreciation on each 
point severally. 
(a) Without exception, reports of each Resident Commissioner have shown that 
general Malay opinion in every State is firmly behind Ruler's resistance to Union 
and various groups of Malay associations (?we hope to) combine in U.M.N.O} 
which uncompromisingly supports the Sultans in this matter and has, in fact, ' 
directed them. Only Malay Party which still gives lukewarm support to the 
contemplated Union is M.N.P., whose chief influence now depends upon Indone-
sian and Communist elements and is not to be compared with representative 
character of U.M.N.O. as concerning Malays. I wish to stress that the force of Malay 
opinion is not due to personal views of the Rulers, but is expression of Malay 
popular feeling and that it is considered that Rulers are, in fact, now playing 
moderating part. Above information is confirmed by secret sources of security and 
police organisations throughout the Country, as well as articles and reports in 
Malay press. 
(b) With negligible individual exceptions, Malay opinion throughout the States is 
generally favourable to federation of all Malay States but is solidly against "Union", 
and minor modifications would not change their feelings. "Union" is (corrupt 
?believed) by them to be tantamount to act of annexation, destructive of 
independent status of Malay Rulers and states. 
(c) Neither Chinese nor Indians have displayed interest or preference in respect of 
Union as against federation. They are specially interested in questions of 
citizenship and popular representation in the councils, and, with the exception of 
a small group of Straits-born Chinese, both communities are concerned to retain 
their Chinese and Indian national status along with Malay[an] citizenship. 
(d) (1) M.C.P. has, for many years, constituted problem in Malaya. Its influence 
normally ebbs and flows with economic conditions here and with consequent 
opportunities at any time to disturb the peace. Its object has always been the 
achievement of communist revolution and the overthrow of the British Govern-
ment in Malaya. Its methods are intimidation, violence and extortion; and it is at 
all times feared by the mass of the Chinese population. It was prominent and 
2 The United Malays National Organisation was formally inaugurated at the meeting of the PMMC in 
Johore Bahru on 11-13 May, ie at the time this telegram was despatched. See 90. 
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powerful in the days following the Japanese surrender but soon antagonised the 
public, which supported the strong policy B.M.A. were forced to take. This 
restored confidence and influence of moderate K.M.T. who still maintain their 
predominant position in the Chinese community, while the power of M.C.P. is at 
present declining. One of the M.C.P. weapons against the Government and public 
order is General Labour Union and it looks for other weapons by infiltration into 
any Malay Indonesian groups or organizations. 
(2) Indonesian political organisation is in two rival camps divided by issue of 
indiscriminate infiltration. They are both considerable and well organised groups 
and their influence, which is strongly Malay-Indonesian Nationalist, lies chiefly on 
the West coast. Their future local significance is likely to depend on Netherlands 
East Indies political developments and, if the British can be credited with 
sympathy for Indonesian aims there, we may look for favourable attitude in 
Malaya, provided that Malay opinion is sufficiently met in our own political 
problem in Malaya. 
3. Reasoned presentation of arguments for which you ask in paragragh 4 of your 
telegram, might, I suggest, take the following line. 
(a) Purpose of H.M. Government was to create in post-war Malaya unified political 
system at centre with provision of subsidiary local legislative and administrative 
bodies. This policy of unified centre was designed to be both practical and 
economical and to provide necessary basis for future political progress based on 
the exercise of citizenship rights. 
(b) Two courses were considered:-
(!) Union 
(2) Federation, and of these, Union was considered more direct and effective and 
required agreements with each ruler to secure jurisdiction for His Majesty. 
(c) such agreements were duly obtained with some reluctance from some rulers, 
but they have been subjected to increasing and now intense criticism by Malay 
political groups as to (corrupt group)3 as they came to (corrupt group) them. Basis 
of criticism is ostensibly annexation and loss of political status of rulers and states. 
(d) But conception of closer unity of Malayan territories nevertheless generally 
acceptable to Malay political opinion provided that it is done by federal road. 
(e) This acceptance of All Malaya Federation is in itself remarkable development of 
Malay opinion away from open separationist ideas and is one which H.M. 
Government welcome as having similar objective to their own policy. But Malay 
co-operation essential for the purpose of developing unity and political progress. If 
this can be secured by federal, rather than by Union road, and (corrupt group) 
central system with representative political institutions can be ensured them, 
H.M. Government can well afford to allow local views to influence their decision 
on which road to go forward, as earnest of their policy of developing local self 
governing institutions. 
3 ie phrase garbled in transmission. 
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90 CO 537/1581, no 11 16 May 1946 
'The inaugural conference of UMNO': HQ Malaya Command weekly 
intelligence review, no 28 [Extract] 
5. The inaugural conference of UMNO 
The conference was held in JOHORE BAHRU and was opened on 11 May by H.H. the 
Regent of JOHORE,l continuing on the 12 and 13 May. The proceedings passed off 
much as had been expected, and it can be stated that it was an unqualified success in 
that it obtained complete unity and that it is now able to show a united Malay front. 
All 41 Malay Associations who had been invited attended the conference and agreed 
to owe alleigence [sic] to UMNO while retaining their individual names. Dato Onn 
was unanimously elected Chairman of the conference and it opened with the 
approval and ratification of the Charter of incorporation. The next item on the 
agenda was selecting a title, and it was officially decided that the association would in 
the future be called the United Malay [s] National Organisation (UMNO) . Zainal 
Abidin suggested that Pan Malay League would be a more suitable title, but this 
proposal was not agreed upon. 
Having agreed upon the name, the conference then met in the official capacity of 
UMNO and proceeded to elect Dato Onn as president and Abdul Wahad [sic] alias Dato 
Panglima Bukit Gantang, President of Malay League of PERAK, as Chairman of the 
organisation. JOHORE BAHRU is to be its HQ, and the following departments would 
be inaugurated: Secretariat, Finance, Public Relations, Education and Religion, 
Anti-Malayan Union, and Commerce and Industry. 
The most important decision taken was to despatch to LONDON a delegation 
representing the people and submitting their objection to the Malayan Union to H.M. 
the King. Dato Onn, Tengku Abdul Rahman, and Abdul Wahad, it was agreed, would 
comprise this delegation and proceed with the Sultans: $100,000 were allotted to the 
delegation to defray the costs. It is not, however, clear whether this delegation is 
going in an advisory capacity to the Sultans or whether it will present an individual 
case to the British Government. It has been suggested that the Sultans may now wish 
to modify their connections with UMNO as they feel that if they are always guided by 
UMNO's decisions that may prejudice their position. If this is the case, then it is 
likely that UMNO and the Sultans will submit separate cases, though in actual fact 
the cases will probably be essentially similar. The powers and views of the UMNO 
delegation to be expressed in ENGLAND were discussed in a secret session, but the 
views of UMNO and the Malays have been so frequently expressed that they are not 
likely to deviate from their previous policy, although they have recently agreed to 
support, in principal [sic], a Federation of the Malay States as opposed to the Malayan 
Union. 
It was further decided that in tune with the current policy of non-cooperation and 
passive resistance that they should boycott the arrival in MALAYA of the Governor 
General , Mr Malcolm MacDonald. This shows, if further proof is necessary, that the 
1 Sultan Ibrahim spent much of his time in London until early 1948. During his absence the Tunku 
Mahkota (crown prince) Ismail acted as regent of Johore. 
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Malays are adamant in their opposition and propose to carry out their programme 
against the Malayan Union. As regards the forthcoming visit of Capt Gammans and Lt 
Col Rhys [sic] Williams,2 who are expected on 19 May, it was agreed that UMNO 
would be responsible for organising receptions throughout the country. Processions 
and displays with banners would be arranged to show the Malays [sic] disfavour of the 
Union. KUALA KANGSAR was to be the meeting place for the discussion between the 
two MPs, the Sultans and UMNO, and the latter elected a Select Committee of 26 
members, under the Chairmanship of Dato Onn, to express their views. 
The MNP3 have again been in difficulties as regards their policy towards the 
Malayan Union, UMNO and the Sultans. Previously it was reported that the MNP 
were no longer "persona grata" with UMNO as they were not supporting the 
continued opposition to the Malayan Union. However inspite of this Dr Burhannudin 
and Zulkifly Owney attended the conference and have now decided that they will 
support UMNO and the anti Malayan Union policy whilst retaining the right to be the 
left wing opposition faction. 
The results of the conference are certainly considerable and have again proved that 
the Malays have united under the able leadership of Dato Onn. UMNO has become a 
definite power in Malayan politics and is likely to play a big part in the months to 
come during which the opposition to the Union will come to a head in the two 
LONDON-bound delegations.' ... 
2 L D Gammans (Conservative MP) and D R Rees-Williams (Labour MP) were sent to Sarawak by the 
British government to sound local opinion on its cession to the Crown. They broke their return journey in 
Malaya where they witnessed Malay demonstrations against the Malayan Union. 
3 The Malay Nationalist Party, a radical nationalist party with aspirations for union with Indonesia, held its 
inaugural conference in lpoh (Perak) in Nov 1945 and moved its headquarters to KL the following Feb. In 
1946 Dr Burhanuddin al-Helmy succeeded Mokhtaruddin Lasso (the first president) and Zulkifli Ownie 
took over as secretary from Dahari Ali. Ambivalent in its response both to the Malayan Union and UMNO, 
the MNP finally withdrew from UMNO in June 1946, ostensibly over the proposed design of UMNO's flag. 
91 CO 537/1529, no 104 16 May 1946 
[Sultan's constitutional proposals]: outward telegram (reply) no 442 
from Mr Hall to Sir E Gent. Minute by H T Bourdillon of a discussion 
between Mr Hall and Mr M J MacDonald 
Your telegram No. 268.1 
Sultans' Constitutional proposals. 
Am grateful for full and useful information which you have been able to provide at 
such short notice. I have now discussed whole subject with Governor General and 
have fully acquainted him with my views. I think it is important that you should 
likewise know clearly my present attitude. 
2. There are two points which I regard as fundamental. The first point concerns 
the question of jurisdiction. The proposals by the Sultans appear to imply the 
surrender of jurisdiction by His Majesty and a reversion to the previous treaties. I 
cannot (repeat cannot) see how such a reversion can be contemplated. The Sultans 
1 See 89. 
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signed the new Agreements without coercion2 and in full knowledge of the facts, and 
I have already informed them that I cannot admit the right of one party to withdraw 
from engagements solemnly entered into. Moreover, my preliminary legal advice is 
that the surrender of jurisdiction by His Majesty might involve legislation by 
Parliament. As I see it, this would place His Majesty's Government in an indefensible 
position. 
3. Second point which I regard as fundamental is maintenance of strong central 
authority in Malaya, with control over all matters of importance to the country as a 
whole. The basic purpose of His Majesty's Government's policy, as reflected in the 
Order-in-Council, is unity; that is to say, a real coherence which will make possible 
progressive political development in Malaya without the constant drag of powerful 
parochial interests. In my view, the Sultans [sic] prQposals are very far from 
achieving this unity. Under these proposals, the State organisations would be 
strengthened as never before, and these organisations would only remit to the 
Central authority a very few subjects, further remissions depending on the unani-
mous approval of all Rulers. I note from paragraph 2 (iii) of your telegram No. 225 
that you have appreciated inadequacy of Sultans [sic] proposals in this respect and 
that you are studying the matter with Maude's3 help . I am very ready that you should 
pursue these consultations with Maude. You will recall that intention has always 
been, as was made clear in Parliamentary Debate, to leave over for later decision, in 
the light of local consultations, the exact division of functions as between Central 
and local authorities. 
4. Subject to these two fundamental points, I have already indicated (see 
paragraph 5 of my telegram No. 366)4 that I would not rule out adjustments with the 
object of satisfying Malay opinion. It remains to be seen, of course, whether the 
attitude at present adopted by the Sultans and the Malays generally would permit of 
any solution within this essential framework. I am very anxious that the Governor 
General should form his impressions on the issues involved, and I should be grateful 
if, as soon as possible after his arrival, you would discuss the whole matter with him. 
Minute with 91 
See my minute of 18/5. The file has now come back to me to record the discussion 
with the Secretary of State and the Governor-General last Thursday afternoon (May 
16th). 
The Secretary of State began by making clear to Mr. MacDonald his views on 
Malayan policy, as set out in the draft telegram which was despatched after the 
meeting (see No.104). Mr. MacDonald expressed his full personal agreement with 
these views, and said he hoped a solution would be possible within the framework 
which the Secretary of State regarded as essential. He himself would do all in his 
power to work for this. He asked whether the Secretary of State would be prepared to 
indicate any modifications in the policy which he would regard as permissible within 
2 The issue of duress- whether it had been contemplated and whether it had been authorized- was being 
examined within the CO at about this time. Officials concluded that it would be legitimate to deny the 
allegations that the sultans' signatures were obtained under the threat of deposition. See CO 537/1553, 
minutes by P Rogers, Bourdillon, Paskin, Lloyd, Cater, and Lloyd, 18--24 May. 
3 See 85, note 5. 4 See 87. 
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the framework, or whether he would prefer a scheme to be worked out locally and 
submitted to the Colonial Office. The Secretary of State said that he favoured the 
latter course, since it was difficult to assess from this end the relative importance 
which would be attached in Malaya to any modifications which might be considered. 
While reaffirming his agreement with the Secretary of State's views, Mr. 
MacDonald said he hoped he would be at liberty to be quite frank if, after a thorough 
study of the situation on the spot, he was forced to the conclusion that no solution 
could be achieved within the framework laid down. The Secretary of State said that 
this could be taken for granted, but added that he hoped there would be no 
disappointment if his own communications were equally frank. He recalled that the 
Malayan Union scheme had been blessed by the Coalition Government as well as by 
the present Labour Government, and has been approved in both Houses of 
Parliament without a division in either House. In these circumstances, he would 
require a great deal of persuasion before considering any variations in the essential 
framework of the policy. He also asked Mr. MacDonald to bear in mind that the 
present unsatisfactory economic conditions in Malaya had the effect of magnifying 
political difficulties, and that a solution to these difficulties might become easier 
with the passage of time. 
The Governor-General's p'rogramme for handling these questions after his arrival 
in Malaya was also discussed. Mr. MacDonald emphasised that he was most anxious 
to avoid any appearance of supplanting Sir Edward Gent, who, as Governor of the 
Malayan Union, must continue to play the principal part in these affairs. Mr. Hone 
made the point that the Sultans were not acting on their own, but were under 
pressure from probably quite a small group of influential Malays who were afraid of 
losing their present influential position under the new system. Any programme for 
future discussion in Malaya must take full account of these people, who must be 
persuaded that their opportunities for service and advancement would in future be 
increased rather than diminished. The importance of this point was agreed. It was 
concluded that the Governor-General could not map out an exact programme until 
he had talked to Sir Edward Gent, who would meet him on his arrival in Singapore. 
Perhaps the best plan would be for Sir Edward Gent and himself to hold further 
consultations with the Sultans in the first instance, and then to widen their 
discussions so as to include influential Malays. This might lead ultimately to a public 
announcement, which would be very necessary at some stage in order to explain His 
Majesty's Government's policy and dispel prevalent misunderstandings. 
During the discussion, the question of amendments to the Malayan Union 
Order-in-Council was raised, and the Secretary of State laid great emphasis on 
preserving the basis of the present Order. Mr. Roberts-Wray5 said that the Legal 
Advisers had made a rapid preliminary survey of this particular matter, from which 
his tentative conclusion was that nothing more drastic would be needed than a 
supplementary Order of some 8 to 10 clauses, even if all the policy modifications 
which had been suggestep from time to time were to be put into effect. At the 
Secretary of State's request he gave examples, from which it became clear that the 
importance lay in the nature of any particular concession in itself, rather than in its 
effect on the text of the Order-in-Council. The essential thing was that the basis of 
5 Legal adviser, CO. 
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the policy, and consequently the basis of the Order embodying the policy, should 
remain untouched. 
Mr. Creech Jones, who had joined the discussion after its inception, then made 
two points:-
" (a) Publicity. This had already been mentioned in connection with the possibility 
of a public announcement in Malaya, but Mr. Creech Jones emphasised in general 
terms that insufficient attention appeared to have been given to the problem of 
"putting over" H.M.G.'s policy in Malaya, with the result that the wildest 
misconceptions, which never should have gained credence, were now rife amongst 
Malays and were greatly increasing our difficulties. He suggested that Mr. 
MacDonald should look into this on his arrival in Malaya. The Secretary of State 
agreed with this, and mentioned the possibility of sending out a special officer to 
be in charge of Malayan publicity, should Mr. MacDonald so recommend. At the 
same time, he pointed out that this was an administrative matter, in which the 
Governor-General must take care not to play too prominent a part. 
(b) Social and economic policy. Mr. Creech Jones stressed that in our pre-
occupation with constitutional problems in the Malayan Union, we must not 
forget the economic and social side. Mr. MacDonald undertook to bear this in 
mind, though here again the questions involved were mainly administrative. 
Finally, the Secretary of State spoke in very appreciative terms of Sir Edward Gent, 
and asked Mr. MacDonald to convey to Sir Edward a special personal message from 
himself. Mr. MacDonald undertook to do this, and the meeting. terminated. 
I do not think any further action is required at this end for the time being. We 
must await reports of further developments from Malaya. 
? put by. 
H.T.B. 
23.5.46 
92 CO 537/1529, no llO 25 May 1946 
[Proposed concessions to Malays]: inward telegram no 6 from Mr M J 
MacDonald to Mr Hall 
[MacDonald arrived in Singapore on 21 May; the next day Malays boycotted his 
installation as governor-general. After intense dicsussions he submitted the following 
proposals (from Penang) for the modification of Britain's Malayan policy.] 
I have had long and thorough discussions with Gent, Gimson and their principal 
Advisers, including Sir John Maude, as to the next steps to be taken in the 
constitutional problem of the Union. Gent has given me a most careful and, I am 
sure, penetrating analysis of the situation. He and I have also had several talks with 
Rees Williams and Gammans, 1 who are in personal touch with important sections of 
Malayan opinion, e.g. Dato Onn and other leaders of U.M.N.O., and both of whom are 
being co-operative at the moment. I have also discussed the matter informally with 
experienced unofficial Europeans from whom I have the impression of full and 
1 See 90, note 2. 
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remarkable sympathy with the general sense of Malay claims. Whilst indicating 
firmness on the principle of Union I have not, of course, given either the Members of 
Parliament or other unofficials any indication of our more detailed official views. I 
am all the more impressed, therefore, by the fact that they have independently and 
unanimously reached the same general conclusions on the problem as Gent, Gimson 
and I. In particular, both Members of Parliament are so impressed with the need for 
some modification in our original plan to meet Malay Rulers and people that they 
would be prepared to go further in the direction of meeting the Sultans on 
Federation than Gent's and my recommendations contained in my immediately 
following telegram.2 
2. I believe that there are certain definite factors to be taken into account in 
deciding what our policy should be. It may be helpful to you if I recapitulate those 
factors which seem to me of most importance. 
3. The Sultans are by no means free agents. When contact has been established 
with them, either individually or collectively, they make no statements but merely a 
reply that they must consider or consult. Any reply comes after an interval of time 
and in carefully phrased language. There is no doubt that the Sultans are in every 
case being instructed as to their attitude by U.M.N.O., headed by Dato Onn. Locally 
Onn has established himself firmly with the Sultans. Rees Williams, who has little 
use for the Sultans, is particularly insistent that we are in fact dealing with the 
leaders of progressive Malayan opinion. Sultans, for their part, maintain constant 
contact with the Sultan of Johore, who is advised by (?London Lawyers) . The 
opposition is, therefore, widely representative, well organised and ably directed. 
4. We must face the fact that Malayan3 opinion is, in effect, solid. At the same 
time, Malayan opinion is friendly to Britain and H.M.G. and wishes for complete 
restoration of understanding and good will. We can secure that 100% if we reach 
early settlement of the dispute, but shall try it too hard and lose it by any 
considerable delay or, of course, by failure to reach agreement. Though Malays would 
deplore this, they honestly and determinedly believe that the policy they are adopting 
is the only one that will preserve their independence and prevent the complete 
political and economic submergence of Malay by other races in the territory. 
5. Both conservative and progressive Malayan opinion charge the Sultans with 
having completely surrendered their position as Malayan leaders by the MacMichael 
agreement, by which "Full power and jurisdiction is vested in His Majesty". U.M.N.O. 
assert that the Order in Council proves their case up to the hilt. They complain that 
all public lands are vested in the British Crown: that all oaths of allegiance are to the 
King: and that virtually all legislative and executive powers are vested in Governors 
and Resident Commissioners. From this, they argue that whatever legal phraseology 
of MacMichael Agreement and Order in Council, practical effect is deposition of the 
Sultans in all temporal affairs and annexation of States. They regard this as a breach 
of our past undertakings and, on this ground, bitterness against H.M.G. is beginning 
to develop. 
2 This telegram, which is not printed here, outlined a 'Malaya Federal Union' which would retain the key 
principles of British policy (ie a strong central authority, the maintenance of British jurisdiction as 
secured by the MacMichael treaties, the establishment of institutions to facilitate political development, 
and a com·mon citizenship) and could be established by means of a short supplementary Order in Council. 
See CO 537/1529, no 111, 26 May 1946. 
3 MacDonald means 'Malay' since the term 'Malayan' includes all communities residing in Malaya. 
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6. Some of this is due to lack of publicity and explanations here at the time and 
following publication of the White Paper.4 Nevertheless, it is agreed here that no 
range in explanations or arguments will substantially alter Malay opposition. Gent 
feels strongly that confidence in our good faith can only be (?group omitted) and by 
substantially adapting our line of approach to objectives of H.M.G.'s policy so as to 
meet reasonable Malay feeling without thwarting legitimate share of non-Malay 
citizenship in future political institutions. Those objectives are largely approved by 
Malay opinion which, however, insists that they can and should be achieved without 
such injury to individuality of state institutions as "Union" involve. These ?prevalent 
opinions are universally shared by those Europeans and others here who can claim 
knowledge of Malays and I believe that a wholly rigid attitude by H.M.G. would lose 
the support of our other friends besides Malays. 
7. As happens in these situations, position has steadily deteriorated since 
publication of the White Paper, and is capable of further deterioration. It is now three 
weeks since the Sultans submitted their Federation proposals to you and they (and 
Malay political leaders generally) are beginning to become restive and dissatisfied 
that no answer is yet forthcoming. It will not, of course, be reasonable for them to 
expect H.M.G. to be rushed over their conclusions on these most important issues 
and now that I have myself arrived here, I hope that advice I am now sending you 
may help you to reach conclusion. 
Gent apprehends that the Sultans may not be prepared to meet him and me unless 
and until we can assure them that he has a definite and constructive reply from 
H.M.G. to make to the Sultans [sic] proposals. In any case, the longer this is delayed, 
the more difficult will it be to reach satisfactory solution of present impasse. 
8. At the same time, I believe there is good chance of reaching agreement by 
making variations in our proposals which are reconcilable with you and our desire to 
preserve principle of unity and common citizenship. Malayan Union will accept 
strong central Government and common citizenship for all who fully recognise 
Malaya as their permanent home. 
9. I have only been short time here. If I thought delay did not matter I would 
refrain from offering you advice until I had been here longer, but I am convinced that 
time is of the essence in this matter. Moreover, all this week I have given 
consideration to the problem in the light of talks with advisers in whom I feel great 
confidence. I am particularly interested by Gent's modification . of view since he 
arrived here. Far from feeling this change too great or too hasty, it increases my 
respect for his courage, honesty, and capacity as one of your servants and I fully 
agree with his present view. In (?group omitted ?general) situation is one of major 
political importance, involving good relations between H.M.G. on one side and 
Malays in particular and Malayans in general on the other. If we can get agreement 
now, we can retain full trust in British leadership in this region which is the main 
base of the British position in the Far East. 
If we do not, we shall begin to lose acceptance of our leadership by local peoples 
and process of our being at each stage bit behind local political opinions (such as has 
been so unfortunate in the history of the Indian problem) will start. We must, of 
course, keep in mind that there are powerful political groupings in Asia which are 
ready to exploit any weakening of our position i.e. Indian nationalists and Imperial-
4 ie Malayan Union and Singapore: Statement of Policy on Future Constitution (Cmd 6724, Jan 1946). 
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ism, Chinese Imperialism and especially Pan Malayan Movement led by Indonesians. 
10. My next following telegram sketches the lines on which Gent and I believe 
reply to Sultans should be framed. We believe, if our proposals can be approved as a 
whole, there is reasonable chance of early agreement. If they are only accepted in 
part, our chances will be by that much reduced. We feel assured that such a plan will 
have no unfavourable reactions on Chinese or Indian sections of the population. 
Indeed, local Chinese's main interest is in restoration of peaceful conditions for their 
business and they are positively interested that agreement between us and Malays 
should be quickly achieved. 
93 PREM 8/459 31 May 1946 
[Fundamental principles of Malayan policy and proposed concessions 
to Malays]: minutes by Mr Hall and T L Rowan1 to Mr Attlee 
[Given the pace of events in Malaya and the fact that Gent and MacDonald were due to 
meet the rulers for lunch on 1 June, an immediate reply to MacDonald (see 92) was 
necessary. Having consulted Arthur Greenwood (chairman of the Cabinet Colonial Affairs 
Committee) on 30 May, Hall despatched on the same day a telegram in which he went 
through the points detailed by MacDonald in 92, making a number of minor concessions 
but insisting on the retention of a strong central authority and the MacMichael treaties 
which underpinned it. Hall prudently kept the prime minister informed of developments 
(see CAB 118/29; CAB 128/5, CM 54(46)5; and CO 537/1529 and 1549).] 
Prime Minister 
As you know, since the restoration of civil government in Malaya on April 1st, we 
have had our troubles with the Malay Sultans and with Malay Organisations. The 
Governor of the Malayan Union has kept me fully apprised of the situation as it has 
developed, and I had a long discussion with Mr. MacDonald before he left this 
country to take up his duties as Governor-General.2 Our difficulties with the Malays 
over the form of the Malayan Union Constitution have led to a mass of suggestions 
and counter-proposals, and it seemed to me from the outset that we could only 
achieve a solution if we were first quite clear in our own minds on those points which 
are really fundamental to the policy of His Majesty's Government. Apart from the 
question of common citizenship (which is the subject of separate local consulta-
tions), I concluded that there were two essential points on which we must stand firm 
if the policy is to remain intact. The first is the retention by His Majesty of the 
jurisdiction in the Malay States acquired under the MacMichael Agreements, and the 
second is the preservation in Malaya of a strong central authority, having control 
over all matters of importance to the welfare and progress of the country as a whole. I 
gave a clear indication of my views on these points both to the Governor and to Mr. 
MacDonald, and I asked the latter to devote as much of his time as possible, after his 
arrival in Malaya, to the task of working out, in consultation with the Governor, the 
1 T Leslie Rowan, assistant and later principal private secretary to prime minister (Churchill, 1941-1945, 
and Attlee, 1945-1947); permanent secretary, Office of Minister for Economic Affairs, 1947; second 
secretary, Treasury, 1947-1949; economic minister, Washington Embassy, 1949-1951; second secretary, 
Treasury, 1951-1958; KCB, 1959. 
2 See 91. 
240 MALAYAN UNION TO FEDERATION [93] 
basis for an early approach to the Sultans as nearly as possible within the framework 
of the Malayan Union Order in Council. 
Mr. MacDonald wasted no time after his arrival and sent me on the 26th of May a 
detailed appreciation and a list of recommendations,3 based on exhaustive discus-
sions with the Governor and others concerned. The main points in his appreciation 
are that the Malay people, who have not yet lost their feeling of friendship for Great 
Britain, have none the less been deeply and genuinely stirred, and that the prospects 
of a happy solution depend upon speed in reaching a settlement. The only points in 
his recommendations with which I need bother you are those directly concerned 
with the two matters of retention of jurisdiction and the maintenance of strong 
central authority. As regards the latter, I am satisfied that the position is thoroughly 
understood both by the Governor and by Mr. MacDonald, and the only problem is the 
practical one of working out the best division of functions between the Central 
Legislature and the various State Councils. The recommendation as regards 
jurisdiction is that the MacMichael Agreements should be retained, but that there 
should be, in addition, a new agreement with the Sultans, in which His Majesty's 
Government would bind themselves to obtain the Sultans' consent before making 
any further changes in the constitution. I do not see how we could contemplate any 
arrangements which would thus make all future progress in Malaya dependent upon 
the caprice of the Sultans and of the Sultans alone, but I think we might devise a 
different procedure, which would keep us clear of any new Agreements, but would 
include an unilateral statement by His Majesty's Government to the effect that they 
would not of course envisage further changes without consulting the Sultans and 
without giving full opportunity for the free expression of local opinion. 
I felt it was most important to discuss the matter with the Lord Privy Seal, 4 in view 
of his special interest as Chairman of the Colonial Affairs Committee. I had a talk 
with him yesterday afternoon, and have since, with his agreement, sent Mr. 
MacDonald a telegram which contains my views on the two major questions, as well 
as on the minor points (mostly matters of pure form which will help towards a 
solution but will in no way affect our policy) which were included in the 
recommendations sent to me. 
I learn that Mr. MacDonald and the Governor will be meeting the Sultans at an 
informal lunch party to-morrow, and that they hope to embark on further 
discussions on Monday. I was most anxious, therefore, not to delay my reply to the 
recommendations, but I have made it quite clear that I shall have to submit the 
whole problem to my colleagues at a later stage. 
During the course of our exchanges of telegrams, I have ascertained from Mr. 
MacDonald that he and the Governor do not propose to confine their discussions to 
the Sultans, but have in mind a full programme for consultations with all 
representative sections of opinion in Malaya. 
The purpose of the present minute (of which I am sending a copy to the Lord Privy 
Seal) is to keep you fully abreast of developments. As I have just said, I propose to 
submit the matter to my colleagues later on. 
3 See 92, note 2. 
G.H.H. 
31.5.46 
4 Mr Greenwood. 
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Prime Minister 
I do not know all the intricacies of the Malayan question, but it is clear from the 
public reaction, from Questions in Parliament and indeed from the attached minute 
from the Colonial Secretary, that this matter is of the greatest importance to our 
position in the Far East. It has already aroused considerable controversy, and 
although the line which the Colonial Secretary is taking may be the right one, I feel 
that it would be wise for it to be considered by the Cabinet before matters go too far. 
Admittedly, he says that he has made it clear to the Governor-General that he will 
have to submit the whole problem to his colleagues at a later stage, but the 
impression I get is that at the later stage it may be found that things have gone too 
far for changes to be made. At the very least I should have thought that the telegrams 
about this matter should be given Cabinet distribution, and this, so far as I know, has 
not been done. You may possibly like to speak to the Colonial Secretary on these 
lines.5 
T.L.R. 
31.5.46 
5 On reading these minutes, Attlee instructed Hall to explain the position to Cabinet on 3 June when it was 
decided to stand firm on the MacMichael Treaties. 
94 CO 537/1581, nos 14, 15 and 16 31 May- 22 June 1946 
[Communal violence and political militancy I: HQ Malaya Command 
weekly intelligence reviews, nos 30-32 [Extract] 
[Communal fighting occurred throughout the peninsula and particularly in west Johore 
and along the Perak river during the closing months of the Japanese occupation and 
throughout the interregnum, though there is no real evidence that the Japanese 
instigated the clashes. Conflict also flared up in the BMA period, and, as Malay opposition 
to the Malayan Union mounted, there were fears of a recurrence of communal fighting. 
Sufi Kiyai, combining Islamic authority with occult powers, played a major part 
organizing the Malay struggle against the MPAJA and Chinese in west Johore. The leading 
figure here was Kiyai Sail eh of Batu Pahat. Sail eh was believed to have been a gang leader 
before the war and had been detained for a time, but the British did not imprison him 
after their return in 1945 largely because of his significance for Malays and his 
connections with Dato Onn. On the Japanese surrender Sultan lbrahim had appointed 
Onn as district officer of Batu Pahat where he won a reputation for bravery and as a 
peacemaker; thereafter Salleh was Onn's faithful follower.] 
No 30 (to 31 May 1946): Views of a Malay on the Sino-Malay differences 
From the Malay point of view, the quarrel between Malays and Chinese which 
originated in the Japanese time was brought about by the following items in the 
programme of the Communists when fostering their anti-Japanese activities:-
(a) Compulsory subscriptions. 
(b) Taxing of Malay produce. 
(c) Demanding mosques to be made their meeting places. 
(d) Demanding Malay girls to work for them in the jungles. 
(e) Abducting and killing Malays and destroying their houses and property. 
(a) and (b) were not minded by the Malays very much, but (c), (d) and (e) were too 
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much for them; they were absolutely contrary to the Malay custom, honour, 
principle and religion. Consequently, the friendly relations were severed, the Malays 
began organising and planning retaliation and were resolved to die fighting to 
uphold their belief, rather than give way and see their religion desecrated, their 
women molested, their relations killed and kidnapped and their houses burnt. 
Aggravating the situation and fostering the Malay courage was, of course, the 
'invulnerability Cult' and hence clashes broke out. 
At present, the communal situation is not smooth and there is still the feeling of 
fear and distrust between the communities. The condition now seems to be that in 
areas where there has been fighting, the Chinese fear the Malays, and in areas where 
there has been no fighting, the Malays fear the Chinese. That is why the Malays at 
PARIT SULONG are always distrusted by the Chinese. 
This mutual distrust is being encouraged by some, especially by those people who 
did a great deal of mischief during the Japanese occupation. The Chinese who took a 
great part in troubling the Malays do not feel safe now. Their guilty conscience 
makes them fear the Malays foremost for they know that these people when they have 
trouble are there and might take their revenge. It is these guilty Chinese, who seek to 
create tension in the feelings of the Chinese against the Malays so that they might get 
support in case the Malays were to take their revenge. 
On the other hand, these Malays who are guilty, fear the same thing from the 
Chinese. So they, in order to gain support and protection incite the Malays to tight 
the Chinese. Thus, the presence of this element in both the communities, though 
small in proportion is a standing influence endangering the peaceful Sino-Malay 
relationship. 
Another element which is aggravating the strained relations comes from the 
labourers in kampongs who do not have a steady income. These people, both Malays 
and Chinese included, now find that it is more profitable to tap rubber illegally, in 
plantations whose owners are absent, rather than to. earn an honest livelihood. So, 
they use the Sino-Malay differences as a means to prevent the owners from knowing 
what is happening to their lands, and organising work systematically. 
The Malay labourers would speak bad of the Chinese, and the Chinese would in 
turn speak bad of the Malays. Consequently idle rumours spread, the owners are 
frightened to return to their lands and the authors of these rumours are happy, daily 
becoming rich by their undisturbed illegal work. 
Business people, both Chinese and Malays, who are already established in the 
villages are using the same tactics. When competition is encountered the established 
traders spread idle rumours concerning communal activities of their oponents. 
Though only seeking to protect their businesses, they overlook the final consequ-
ences of their deeds. 
Still another element is the armed robber, the robbers threatening all honest and 
peace loving people. They do not feel as safe as the people living in the towns, who 
enjoy the protection of the police and military forces. So to protect themselves and 
ensure their safety, they have to stand together with their own communities. Thus 
outwardly it appears the communities are severing their relations. 
Malays and Chinese who possess a high spirit of nationalism are working against 
one another. The Malays who claim MALAYA for Malays are enlarging minor 
incidents and are always speaking ill of the Chinese and propagating the Chinese 
desire to make MALAYA a part of her empire. Such talk often puts fear in the minds 
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of the Malays, especially amongst the literate and semi-literate classes. On the other 
hand, the Chinese condemn the Malays, exaggerating whatever is unpleasant to the 
Malays with the idea of showing and proving that all Malays are bad. 
Thus people who have lost their houses, property and relatives help to maintain 
the tension. They wish for revenge, are irreconcilable and will never learn to forgive 
and forget. 
So, summarising the whole situation, it seems that the unsettled relations are due 
to genuine fear in certain sections of the communities, and for other sections, it is 
purposely kept as a medium to benefit their own ends. Thus it is the working of all 
these various elements spreading and enlarging minor incidents which result in 
stirring the communities to strife .... 
No 31 (to 11 June 1946): Che Salleh and the "Red Band" 
During the Japanese Occupation JOHORE was the scene of some of the worst 
Sino-Malay troubles of this century. Various reasons may be assigned for this, not the 
least of which was the Japanese application of the policy of "Divide & Rule". 
Unfortunately, that was not the only reason, and recent reports indicate how 
incorrect it would be to assume that with the removal of the Japanese the situation 
would become entirely peaceful. Initiative in the present instance has been taken by 
the Malays, and the Golden Needle Invulnerability cult has now spread almost 
throughout the State from the centre of BATU PAHAT. About the turn of the year 
this cult was mentioned in this review, and was blamed for instigating trouble as far 
away as PAHANG; since then a vast amount of information has been received about it 
from which the following picture of the situation as it stands today has been 
compiled. 
The leader (and he can scarcely be so unwillingly) would seem to be Che Mohamed 
Salleh bin Abdul Karim, the Penghulu of Mukim 41 in the District of BATU PAHAT. 
This man, of mixed Malay and Indian parentage, has had a varied life which includes 
three spells in gaol for theft. He was chosen for Pneghulu [sic] by Dato Onn bin Jaffar 
(of UMNO), but during the past two months the latter has been made fully aware of 
Salleh's tacit admission to complicity in the Cult. Whilst admitting in principle that 
Salleh ought to be removed, the Dato has stated his preference that he should be 
allowed to continue in office- provided he refrains from further trouble-making- in 
order to avoid antagonising his appreciably large following, which would produce a 
split in the unity the Malays have so lately won. 
Che Salleh has spread his own deep-seated mistrust of the Chinese by appeals to 
the fanatical and superstitious side of the kampong Malays. Working in the main 
through the Imams, the religious teachers of the Muhammadan community, he has 
apparently established "cells" not only in every Parit [? Parish] in his own Mukim, 
but as far away as MERSING and KOTA TINGGI. Che Salleh has gone a step further 
than most traditional preachers of Holy Wars who merely promised Paradise to those 
who died killing the infidel, and has appealed to the pre-Muslim animist background 
of the Malays with the promise of invulnerability. The Malays' faith in charms and 
ritual magic (which, though theoretically irreconcilable with orthodox Muhamma-
danism, he has in fact reconciled with his Faith even as, in Eastern EUROPE, the 
1 Mukim is an administrative subdivision of a district; penghulu is a headman of a mukim or group of 
mukims. 
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Christian peasant has found his religion in no way incompatible with many a pagan 
ritual) is a known characteristic of his race, and the magic employed in the present 
instance follows the traditional forms. Being pierced with the Golden Needle 
achieves for one Invulnerability; so does the drinking of a potion previously blessed 
by the Imam; or the wearing of the Red Band from which Che Salleh's organisation 
takes its name. In every case the pagan form is coupled with the use of warlike texts 
from Al-Koran, and the power of the latter alone to arouse unthinking fanaticism is 
already famous wherever a Muhammadan community exists. 
It will not be out of place to review the powers Che Salleh's supernatural gifts are 
reputed to confer upon him, and which he can delegate to his followers, because only 
by an understanding of these can one appreciate the power which a fanatical belief in 
their possession can engender. Nor should it be imagined that defeat and the death of 
numerous Invulnerables would immediately shake belief, because the failure could 
always be attributed to the unworthiness of the individual, in that the Power is 
conferred only on those who are without pride, who do not loot in war, who rob not 
the dead, and who never look back when fighting. Che Salleh himself- it is popularly 
claimed - cannot be killed by bullets; he can walk dryshod across rivers; he can burst 
any bonds that are put upon him; his voice can paralyse his assailants, making them 
drop their weapons; and were the Chinese to take him and set him in a cauldron of 
boiling water he would emerge alive and unharmed. These powers he has delegated 
to two principal assistants, known as Haji Fadil and Haji Adnan, of PASIR PLANGI, 
who, together with himself, have the ability to confer Invulnerability upon devotees 
who faithfully observe a certain ritual. The Power, however, lasts only as long as the 
Faith of the Initiate in his own Safety is firm. Initiates are known in battle by the 
band of red cloth they may wear on their arm, and leaders bear a wider band across 
their chests. 
Amongst his disciples Che Salleh also numbers one Endar, known to the Faithful 
as "Selamat" (which comes from the Arabic, and means "peace, security or safety") 
who has been to SEGAMAT, to LENGGENG and as far afield as to MANTIN in NEGRI 
SEMBILAN recruiting followers. He is thought to be of British North BORNEO birth. 
Another is Haji Salihon, who visited SINGAPORE, and assembled a large Malay 
meeting to hear Che Salleh speak, but when the appointed time came, Haji Salihon 
himself addressed the crowd in his place. Although the connection between these 
men and Che Salleh has never been conclusively proved, it is scarcely likely that he is 
unaware of what is being done in his name, and when he was interviewed recently in 
the presence of Dato Onn he tacitly owned to all that was said of him. In practice, 
anti-Chinese activity has so far been confined to boycotts in the estates, but a feeling 
of alarm is spreading amongst the Chinese, many of whom began to drift away from 
the kampongs in the MINYAK BEDU area, some twenty miles SW of KLUANG, in the 
middle of May. When interrogated these refugees gave as the causes of their 
evacuation the movement by night of armed parties of Malays and pressure by Malays 
who had leased estates to the Chinese for the winding-up of these leases before their 
expiry. Although the Chinese are prone to exaggerate, these stories undoubtedly have 
some foundation, and the Chinese were so convinced of their danger that they were 
firmly intending to send away their families, leaving only the menfolk to work the 
estates. It is possible that the inability of the Japanese to protect them from massacre 
during the occupation has left them uncertain of the effectiveness of the protection 
where the British can offer. ... 
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No 32 (to 22 June 1946): The Malay "Youth Corps for Justice" (API) 
A reliable and interesting, indeed intriguing, report has recently been received 
regarding the Ankatan Pemuda Insaf (API). This was previously mentioned in this 
review as a Youth Movement then in the process of formation under the control of 
the Malay Nationalist Party (MNP). Literally, the full name means "Youth Corps for 
Justice"; what is possibly more to the point, and is certainly easier to mouth, is the 
word "API" formed by its initials, which means "Fire" or "Flame", and may be 
presumed to describe the ardent nationalism its organisers hope to inspire in their 
recruits. So far, API is still in its infancy. The report referred to states that, when 
fully developed, it will work on the lines of the terrorist organisations now operating 
in INDONESIA. Its aims would then be to coerce the Malay community into 
supporting the MNP to a greater degree that [than] its unrepresentative character 
would justify in a democratic country. If UMNO's proposals for the amendment of the 
Malayan Union proposals are not accepted, API might well come under the indirect 
control of this organization by means of the affiliation of the MNP to it; if, on the 
other hand, UMNO achieves a satisfactory settlement, API may be still-born. Its plan 
is reported to envisage three phases, all dependant upon the establishment of the 
MNP, its parent body, as a force to be counted with in Malay politics. This has, in 
view of its organisers, already been achieved, and API has entered on its first phase, 
the formative stage, during which the preliminary underground organisation is to be 
set up. The second phase is to be affiliation [affiliated] with the GLUs, thus tightening 
the bond between the MNP and the MCP, and providing a useful variety of 
elimination squads for their joint use. Lastly, the Youth Militant will launch 
"AROBA" (Asia Raja Oentok Bangsa Asia, which means ASIA for the Asiatics). This 
phase will presumably involve a "Quit MALAYA" campaign against the British 
administration and a demand for self-government within the Indonesian Federation. 
The HQ of API is to form part of the central HQ of the MNP. Its present leader is 
reported to be Ahmad Bestamam [sic],2 of KUALA LUMPUR. He will probably be the 
organiser of the API congress which has already been twice postponed but is said to 
be planned for the near future . The choice of site for this congress has fallen on 
MALACCA, both because this city is the traditional "capital" of Malay fanaticism and 
because it is the headquarters of the "Holy War" movement. Many of API's members 
will probably take advantage of the occasion to don invulnerability, and it is of 
interest that they too are to be known by a red armband (the sign of Che Salleh's 
"Invulnerables"), but with the letters A.P.I. inscribed on it. The relationship between 
API and MNP on the one hand and PIM (Pembantoe Indonesia Merdeka - the 
Indonesian Freedom movement) on the other is uncertain, but is at present thought 
to be merely one of "mutual sympathy" and cooperation. API's formal aims are to 
unite nationally-conscious youth in order that it may play its full part in the struggle 
for the freedom of the Race and Country. Membership is restricted to members of the 
MNP or its affiliated bodies between the ages of 18 and 35, and recruits must be 
sound in mind and body and willing utterly to subordinate themselves to the orders 
of their higher commanders. 
API is to have a central committee of nine members, with State committees under 
2 Ahmad Boestamam recorded his memories of his days with API in Merintis Jalan Ke Punchak (Kuala 
Lumpur, 1972) translated by William R Roff as Carving the path to the summit (Athens, Ohio University 
Press, 1979). See 116. 
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this to organise and integrate all activities within their respective States, and the 
whole organisation is designed to enforce a strict almost fascist discipline, based on 
the four precepts: 
Respect your Seniors 
Obey your Orders 
Always be Prepared 
Abide by all decisions of the MNP. 
After the sensationalism of the above report, it may be worth while to observe here 
that the activities of the API have up to date .been almost nil. A few meetings have 
been held. A few branches have been established. But the whole organisation is still 
nebulous, and will doubtless remain so until the first Congress has met and the 
Committees have been formally established. Nevertheless API is a movement to be 
watched with close interest, and the possibility of its developing into an armed body 
of extremists is by no means remote. One need only remember the close kinship 
between the Malays of MALAYA and the Malayan peoples of the rest of INDONESIA. 
What the latter can do, can be done equally well by the Malays of this Peninsula ... . 
95 CAB 2111954 17 June 1946 
'Survey of co-ordination within the territories of South-East Asia': 
inward savingram no 12 from Lord Killearn to FO 
[After three months as special commissioner, Killearn urged that steps be taken to 
improve the co-ordination of British activities in the region. Though despatched on 17 
June this savingram was not received in the FO until1 July. Writing to Sir Norman Brook 
on 12 July, EA Armstrong pointed out that it was the FO's view that adequate 
co-ordinating machinery already existed in the Far East (Official) Committee. For 
Killearn's annual report to Bevin, see 'South-East Asia: work of the Special Commission 
during 1946', 12 Apr, CAB 21/1955, F 6151/6151161 (see also 119).] 
The area 
1. At the end of the war the Supreme Allied Commander, South East Asia, was, 
broadly speaking, responsible for the area comprising Ceylon, Burma, Siam, 
Southern Indo-China, Malaya, Borneo, and the Netherlands East Indies. 
2. This area will continue to be a bastion of vital political, strategic and economic 
importance to the British Commonwealth. 
3. In addition to the Kingdom of Siam, the Governments of France and Holland 
have a territorial stake in the area. Australia, New Zealand, and India are interested 
neighbours. China and the United States are intimately concerned. The Soviet Union 
might become active within the area in the future. 
Possible threats to the area 
4. There are a number of contingencies which, to a greater or lesser degree, 
would imply a threat to British interests in the area as a whole. Among these are:-
(a) The collapse of law and order in any given area. 
(b) An increased revival of trouble in the Netherlands East Indies. 
(c) Difficulties with Nationalists [sic] movements. 
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(d) Trouble with the inhabitants of the South East area of Chinese race. (If the 
general relations of His Majesty's Government with China become bad, and still 
more, if (however remote the prospect) China and the Soviet Union were working 
together against us, the threat might become extremely serious). 
There are many other sources of possible concern to the interests of His Majesty's 
Government in the area as a whole. 
5. Even if none of these contingencies should arise, the positive advantages, in 
terms of commerce and of the prosperity and political development of the 
Commonwealth as a whole, and of the United Nations concerned, of a co-ordinated 
approach to the problems of the area are very great. 
Departments of His Majesty's Government concerned 
6. The Departments of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom which 
are primarily concerned with the area include the Foreign Office, the Dominions 
Office, Colonial Office, India Office, the Burma Office, the Services Departments, the 
Treasury, the Board of Trade, the Ministry of Transport, the Ministry of Food, the 
Ministry of Supply, the Ministry of Civil Aviation, and the Post Office. 
The problem 
7. The political (both foreign and internal), strategic and economic interests of 
the Commonwealth in the area are interlocking and ought to be treated as such. 
What happens in one part of the area is of interest to all other parts of the area. A 
reversion to the pre-war system of handling these problems in water-tight compart-
ments and penny packets would be a fatal step. Recent years and the war have taught 
us lessons which, if we benefit from them, cannot fail to ensure that the 
Commonwealth, both administratively, economically, and strategically, is on a far 
surer footing than it has been in the past. 
Co-ordinating machinery 
8. Until recently the Supreme Allied Commander was the only co-ordinating 
authority in all matters but with the resumption of civil authority on a peace-time 
basis in the various countries of the area, the Supreme Allied Commander is 
progressively and as quickly as possible, passing his responsibilities in regard to civil 
matters to other authorities. Under present arrangements, the machinery available 
for co-ordination is centred in:-
(a) The Governor-General, Malaya (and prospectively Borneo). 
(b) The Special Commissioner. 
(c) The Supreme Allied Commander. 
It is important that there should be the closest co-operation between these three 
authorities and that, through them, effective co-ordination should be achieved 
within the area. The staffs of these authorities will work as a team in intelligence and 
planning and in directing executive action in all matters of common interest; to this 
end, the staffs concerned will be located in Singapore and, if possible, in the same 
building. There will be constant personal contact and mutual consultation at the 
staff level between the Chief of Staff and Principal Administrative Officer, 
S.A.C.S.E.A., Deputy Special Commissioner, and the Secretary General to the 
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Governor General. These officers will comprise a standing committee to be known as 
the Co-ordination Committee. 
Defence committee 
9. A Defence Committee is to be set up immediately comprising the following 
members:-
Governor-General, Malaya. (Chairman). 
The Special Commissioner. 
The Supreme Allied Commander. 
The Governors of British territories and Service Chiefs will attend as required and 
Dominion and Foreign authorities will be called into consultation as occasion arises. 
Functions of governor-general 
10. Sphere of Authority. At present the sphere of authority of the Governor-
General is restricted to the Malayan Union and the Colony of Singapore, but very 
shortly British North Borneo, Brunei and Sarawak will be added. Hong Kong is at 
present outside his sphere but arrangements will be made for him to represent the 
interests of that Colony in matters coming within the purview of the Defence 
Committee. 
Co-ordination of policy and administration 
11. The main purpose of the Governor-General's appointment is to ensure 
co-ordination of policy and administration throughout all the territories within his 
sphere, with particular regard to political, economic and social questions. Planning 
is to be directed to the co-ordinated development of sea and air communications and 
to ensure that the more backward parts of the territories share equally in 
programmes for social and economic advancement and the organisation of many 
forms of research. On the political side it will aim at progressive and closer political 
co-ordination and the development of self-governing institutions among the peoples 
concerned. 
Co-operation with other colonial powers 
12. I n matters of Colonial Administration co-operation should be encouraged 
between Great Britain and other Colonial Powers in the Far East, and, for this 
purpose, the Governor-General will, by arrangements with and through the Special 
Commissioner, keep in touch, with the principal administrative authorities in the 
foreign territories concerned. 
Co-operation with foreign territories in all matters of common interest 
13. In these wider matters the Governor-General will maintain close contact with 
the Special Commissioner who is primarily responsible for advising His Majesty's 
Government on these aspects of co-operation. The Supreme Commander will be 
consulted on all matters of defence in relation to foreign territories. 
Contact with governments of the dominions etc 
14. The Governor-General will maintain close contacts with any representative 
who may be established within his sphere of authority by the Governments of any of 
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the Dominions, India, Burma, or Ceylon. He will also keep in touch with the Viceroy 
of India, the Governors of Burma and Ceylon, and United Kingdom High Commis-
sioners in Australia and New Zealand, through whom contacts with the Governments 
of those countries may also be made as occasion arises. 
Authority of Governor-General 
15. The Governor-General will have power to give any Governor or British 
Representative in charge of any territory within the Governor-General's sphere, such 
directions as may be necessary, either in discharge of his responsibility for 
co-ordinating policy, or in order to give effect to the policy of His Majesty's 
Government in any matter. He will not, however, exercise direct administrative 
functions in any territory and will invariably address his directions or advice to the 
Governor or British representative himself. The Governor-General will have power at 
any time to convene and preside over Conferences of British Governors and 
representatives in his sphere of authority for any purpose that he may consider 
necessary. He will also have power to convene any other Conferences deemed 
necessary in the exercise of his responsibilities. He will further have authority to act 
as arbiter in any disagreements between Governments within the sphere of his 
authority on matters of policy or administration and if disagreements persist he may 
decide any such matter, unless any Governor concerned asks for it to be referred to 
the Secretary of State for the Colonies or the Defence Committee at home if Defence 
and other interests clash. 
Functions of the Special Commissioner 
16. Foreign affairs. The Special Commissioner is charged with the duty of 
advising His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom on problems affecting 
foreign affairs which may arise in the area comprising Ceylon, Burma, Siam, 
Indo-China, Malaya, Borneo, and the Netherlands East Indies. (The situation as 
regards Hong Kong remains to be clarified). He is to give guidance to the Supreme 
Commander, South East Asia Command, on matters relating to Foreign Affairs, and 
in particular on non-military matters arising in foreign territories within the South 
East Asia Command. In respect of foreign affairs he is to maintain contact and will 
confer personally as required with the Viceroy of India, the Governor-General of 
Malaya, the Governors of Burma, Ceylon, and Hong Kong, and His Majesty's Minister 
in Siam, and will arrange for interchange of information with them. He will maintain 
close contact with the Governments of Australia, New Zealand, India and Burma as 
may be required, whether by personal visits, by correspondence with the United 
Kingdom High Commissioners in any of the Dominions concerned, or by the close 
co-operation which he will, in any case, maintain with any representatives which 
these Governments may establish in Singapore. He is to direct the activities of 
Foreign Service Officers within the area, (otherwise than in Siam), and when civil 
administration has been restored in the foreign territories at present in South East 
Asia Command, he will maintain contact with the foreign administrations in those 
territories in such manner as may appear most suitable from time to time. 
17. Food. The Special Commissioner has been given by the Cabinet special 
authority and responsibility in regard to food and related matters in respect of 
Ceylon, Burma, Siam, Indo-China, Malaya, Borneo, the Netherlands East Indies and 
Hong Kong. In respect of food he is to maintain close contact with the Government 
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of India and to take India's needs into account. He is also to maintain close contact 
with Dominion representatives at Singapore and with United Kingdom High 
Commissioners in Australia and New Zealand. His responsibility will be without 
prejudice to, and will in no way affect, the position or the individual responsibilities 
of the Governors of British territories, His Majesty's Minister in Siam, and the British 
Service Commanders within the area. He is to endeavour to secure agreement 
between all authorities concerned, both British and Foreign, on the adoption of 
measures designed to alleviate the food crisis and in particular to ensure that the 
availability of foodstuffs, especially rice, is phased according to the productive 
capacity and harvests of the various territories. A Special Committee, the Official 
Committee on South East Asia (Food Supplies) has been set up to co-ordinate action 
by United Kingdom Departments on Communications with the Special Commission-
er which are concerned with food problems and related economic questions in South 
East Asia. 
18. Publicity. The Special Commissioner is considering separately whether any 
problems of publicity require consultation between the Governor-General and the 
various other British authorities in the area, whether in British or in foreign 
territory. 
19. Economic questions. The Special Commissioner was instructed to consider, 
in consultation with the Governor-General, the Supreme Allied Commander, and 
other authorities concerned, whether:-
(a) the existing machinery in South East Asia is sufficient to deal with economic 
questions arising within the area at present, and 
(b) what arrangements, if any, should be made for the period immediately after 
the military authorities have handed over control to the civil governments, and to 
make recommendations on these points. 
Action has already been taken on some of these points. Further consultation is 
required on others. 
Immediate recommendations 
20. Meetings. Periodical meetings should be held under the chairmanship of the 
Governor-General or the Special Commissioner, as may be appropriate in each case, 
to discuss problems of concern to all British representatives in the area. These may, 
as action warrants, be attended by the representatives of British territories only, or in 
addition, either by British representatives in foreign territories, or by representatives 
of foreign territories, or by both. It should be borne in mind that if the status of 
Burma and Ceylon changes, whether into that of a Dominion or otherwise, 
attendance at such meetings may become inappropriate. In that event either Cabinet 
Ministers from these areas or the United Kingdom High Commissioner (if such 
appointments are made), or both, might participate. 
21. Visits. It is desirable that the Governor-General and the Special Commission-
er and the Supreme Allied Commander and their staffs should keep in personal touch 
with London by periodic visits, and that there should be frequent interchange of 
visits within the area. 
Note: If these visits are paid, suitable accommodation and locomotion would have 
to be provided. 
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Communications 
22. Co-ordination within the area cannot be achieved without efficient methods 
of communication. It is essential that:-
(a) all British authorities in the area should possess both a cypher and a code in 
which they can communicate with each other. The Foreign Office are now issuing 
a special cypher for communication between British representatives in South East 
Asia. 
(b) British representatives should be able to travel within the area, to neighbour-
ing countries, and to London by air as, and when required, without delay. The 
Supreme Allied Commander is enquiring into the means necessary to ensure this. 
(c) British representatives in the area must be able to communicate with each 
other and with London by frequent and quick bag service. The Special Commis-
sioner is examining this question which is, of course, linked with (b). 
Co-ordination in London 
23. Most of the measures of co-ordination outlined above can be achieved by 
action on the part of British authorities within the area on their own initiative. But 
co-ordination in London is also desirable. It may be that such co-ordination can be 
effected by the existing machinery. Alternatively, it might be effected either by 
enlarging the scope of the Nathan Committee1 or by setting up some other 
machinery. In any case, the advantages of some body in London which would 
co-ordinate the work of the various Government Departments in dealing with all 
questions affecting South East Asia, and which would have direct access to the 
Cabinet, are obvious. 
Future development 
24. Only experience will show whether the basis outlined above for co-ordination 
in the area is the right one, and if so the full measure of what can be built upon it. 
Fully successful co-ordination can only grow in the light of events. But the need is 
there. If one solution fails another must be tried. 
Summing up 
25. To sum up. The problems of South East Asia are inter-related and there is 
vital need to treat them as such. This requires closer co-ordination both within the 
area and in London. The necessary machinery has now been set up in respect of the 
Defence Committee, of Foreign Affairs, and of food. Publicity, economic, and social 
welfare questions are to be examined. Periodical meetings should be held within the 
area to discuss problems of concern to the various British authorities. These may, on 
occasion, be attended by appropriate foreign representatives. There should be 
frequent interchange of visits within the area, and the Governor-General, the Special 
Commissioner, and their staffs should be in constant personal touch with London. 
There must be adequate cypher and bag arrangements for communication within the 
area and with London, and arrangements for rapid air travel within the area and to 
1 Lord Nathan, parliamentary under-secretary for War, 1945-1946, chaired the Official Committee on 
Food Supplies for SE Asia; Nathan was succeeded first by Lord Pakenham in Oct 1946 and later by M E 
Dening, see CAB 2111714. 
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and from London. Further development and adaptation must be sought in the light 
of experience. 
Co-ordination with Australia, New Zealand and India 
26. No attempt is made in the above Survey to cover the question of co-
ordination with Australia, New Zealand and India. This requires further considera-
tion. Meanwhile it may be noted that the closest relations have been established with 
[the] Australian Commissioner in Singapore who attends all important meetings 
convened by the Supreme Commander, or the Special Commissioner. In addition, an 
Australian representative has been appointed in Singapore who is combining the 
functions of political adviser to the Australian Commissioner and of Special Liaison 
Officer with the Special Commissioner. 
96 CO 537/1529, nos 149-152 21-22 June 1946 
[MacMichael Treaties and conciliation of Malay opposition]: inward 
telegram no 57 from Mr M J MacDonald to Mr Hall 
[The goverment's intransigence over the MacMichael treaties hardened the rulers' resolve 
to go to London. Anxious to prevent this, MacDonald despatched in four parts the 
following telegram urging Hall to reconsider his position on the treaties.] 
Part 1 
Governor Malayan Union's telegram No. 431 containing text of reply from Rulers. 
Gent and I regret that our warning in paragraph 11 of my telegram G.G. No. (?) 
and in paragraph 5 of telegram M.U. No. 380, in spite of the long way which your last 
proposals went to meet Malay opinion, the MacMichael Agreements might prove 
serious stumbling block to successful negotiations on Federal Government has been 
justified. This telegram and my two immediately following telegrams contain our 
considered comments and advice on the situation. We fully realise you may find great 
difficulty in accepting the proposals which we make about the MacMichael Agree-
ments. We are sorry we have to bother [you], but know you wish us to give you our 
honest appreciation of the position and whatever advice we consider necessary on the 
merits of the case for your consideration. We do not however suggest (unless you are 
prepared to do so) that you should now commit yourself to accepting our proposal on 
this matter. Our suggestion is as follows:-
As you know, Gent and I are meeting Dato Onn and some of his colleagues in 
Penang next Wednesday 26th June. Would you be willing that we should try out on 
them in general terms and without committing ourselves, let alone you, the gist of 
the suggestions in my immediately following telegrams? We would then try to 
discover whether U.M.N.O. leaders (who have great influence over the Rulers) would 
regard this as acceptable basis for agreement. We would report to you our findings 
after the meeting and you could then decide whether or not you would authorise us 
to put forward these proposals formally and on your behalf. 
Part 2 
Having now been here for a month with many opportunities to gauge Malay opinion, 
I can confirm everything that Gent and I have said in previous telegrams about its 
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strength and unity. Malay opinion is roused as never before. By itself, this is not a bad 
thing, for it is highly desirable that Malays become politically conscious so as to 
prepare themselves to play appropriate part in developing self-Governing institu-
tions. But it will be extremely unfortunate if this awakened political consciousness 
and interest gets rail-waded [sic: rail-roaded) into extremist and anti-British 
channels. If we can restore Malay confidence in Britain as a result of the present 
negotiations and secure in possession of agreement we can prevent this. Then Malay 
nationalist movement is likely to be friendly with the administration here and to 
cooperate with us in political affairs instead of being swept into Indonesian 
anti-European currents. If, on the other hand, we do not succeed in this, we shall 
miss great chance. We should then face probability of widespread non-cooperation 
and begin to tread the(?) full road of local opposition and bitterness which has led to 
such damaging situations elsewhere. 
Gent and I have considered carefully whether publication of your last proposals 
now would counteract the present opposition to gain effective popular support for 
your proposals and thus enable (?) us to hold the position. If we thought it would 
help, we would advocate this course. But at the present stage, such action would not 
be helpful. Strong feeling against MacMichael agreements does not spring so much 
from rulers as from U.M.N.O. and Malay opinion generally. If we published proposals 
which left in the air the question of replacement of MacMichael Agreements, on 
which Malay opinion is especially vigilant, form of criticism would concentrate on 
that [and) the effect of your proposals would be spoiled, and their advantages be 
forgotten amidst agitation against MacMichael Agreements. We should get no thanks 
for your proposals and opinion would harden in undesirable directions. 
I have been more and more forcibly impressed with the fact that the core of 
opposition is to the MacMichael Agreements as such, and that unless we satisfy 
opinion on this, we shall lose the opportunity to heal the breach between Malays and 
us. Gent and I are certain that in a better atmosphere, your last proposals would be 
appreciated and form basis of firm agreement. But they will not be considered in the 
proper light if the shadow of the MacMichael Agreements is thrown across them. We 
believe Rees Williams, Gammans, Sir John Maude and Sir Theodore Adams1 will all 
agree with this. We must therefore consider most seriously opposition to MacMichael 
Agreements. 
Part 3 
In this case neither Gent nor I feel any sympathy whatever with the Rulers, except to 
some extent with one or two like the Sultan of Kedah who, as MacMichael stated 
frankly in his report, signed in effect under protest.2 Other Rulers signed voluntarily 
although not anticipating strength of Malayan3 reactions. Subsequent attitude 
results from that latter mistake, which has landed them in personal prevarication for 
which we can have little respect. On the other hand, we feel impelled to state frankly 
1 Sir Theodore Adams (1885-1961) . As British resident of Selangor, 1932-1936, he had advised the British 
to bar Musa-Edin from the succession and prefer Alam Shah in his place (see 57). Adams was in Malaya 
from mid May to mid June and acted as adviser to the rulers in their informal negotiations with the 
Malayan Union government. 
2 See 64 and also Colonial Office, Report on a Mission to Malaya by Sir Harold MacMichael, GCMG, DSO 
(October 1945- January 1946), Col 194, paras 13 and 20. 
3 He means, of course, 'Malay' sihce 'Malayan' includes Chinese and Indian residents. 
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that we have considerable sympathy with U.M.N.O. in their opposition to the 
MacMichael Agreements. Their opposition is what has really provoked the Rulers 
into eagerness to repudiate the agreements. When Malayan Congress feelings found 
support amongst retired Malayan officials in Britain, their views became all the 
firmer and crystallised in U.M.N.O. Conduct of retired Malayan officials in publicly 
attacking H.M.G.'s policy and aggravating the difficulties is indefensible.4 But we 
shall only prevent ourselves from seeing the issue in its proper perspective if we 
become rigid on the point because of righteous indignation at the conduct of the 
Rulers and retired Malayan officials. The central fact is that the opposition to 
MacMichael Agreements comes strongly from Malayan democratic opinion as a 
whole. That is what we have to reckon with. It is a case of the will of the people 
expressing itself. This was born out in Gent's talk with Dato Onn and colleagues the 
other day,5 on which he has reported in his telegram to me No. 423 repeated to you. 
Our sympathy with democratic Malayan opinion is based on consideration that 
Agreements were signed by most Rulers without anything like adequate consultation 
with their peoples. Whether this was strictly constitutional or not, it is morally and 
politically of doubtful rectitude. It flouted all the rules of democratic Government 
and of Government on satisfactory lines we confirmed, and has caused deep 
resentment in Malaya. 
Part 4 
Although Malayans highly prize His Majesty's protection, and although they are in 
favour of strong central Government of the kind proposed by you, they are at the 
same time proud of their States and desire to preserve their sovereign status. They 
are convinced that the terms of MacMichael Agreements transferring "full powers 
and jurisdiction" to His Majesty deprive them of this status. We are advised by legal 
authorities that their conviction may well be justified and courts would interpret the 
Agreements as having wholly transferred soveriegnty [sic] from State Rulers. Sir 
John Maude has discussed this aspect of the matter with us and I am sure will be 
helpful to you in consideration of the point. 
At the same time, we recognise the impossibility of agreeing that MacMichael 
Agreements should be revoked forthwith. Weighing all these various considerations 
together, we venture to offer the advice contained in my two immediately following 
telegrams. 6 
With regard to the Rulers' request that they and their advisers should now be 
enabled [to] travel [to] London for negotiations, we trust that you will reject this. 
Proper place for negotiations is here. Gent and I have been fully authorised by you 
[to] conduct discussions on your behalf and have started to do this in our talks with 
the Rulers and other representatives. Transference of discussions to London now 
would undermine Gent's and my authority in Malaya, even if it were possible both of 
us to go to London to help you in negotiations. Our leaving Malaya at the present 
would cause serious interruption to our other talks here. Moreover, if the Rulers go 
to London, they will fall into the hands of retired Malayan officials and lawyers with 
4 See 73, note 1. 5 MacDonald is referring to Gent's talk with Onn on 19 June. 
6 In these telegrams (not printed here) MacDonald argued that the revocation of the MacMichael treaties 
should not take place until the government were satisfied that the fundamental principles of their policy 
were guaranteed and that their revocation would enhance Britain's reputation. 
[97) JULY 1946 255 
consequent increase in the difficulties of reaching agreement. 
Gent will, of course, tell the Rulers that he is transmitting to you their request 
that they should be enabled to go to London. This will keep them in play for a while. 
Subject to what transpires at our meeting with Dato Onn and Company, we strongly 
hope however that you will later feel able to reply to them on the lines of suggestions 
in my immediately following telegrams. Ends. 
97 CO 537/1529, nos 169- 171 5 July 1946 
[MacMichael treaties and conciliation of Malay opposition]: outward 
telegram no 848 from Mr Hall to Sir E Gent 
[MacDonald and Gent were heartened by informal talks with Onn and other Malay leaders 
at MacDonald's temporary quarters in Penang on 26 June (for a record of this meeting see 
CO 537/1529, no 208), and, recognizing the need to strengthen UMNO against the radical 
MNP, again urged Hall to make concessions on the MacMichael treaties. In his reply on 5 
July Hall appears to be shifting his position from principles to tactics.) 
My telegram No.813 of 29th June (addressed to Governor-General as No.61): Malayan 
Constitution. ' 
I have now considered the whole position as carefully and rapidly as my other 
preoccupations, particularly with Palestine, have permitted. I fully appreciate from 
paragraph 2 of Governor-General's telegram No.59 and from paragraph 3(c) of his 
telegram No.73, that the assurance which I am now recommended to give regarding 
the eventual replacements of the MacMichael Agreements would be dependent upon 
the reaching of a solution satisfactory to H.M.G. I welcome the fact that Dato Onn 
and his associates appear to have adopted in this regard a less intransigeant 
attitude than might have been feared. Nevertheless, I confess that I see great 
difficulty in the proposed course of action for the following reasons. It is suggested 
that I should forthwith not only give the assurance but announce in Parliament that 
I have done so, without any concrete knowledge of the attitude taken on the Malay 
side either as regards the definite constitutional proposals put forward in my 
telegram[s] 581, 582 and 586, or as regards the form of agreement which they 
propose in substitution for the MacMichael Agreements. This I am not inclined to do, 
for if I now give the assurance on the basis of such vague premises, I foresee that this 
may involve great difficulties later on not only for H.M.G. in London but for the 
Governor-General and yourself. We cannot blink the possibility that the Malay 
negotiators, after the assurance has been given, may prove not (repeat not) to be 
amenable either as regards constitutional proposals as such or as regards the form of 
a new ,agreement or as regards both. In that event, H.M.G. will be placed in the 
unenviable position either of having to accept a solution which they do not approve 
or of appearing to be entirely responsible for subsequent breakdown in negotiations. 
In short, I am still afraid that H.M.G. may be forced to concede point after point 
without receiving anything tangible in return. 
2. In any case such soundings as I have been able to take show that even if I 
myself were convinced that the present recommendations are sound, the above point 
of view' would undoubtedly be taken by my colleagues. If I now place before them 
your recommendation that the assurance should be given as proposed, they are 
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bound to ask me what concrete suggestions or offers have been put forward as an 
alternative; and I shall have nothing to say. 
3. My present position is that I have made constructive constitutional proposals 
which deserve to be considered. I have also indicated that I shall be prepared to limit 
future use of jurisdiction acquired by His Majesty, by binding H.M.G. to consult 
leaders of Malayan opinion to fullest extent before initiating further constitutional 
changes. If Sultans or Malay leaders are not satisfied as apparently they are not, then 
the least they should be willing to do is to work out with Governor-General and 
yourself a position [sic] alternative. 
4. I am encouraged by the friendly tone of your conversation with Dato Onn and 
his associates into believing that they can be brought to see the matter in a 
reasonable light, and to work out with the Governor-General and yourself practical 
proposals which I can with confidence put before my colleagues. What I am 
suggesting is that, in an endeavour to bring about a resumption of discussions, you 
should put forward the proposal that they should be recommended on the basis 
that:-
(a) we for our part fully recognise the objection which the Malays see to the 
MacMichael Agreements, but the question whether those agreements should be 
replaced should be put on one side without prejudice to its later consideration; 
(b) if and when a sufficient measure of agreement has been reached on all other 
matters, the question of some amended or new agreement could be considered, 
and I should be agreeable to proposals being formulated on the clear understand-
ing that willingness of H.M.G. to accept such amended or new agreement would 
depend entirely on the nature of that new document. 
5. The above must of course be considered together with the proposals made by 
Adams on which I have consulted you in my telegram No.842 and I shall be grateful 
for frank views of Governor General and yourself on both telegrams. 
98 CO 537/1598, ff24-27 20-21 Aug 1946 
[Closer association of Malaya and Singapore]: item 7 of minutes of 
governor-general's conference in Penang, 20-21 Aug 
[A significant constitutional problem, though one that was less pressing in 1946 than was 
the crisis over the Malayan Union, concerned regional consolidation. The White Paper of 
Jan 1946 had announced the government's commitment to the closer association of the 
Malayan Union and Singapore in the longer term. Yet two separate governments, each 
under a different governor, threatened to pull in different directions. MacDonald, one of 
whose functions was to facilitate liaison between the territories, took up the matter of 
merger when the committee, which Sir F Gimson had appointed to examine the 
reconstitution of Singapore's legislative council, made recommendations likely to enlarge 
the gulf between island and peninsula.] 
Future constitutional arrangements: Malayan Union and Singapore (Reference)* 
The Governor-General said that he had caused this item to be placed on the Agenda 
to enable him 
• (Ref: Report of the Committee appointed by H.E. the Governor of Singapore to make recommendations 
for the reconstitution of the Legislative Council of the Colony.) 
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(1) to get further information as to what the Governors had in mind about 
constitutional developments in their respective territories in the early future, and 
(2) to consider the situation in relation to the possibility of the Malayan Union and 
Singapore being more closely associated constitutionally at a not too distant date. 
With regard to the first point, the paper before the Conference was a report of the 
Committee appointed to consider the scope and nature of the future Legislative 
Council of the Colony of Singapore. He considered that the proposals were sound and 
progressive and that, by themselves, they were generally to be welcomed. However, 
with regard to the second point, if the proposals were accepted and a Legislative 
Council with an unofficial majority were established in the near future in Singapore, 
a step might have been taken which would be prejudicial to the ultimate objective of 
a closer union between the Malayan Union and Singapore. It had been stated in the 
White Paper that the formation of the Malayan Union would not prejudice closer 
constitutional arrangements at a later date between the two territories. When he left 
London he felt that this was a problem which could be considered in a serious but 
more or less leisurely fashion by the authorities concerned over, say, the next two 
years, with a view to policy being settled after that in the light of experience in the 
meantime. Since reaching Malaya he had altered this view. Practical problems of 
administration and policy indiCated that there was some danger of the two territories 
drifting apart. He now felt that an early examination of the problem was desirable, 
with a view to the Governors and himself making up their minds, even if only 
tentatively, what was ultimately desirable in the way of a closer constitutional tie-up. 
Then they would be able to ensure that policies were not pursued in either territory 
which would ultimately prejudice the possibility of realising their long term 
objective. He knew that no actual constitutional change should take place before, 
say, eighteen months. It would be a mistake to suggest anything of the kind before 
the new constitution on the Peninsula had been not only agreed but also put into 
effective and steady working. But, without giving publicity to what they had 
authorised, he thought that they should appoint an informal sub-committee of their 
principal advisers to start an examination of the matter. 
The Governor, Malayan Union, said that economically it was not desirable that the 
Malayan Union should be dominated by the commercial consideration of Singapore. 
He considered that there was every reason why the Malayan Union should remain a 
single Government and that its needs and activities should be regarded independent-
ly and not in the light of Singapore aspirations. He felt that there would be very 
strong opposition from the Malayan Union to the inclusion of Singapore and that 
unless public opinion in the Malayan Union as well as in Singapore was favourable to 
the change, it could not be contemplated. He felt that any immediate change is out of 
the question. 
The Governor-General stated that he was not advocating an immediate change. He 
felt that the immediate urgency was to consider the problem especially in view of the 
proposals for an unofficial majority in the Legislative Council of Singapore. 
The Governor, Singapore, said that there was a very strong feeling in unofficial 
circles in Singapore that the severance of the two territories was a mistake and that 
Singapore should be linked constitutionally and administratively with the Govern-
ment of the Peninsula. In various ways the commercial community did not consider 
the present arrangements were working satisfactorily. 
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The Governor, Malayan Union, said that the opinion of the commercial people of 
Singapore should not be a deciding factor. It was one thing for Singapore to want to 
come into the Malayan Union but the crucial question was whether the people of the 
Malayan Union would accept the inclusion of Singapore. The economies of Singapore 
and the Malayan Union were entirely different and they should each develop on their 
own lines. Penang, for example, as a free port was most important to the Malayan 
Union and it was desirable that more and more ships should go there. 
The Colonial Secretary, Singapore, 1 said he felt that in many ways the economies 
of the two countries were complementary. There was a great deal of work that the 
commercial community of Singapore could and should do for the Malayan Union. 
Singapore provided, for example, a large and adequate port which was quite 
competent to deal with the trade of the whole territory. Singapore was the natural 
port of Malaya and it was only an accident of nature which divided it from the 
Peninsula. 
The Governor, Malayan Union, said that having regard to the size of the territory 
and the value and importance of its produce, he would not regard the existence of 
three major ports as excessive. It would not therefore be satisfactory for the Malayan 
\ Union to rely on Singapore alone, in fact before the war only 20% of the import and 
export trade of Singapore derived from Malaya. Singapore lived on the entrepot trade 
which admittedly may be threatened by the Dutch. The task of Singapore is to hold 
that trade and endeavour to expand it. 
The Colonial Secretary, Singapore, said that in addition to imports and exports, 
Singapore provided for the Malayan Union a number of 'invisible ' services the extent 
and nature of which it is very difficult to estimate but he considered that they were of 
great importance. 
The Governor, Malayan Union, presumed the Colonial Secretary was referring to 
the services such as Banking, Insurance, Shipping, etc. As to this is was possible that 
there might be some shifting of the balance to theUnion but it was a matter for 
business interests to consider for themselves. 
The Governor-General felt that Kuala Lumpur could never replace Singapore in its 
political capacity as the principal city of the South East Asia area. 
The Chief Secretary, Malayan Union,2 said the discussion so far had dealt with the 
economic aspects. He felt that there was a very important political consideration to 
be borne in mind. Their Highnesses, the Rulers, in the recent political discussions 
had directed their minds to a federation of the Malay States and showed some 
reluctance to the inclusion of Penang and Malacca. He felt that if it became known 
that any consideration was being given at present to the inclusion of Singapore in a 
wider federation, some of the present negotiations would break down and a charge of 
'bad faith' might again be made. 
The Governor-General said that it was most important that any further explora-
tion of the problem should be strictly confidential but that he felt it might be wise to 
appoint a sub-Committee of the Secretary-General,3 Colonial Secretary, Singapore, 
and the Chief Secretary, Malayan Union, to consider the matter in more detail and 
report later. 
1 P AB McKerron, colonial secretary of Singapore, 1946-1950. 
2 AT Newboult, chief secretary of Malayan Union, 1946-1948. 
3 Sir Ralph Hone, secretary-general to governor-general, 1946-1948. 
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The Governor, Malayan Union, drew attention to the references made to Malayan 
Union citizenship in the report regarding the proposed Legislative Council for 
Singapore. 
The Colonial Secretary, Singapore, said that they were included to show that they 
had not been overlooked but pointed out that until status &c. of a Malayan Union 
citizen had been defined, the Committee felt unable to say any more on the subject. 
The Governor, Malayan Union, enquired if any Malayan Union representative was 
consulted by the Committee on this point. 
The Colonial Secretary, Singapore, said no such consultation had taken place and 
as the subject was still under discussion he did not feel that any useful purpose would 
have been served by referring the point to the Government of the Malayan Union. 
The Governor, Malayan Union, said that if the report was to be published he would 
ask that references to the Malayan Union on citizenship should be excised. 
The Governor, Singapore, said that he had asked the Secretary of State for 
permission to publish the report and, if this was received, he and the Colonial 
Secretary would arrange for the references to be omitted. 
The Governor-General, enquired whether the Government of the Malayan Union 
had any other observations to make on the report or whether they felt that it might 
serve as a useful guide to certain of the future representative bodies in the Malayan 
Union. 
The Governor, Malayan Union, said that he thought it was a notable report and 
that he hoped to adopt a similar principle in regard to the more advanced political 
bodies in the Malayan Union. In regard to the future constitutional relations of 
Singapore with the Malayan Union, he stressed that it was important that the wishes 
of the people of the Malayan Union should be ascertained and given their full weight. 
After further discussion it was agreed that (a) if the Secretary of State approved the 
publication of the proposals for Singapore Legislative Council, references to Malayan 
Union citizenship should be excised, and (b) that a sub-Committee comprising the 
Secretary-General, the Chief Secretary, Malayan Union, and the Colonial Secretary, 
Singapore, should examine the wider problem further. 
99 CO 537/1530, no 245 29 Aug 1946 
'Developments in Malayan constitutional discussions': note by H T 
Bourdillon on deliberations of the Anglo-Malay working committee 
[On 18 June MacDonald and Gent met the rulers and UMNO leaders together for the first 
time. Despite their continuing mistrust of the British over the treaties, which the 
secretary of state was most reluctant to abrogate, the Malays signalled their willingness to 
enter formal talks. On 24 July the rulers and UMNO representatives submitted draft 
proposals for fresh constitutional arrangements and an Anglo-Malay working committee 
was set up the following day (coinciding with a Commons debate which, contrary to the 
fears of some, did not upset the delicately poised negotiations). The members of the 
working committee were: (for the government) AT Newboult, K K O'Connor, W D 
Godshall, W Linehan, A Williams, with D C Watherston as secretary; (for the rulers) Dato 
Hamzah b Abdullah (Selangor), Hj Mohamed Sheriff (Kedah), Raja Kamaralzaman b Raja 
Mansur (Perak) and Dato Nik Ahmed Kamil (Kelantan); (UMNO) Dato Onn (Johore) and 
Dato Abdul Rahman b Mohd Yasin (Johore). Its sessions were also attended by Hone (for 
MacDonald), Adams (for the rulers) and Roland Braddell (for UMNO). The working 
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committee met over four periods: 6-16 Aug, 6-28 Sept, 11 Oct-1 Nov and 11-18 Nov. 
Bourdillon 's note assesses its deliberations until it adjourned on 16 Aug.] 
Before the Secretary of State went away, we had heard that discussions with the 
Sultans and Malay Leaders on Constitutional questions had been successfully 
resumed, and that a Joint Working Committee, consisting of five Government 
representatives plus Sir R. Hone as an observer and five Malay Representatives plus 
Sir T. Adams, had been set up to study details. ~ 
2. The Working Committee assembled on August the 6th. 'It held meetings from 
that date until August the 16th, when it adjourned, for Mohammedan religious 
reasons, until the 6th of September. 
3. In his telegram No. 784, Sir Edward Gent has given us an account of progress 
made up to the date of adjournment. In certain respects this progress has been 
remarkable, though in others much ground remains to be covered. The main points 
may be tabulated as follows:-
(a) Establishment of strong central government in Malaya. The Working Com-
miteee spent the first week of its life in drawing up a list of subjects which are to be 
under the control of the Central Legislature. The results have been very 
satisfactory. In his telegram referred to above, Sir Edward Gent tells us that the 
list as finally agreed is very comprehensive, and this can be verified by reference to 
the list itself, which he has sent home under cover of a letter to Mr. Paskin. The 
list includes all the subjects which the Secretary of State, at an earlier stage, laid 
down as being essentially "central", besides a number of others. At first sight, in 
fact, there seemed to be no important subjects of any kind which are not placed 
under central control, though the Malays have stipulated in a number of cases that 
a measure of executive authority shall be entrusted to the State Councils. We have 
always ourselves envisaged this. Sir Edward Gent tells us that having gone thus far 
(and they have gone a very long way), the Malays are likely to insist on the 
"unallocated residue" of subjects being left under State control. We have hitherto 
resisted this, but it is open to question whether we need continue to do so -should 
the Malays maintain their present attitude - seeing that we have secured such a 
comprehensive list of central subjects. 
(b) Common citizenship . The Malays were at first unwilling to admit Chinese as 
Malayan Union citizens at all, but it seems that they are likely to modify this 
attitude if they can be assured that Chinese in Malaya already have the status of 
British Protected Persons (i.e. that Chinese will not for the first time acquire that 
status by virtue of their status as Malayan Union citizens). The reasons for this 
stipulation are not entirely clear, but Chinese born in the Malay States have always 
been treated as British Protected Persons in the past, and this is still the case. We 
are in consultation with the F.O. with a view (if the S.of S. approves) to Sir Edward 
Gent being authorised to inform the Malays accordingly, and it is to be hoped that 
a solution will be reached on these lines. But we shall know nothing further until 
the meetings of the Working Committee are resumed. 
(c) His Majesty's jurisdiction in the Malay states. This question, and the 
connected question of the modification or replacement of the MacMichael 
Agreements, have not hitherto been discussed by the Working Committee. This is 
in accordance with the Secretary of State's wish that the question of any new 
Agreements to replace the MacMichael Agreements should be reserved for a later 
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stage in the discussion. We know from the record of the renewed meetings with 
the Sultans which preceded the establishment of the Working Committee, that the 
Sultans at that time were still adopting a rigid attitude on this question, which will 
undoubtedly prove the most difficult to solve. 
4. The three points enumerated above are those which the Secretary of State has 
always regarded as representing the essential basis of our Malayan policy. It will be 
seen that very good progress has been made on the first of the three points, that 
progress now appears to be possible on the second, and that the third remains to be 
tackled. On the whole, there seem to be grounds for cautious satisfaction with the 
results hitherto achieved; but Sir Edward Gent warns us that a point conceded by the 
Malay side of the Working Committee is not necessarily a point conceded by the 
Sultans and Malay Leaders themselves. In the last paragraph of his telegram No.784, 
he sums up the position as follows: 
"Much will depend on the attitude of Malay Members when the Working 
Committee re-assembles, and on the extent to which they have been able to carry 
Rulers and U.M.N.O. with them in conclusions so far reached in Committee's 
discussions. It has been continually evident that Malay members of the Committee 
have themselves felt that, . in compromising with our views on many important 
matters, too much has had to be conceded by their side". 
100 CO 537/1542, no 94 14 Sept 1946 
'Citizenship': inward telegram no 855 from SirE Gent to Mr Hall 
[The Working Committee reassembled on 6 Sept and Gent reported 'encouraging' 
progress despite 'extreme sensitiveness' to what members called 'dictatory' British 
attitudes (inward telegram no 854, CO 537/1542 no 93) . It began by considering the 
categories of people qualified for citizenship, summarized by Gent in this telegram.] 
My immediately preceding telegram No. 854. 
Citizenship. 
(1) Proposed categories are:-
( 
(a) British subjects and subjects of Rulers born and permanently resident in the 
country. 
(b) Any person applying for citizenship who satisfies High Commissioner as to:-
(i) birth in country and local residence for 10 out of 15 years preceding 
application; 
(ii) good character; 
(iii) adequate knowledge of Malay or English language. 
(c) Any applicant not included in (a) or (b) who satisfies High Commissioner as to 
(i) residence for 15 out of 20 years preceding application; 
(ii) good character; 
(iii) adequate knowledge of Malay or English language. 
2. Categories (b) and (c) would be required to make declaration of permanent 
settlement and take oath of citizenship. 
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101 CO 537/1530 17-24 Sept 1946 
[Developments in Anglo-Malay constitutional discussions]: minutes 
by H T Bourdillon, T I K Lloyd and Mr Creech Jones 
I understand that the Secretary of State has asked for an appreciation of the state of 
constitutional negotiations in Malaya, as affected by the two latest telegrams from Sir 
E. Gent (247 and 248). 1 
I have flagged No. 245 on the file ,2 which is an earlier appreciation submitted to 
the Secretary of State at the end of last month. It will be seen that I then dealt with 
the subject under three heads (paragraph 3 of No. 245), and it would perhaps be best 
if I now proceed in the same way, since these heads represent the principles which 
the Secretary of State has always regarded as fundamental to our Malayan policy:-
(a) Establishment of strong central government in Malaya. In my previous 
appreciation I reported good progress under this head, though I pointed out that 
the progress hitherto made was only progress in the Working Committee, and that 
it could not be taken for granted that the Sultans and Malay leaders would accept 
all the Working Committee's conclusions. It seems clear from the latest telegrams 
(see in particular paragraphs 2 to 8 of No. 247) that progress has been maintained 
and consolidated. Discussion has centred round the problem of finance, and it 
might well be expected that this would bring into the open any latent difficulties in 
the allocation of powers between the Central Legislatures [sic] and the State 
Councils. In the last resort, whoever has the money has the power; so the Malays 
would undoubtedly have shown fight on the financial issues if they were going to 
show fight on this particular question at all. Sir E. Gent says that there have 
indeed been difficulties, but I think we may regard the conclusions as definitely 
satisfactory. First and foremost, the Working Committee appears to have agreed to 
a general pooling of existing State assets and liabilities. This, I think, is a big point 
gained. It is true that in taking this step, the Malay members of the Working 
Committee have tried to impose certain conditions, and that these conditions may 
prove difficult (paragraph 2 of No. 247). If pushed to its logical extreme, the 
stipulation desired by the Malay members would mean that assistance granted 
from Federal funds to the individual States for rehabilitation purposes would go in 
the main to the richest States. This, of course, would militate against one of the 
main objects of the pooling of resources, which is to enable the poorer and more 
backward States to benefit from the common exchequer. But I do not feel that this 
need be taken too seriously. The words "due consideration" in paragraph 2 of No. 
24 7 allow of much latitude, and it is natural that the States which will contribute 
most towards the Central pool should ask for some recognition of that fact. The 
main point seems to be that the Malay negotiators have crossed the Rubicon by 
accepting the conception of the common pool. 
The examination of the Working Committee's conclusions regarding the 
allocation of future revenues and expenditure (paragraphs 3 and 6 of No. 247) 
confirms, I think, that the main battle has been won. So far as revenue is 
concerned, it is proposed that the division between Central and States revenues 
1 248 is a copy of inward tel no 855, see 100. 2 See 99. 
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should follow the F.M.S. practice immediately before the Japanese invasion, with 
certain important modifications in favour of the Central authority. We are referred 
to the relevant statement in the 1941 F.M.S. Estimates, which shows that out of a 
total revenue of $87,000,000, the "Federal" figure amounted to over $58,500,000. 
This means that the Federal revenues in 1941, which included all revenues from 
Customs and Excise, amounted to more than twice the revenues of all the States 
put together. Bearing in mind that the important revenues from motor licenses, 
electrical installations and posts and telecommunications are now to be added to 
the Central list, I think we have a clear indication that, generally speaking, the 
finances of the country will be firmly under Central control. This is further borne 
out by the proposed allocation of responsibility for expenditure, which involves the 
transfer to the Central authority of some of the most important items previously 
under the control of the States. 
Paragraph 8 of No. 247 shows that the Malay negotiators object strongly to any 
title for the new system which will include the word "Union". In this they are 
apparently supported by Sir Theodore Adams, who told us before he left this 
country that the Malay translation of the word "Union" conveys something much 
more uncompromisingly centralized than its English equivalent. The Secretary of 
State has not hitherto indicated that he would be prepared to go further than the 
title "Federal Union", but Sir Theodore Adams warned us in one of our last 
conversations with him that this, when translated into Malay, amounts to a 
contradiction in terms. If satisfactory agreement can be reached on the substance 
of Central control, I would personally hope that we do not remain too adamant 
over the title . 
(b) Citizenship. In my previous appreciation, I indicated that the Malay nego-
tiators had been at first unwilling to admit Chinese as Malayan Union Citizens at 
all, but that they were showing signs of modifying this attitude. The latest 
telegrams (see paragraph 1 of No. 24 7 and the whole of No. 248) at least confirm 
that the Malays are no longer talking about rejecting the idea of Malayan 
Citizenship altogether. But given this amount of progress, I do not think we can 
regard the latest posi~ion as either very clear or very satisfactory. The present 
proposals of the Working Committee would appear to make it necessary for any 
Chinese in Malaya (apart from Chinese British subjects), whether or not he was 
born in the country, to reside there for a long period in addition and then to make 
individual application to the High Commissioner before being admitted to 
Citizenship. But the proposals as regards Citizenship are far from clear. They are 
at present being studied in the Department on the Citizenship file [ie CO 
537/1542], and this file will be submitted as soon as possible. 
I do not think, in fact, that we can regard the passages in these telegrams which 
deal with Citizenship as definite proposals at all. For one thing, they are far too 
short and leave far too many gaps. They seem to be rather in the nature of an 
interim report, with definite proposals to come. Nevertheless, they do seem to 
demand comment from us, and are being studied with this end in view. 
(c) His Majesty's jurisdiction in the M a lay States. This subject has still not been 
touched upon. This is in accordance with the Secretary of State's wish that the 
whole question of the future of the MacMichael Agreements, or of any new 
agreements to take their place, should be reserved for a later stages [sic] in the 
discussions. 
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When I last reported on the position, it was doubtful to what extent concessions 
made by the Malay negotiators would be accepted by their own "principals". The fact 
that the Malays, after the resumption of the Working Committee, have not attempted 
to retreat from any of their previous concessions, indicates, I think, that the progress 
made in the past can now be regarded as reasonably firm. In particular, I feel fairly 
confident that one of the three main battles (that of the strong Central Legislature) 
has been won, though the same can by no means be said of the other two. 
This minute is merely an attempt at a prel iminary appreciation of the latest 
telegrams. The telegrams are now being studied in detail, and will be submitted as 
quickly as possible with recommendations for action. 
H.T.B. 
17.9.46 
I sent forward on Saturday the draft of a telegram replying to the Governor's latest 
report (No.248) about citizenship. That draft criticised freely the "categories" as set 
out by Sir E. Gent in No.248 and the fact that we have had to dissent from so much of 
what has been agreed in local discussions on citizenship makes it the more 
necessary, in the hope of avoiding deadlock, to accept as much as possible of what 
has been agreed on central government and finance. 
I share the view that on finance the proposals in No.247 are on the whole very 
satisfactory. But they are clearly based, as is the legislative list enclosed in No.246, 
upon the conception not of a union but of a federation. That point is made equally 
clear by paragraph 8 of No.247 where we are told that only some such title as 
"Federation of Malaya" would be tolerable to Malay opinion. 
While we should not ourselves use language which implied that the Secretary of 
State has accepted the idea of federation (and for that reason I have made some 
verbal changes in Mr. Williams' draft), I hope that it will not be regarded as necessary 
now to challenge that conception or to ask the Governor to remind the Malay Rulers 
and U.M.N.O. that the Secretary of State has not yet gone further than to agree that, 
if all other matters are satisfactorily settled, some such title as "Federal Union" might 
~ be adopted. 
If in fact we can get a central government with the legislative powers and the 
financial rights now proposed, we shall have made really substantial progress. Not 
only will the four [five] unfederated Malay States have thus become aligned with the 
five [four] States formerly federated but the new Federal Government will have 
considerably wider powers and rights in relation to the whole of the nine States than 
it previously had in relation to the five that were federated . 
On those subjects of importance (e .g. elementary education, agriculture, health) 
where the State Governments are, under the latest local plan, to have responsibility 
for expenditure, the Central or Federal Government is at least (under the list 
enclosed in No.246) to have the legislative powers necessary to ensure a common 
policy and a common system of administration. That should give a measure of 
control good enough for all practical purposes. 
Draft telegram submitted. 
T.I.K.L. 
23.9.46 
These negotiations are obviously difficult but we seem to be reaching agreement for a 
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strong and comprehensive Central Authority (legislating for the whole of Malaya), 
and the states with certain limited powers & claims on revenue & expenditure. But 
on most important subjects there will be common legislation .... The difficulties in 
regard to common citizenship have still to be cleared. 
The scheme which is emerging does assure a measure of local government though 
not altogether on the English pattern. The draft telegram does not raise the question 
of title. I don't like the "Federation of Malaya" because it is inaccurate & suggests a 
retreat by the British Gov. from union, whereas it is the substance of union which 
has been achieved & in any case the MacMichael agreements have formalised the 
transfer of authority. The Malays don't like the implications of "Union" & dislike the 
word & undoubtedly want a "face-saving" title. "Federated Union" is not good & in 
any case appears unacceptable. In these circumstances, can't we ask the local people 
for their suggestions? 
A.C.J. 
24.9.46 
102 CO 537/1542, nos 95/96 24 Sept 1946 
[Citizenship]: outward telegram (reply) no 1327 from Mr Hall to Sir E 
Gent 
[Following the government's concession to defer the implementation of Malayan Union 
citizenship until local consultations had taken place (see 80, note), a committee chaired 
by W Linehan met between mid May and late June to consider citizenship qualifications. 
Its report, which was submitted on 2 July, recommended some tightening up of the 
original proposals and was broadly acceptable to the CO. This committee was, however, 
boycotted by Malays while its proposals were overshadowed by those of the Constitutional 
Working Committee. The latter deviated significantly from Malayan Union principles in 
providing for differential treatment in the automatic qualification for 'first generation' 
citizens as between Malays, British subjects and others (ie Chinese who were not British 
subjects).] 
Your telegrams Nos. 854 and 855.1 
Constitutional Working Committee. 
I am grateful for these further reports, and am glad to see that earlier progress 
towards agreement on the need for a strong Central Legislature appears to have been 
continued and consolidated. I am studying further those passages in your telegram 
which deal with this problem, and I will send you my comments, if any, as soon as 
possible. 
2. Subject of the present telegram is citizenship (your telegram 855 and 
paragraph 1 of your telegram 854). It seems clear that your account of the latest 
position in this respect, which is extremely summarized in character and which 
omits many important points, is not intended as a submission of definite proposals 
but rather as a progress report on a subject still under discussion. In these 
circumstances, detailed comment by me seems neither necessary nor desirable at the 
present stage. Nevertheless I think you will welcome general guidance, and indeed I 
feel bound to express my views forthwith, since I cannot pretend to regard the 
present position, if I have understood your telegrams aright, as at all satisfactory. 
1 See 100. 
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3. I am glad that Malays have overcome their earlier disinclination to discuss 
citizenship at all, but they seem still to be far short of anything which I could regard 
as conforming to the principle of "common citizenship" as affirmed throughout by 
His Majesty's Government. Crux of the whole matter is category (a) as stated in your 
telegram No. 855. I have been willing to consider changes in His Majesty's 
Government's original proposals, such as the exclusion of Singapore and the 
"tightening up" of the residence qualification (see my telegram No. 1034), since I 
appreciate that original proposals might have admitted to citizenship a number of 
people with no real stake in the country, and might thus have tended to weaken 
rather than strengthen the basic conception of common loyalty. I might even be 
prepared to consider further modifications on these lines, if it can be shown that they 
are in accordance with the principle which we aim to establish. Category (a) in your 
telegram No. 855 appears, however, to resort to an overt discrimination between 
races and thus to cut right across this principle. I fear that I should find it impossible 
to defend in Parliament any such fundamental reversal of policy. Moreover, I have 
watched with interest the recent emergence of a real interest in this problem 
amongst the Chinese community in Malaya, under the leadership of Mr. Tan Cheng 
Look and others. It seems to me that if any proposal on the lines of category (a) were 
to be introduced into the · wider consultations which are to follow your present 
discussions, it would certainly give rise to an outcry from the Chinese, who would 
justifiably regard His Majesty's Government of [sic] having abandoned their prom-
ises, and to an access of racial bitterness which it is our first object to avoid. 
4. There also appear to be the following fatal practical objections to category (a) 
which I assume is intended to operate in the future as well as at the date of coming 
into force of Order 
(a) It is confined to persons from within Malaya and makes no provision for 
persons equally belonging to the country (even the children of Malays) who 
happen to have been born outside. · 
(b) It would involve a definition of the phrase "subjects of Rulers", which has 
always been found to present insuperable difficulties in the past. Rulers themselves 
have refused to regard as their subject anyone who is not "of Malay race and 
Mohammedan religion", but any attempt to define this status would only bring to 
light the anomalous position whereby immigrants from the Netherlands East 
Indies have been automatically regarded by the Rulers as their subjects im-
mediately upon entry, whereas immigrants from China have never been so 
regarded however long they have resided in Malaya. 
(c) Chinese born in Penang or Malacca would qualify for citizenship under 
category (a), whereas Chinese in the Malay States, though equally belonging to the 
country in every real sense, would not so qualify. Such a situation would obviously 
be impossible to maintain. 
(d) The words "permanently resident" cannot be applied to children at birth. Even 
in regard to persons residing in Malaya at the time of the Order it cannot be said 
that a person is permanently resident unless he furnishes proof of the fact, and this 
would mean that category (a) would cease to be automatic and would become a 
matter of individual applications in the same way as categories (b) and (c). 
5. Acceptance of the above arguments would mean that there would be no room 
for category (b) . As regards your category (c) I assume that this is intended to be a 
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variation of the" 10 years residence" qualification (see paragraph 5 (c) of my telegram 
No.1034), and is not intended to cover naturalization, by whatever name that may be 
described (see paragraph 2 of my telegram llO). I will, however, refrain from detailed 
comment on this and other points until I receive a fuller report from you. In the 
meanwhile my views remain as stated in my telegram No. 1034, and in particular, as 
I have said above, I cannot regard any radical alteration of the birth qualification on 
the lines of your category (a) as acceptable. I greatly hope you will be able to persuade 
Malays in further discussion to adopt a less restrictive attitude. In doing so, you may 
find it helpful to emphasize the practical arguments, and particularly the argument 
in paragraph 4 (c) (repeat 4 (c)) above. 
1 See 100. 
103 CO 537/1542, no 97 28 Sept 1946 
[Citizenship]: inward telegram (reply) no 919 from SirE Gent to Mr 
Hall 
Your telegram No.1327.1 
Citizenship. 
Very grateful for the guidance you have given me on this most delicate question 
and I at once confirm your assumption that my telegrams Nos.854 and 8552 were 
intended as progress reports and not submission of definite proposals. You will 
appreciate that the present Working Committee is engaged in search for definition of 
practical arrangements to which Malayan representatives could be brought subject to 
later review by their own principals. 
2. In view of conclusion you have (?formed) regarding category (a) in my 
telegram No.855, I regret that within the compass of that telegram I did not include 
the following fuller explanation on certain points. 
3. Category (a) is qualified by birth and permanent residence in the country. 
Permanent residence is defined as follows. Begins. 
"(a) A person shall be deemed to be permanently resident in the Federation who 
has completed a period of fifteen years residence therein, whether such period be 
completed before or after entry into force of this agreement; 
(b) In computing any period of residence, there shall be included 
(i) any period or periods of absence from the Federation for the purpose of 
education; and 
(ii) temporary absence from the Federation not inconsistent with essential 
continuity of residence therein". Ends. 
4. In all their discussions, the Committee has been guided by two principles of 
H.M. Government's declared policy. 
(1) That Malayan citizens are to be people who regard Malaya as their real home 
and the object of their loyalty. 
(2) That the special position of Malays must be safeguarded. 
1 See 102. 2 See 100. 
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5. Category (a) of my telegram No.855 includes British subjects and subjects of 
Rulers born and permanently resident (as above) in the country. Mere birth 
qualification has been deliberately rejected, because it would admit large numbers of 
persons who do not in any sense regard Malaya as their real home and object of 
loyalty, and because Malay members insist that Malays should not be swamped by 
persons who have no real stake or interest in the country. 
6. In reply to your paragraph 4, I venture to offer the following explanation:-
(a) Category (a) of my telegram No.855 deals with citizenship rights which cannot 
be exercised before completion of the stipulated period of minimum residence by 
the particular individual concerned. This limitation was insisted upon by repre-
sentatives of the Rulers, who were strongly averse to automatic acquisition of 
citizenship by Indonesians and certain Indians. With this view U.M.N.O. repre-
sentatives agreed. Persons not born in Malaya are admittedly not covered by my 
category (a) but, if they belong to the country, are eligible under my category (c) 
whether children of Malays or not. 
(b) It has been agreed that there must be a definition of "subjects of Rulers", but 
immigrants from the Netherlands East Indies, even if included in this definition, 
will not acquire citizenship upon entry. Caterogy [sic] (a) applies to persons born 
(repeat born) and permanently resident (as above defined) . 
(c) Category (a), which is automatic category, includes only respective subjects of 
parties agreeing to constitute the proposed Federation, namely His Majesty and 
the Malaya [sic] Rulers. I cannot be too emphatic that conception of consensus of 
these parties forms whole basis of proposed agreement. With all respect, I suggest 
that an unquestioned assumption of loyalty by their subjects born and permanent-
ly resident in the country(? is justifiable). Provision is made under my category (b) 
for others born in (? Malay States) if belonging to the country in a real sense to 
acquire citizenship. 
7. Chinese British subjects (of whom Tan Cheng Loch [Lock] is example) have 
been accustomed to regard themselves as having a special status, which will be 
recognised by the Committee's proposals. We have constantly in mind the import-
ance of securing from Malay representatives proposals at least sufficient to justify the 
expectation that local non Malay community could not reasonably reject them. 
8. In the light of the above explanation, I trust that you will not feel it necessary, 
at any rate at this stage, to reach adverse decision on Working Committee's proposals 
on this most crucial and difficult part of their work. 
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104 CO 537/1542, no 98 11 Oct 1946 
[Citizenship] : outward telegram (reply) no 1446 from Mr Hall to SirE 
Gent [Extract] 
Your telegram No. 919. 1 
Citizenship. 
I am grateful for this further explanation of proposals in your telegram No. 855.2 I 
regret, however, that I must adhere to my view that in certain respects these 
proposals are unsatisfactory in principle. You will appreciate that the following 
comments are confined to matters which I regard as of fundamental importance, and 
that I am reserving any more detailed observations for a later stage. 
2. As stated in paragraph 3 of my telegram No. 1327,3 present proposals involve 
an overt discrimination between races and therefore conflict with principle of 
common citizenship as formulated and re-affirmed by H.M.G. Since there appears to 
be some misunderstanding of this principle, and of its relationship to assurances by 
H.M.G. that special position of Malays will be safeguarded, further elucidation 
appears necessary. Paragraph 11 of the explanatory memorandum handed to the 
Malay Rulers by Sir Harold MacMichael states that "it will be the policy to safeguard 
the rights of the Malay people in matters of land reservation and in their facilities for 
education and progress". Paragraph 7 of the January statement of policy on future 
constitution of the Malayan Union and Singapore (Cmd.6724) confirms that the 
Malay Land Reservation Policy, in particular, will be maintained. Special measures 
overtly designed to safeguard the Malay race have thus always been envisaged as 
operating in relation to specific matters, amongst which citizenship has not (repeat 
not) been included. The policy regarding citizenship is clearly laid down in paragraph 
10 of Cmd.6724, where it is stated that citizenship "will include, without discrimina-
tion of race or creed, all who can establish a claim, by reason of birth or a suitable 
period of residence, to belong to the country". It was this policy which I categorically 
reaffirmed in Parliament on March the 18th, when I said that "the Government 
cannot abandon the basic principle of common citizenship, that is to say, the basic 
principle which demands that political rights in the Malayan Union should be 
extended to all those who regard Malaya as their real home, and as the object of their 
loyalty". 
3. This statement of mine was intended to be, and should in practice be, as full a 
safeguard as the Malays can reasonably expect seeing that while the great bulk of 
them have no other object of loyalty than Malaya, this is only true of a limited 
proportion (who alone would acquire citizenship) within other racial communities . I 
regard it as most important, for the following reasons, that we should adhere to this 
defensible and relatively simple criterion, and should not have recourse to measures 
which can and will be attacked on grounds of racial discrimination: 
(a) Clear undertakings have been given, and these are known to the Chinese 
community in Malaya. In these circumstances, I cannot see how the present 
proposals "could not reasonably be rejected by the local non-Malay community" 
(your paragraph 7). 
1 See 103. 2 See 100. 3 See 102. 
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(b) These same undertakings have been given in Parliament, and I could not 
defend my position in Parliament if I were to abandon them. 
(c) As you are aware, we have throughout regarded the institution of common 
citizenship as the surest line of defence, in the interest of the Malays, against 
future pressure from outside (e.g. China) for the indiscriminate extension of 
political rights in Malaya to non-Malays. We can maintain this line of defence so 
long and only so long as we can show that we have offered political rights to all 
those, irrespective of racial origin, who accept the attendant responsibilities. 
4. Nevertheless, I appreciate that this whole question is extremely delicate, and 
that measure of progress recorded in your telegram represents a considerable 
achievement. I am most anxious not to make your task unnecessarily difficult, and I 
wonder whether we could not work towards a more satisfactory solution by using the 
present proposals as a basis, and by merely effecting certain modifications in these 
proposals which would bring them into line with the fundamental principle 
discussed above, but which could nonetheless be presented to the Malays as in no 
way endangering their essential position. With this end in view, I have the following 
comments. 
5. I assume that your categories (a) and (b) are not (repeat not) merely intended 
to apply to first generation of citizens, and that these proposals mean that a person 
born in the country in the future, whether or not the child of Malayan citizens, will 
not possess citizenship until after fifteen (ten according to your telegram No. 855) 
years residence. It is our aim, however, to encourage Malayans of the future to unite 
from childhood onwards in a real sense of common loyalty, and it seems to me that 
this cannot be achieved unless citizenship comes to be regarded as a birthright and 
not merely as something to be acquired after a long period. I feel strongly, therefore, 
that children born in the country of Malayan Union citizens should themselves be 
citizens by birth. It appears to me that this change could be urged on the Malay 
members of the Working Committee as being advantageous from their point of view, 
since it would do much to encourage a sense of patriotism towards a united country 
in future generations of the Malays themselves. Citizenship by birth would of course 
apply equally to non-Malay (repeat non-Malay) children born in the country of 
parents who are Malayan Union citizens, but I do not think the Malay negotiators, if 
they are brought to consider the matter carefully, need regard this with concern. 
Such non-Malay children will in any case be descended from persons who have given 
proofs of loyalty necessary for acquisition of citizenship, and the presumption 
therefore is that the children themselves will make Malaya their permanent home. 
But in cases where this is not so (i.e. in cases where non-Malay citizens by birth 
decide to sever their ties with the country), no problem will arise, since such 
persons, being absent from Malaya, will not be able to exercise their right of 
citizenship to the detriment of the Malays. If it is feared that such persons, while 
owing no real allegiance to the country, might nonetheless return after a protracted 
period of absence and immediately claim full citizenship rights, this contingency 
could be circumvented by laying it down that citizenship should be forfeited after, 
say, ten years absence .... 
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105 CO 537/1530, no 303 5 Nov 1946 
[Anglo-Malay constitutional negotiations]: letter from SirE Gent to 
Sir G Gater. Enclosure: extract of a letter from R Braddell to A T 
Newboult, 1 Nov 1946. Minute by H T Bourdillon 
[On 1 Nov the Constitutional Working Committee adjourned for a third time on the 
occasion of the Hari Raya holiday marking the end of Ramadan.) 
Thank you for your telegram No. 1550. I very much hope that our answer has been 
able to set your apprehensions at rest and that you will be able to advise the Secretary 
of State that the proposals which will emanate from here on H.M.'s jurisdiction and 
other points are not unacceptable. 
There has been a noticeable increase of nervous tension, .not only on the part of 
the Malay representatives on the Working Committee, but also in Malay political 
opinion generally here. The two advisers, Roland Braddell and Theodore Adams, have 
themselves very definitely come to feel the delicacy of their own position and both 
are in a fairly advanced condition of strain. But the recess these few days will, I hope, 
help to give things a chance of cooling off until the final round next week. 
Braddell has gone off to Singapore for his few days holiday, from where he has sent 
to Newboult a longish letter of which I attach the substantial part. The information 
we are getting from secret sources tends to agree that the Malays in the Rulers' and 
UMNO camp have come as far as they dare towards our point of view, and they are 
very conscious of the fact (which is also borne out by our intelligence) that there are 
considerable Malay elements gunning for them for having gone so far - to wit, the 
Nationalist Party1 and the diehards. These will be only too happy if the local 
proposals are rejected on any substantial point which will give the Malays generally 
an opportunity of backing out and definitely non-cooperating. The position will then 
pass into the hands of the Indonesian forces of the M.N.P., supported for so long as it 
suits them by the Malayan Communist Party. 
And, of course, as is generally the case in such a situation, a quick settlement with 
UMNO and the Rulers is necessary, if there is to be a settlement. 
Although one makes as few predictions as possible in the circumstances, it can still 
be expected, in our view, that the Indians and Chinese are likely to accept the local 
proposals, if they are accepted by H.M.G. 
I feel sure you and the Secretary of State will appreciate that the position here is a 
critical one and may be calamitous if things go wrong (the tension is, of course, 
greatly increased by the continuing severe food shortage) but we all hope that it 
should not be necessary for that contingency to be allowed to arise . 
Pyke2 turned up in good fettle and seems to have done extremely useful series of 
works at home and in Washington. I am sure you found what he had to tell you of our 
affairs interesting. 
Enclosure to 105 
It is a strange coincidence that almost all that I said on Wed. morning with respect to 
1 ie Malay Nationalist Party (MNP). 2 C J Pyke, see 49, note 2. 
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O'Connor's fears has been corroborated in The Straits Times of Thursday and today. I 
attach the clippings. 
If only the S. of S. would understand that 
(1) the Chinese are apathetic generally 
(2) the Straits Chinese and Indian Malaya-borns resent the immigrants 
(3) the Malays are adamant, 
he would accept the present section on citizenship as we left it on Wednesday 
morning. 
I am (and my record proves it) an optimist and not an alarmist but I place myself 
on record with you that the "Malay" situation at the moment is loaded with dynamite 
which will not need much to touch it off. Our friends are the Peninsular Malays. With 
them behind us we can handle the Merdeka3 movement. The present proposals are 
those of the Peninsular Malays. Accept them and we have a solid backing which will 
include the Straits Chinese and the Indian Malaya-borns and Eurasians. Reject these 
proposals and you will have a state of affairs very quickly that will mean much 
bloodshed and an anti-British spirit which will never be quelled or quellable. We have 
our very last chance in this Committee and the Plenary Meeting which is to follow it. 
I also want to say that any idea of building up a Malayan Empire as a fulcrum for 
British influence in the Far East will go too, for the reason that not only the Malay 
movement but, alas, the Merdeka movement is very strong in Sarawak and probably 
in B.N.B.4 though my information as to the last is not very good. 
I want you to be kind enough to pass this private letter on to Sir Edward and to Mr. 
MacDonald in justice to myself. I feel very deeply the responsibility I accepted when I 
agreed to be the legal adviser to U.M.N.O. and I only accepted it because I felt that I 
might be able to help not only them but my own fellow-countrymen. It disturbs me 
deeply to think that, if the present conciliation fails, the safety of British people in 
Malaya is certain to be endangered and the good name of our country and ourselves 
dragged in the mud. And all for what? The sake of immigrants who do not, never 
have and never will, either regard Malaya as their real home or show it any loyalty. 
The utter unfitness of the Chinese for any form of citizenship has surely been proved 
by their behaviour these past 4 months, to put it no further back. They have shown a 
total want of public spirit, a desire to gauge out every singe cent of profit, regardless 
of ethical or legal restrictions. And it must surely be obvious that behind all that is 
going on there must be powerful influences who cannot have the excuse of not 
knowing any better. 
In the Straits-born Chinese we have a fine mass of citizens. So too have we in the 
third and even second generations of the Malaya-settled Chinese. They are protected 
in our proposals. 
These remarks apply to the Indians tho' in a less degree because Indians are so 
politically minded where the politics of India are concerned. 
I am positive that none of these people would regard it as anything but natural and 
proper that all Malay subjects of the Rulers should come in by reason of their 
birth-right. ... 
3 Merdeka means independence. It would appear that Braddell is referring to the radical movement 
campaigning for Greater Indonesia. 
4 British North Borneo (later Sabah). 
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Minute on 105 
... Sir George Gater has handed me the attached extremely important letter from 
Sir Edward Gent, together with its equally important enclosure (a copy of a letter 
from Mr. Roland Braddell, Legal Adviser to U.M.N.O., to Mr. Newboult). Mr. Braddell 
has been for very many years one of the foremost lawyers in Malaya, and his opinion, 
if not entirely unbiased, is entitled to great respect. We know from past telegrams 
that his influence has been very useful in controlling and guiding the Malay side of 
the Working Committee, and it is evident from his own letter that he accepted the 
post of Legal Adviser to U.M.N.O. as much out of a sense of responsibility to Great 
Britain as to the Malays. 
I need not recapitulate the extremely clear, if disturbing account given in both 
letters of the complex and dangerous situation which exists in Malaya not only as 
between the races, but within the individual racial communities. Mr. Braddell openly 
expresses the fear that failure to handle this situation promptly will spell ruin for the 
whole British position in South East Asia. Sir Edward Gent does not endorse this 
opinion in so many words, but he does not contradict it, and the last sentence of his 
third paragraph points pretty clearly in the same direction. 
The moral to be drawn from both these letters, if we accept in the main the picture 
which they present (even leaving out of account Mr. Braddell's extreme views about 
the Chinese), is that a quick settlement is necessary on the general basis of the 
Working Committee 's proposals. It is common ground that we want to solve our 
Malayan constitutional problems as quickly as possible, but we must face the 
difficulties . Mr. Braddell says:-
"We have our very last chance in this Committee and the Plenary Meeting which is 
to follow it." 
This suggests that His Majesty's Government must be ready with at least a 
provisional approval of the Working Committee proposals in t ime for the Plenary 
Conference,5 but such a course is obviously out of the question. H.M.G. must see the 
final proposals as they emerge from the Plenary Conference, and must discuss the 
resulting position with the Governor-General and Mr. Newboult, before they can 
reach even the most tentative conclusions. This position has always been clearly 
understood. It was reiterated in the most explicit terms in paragraph 4 of our 
telegram No. 1595 (No.298), and it is obvious from No.302 that Sir Edward Gent 
fully understands and endorses the Secretary of State's attitude in this matter. 
Paragraph 5 of his own letter, however, reveals a possible source of further 
misunderstanding. He says:-
"Although one makes as few predictions as possible in the circumstances, it can 
still be expected, in our view, that the Indians and Chinese are likely to accept the 
local proposals, if they are accepted by H.M. G." (My [emphasis]). 
This leaves no doubt that in Sir Edward Gent's view, H.M.G., admittedly after seeing 
the Malay proposals in their final form and discussing the matter with the 
Governor-General, must give a pretty clear indication of their approval of these 
5 The Constitutional Working Committee reconvened on 11 Nov and submitted its report to the plenary 
session of officials, rulers and UMNO representatives on 20 Nov. 
274 MALAYAN UNION TO FEDERATION [106] 
proposals before the other communities are consulted. It has always been our 
conception, on the other hand, that H.M.G. would refrain from any positive 
pronouncement until all the communities concerned had expressed their views. It is 
true that in paragraph 2 of his telegram No.963 of the 5th of October (No.258), on 
which we did not comment at the time, Sir Edward Gent spoke of the Malay 
proposals being submitted to H.M.G. for "conditional approval" before the wider 
discussions took place, and in paragraph 3 of the same telegram he said that the 
Malay proposals would be forwarded to the Secretary of State for the latter to decide 
"whether any part of the proposals would be unacceptable to H.M.G." We have always 
taken this, however, as meaning no more than that H.M.G. should approve the 
proposals as the basis for further discussion, having first ensured that there were no 
obviously unsatisfactory features. It looks as though Sir Edward Gent is now going a 
good deal further than this, and the point seems to need clearing up. 
There is, however, a further and more fundamental difficulty. Whatever form the 
"conditional approval" of H.M.G. for the Malay proposals were to take, Sir Edward 
Gent is pleading for an early settlement on the basis of these proposals. Fully as we 
may sympathise with these reasons, we cannot get over the fact that (unless a 
miracle happens between now and the end of the Plenary Conference) certain aspects 
of the proposals are definitely unsatisfactory. The Secretary of State's views on the 
two points which he at present regards as unacceptable are set out in No.298. First, 
there is the provision for future changes in the constitution, over which the Sultans 
would have a complete power of veto. Secondly, there is the whole question of 
citizenship. On this, Sir Edward Gent has himself told us in his telegram No.1072 
(on the citizenship file) that he recognises the unsatisfactory nature of the proposals 
and is fully reserving his position. 
Against the background of these hard facts, we have to take into account the 
imperative need, as shown in Sir Edward Gent's present letter, for an early solution. 
6 
H.T.B. 
13.11.46 
6 Bourdillon concluded his minute by suggesting that it might be tactically wise to separate citizenship 
from the rest of the constitutional proposals, making the latter the basis of further consultation with 
Chinese and Indians while deferring further consideration of the former. This proposal was not taken up. 
106 CO 537/1543, no 106 
'Malayan citizenship': note by H T Bourdillon 
[Nov 1946] 
[Extract] 
[When the Constitutional Working Committee reconvened on 11 Nov it made what Gent 
reported to be a 'substantial advance' on citizenship. The CO was now faced with what 
Bourdillon called 'the fundamental and comparatively simple question', namely: could 
HMG accept any scheme which entailed different racial categories for the automatic 
acquisition of 'first generation' citizenship? This issue was addresed by Bourdillon's note 
and the departmental discussion on 22 Nov (see 107).] 
Part I. Federal exposition 
4. Next we come to the Malay ideas on the subject, as evolved in the 
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Constitutional Working Committee which has just completed its labours. At first the 
Malays refused to consider citizenship at all, but they were later persuaded to discuss 
it on the basis of the Citizenship Committee's report and the Secretary of State's 
comments thereon. Subsequent history has shown many vicissitudes, with the 
Malays alternately freezing into rigidity and thawing to the persuasions of the British 
side of the Working Committee. There was an unexpected thaw at the final session 
(see tels. Nos. 1140 and 1141 from the Malayan Union), and the resultant position, as 
extracted from these telegrams and the earlier telegrams Nos. 1072 and 1073, may be 
summarised as follows:-
1. Qualification by birth in the Malayan Union.* 
(a) Malays to have automatic qualification by birth alone. 
(b) British subjects born in either of the Settlements to qualify automatically if 
they have ordinarily resided in the Union for fifteen years. 
(c) British subjects born anywhere in the Union to qualify automatically if their 
fathers were either born in the Union or have ordinarily resided there for fifteen 
years . 
(d) Others born in the Union to qualify automatically if both their parents were 
born in and have ordinarily resided in the Union for fifteen years. 
11. Qualification by descent. Any person whose father is a citizen at the time of 
that person's birth to qualify automatically (whether born in the Union or not). 
Ill. Qualification by application. 
(a) Any person naturalised as a subject of a Ruler, under any law for the time 
being in force, to qualify, by virtue of such naturalisation, for citizenship. 
(b) The High Commissioner to have discretion to confer citizenship on any 
applicant (and on his minor children) who satisfies him 
(i) either that he was born in the Union and has resided there for 10 out of 
the last 15 years or that he has resided there for 15 out of the last 20 years, 
(ii) that he is of good character, 
(iii) that he has an adequate knowledge of Malay or English, and who makes a 
declaration of permanent settlement and takes the oath of citizenship. 
5. These proposals are very different in form from those which emerged from the 
Citizenship Committee. The following remarks may assist in making a true 
comparison. His Majesty's Government's original proposals, both before and after 
they had been through the Citizenship Committee, envisaged a distinction between 
initial entrants and subsequent entrants. Thus the "ten years' residence" qualifica-
tion was to apply only to those who had completed their ten years' residence before 
the date when the Order came into force, and was designed purely to create, as it 
were, a body of"foundation members". Subsequent entry was to be either by birth or 
naturalisation. Under the Malay proposals this distinction has disappeared, but in its 
place two other distinctions have sprung into prominence. First, there is the 
distinction between "first generation" and "second generation" citizens (children of 
citizen fathers would automatically be citizens); and secondly, there is the distinc-
tion within the "first generation" group, between the qualifications required for 
* This name is used throughout for convenience, though the Malays, of course, do not admit the title. 
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Malays, those required for British subjects (these are again sub-divided), and those 
required for "others". 
Part If. Tentative comments 
In considering the Malay proposals, it would not seem profitable to judge them too 
closely in strict relation to the original detailed scheme of His Majesty's Government, 
as set out in the draft Citizenship Order in Council and as summarised in the 
Appendix1 to this note. In deferring that scheme for further consideration in the 
light of consultations with local opinion, His Majesty's Government showed that they 
had taken into account the criticisms which had been made in Parliament against 
the scheme as it then stood. There had been widespread acceptance in both Houses of 
the principle of common citizenship, but there had also been' widespread anxiety (by 
no means confined to the Opposition), lest the actual scheme, by casting the net too 
wide, would admit to citizenship many people without any ties of loyalty to Malaya. 
His Majesty's Government, then, recognised the force of these criticisms, and in so 
doing recognised that the scheme as finally brought into force might be substantially 
different from the scheme set out in the draft Order. But at the same time they 
reiterated the fundamental principle that political rights in Malaya should be 
extended "to all those who regard Malaya as their real home and as the object of their 
loyalty". It is against this principle, therefore, that the present Malay proposals must 
be judged. 
2. At first sight, the feature in these proposals which seems clearly to conflict 
with the principle is the provision for differential treatment in the automatic 
qualification for "first generation" citizens as between Malays, British subjects and 
others (i.e. Chinese who are not British subjects). This feature was adversely 
commented upon by the Secretary of State in his telegrams 13272 and 14463 to the 
Malayan Union, on the grounds that it constituted an element of overt racial 
discrimination. At that time, however, differential treatment was proposed not only 
for "first generation" citizens but for their descendents ad infinitum, since there was 
no provision for automatic acquisition of citizenship by children of citizen fathers. 
Such a provision has now been added, and this means that there will grow up in the 
course of years a body of people, Chinese and Indians as well as Malays, who will have 
citizenship as a birth-right. In the long run this will clearly do much to promote a 
common bond of loyalty which will ignore racial barriers, so the position is 
undeniably much more satisfactory than it was. But for "first generation" citizens the 
differential treatment remains. Is this incompatible with the fundamental principle 
referred to at the end of paragraph 1 above? If so, it cannot be contemplated. If 
not-if it is in accordance with the principle and can be shown to be in accordance 
with it-then it may be expected (a) that Parliament, which has always endorsed the 
principle as such, would not only accept but applaud a scheme based on the present 
proposal, and (b) that such a scheme would be in the interests of Malaya itself, since 
it is clear that the imposition of any form of citizenship which would include large 
numbers of people with no loyalty to the country can only promote racial discord. 
3. It is proposed that Malays shall qualify automatically for citizenship by birth 
alone. Can it be said, by and large, that any Malay born in the Union regards the 
1 Not printed. 2 See 102. 3 See 104. 
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country as his real home and the objective of his loyalty? The answer seems to be in 
the affirmative. Even those Malays who are descended from recent immigrants from 
Indonesia have settled on the land and have come to regard Malaya as their only 
home. This very probably cannot be said of all Malays or Javanese who have entered 
the country in the present generation, but such people are excluded. 
It is proposed that British subjects born in the Settlements shall qualify 
automatically for citizenship subject to the additional qualification of 15 years' 
residence. Is this proposal, and in particular the stipulation regarding 15 years' 
residence in accordance with the fundamental principle? Here again, the answer 
would seem to be in the affirmative. Mere birth, in the case of British subjects born 
in the Settlements, might well be considered to open the doors too wide, since it 
would admit anybody who happened to have been born in either of the Settlements. 
The fifteen years' residence qualification would exclude transitory elements, but on 
the other hand it would not exclude the established population. In particular, it 
would admit all those Chinese families, having their roots in the Settlements, who 
form much the most stable and "Malayan-minded" element in the whole Chinese 
population of the Union. 
Thirdly, it is proposed that British subjects born anywhere in the Union shall 
qualify automatically for citizenship subject to the addition[al] that their fathers 
were born in the Union or have resided there for fifteen years. This gives British 
subjects born in the Settlements a measure of preference over British subjects born 
in the Malay States. The Malays apparently refused to be budged from this position, 
and presumably they had in mind the large Indian population, mainly consisting of 
Tamil workers on the rubber estates. The stipulations of (a) birth and (b) fifteen 
years' residence should, however, be sufficient to exclude the transitory elements 
within the Indian community, and it therefore seems hard to justify this distinction. 
Finally, it is proposed that "others" born in the Union (this, in effect, means 
Chinese born in the Malay States) shall automatically qualify for citizenship subject 
to the additional qualification that both their parents were born in the Union and 
have resided there for fifteen years. If mere birth, in the case of British subjects born 
in the Settlements, would open the doors too wide, then the same is true, a fortiori , 
of Chinese born in the Malay States. It could also be reasonably argued that birth 
plus fifteen years residence, in the case of the latter, is not a sufficient stipulation, 
since many Chinese, even after long periods of residence in Malaya, revert to China. 
It is another question, however, whether this argument can be used to justify the 
stipulation that both parents must have been born in the Union and have resided 
there for fifteen years. 
4. The preceding paragraph would appear to indicate that some distinction 
between racial categories in the automatic qualifications for "first generation" 
citizens is compatible with the fundamental principle of His Majesty's Government. 
If this can be accepted (and it should be borne in mind that acceptance at present 
merely means acceptance subject to the views of the non-Malay communities), then 
at least the present Malay proposals need not be rejected out of hand. This is not to 
say, of course, that they can be accepted in every detail. They would have to be 
carefully scrutinized, and one of the most important matters demanding scrutiny 
would be the provisions for acquisition of citizenship by application. It will be noted 
that two methods are proposed: first, direct application for citizenship, and secondly, 
application for naturalisation as a subject of a Ruler. If the second class of application 
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is to be based on the existing F.M.S. laws, this would permit of citizenship via 
naturalisation after five years' residence, whereas direct application for citizenship 
would require a much longer period of residence. This position seems anomalous. 
I 07 CO 537/1543 22 Nov 1946 
[Citizenship]: minute by H T Bourdillon of a CO departmental 
meeting [Extract] 
. . . This morning's discussion confirmed the view tentatively put forward in 
paragraph[s] 3 and 4 of the second part of the Memorandum1-namely, that some 
distinction between racial categories in the automatic qualification for "first 
generation" citizens is demonstrably compatible with the fundamental principle of 
His Majesty's Government, and is in fact both reasonable and just. In particular, it 
was felt that it would be very hard to find fault with the proposal that all Malays born 
in the country should automatically be citizens; and it was considered that this 
proposal would be readily understood and accepted by the other communities in 
Malaya. It was also felt that there are good grounds for the proposal that, amongst 
the non-Malay population, British subjects should receive special treatment as 
regards automatic qualifications for "first generation" citizenship, especially in view 
of the large number of Chinese British subjects living in the Settlements of Penang 
and Malacca, whose families have been settled in the Settlements for many 
generations. 
Given this general feeling, however, it was considered that there are two points in 
the Malay proposals as they at present stand which require further explanation, and 
which, in view of their considerable importance, 1)1ight well be raised by the 
Secretary of State with Mr. MacDonald. These points are as follows: 
(a) It will be seen from paragraph 4 in the first part of the Memorandum opposite 
that a distinction is proposed, in the automatic qualifications for "first generation" 
citizenship, as between British subjects born in the Settlements and British 
subjects born in the Malay States. The former would automatically acquire 
citizenship either if they themselves had resided in the Union for fifteen years or if 
their fathers had either been born there or had resided there for fifteen years, 
whereas the latter (i.e. British subjects born in the Malay States) would only have 
the benefit of the second of these alternatives. Now the great majority of British 
subjects born in the Malay States are Indians, and it was presumably in view of this 
fact that the Malays insisted on the above distinction within the category of British 
subjects. Even granted, however, that it is necessary to exclude from citizenship 
the large transitory element in the Indian population, are there sufficient grounds 
for any such distinction, particularly having regard to the possibility that it may 
bring complaints from the Indian Government? 
(b) It will also be seen from paragraph 4 in Part I of the Memorandum that under 
the present proposals, applicants for citizenship can either apply to become 
citizens tout court, or can apply to become naturalised as subjects of one of the 
1 See 106. 
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Rulers, which status will carry with it the status of citizenship. Applicants by the 
former method must either have been born in the Union and resided there for ten 
out of the last fifteen years or must have resided there for fifteen out of the last 
twenty years, whereas applicants by the latter method, assuming that the law 
would be based on the existing F.M.S. Ordinance, need only have resided in the 
Union for five years. Are there any good grounds for this marked discrepancy 
between the two methods of application? Indeed, given that the only people who 
are likely to apply for naturalisation as subjects of the Rulers or to be accepted as 
such are immigrants of Malay race from Indonesia, would not any such 
discrepancy be positively objectionable, on the grounds that it would place Malay 
immigrants of the present generation (and very recent arrivals at that) in a more 
favourable position not only than other applicants for citizenship but even, in 
certain cases, than British subjects born in the Union? 
108 CO 537/1531, no 320 22 Nov 1946 
[Anglo-Malay constitutional proposals]: letter from SirE Gent to 
T I K Lloyd 
[The Constitutional Working Committee presented its report to the plenary session of 
officials, rulers and UMNO representatives on 20 Nov; on 22 Nov MacDonald and his party 
departed for constitutional talks with the CO.) 
MacDonald, Newboult, O'Connor and the rest of our party will be accompanied in 
their rapid aircraft by the papers emanating from the Malay Working Party and 
Plenary Conference with all Their Highnesses etc. regarding the constitutional 
proposals. I have rapidly put together a covering despatch in the interval of 
continuous visits from British and Malay personages of one sort and another 
(including Lord Killearn who pops in and out while his wife is in the hospital here 
and a candidate for a minor operation). 
I want to urge the importance of two things:-
(1) a broad acceptance of the scheme as a whole at this stage, without permitting 
any "clever" points to be made either of a legal or political nature-real cleverness 
will lie in avoiding any disturbance of the better relations we have succeeded in 
restoring. We can correct at leisure in the next year or two any inconsistencies and 
so on in the constitutional scheme; 
(2) the importance of a quick response from H.M.G. giving a provisional 
favourable reaction to the scheme. 
I may be asking a lot but a lot is at stake with China, India and Indonesia as very 
strong forces pulling us apart here. 
I can ill-spare Newboult and O'Connor but I told MacDonald that I should feel 
happier if both went to London at this stage. Please let nothing interfere with a very 
early return of O'Connor at any rate; but if there is a Debate before Christmas in 
Parliament I think you should keep Newboult for it. 
They will tell you all the local news and as the bag and the aircraft are just to go I 
will finish up. 
With all good wishes to yourself and the Eastern Department. 
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109 CO 537/1543, no 109 29 Nov 1946 
'Malayan policy': memorandum by Mr Creech Jones for Cabinet 
Colonial Affairs Committee (C(46)6) 
[MacDonald's party arrived in London on 24 Nov and began discussions at the CO the next 
day. By 29 Nov the CO completed this policy paper which went to the Cabinet Colonial 
Affairs Committee on 2 Dec (see 110). Papers of the Colonial Affairs Committee are also at 
CAB 134/52.] 
On 31st May, 1944, the War Cabinet, taking as their basis the recommendations of a 
Ministerial Committee1 under the chairmanship of the present Prime Minister, gave 
their provisional approval, for planning purposes, to a new policy for Malaya whose 
fundamental objectives were the creation in that territory of a real and effective 
constitutional unity, and the establishment of a common citizenship which would 
grant political rights to all those who genuinely regard Malaya as their home and as 
the object of their loyalty. On 3rd September, 1945,2 my predecessor sought and 
obtained the Cabinet's final authorisation of this policy, and their agreement to the 
proposal that Sir Harold MacMichael should visit Malaya in order to conclude new 
agreements with the nine Malay Sultans, whereby the latter would grant jurisdiction 
in their States to His Majesty. 
2. Sir Harold MacMichael had completed his task by the end of last year. In due 
course, the policy was approved by both Houses of Parliament, and the Order in 
Council setting up the Malayan Union was then issued, in time for the Governor of 
the Union to take up his functions at the termination of military administration on 
1st April last. 
[3.] On 3rd June,3 my predecessor gave the Cabinet an oral account of develop-
ments since 1st April. An organised Malay nationalist movement extending over the 
whole Peninsula had emerged, and it will be recollected that certain features of the 
new constitution had met with vigorous and united resistance from the Malays, who 
did not consider that they had been sufficiently consulted before the new system had 
been brought into force, and who expressed their objections in a refusal to co-operate 
in the activities of Government. This situation threatened at one time to become 
extremely dangerous, with the prospect of the Malays, united as never before, 
pursuing a policy of wholesale non-co-operation which might at any moment have 
degenerated into actual violence. Although the constitution provided for the fullest 
consultation between the central authority and the local State Councils proposed as 
to powers, representation and structure, and for consultation on the terms of 
citizenship, it was evident that the enforcement of the proposals against the will of 
the largest section of the community in Malaya would only defeat the very objectives 
of His Majesty's Government as stated in paragraph 1 above. Accordingly, with my 
predecessor's approval, the Governor of the Malayan Union and later the Governor-
General entered into discussions with Malay representatives for the purpose of 
arriving at an agreed solution within the essential framework of His Majesty's 
Government's policy. I am happy to say that, notwithstanding initial hesitations, the 
Sultans and the Malay leaders responded to this approach in a statesmanlike manner, 
and from the beginning of August until the middle of November a Working 
1 See25. 2 See 50. 3 See 93, note and note 5. 
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Committee, consisting of representatives of the Sultans and the principal Malay 
political party on the one hand and Government representatives on the other, was 
busy elaborating the details of a revised constitution. At a subsequent plenary 
conference, the Sultans and the representatives of the political party mentioned 
above indicated to the Governor-General and the Governor of the Malayan Union that 
they were satisfied with the scheme. The proposals were thereupon submitted to me 
for my provisional scrutiny. It must be understood that these proposals represent a 
considerable effort at accommodation by the Malays, and a basis which they agree 
can be offered for further consultation with the other communities in Malaya. 
4. I have now had time to study the whole scheme with the assistance of the 
Governor-General and of certain officers of the Malayan Union Government who 
have flown with him to this country. One of the most encouraging features of the 
Working Committee's deliberations has been the manner in which the whole 
Committee, Malays and Government representatives alike, accepted the essential 
purposes of His Majesty's Government as described above, as the basis of their 
deliberations, and I am happy to record my own convictions, after examining the 
documents in detail, that the resultant proposals, in their main provisions, are 
calculated to achieve these purposes in an effective manner. 
5. First, I am satisfied that the proposals will achieve the object of establishing in 
Malaya a strong central Government, with control over all matters of importance to 
the welfare and progress of the country as a whole. There has been drawn up a list of 
subjects upon which the right of legislation has been reserved for the Central 
Legislature alone, and this list, which embraces 144 items (see Appendix for list of 
important examples)4 is extremely comprehensive. It ensures that so far as can be 
foreseen all legislation of any considerable importance will in fact be in the hands of 
the Central Legislature, which will also maintain effective control in the all-
important sphere of finance . On the other hand, it is proposed that executive 
authority, under central legislation, will be entrusted in a number of fields of local 
administration to the authorities in the individual States and in the settlements of 
Penang and Malacca. I do not regard this as materially detracting from the authority 
of the centre, but rather as ensuring healthy and constructive local activity within a 
limited sphere. 
6. The organisations of Government which are envisaged as carrying out the 
functions described above are as follows. First, in place of the Governor there will be 
a High Commissioner with an Executive Council. Secondly, there will be a central 
Legislative Council, consisting of the High Commissioner as President, three 
ex-officio members, eleven other official members and thirty-four unofficial mem" 
bers, of whom eleven will be representatives of the State and Settlement Councils. 
Thirdly, there will be a Legislative body in each State, with the title of "Council of 
State", and similar legislative bodies in each of the two British Settlements. 
Fourthly, it is proposed that there should be established in each State a body with the 
title of "State Executive Council", which will carry out the executive functions 
provided for under Central or State Legislation. Fifthly, there will be a central 
Conference of Rulers, whose functions will be almost entirely formal and consulta-
tive (see paragraph 9 below) . I have been in some doubt regarding the necessity for 
State Executive Councils and it may be that in course of time some "streamlining" of 
4 Not printed. 
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State Government machinery may be found advisable. I am advised, however, that 
the Malays attach great importance to the establishment of the State Executive 
Councils, on the grounds that the Sultans, who are envisaged as presiding over the 
State Executive Councils but not over the Councils of State, should henceforth be 
treated as strictly constitutional princes and not as absolute Rulers. I am further 
advised that adequate provision has been made to prevent the possibility of deadlock 
between the Legislature and the Executive in the States. 
7. I also consider (subject, of course, to the views of the non-Malay communities, 
a point of fundamental importance to which I shall revert later) that the proposals 
regarding citizenship are designed to give reality to His Majesty's Government's 
essential objective of granting political rights to all those who regard Malaya as their 
real home and as the object of their loyalty. This matter is one of peculiar delicacy (a 
fact which His Majesty's Government recognised when they agreed, in the House of 
Commons on 18th March, to defer the implementation of citizenship proposals 
pending local consultations), and the task of the Working Committee has according-
ly not been easy. A most important feature of the present proposals is the provision 
that children of citizens will themselves automatically be citizens. This will 
encourage the growth, in course of time, of an increasing body of men and women, 
irrespective of race or creed, who will regard citizenship as a birth-right, and an 
effective bond of common loyalty will thus be created. As regards the provisions for 
the initial creation of a body of citizens, it is proposed, in effect, that a Malay should 
qualify automatically for citizenship if he is born in the country (or if he is the child 
of a father who is a subject of one of the Rulers), that a British subject born anywhere 
in the territory should automatically qualify if his father was either born there or has 
resided there for fifteen years, that a British subject born in either of the Settlements 
should alternatively qualify automatically if he himself has resided there for fifteen 
years, and that all others born anywhere in the territory should automatically qualify 
if both their parents were born there and have resided there for fifteen years. My 
provisional view is that these stipulations are reasonable. The special provision for 
Malays is justified on the grounds that Malays born in the country, whether or not 
they are descended from comparatively recent immigrant stock, regard Malaya as 
their only home and the only object of their loyalty. The special provision for British 
subjects born in the Settlements, as against British subjects born elsewhere in the 
territory, is justified on the grounds that the two Settlements include a large body of 
Indians and Chinese who are truly "Malayan" in spirit, who are intensely proud of 
their status as British subjects and who, incidentally, would be the first to resent any 
indiscriminate "opening of the flood-gates" to Indians and Chinese whose loyalties lie 
elsewhere than in Malaya. In general, the proposals are designed to exclude the large 
transitory element in the population, but to include all those who are ready to accept 
the duties as well as the rights of citizenship. Finally, it is proposed that the High 
Commissioner should be empowered, subject to his entire discretion, to grant 
citizenship on application to persons who fulfil certain residence and language 
qualifications and who are ready to make affirmations of loyalty and continued 
residence in the country. 
8. One matter which has given rise to special difficulties in the deliberations of 
the Working Committee has been the question of His Majesty's jurisdiction, in the 
Malay States (his jurisdiction in the Settlements, of course, remains complete) . 
Under the MacMichael Agreements the Sultans conferred full jurisdiction in their 
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States on His Majesty, and this is one of the principal points to which the Malays have 
objected. His Majesty's Government, however, have never regarded jurisdiction as an 
end in itself, but merely as a means of ensuring the future progress of Malaya towards 
self-government. Subject to one exception to which I shall refer later, I regard the 
present proposals, judged from this point of view, as satisfactory. It is proposed that 
the revised constitution should be embodied in a new agreement, but it has been 
agreed that legal force in the Malay States should be given to the new agreement by 
His Majesty's Order in Council under the Foreign Jurisdiction Act. There would also 
be separate agreements with the individual Rulers superseding previous agreements 
(including those negotiated by Sir Harold MacMichael). All these agreements would 
be ratified by enactments of the various Councils of State. Thus a firm legal 
foundation is provided for the establishment of the revised system. Thereafter it is 
proposed that His Majesty should have jurisdiction in all matters relating to external 
affairs and defence. This would include the necessary internal jurisdiction in relation 
to such matters, the advantages of which, particularly in times of crisis, are obvious. 
It is further proposed that His Majesty should have jurisdiction for the purpose of 
appeals to the Privy Council, that His Majesty should in effect have the power to 
disallow laws, and that there should be the usual provision for the reservation of bills 
for His Majesty's pleasure. Lastly, it is proposed that in all matters of Government, 
excepting (a) amendments to the constitution and (b) matters relating to Moslem 
religion and the custom of the Malays, the High Commissioner, and the British 
Adviser in each of the States, should have the power of tendering advice to the Ruler, 
which the latter would be bound to accept. In this whole connection it will, of 
course, be appreciated that under the scheme great powers have been surrendered by 
the States to the Central authority, and that the Sultans have delegated powers over 
an immense field to the High Commissioner. 
9. The one feature of the proposals regarding jurisdiction which I regard as 
unsatisfactory is the provision that future amendments to the constitution would 
require the consent of the Sultans, a provision which would in theory enable any one 
Sultan to block future constitutional progress. I am advised that the recent 
emergence of political awareness amongst the Malays is such that it is most unlikely 
that any Sultan would be able to follow his personal will in such matters in future, 
but the provision remains unsatisfactory in principle. The present proposals (as 
stated in paragraph 6 above) include the establishment of a Conference of Rulers- a 
body with certain purely consultative and formal functions-and I have it in mind, 
subject to my colleagues' consent, to stipulate that future constitutional changes 
should require the agreement of this body (that is, in effect, of a majority of Sultans) 
and not of each Sultan individually. 
10. It is proposed that the revised constitutional system should be described as 
the "Federation of Malaya". I would have preferred some title which would have 
included the word "Union", as being more indicative of the closely-knit system which 
is in fact envisaged, but I am advised that this is a point on which the Malays have 
proved adamant, and in these circumstances I consider that it would be most unwise 
to press the point further. 
11. It cannot be too strongly emphasised that there is no question of His 
Majesty's Government giving their final approval to any of these proposals until the 
other communities in Malaya, besides the Malays themselves, have been fully and 
freely consulted. The Malays themselves have clearly recognised this, but at the same 
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time they have pressed that if there are any points in the present proposals which His 
Majesty's Government consider definitely unacceptable, these shall be referred back 
to them for further consideration before the wider discussions commence. In this 
connection the Governor-General and the Governor of the Malayan Union have 
emphasised two points. First, they have told me that while the political situation in 
Malaya has greatly improved during the past few months, there is a danger 
amounting to certainty that the improvement will vanish unless His Majesty's 
Government now act with all reasonable speed. Secondly, they have urged that at the 
time when the wider discussions are opened, His Majesty's Government should 
indicate in definite terms their provisional acceptance of the general scheme, subject 
always to the views of the non-Malay communities. It is emphasised that such an 
indication by His Majesty's Government will carry a stage further the process of 
recovering the good will and confidence of the Malays, will prevent the projected 
wider discussions from becoming extravagant and irresponsible, and will greatly help 
to achieve that speedy solution which is so essential. 
12. I see great force in these views, and I accordingly submit the following 
programme of action for approval of my colleagues. First, I would ask the Governor 
to take up with the Malays, with the least possible delay, the following points which I 
still cannot regard as entirely satisfactory or as entirely clear:-
(a) The agreement to be signified to future constitutional changes should be that 
of the Conference of Rulers and not of the Sultans individually. 
(b) The Constitution, and in particular the exact conposition (sic] of the Councils 
of State, in the various States has not yet been determined. It is of great 
importance that the State legislatures should be of a truly democratic character, 
and I would propose to say that His Majesty's Government must reserve all 
judgment on this matter until they see detailed proposals. 
(c) It is proposed that the Central Legislative Council should have twenty-three 
unofficial members besides the representatives of the States and Settlement 
Councils. It is further proposed that steps should be taken to institute an electoral 
system as soon as possible, but this is not considered feasible as an immediate 
measure. In the meanwhile it is proposed that the High Commissioner should 
nominate these twenty-three members, of whom nine would be Malays and the 
remainder would be chosen as representing important interests such as labour, 
mining and planting-a device which was primarily intended to ensure adequate 
representation for the Chinese and Indians. I regard such specific representation 
by interests as liable to produce an unduly sectional point of view in the members 
of the Council, and I would propose to say that, subject to the selection of nine 
Malays (which I regard as reasonable) the High Commissioner should have 
discretion in nominating the remainder, though he should bear in mind the 
importance of securing a chamber broadly representative of all important 
economic, social and communal interests in the Peninsula. 
(d) There is one point in relation to citizenship which must be clarified. It is 
proposed that persons naturalised as subjects of any of the Rulers should acquire 
citizenship by virtue of such naturalisation. There is room for discrepancy here 
between the qualifications required for naturalisation as a subject of a Ruler and 
those required for direct application for citizenship, and it must be ensured that 
there is in fact no such discrepancy. 
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13. Subject to the above points being satisfactorily resolved, I would propose to 
inform the Governor of the Malayan Union that the proposals have the conditional 
approval of His Majesty's Government, and may forthwith be used for discussions 
with the non-Malay communities. I also think it would be very desirable that before 
the Christmas recess I should make a statement in Parliament, outlining the present 
position. After making it clear that there were still some matters both of substance 
and important detail to be discussed with the Malays, I should propose to conclude 
such a statement with words to the following effect:-
"I am happy to say that the present proposals, which represent the outcome of 
much patient and devoted work and of much constructive good will on both 
sides, appear to His Majesty's Government to be calculated to achieve those 
fundamental objectives in Malaya for which His Majesty's Government have 
always striven. There can be no question, however, of His Majesty's Govern-
ment reaching any final decision on any of the matters involved until all 
interested communities in Malaya have had full and free opportunity of 
expressing their views. I am glad to say that the necessity of consulting to the 
fullest extent the other interest[ed] communities has been clearly appreciated 
by the Malay representatives themselves. It is now intended, therefore, that 
the proposals should, .with the minimum of delay, form the subject of wider 
discussions in Malaya. His Majesty's Government will again consider the 
matter in the light of the results of these discussions, and at that stage the 
House will be given the opportunity of commenting on the proposals as a 
whole. Meanwhile, copies of the proposals as published in Malaya will be 
placed in the Library of the House as soon as they are received."5 
5 See Creech Jones's written answer, H of C Debs, vol 431, cols 228-229, 11 Dec 1946. 
110 CO 537/1543, no 110 3 Dec 19461 
'Malayan policy': Cabinet Colonial Affairs Committee minutes 
(C 3(46)) 
The Committee considered a memorandum by the Secretary of State for the Colonies 
(C.(46) 6)2 regarding future policy in Malaya. 
The Secretary of State for the Colonies recalled that at the beginning of the year 
His Majesty's Government had announced a policy whereby an effective constitution-
al union would be created in Malaya, backed by a common citizenship open to all, 
whether Malays, Indians, Chinese or others, so long as they had adopted Malaya as 
their true home. The policy entailed the grant of jurisdiction by the Sultans to His 
Majesty; this had already been covered by agreements with the Sultans which had 
been negotiated by Sir Harold MacMichael. 
On the announcement of this policy there had been very strong resistance to it 
from the Malays, who considered that they had not been sufficiently consulted in the 
preparation of it: it had then been decided that negotiations should take place with 
Malay representatives with the object of working out a revised policy which would be 
1 The meeting was held on 2 Dec 1946; the minutes are dated 3 Dec. 2 See 109. 
286 MALAYAN UNION TO FEDERATION [HO] 
agreeable to them. These negotiations had now been completed and the results were 
set out in the memorandum now before the Committee. 
While, as indicated in the memorandum, he had comments on certain points, the 
Secretary of State said that he was satisfied that the new proposals preserved the 
principles of the policy which the Cabinet had approved and he now asked his 
colleagues to agree that, subject to these points, they should be used for the purpose 
of discussion with the other communities in Malaya. While there was no intention of 
final approval being given until these discussions had taken place, it was desirable to 
indicate in those discussions that the proposals had the conditional approval of His 
Majesty's Government. The precise course of action which he proposed was indicated 
in paragraphs 12 and 13 of his memorandum. 
The following points were raised in discussion. 
(a) There was no one body representative of all the Chinese or Indian interests in 
Malaya and it would therefore be necessary to consult various bodies. Between 
them, however, these should give an adequate indication of Chinese and Indian 
opinion. There was reason to suppose that these communities as a whole, and in 
particular the more stable elements would accept proposals on the lines of those 
now put forward. 
(b) The provision for separate Executive Councils for the individual States was 
cumbrous, but were a concession to Malay feeling. They would have executive 
authority only in a limited number of fields of local administration. 
(c) The proposals regarding citizenship would permit practically all Malays and a 
considerable number of Chinese and Indians to acquire Malayan citizenship. There 
were in Malaya, in round figures, 2t million Malays, H- million Chinese, and 
750,000 Indians. British subjects would be able to obtain Malayan citizenship 
rather more easily than others except Malays. A considerable number of Indians 
and Chinese in Malaya were British subjects. " 
(d) While the jurisdiction of His Majesty would not be so comprehensive as under 
the agreements negotiated with Sir Harold MacMichael, the provisions on this 
subject in the new proposals appeared adequate. 
(e) Under the proposals all courts would be set up by federal legislation. The 
Supreme Court would have jurisdiction throughout the federation and provisions 
would be made for appeal to the Privy Council. 
There was general agreement that proposals had been evolved which besides 
satisfying Malay feeling, preserved the fundamental objectives of His Majesty's 
Government. 
The Committee:-
Invited the Chairman to submit a memorandum to the Cabinet seeking their 
approval of the action proposed in paragraphs 12 and 13 of C(46) 6).3 
3 The memorandum was submitted to the Cabinet by the committee's chairman (Lord Addison, secretary 
of state for the Dominions) and considered on 5 Dec. Cabinet approved the proposals subject to 
clarification in Malaya of a number of issues listed in paragraph 12, and Creech Jones cabled this 
conditional approval to Gent the same day. On 11 Dec the secretary of state supplied Squadron Leader 
Donner MP with a written answer on the revised constitution. The necessary amendments went through 
the Plenary Conference in Kuala Lumpur on 20 Dec, and, on Christmas Eve the constitutional proposals 
were published. The same day the Consultative Committee, chaired by H R Cheeseman, was appointed to 
sound local opinion on the constitutional proposals. See CAB 134/52; CAB 129/15, CP(46)439, 3 Dec 1946; 
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CAB 128/6, CM103(46)5, 5 Dec 1946; H of C Debs, vol 431, cols 22~229, 11 Dec 1946; Constitutional 
Proposals for Malaya: Report of the Working Committee Appointed by a Conference of His Excellency the 
Governor of the Malayan Union, Their Highnesses the Rulers of the Malay States and Representatives of 
the United Malays National Organisation (Kuala Lumpur, 1946). 
Ill CO 537/2165, ff 19-21 19 Jan 1947 
'Federation proposals': minute 7 of the 5th governor-general's confer-
ence in Penang about the consultative process 
The Governor-General asked the Governor of Malayan Union to explain the local 
course of events in regard to the Federation Proposals since the Governor-General 
had left for London. 
The Governor of Malayan Union gave a detailed account of political events since 
the 23rd November, 1946. 
The Governor-General said that he appreciated that the Council of Joint Action1 
could not be considered to be representative of the masses in any sense. At the same 
time, he wondered whether it would not be wise for the Governor to see them. 
The Governor of Malayan Union said that he had already communicated to the 
Council the Secretary of State's reply to their telegram. He had said that they were 
open to communicate their views to the Governor who would pass them to the 
Consultative Committee. He had also said that he was prepared to see representatives 
of any of the Organisations represented on the Council in order that they might 
clarify their position. He was in fact arranging to have a talk with Mr. Thivl of the 
Malayan Indian Congress informally on his return to Kuala Lumpur. 
The Governor-General said that he felt that if some means could be found by 
which the Council of Joint Action could state their objections to the Committee, 
many of their arguments could be knocked down with considerable ease. 
The Governor of Malayan Union said it was a question of procedure; the 
Consultative Committee had been set up in order that all communities could 
ventilate their views. The Council of Joint Action had categorically refused to accept 
the machinery of a Consultative Committee. 
The Governor-General said that if they stuck to that and gathered considerable 
support in the country it would seem to him that the Malayan Union Government 
would have to eat its words and establish contact with the Council of Joint Action, as 
had been necessary previously in regard to U.M.N.O. 
The Governor of Malayan Union said that if it should be necessary to do so later, 
he would be prepared to eat his words but he was not willing at present to do 
anything which would weaken the position of the Consultative Committee. It was 
also necessary to have regard to the position of the Malays. Their confidence in the 
Government had been largely restored and U.M.N.O. had now consolidated their 
position in support of the Federation plan. To bypass the Consultative Committee at 
the present stage might result in resignations from that Committee; and from the 
Advisory Council itself, and this would be a most undesirable result. 
1 See 113, note. 
2 John Thivy, born in south India; trained as a lawyer in London and practised in Malaya unti11942; joined 
Subhas Chandra Bose's Indian Independence League; interned by the BMA until Apr 1946; founded the 
Malayan Indian Congress in Aug 1946 and was a key figure in the Council of Joint Action. 
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The Governor-General felt that the claims of the Council of Joint Action were so 
bad that if contact could be established early, their arguments could be largely 
discredited. 
The Governor of Malayan Union said that, apart from a few individuals, the 
Council of Joint Action comprised 17 . associations of little account. The Malayan 
Nationalist Party had disassociated itself from the Council. The 17 associations 
referred to were nearly all associated with the General Labour Union, a Communist 
group, whose only purpose was to make trouble for the government and to prevent 
the successful organisation of registration of genuine Trade Unions. It had no 
constructive policy and in the Malayan Union it had not achieved the large scale 
influence it was understood to have gained in Singapore. His present view was that it 
would be dangerous for him to agree to see the Council of Joint Action collectively. 
The Governor-General trusted that the Governor of Malayan Union would do 
nothing finally to close the door to seeing the Council of Joint Action collectively; he 
agreed that, at present, they did not represent very much but if they were mishandled 
there might be a swing of popular opinion in their favour. 
The Governor of Malayan Union took the view that, if he were to see the Council of 
Joint Action collectively at the present stage, he would immediately enhance their 
position, and appear to indicate a lack of confidence in the Consultative Committee. 
The Governor of Malayan Union referred to the recent action of Mr. Chettur, the 
Representative of the Government of India in Malaya, who appeared to have been 
circularising all Indian Associations in the Malayan Union asking for views in regard 
to the Federation proposals. 
The Governor-General said that he had interviewed, Mr. Chettur the previous day. 
Mr. Chettur hoped to go to India to report to his Government and had felt it desirable 
that he should be informed by the various Indian Associations in Malaya as to their 
reaction to the Federation proposals. So far he had received no reports, except from 
Ipoh. The Governor-General did not think that there was any harm in this. He had, 
however, asked Mr. Chettur as to his own views on the proposals. In reply, Mr. 
Chettur had mentioned only three points, as follows:-
(a) He felt strongly that the proposal to insist on a written as well as a 
conversational knowledge of English or Malay from intending citizens, after two 
years from the inauguration of the new Federation, was too limiting. 
(b) He did not like the implications of the Report which suggested that the Malays 
should have the final control in the fixing of the future immigration policy. 
(c) He was not clear that the whole plan was open for discussion. 
The Governor-General stated that he had impressed upon Mr. Chettur that the 
Consultative Committee had been established to enable anyone to make his 
representations for the amendment of the plan in regard to any of the matters in it. 
He had also informed Mr. Chettur that, if the Government of India wished to make 
any official representation in regard to any aspects of the plan which affected India, 
the proper procedure would be for the Government of India to address their remarks 
to the India Office which would transmit them to the Colonial Office, and thence to 
the local Government. 
It was agreed that the situation required careful watching; that while not closing 
the door to approaches from the Council of Joint Action, nothing should be done 
which would be likely to weaken the position of the Consultative Committee, or to 
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give rise to apprehensions on the part of the Malays-particularly the Rulers and 
U.M.N.O., that the individual bodies represented on the Council of Joint Action 
should be encouraged if possible to convey their views to the Governor who would 
transmit them to the Consultative Committee, and that if possible a start should be 
made with the Malayan Indian Congress. 
112 CO 537/2165, ff22-25 19 Jan 1947 
'Singapore constitution': minute 8 of the 5th governor-general's 
conference in Penang about closer association 
The Governor-General said in relation to the discussion which had just taken place1 
there was the question of the possibility of Singapore coming into the Federation at a 
later date. He had discussed this aspect with the Secretary of State who was ready 
that it should be achieved if both Governors agreed. He wondered whether the 
appropriate time had not come for some announcement on policy on this matter to 
be made. It was clear that Singapore could not come into the Federation until the 
new constitution of the Mainland had been promulgated and had got into working 
order, but it might be most politic to state now that as soon as the constitution of the 
Mainland was settled, a Working Committee would be established of representatives 
of both territories to consider and plan for the inclusion of Singapore in the 
Federation. 
The Governor of Malayan Union said that he felt that this was a matter not to be 
rushed, and that if any statement of policy was to be made it should be made by 
H.M.G. and not locally. He did not disagree with the view that the inclusion of 
Singapore in the Federation should be considered and put into effect at the 
appropriate time, but he felt that popular opinion in the Mainland at any rate might 
say that this matter could not be adequately considered until the stage had been 
reached in the Malayan Federation when Elections were held, so that those who 
joined in the consultations could claim to have the status of really representative 
people. 
The Governor of Singapore then said that there was a very strong feeling indeed in 
Singapore that the Island should be included in the Federation. If the problem were 
to be delayed until Elections were held in the Malayan Union an impression might be 
created that the project would be held up indefinitely. 
The Governor General said he felt that on a short term view, it would be most 
politic, if the Governors agreed, to make an early announcement of their intention to 
set up machinery at a fairly early date to consider the inclusion of Singapore in the 
Federation. This would take a great deal of sting out of the present agitation of the 
Council of Joint Action. One of their fundamental points was that Singapore was not 
included in the new proposals and in this they undoubtedly had the support of a large 
number of people, particularly in Singapore. This point undermined, by a pro-
nouncement from H.M.G, there would be comparatively little of real substance left in 
the criticisms of the Council of Joint Action and such other opposition to the plan as 
had already emerged. There were criticisms with regard to the position of the 
1 See 111. 
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Sultans, with regard to the details of citizenship and the fact that Elections were not 
going to be held immediately. But they could all be met, or satisfactorily adjusted by 
the Government. The inclusion ·of Singapore was a big point. He, therefore, 
proposed, if the Governors agreed, that a statement should now be drafted and 
submitted to the Secretary of State for consideration. 
The Governor of Malayan Union said that, in his view, the statement should come 
from H.M.G. and he saw no reason at all to object to that. 
The Governor of Singapore said the feeling on this point in Singapore was strong; 
he had not invited the local communities to address him on the subject and they had 
not done so, but there was no doubt as to the local wishes. 
It was decided that the Governor-General should prepare a draft telegram on the 
subject of the inclusion of Singapore as from himself and the two Governors, and 
that this should be circulated for consideration as soon as convenient. 
The Governor-General said that the question they had been discussing was linked 
up with the proposals that had already been made by the Governor of Singapore for 
the constitution of a new Legislative Council for the Colony.2 The Secretary of State 
had discussed with him (the Governor-General), Sir Franklin Gimson's recom-
mendations and a Colonial Office despatch would be sent shortly on the subject. In 
general, the Secretary of State agrees to all the proposals that have been made except 
that he feels that the age limit for voters should be reduced from 25 to 21, and that 
the number of members to be nominated by the Governor should be three or four 
instead of two. 
The Governor of Singapore said that the recommendation for two was based on 
the existing Order in Council. 
The Governor-General said that the Secretary of State's feeling was that a greater 
number of nominations might be desirable after Elections are instituted in order to 
redress an overwhelming preponderance of any one community among the elected 
members. 
The Governor of Malayan Union said that popular opinion is becoming increasing-
ly averse to the system of nomination by the Governor. 
The Governor-General said that this point could be reconsidered when the 
despatch was received; the general desire of the Secretary of State was to proceed 
with the inauguration of the new Legislature at the earliest possible moment. 
The Governor of Singapore said that a Committee was already working on the 
preparation of the legislation and machinery for conducting elections, and that once 
approval is received from the Secretary of State, the new Legislature could not be set 
up too quickly. 
The Governor-General pointed out that the inauguration of a full and more 
advanced constitution for Singapore at an early date might postpone the entry of 
Singapore into the wider Federation; in fact, it might hold up this step indefinitely, 
as the new Legislature might not be prepared to make the concessions necessary to 
enable Singapore to enter the wider Federation. It could be argued that it might be 
politic to withhold the new constitution pending the setting-up of the new Joint 
Working Party which had been mentioned earlier in the discussions. 
The Governor of Singapore said that he did not think that the present arrange-
2 See 98. On 20 Mar 1948 a minority of six members were elected to Singapore's first Legislative Council 
which was sworn in on 1 April 1948. 
[112] JAN 1947 291 
ments of governing Singapore through an Advisory Council could be allowed to 
continue indefinitely and that a more satisfactory Legislature must be substituted for 
it. 
The Governor of Malayan Union said that if the new constitution of Singapore 
were held up indefinitely, an unfortunate effect might be produced in the Malayan 
Union. It might be argued that H.M.G. was being deliberately slow in implementing 
its promises regarding constitutional advancement. 
The Governor-General enquired if there was any public agitation in Singapore for 
the adoption of a new constitution on the basis of the report which had been 
published. 
The Governor of Singapore said that there was no such agitation; this was perhaps 
due to the fact that the Advisory Council hitherto had not been called upon to deal 
with any highly controversial legislation. 
The Governor of Malayan Union said that, at his Advisory Council on the previous 
day, the T.U. member had already pressed for the setting up of a Committee to 
explore the future electoral system in the territory in the first instance for local 
Government purposes. In this connection, he mentioned that he had just received 
the report of a Committee established to advise on the constitution of the 
Municipality of Kuala Lumpur. He hoped to adopt the report and to recommend the 
constitution of the Municipality of Kuala Lumpur with effect from 1st Jan, 1948. 
The Governor-General enquired whether Sir Edward Gent had in mind any 
programme regarding the final setting up of the new constitutional arrangements for 
the Malayan Union. 
The Governor of Malayan Union said that it was thought that the Consultative 
Committee would probably take six weeks to hear the views of the local communities 
and individuals. They were starting their sessions on the 28th January. They should, 
therefore, be able to report in eight weeks; about one month would be required for 
consideration of their Report and the necessary debate in the Advisory Council. It 
should be possible, therefore, for him to refer the Report, with his conclusions, to 
the Secretary of State, by the beginning of May.3 
The Governor General enquired when the new constitution could be put into 
force, presuming that the reply of the Secretary of State and the decisions of H.M.G. 
were not unduly delayed. 
The Governor of Malayan Union said that he did not think it would be possible to 
inaugurate the new constitution until the 1st January, 1948, at the earliest. 
The Governor-General then enquired when the new constitution in Singapore and 
the holding of elections could be put into force, assuming that the Secretary of 
State's despatch was received in the course of the next few weeks. 
The Governor of Singapore thought that this would not be possible until the 1st 
January, 1948. 
The Governor-General said that this would probably be the time when the 
inclusion of Singapore became a practical issue and it might be better to introduce 
the new constitution in Singapore, with the necessary modifications, to enable 
3 The report of the Consultative Committee was submitted to Gent on 21 March 1947. It was later 
published as Constitutional Proposals for Malaya: Report of the Consultative Committee Together with 
Proceedings of Six Public Meetings, a Summary of Representations Made and Letters and Memoranda 
Considered by the Committee (Kuala Lumpur, 1947). 
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Singapore to enter the Federation by the middle or end of 1948, since it will be 
necessary to get the Federation working properly before' this further step was taken. 
It was to be presumed that the machinery for elections in Singapore will be required 
in any case. The shape of the Island Council would probably be very much on the 
lines of the recommendations already made. Only the legislative powers of the 
Singapore Council in regard to certain subjects would be curtailed in favour of the 
Federal Legislative Council. 
The Governor of Malayan Union said that it would be unwise to hurry unduly this 
development; there would be some hard bargaining between the two territories to be 
done and those negotiations must not be hurried. 
The Governor-General said that it looked as though Singapore could not be 
brought into the Federation earlier than 18 months, or two years, from the present 
time-even if all went well. 
113 CO 537/2174, no 1 27 Jan 1947 
[UMNO]: despatch no 92/47 from SirE Gent to Mr Creech Jones. 
Annex: report on UMNO general assembly, 10-12 Jan 1947 [Extract] 
[Agreement having been reached between the British and Malay leaders, opposition to the 
constitutional proposals arose from two quarters. The Pan-Malayan Council of Joint 
Action, comprising some 17 political groups and with Tan Cheng Lock playing an 
important role, was formed on 22 Dec 1946. Its object was to achieve the political 
unification of Malaya and Singapore, liberal citizenship and staged advance to self-
government. The PMCJA was later renamed the All Malayan Council of Joint Action and 
opposed the constitutional proposals in partnership with a separate front of radical Malays 
known as PUTERA. Meanwhile, Malay negotiators were criticised from within UMNO. 
When UMNO's general assembly came to debate the constitutional proposals, the press 
were ejected and it continued in camera. While many specific amendments were made, 
the assembly eventually accepted the essence of the proposals.] 
The Governor of the Malayan Union presents his compliments to the Right 
Honourable the Secretary of State for the Colonies and submits for information the 
attached copy of a secret report on the proceedings of the General Assembly of the 
United Malays National Organisation held at Alor Star, Kedah, on the 10-12th 
January, 1947. 
Annex to 113 
UMNO held a general assembly at Alor Star, Kedah, from the lOth- 12th Jan. 1947. 
Anti-UMNO propaganda was in evidence as early as the 5th Jan., when cyclostyled 
Jawi1 pamphlets were distributed in the streets. The pamphlet declared that "Dato 
Onn has sold the Sultans and the Raayat2 like slaves. We must liberate ourselves. Do 
not accept the Federation proposals. Our Sultans must be treated as true Sultans 
with prerogatives to command our respect, and should be able to govern us on 
democratic principles. The Council of Joint Action demands Independence for the 
Sultans and the Raayats, and unity with our friends. We can achieve greater success 
1 Jawi is the Arabic-based Malay script. 2 Raayat means 'the people'. 
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and victory than Dato Onn who has become a British satellite. Oppose the Federation 
proposals! Support the Council of Joint Action!" 
2. The Conference opened at 9.45 a.m. on the lOth instant when Dato Onn and 
H.H. the Sultan of Kedah, [sic] each was received by a guard of honour of youths of 
the Kesatuan Pemuda Melayu,3 Sebrang Perak, wearing white uniform. 
3. H.H. gave a speech of welcome of no great importance, and he left the 
assembly immediately afterwards. 
4. In his opening address Dato Onn stressed that the Malay people are not ready 
for Independence. He ridiculed those Malays who demand immediate Independence, 
pointing out that there is no Malay fitted to be a Minister, or a representative to UNO 
or an Ambassador, and that Malaya could not expect practical aid from Indonesia. In 
conclusion he said: "Who was ruling the country immediately after the Japanese 
surrender?-the Chinese. We have been greatly endangered by the Three Stars4 and 
by the MNP. We do not care for these people. We must rise united to defend our 
birth-right; the 2,500,000 Malays in Malaya must be united, and once unity is 
achieved we will have no fear of foreigners." 
5. Inche Mohd Tahir bin Stia Raja was unanimously elected vice-Chairman. 
6. The whole of the Congress was completely dominated by the personality of 
Dato Onn. The principal opponents to Dato Onn and his ideology were: (1) Dr. 
Hamzah5 of the Kesatuan Melayu, Muar, who recently has attended the Council of 
Joint Action, (2) Che Gu Senu6 of Soberkas [sic], Kedah, (3) Sa'adon Zubir7 of the 
Kesatuan Melayu, Singapore. Dr. Hamzah suggested that Dato Onn should confine 
his activities to the office of the Mentri Besar of Johore, and that the Presidency of 
UMNO should be filled by some other person. This proposal was not accepted. Dato 
Onn made a counter attack on Dr. Hamzah by stating pointedly that someone has 
disclosed the "secret" of UMNO to Mr. Tan Cheng Lock at the recent Conference of 
the Council of Joint Action. 
7. Che Gu Senu was prominent during the discussions of the Constitutional 
Proposals. At the outset, he asked for postponement of the debate to the 2nd day; this 
motion was seconded by Dr. Hamzah. But Dato Onn ruled out this request, declaring 
that the delegates had already had ample time to study the Proposals. Che Gu Senu, 
referring to page 8 of the Proposals, pointed out that the partnership in the 
Federation Agreement between H.M. the King and H.H. the Rulers was not on a 
proportionate basis; he went on to declaim the desire for Independence. He was 
seconded by Sa'adon Zubir and Dr. Hamzah. Dato Onn ruled that UMNO did not 
claim Independence but the abrogation of the MacMichael Treaty. Che Gu Senu 
finally did declare that Soberkas agrees with the wishes of UMNO .... 
3 Or 'Association of Young Malays'. 4 A reference to the Malayan Peoples' Anti-Japanese Army. 
5 Dr. Hamzah, enraged by the thought of Anglo-Malay compromise, stormed out of the assembly. He 
attempted to re-open the issue at assemblies in Mar and May, and in May 1947 withdrew from UMNO 
altogether. 
6 Senu b Abdul Rahman, secretary-general of Saberkas (a radical Malay association in Kedah); in the USA 
and Britain, 1947-55; became secretary-general of UMNO and joint secretary of the Alliance in 1955. 
7 Sardon bin Haji Jubir attended the inaugural conference of the MNP in Nov 1945; president of Kesatuan 
Melayu Singapore 1947-1951; elected to the first Legislative Council, Singapore, 1948-1951; president of 
UMNO Youth, 1951; federal minister, 1956--1972. 
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114 CO 537/2174, no 2 17 Feb 1947 
[UMNO's reactions to federation proposals]: letter from Dato Onn bin 
Jaafar to Sir E Gent 
As promised I enclose herewith two copies of the amendments to the Draft 
Federation Agreement passed by the General Assembly of the U.M.N.O. at its Alor 
Star Meeting in January .1 
You have kindly agreed to meet my Committee on the 23rd and I trust you can let 
me know the time most suitable to you in order to discuss the amendments with you. 
Regarding the Federation Proposals, Malay opinion is getting extremely restive 
and highly suspicious of the motives and sincerity of the British Government. I do 
not blame them either. 
As I said the British Government must choose now between Malay support and 
co-operation or sacrificing them to political expediency. 
You will remember asking me whether there was any possibility of the U.M.N.O . . 
and the M.N .P. getting together. My reply was not at the moment but the future 
trend of Malay action will depend entirely on the outcome of the Proposals which 
U.M.N.O. has accepted in principle. 
Undue pandering to elements who do not conform to the conception of Federal 
citizens or to any attempts to further minimise the legitimate rights and the special 
position of the Malays will have disastrous repercussions. 
I cannot conceal from you that the Malays will undoubtedly swing wide into a 
coalition with parties definitely anti-British if only because of frustration and despair 
at British hypocrisy. 
I shall speak frankly and freely when we meet on the 23rd. 
1 See 113. 
115 CO 537/2141, no 28 22 Feb 1947 
[Constitutional proposals]: report by Mr Thomas on his visit to 
Malaya, 9-16 Feb 1947 [Extract] 
Minute by H T Bourdillon 
[Ivor Bulmer-Thomas, who was first a Labour MP, 1942-1948 and then a Conservative 
MP, 1949-195.0, was briefly parli~mentary under-secretary for' the colonies, succeeding 
Creech Jones m Oct 1946 and bemg succeeded by Rees-Williams later in 1947. Thomas 
visited Malaya on his way back from the South Seas Conference in Canberra.) 
6. Constitutional proposals. There is great interest in the constitutional ques-
tion, and it would be perilous to underestimate the immense advance in political 
consciousness which has taken place in Malaya since the outbreak of war. The Malays 
are, of course far behind the other communities in their political training, but even 
the Malays are being swept by big changes; the small Communist-ridden Malay 
Nationalist Party is the only section which openly proclaims its solidarity with the 
events in Dutch Indonesia, but the more representative U.M.N.O. is also influenced, 
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both directly and because it cannot afford to see the M.N.P. steal its thunder. It is 
particularly significant that a women's section of U.M.N.O. is being encouraged, and 
we may expect to see the Malays move rapidly towards the full form of western 
democracy. But they have not got there yet, and it must be admitted that to attempt 
to give Malays full self-government within the next five years would probably mean 
the rule of the Malays by the Chinese. The Chinese are exceedingly industrious, 
prolific and able, but in few cases do they acknowledge Malaya as their "permanent 
home and the object of their loyalty". It is disturbing to see the Chinese flag flying 
over Chinese schools and a portrait of Sun Yat-sen1 as the principal object of 
veneration within them. For a long time to come the Chinese will undoubtedly have 
this dual loyalty-if indeed they feel any loyalty to Malaya. A friend who was born in 
China and has lived for twenty years in Malaya writes to me: "I am absolutely sure 
that the Chinese Government and the Triad Group (which has been and usually can 
be considered as anti-Chinese Government) both wish and intend the rich land of 
Malaya to leave the British Commonwealth and to be available for them to squeeze 
dry. If Malaya does become part of China we will have betrayed the Malays who 
trusted us. The Chinese-all-in their hearts of hearts believe that they are the only 
civilized people and the rest of the people of the world are barbarians. Some Chinese 
have settled here and become real Malayans. They have attended our schools, but 
they are a small minority. We have subsidized and permitted the Chinese schools 
teaching Chinese language and the Chinese ideas that China is the only civilised 
land. The Chinese who have settled here amongst the other inhabitants are not 
resented, but the Chinese who have formed tight Chinese colonies where no-one 
dare report any illegality to our police are very dangerous and are rightly and 
strongly resented and hated by the Malays." The Indians, like the Chinese, have this 
loyalty to a land outside Malaya. Mr. John Thivy spoke most reasonably to Mr. 
MacDonald and myself about the possibilities of co-operation with the Malays, but 
Malayan leaders, such as Dato Onn, distrust him and consider that his change of 
tactics is on recent instructions from [the Indian National] Congress. If the Indians 
achieve a unitary Government it is likely to be one which will make the protection of 
its oversea Indians a primary concern, and where more naturally than in Malaya? 
Nevertheless, it is impossible not to be gratified at the extent to which the different 
communities in Malaya get on with each other. There is no immediate likelihood of 
communal disturbances such as mar the peace of India itself, though with growing 
political consciousness this cannot be ruled out. The Eurasians would like to align 
themselves politically with the Europeans, and it would be good tactics to encourage 
them to regard themselves as Europeans; the only noteworthy exception is Mr. John 
Eber,2 secretary of the Pan-Malayan Council of Joint Action, but his political views 
are disowned by the other members of the community. 
7. Full self-government being not immediately practicable, the field is held at the 
present time by the proposals of the Working Committee on which the Consultative 
1 Sun Yat-sen (1866-1925) Chinese revolutionary politician and founder of the Kuomintang. 
2 John Eber, a Eurasian lawyer who was interned during the Japanese occupation, campaigned vigorously 
for the social democratic objects of the Singapore-based Malayan Democratic Union and the PMCJA. In 
1951 he was detained under Emergency Regulations and after his release went to England where he helped 
edit Malayan Monitor, which claimed to be the organ of the PUTERA-AMCJA (Malayan People's United 
Front) and regularly published MCP documents. He later became general-secretary of Fenner Brockway's 
'Movement for Colonial Freedom'. 
, , 
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Committee is now prepared to hear expressions of opinion. There has been some 
tendency to boycott the Consultative Committee, but the tendency is breaking down, 
and evidence is beginning to be offered. Dato Onn told me that the Working 
Committee's proposals were the limit to which the U.M.N.O. was prepared to go; Mr. 
Thivy told us that the Indians were not prepared to accept them without modifica-
tions, more particularly with regard to the length of residence and the language tests 
of citizenship. These may appear to be irreconcilable standpoints, but it became clear 
to me that we shall never win support from all the communities to any set of 
proposals. The best we can hope for is that when we put forWard our proposals we 
shall secure sufficient acquiescence to carry them, and I believe .we could probably 
get this acquiescence on the basis of the Working Committee's proposals. I used all 
my endeavours to persuade the various communities not to be too precise about 
details, but to accept any proposals which gave Malaya a reasonably satisfactory 
constitution, knowing that modifications could be made later; I found a [sic] 
acceptance for this point of view, although there was some scepticism about the 
possibility of later modifications. 
8. Nevertheless, I am persuaded myself that on merits two big changes should be 
made in the Working Committee's proposals. 
(a) Singapore. The separation of Singapore from Malaya was strongly denounced 
by many with whom I spoke and it was admitted by all that eventually it must be 
included in the Federation. I presumed at first that there must be a military reason 
for the separation, but this does not appear to have been suggested. The argument 
that it is the different character of Singapore's trade convinces one, and in any case 
the trade of Singapore is not fundamentally different from that of Penang. The real 
reason is presumably the predominantly Chinese character of the population of 
Singapore; but I am bound to record that in my talks with Malays no-one 
suggested that Singapore must be excluded. This is not conclusive evidence, as I 
did not raise the subject myself, not wishing to put ideas into the heads of the 
Malays, but if there had been any real hostility to the inclusion of Singapore I 
should have expected to have heard of it. As it is inevitable that some day 
Singapore must be brought into the Federation, I suggest it should be done at 
once. Otherwise the exclusion of Singapore will be a source of controversy until it 
is brought in. The exclusion of Singapore from the Working Committee's 
proposals may, however, turn out to be advantageous, as it will probably be 
necessary to make some concessions to the Chinese, and the inclusion of 
Singapore is the least harmful concession. To resort to metaphor, I regard 
Singapore as a card up our sleeve. If it is brought into the Federation it should, of 
course, have its own Settlement Council like Penang, and it might be advan-
tageous for this Council to assume also the local government work now done by 
the Municipal Commissioners and the Rural Board. It would be a by-product of 
these proposals that the present plethora of the apparatus of government in Malaya 
would be reduced. Malaya is acknowledged by all, including the Governors, to be 
much over-governed at present. The presence of a Governor-General and two 
Governors, not to mention a Special Commissioner, though all are personally 
esteemed, is puzzling to the public and inevitably leads to administrative delays 
when pan-Malayan action is required. I do not, of course, imply any criticism of 
the Governor-General, the Governors and their staffs, for whose work I formed the 
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highest admiration, and I believe they would themselves endorse what I have said. 
(b) Elections. I found much criticism that the Working Committee's proposals 
make no provision for elections. "What advance is this on what we had before the 
war?", I was asked, and it is not a satisfactory answer to say that the elections 
would now be over a wider area. It has always been the weakness of British policy 
to do the right thing too late, and I am certain that we shall fail to do justice to the 
immense political advancement in Malaya if we do not make provision for 
elections both to the Federal Legislature and to the State Councils. It may prove to 
be impracticable to get a satisfactory register by the time the new Constitution is 
brought into force, but if this is the case the constitutional proposals should lay 
down a date not very far distant when elections will take place; Article 69 of the 
Draft Federation Agreement is not nearly precise enough to meet the point. 
I am convinced that it is necessary to bring the new Constitution into effect at 
an early date as the uncertainty is hindering many developments. 
I therefore recommend that definite constitutional proposals should be formulated 
by His Majesty's Government this summer and should be based on the Working 
Committee's report but should make provision for the incorporation of Singapore in 
the Federation with a Settlement Council and should make provision for elections 
both to the Federal Legislature and to the State Councils before a definite date 
within the next few years . ... 
Minute on 115 
... Mr. Thomas has made two recommendations. First, he has proposed that there 
should be a much more definite statement about the early introduction of elections, 
both in the Central Legislature and in the Councils of State, than is contained in the 
Federation proposals. This seems to me to be a very important suggestion, 
particularly since Mr. Thomas has found considerable local feeling on the subject, 
but for the moment we can only bear it in mind. Secondly, he has pleaded for the 
very early inclusion of Singapore in the Federation. I think this recommendation 
demands further consideration at once. The point is, of course, not a new one. It was 
first put to us by the Governor-General in a letter to Sir G. Cater dated 13th 
September last (13 on 50823/40/46). At that time Mr. MacDonald was very worried by 
the lack of administrative co-ordination between the Governments of Singapore and 
the Malayan Union. He felt that proper co-ordination was unattainable so long as the 
two Governments remained separate, and therefore expressed the view that fusion 
would prove necessary at a much earlier date than had previously been envisaged. 
The immediate context was the establishment of the Singapore Legislative Council. 
Mr. MacDonald feared that the setting up of a separate Legislature for Singapore, on 
however sound and progressive lines, would be likely to render fusion more difficult. 
Our feeling here was that we could not interfere with this particular development, 
though at the same time we were impressed by the arguments in favour of early 
amalgamation. The Governor-General was informed accordingly in No. 14 on 
50823/40/46. The matter was carried further with him during his visit to the U.K. at 
the beginning of this year, by which time the Pan-Malayan Council of Joint Action 
had already come forward with "fusion" as one of the principal planks in its platform. 
It was agreed on the one hand that the establishment of the Singapore Legislative 
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Council and the introduction of the revised Constitution for the Malayan Union must 
be allowed to go through; but on the other hand it was also agreed that as soon as 
these events had taken place, there would be great advantage in H.M.G. making it 
clear that they were sympathetic towards, and in earnest about the fusion of the two 
territories as soon as possible thereafter. Mr. MacDonald's actual suggestion was that 
a joint "Working Committee" consisting of representatives of both territories, might 
be set up at an early date to study the problem, and that a public announcement to 
this effect might accompany H.M.G.'s final approval of the revised Malayan Union 
Constitution. It was left that we might expect a telegram with firm proposals to this 
end after MacDonald's return to Malaya, but hitherto no such telegram has arrived. 
We know from Item 8 of the Governor-General's Conference at Penang on January 
19th (1 on 52738/1/47)3 that he indeed discussed the matter with the two Governors 
on his return, that both Governors were sympathetic (Sir E. Gent, I think, 
unexpectedly so), and that a telegram was to be drafted. But there have been no 
further developments. 
Mr. Ivor Thomas appears to envisage the incorporation of Singapore in the 
Malayan Federation from the outset. I still feel that we must first allow the present 
constitutional developments in the two territories to reach finality, since by 
disturbing them we stand to lose more than we should gain, but I think that Mr. 
Thomas's remarks strongly emphasise the desirability of the procedure outlined in 
the previous paragraph. The arguments in favour of the early inclusion of Singapore 
in the Federation are as follows :-
(a) Political. This has been one of the fundamental and common features of all the 
local criticisms of the Federation proposals. See for instance No. 17 on 52243/2/47, 
which denounces the separation of Singapore in the strongest terms. To judge 
from Mr. Ivor Thomas's experience while in Malaya, from Sir E. Gent's attitude at 
the Governor-General's Conference and from the fact that Mr. Roland Braddell, 
Legal Adviser to U.M.N.O., is also a supporter of "fusion", it does not appear, after 
all, that the Malays are achames4 on the subject. Here, then, we are surely 
presented with an opportunity of showing, without antagonising Malay opinion, 
that H.M.G. have paid heed to criticisms of the present Constitutional scheme. 
(b) Administrative. I can find no evidence that administrative co-ordination 
between the two Governments is markedly better than it was. On the contrary, we 
have had two very recent instances of the Governments pulling apart on vital 
matters-Societies Legislation and policy towards the General Labour Union. If, as 
I am convinced, we cannot lay the blame for this on either of the two Governors, 
we can only lay it on the system itself. I know from personal conversation that Sir 
R. Hone feels strongly that the system does not and cannot work. With two 
territories as intimately connected as these, the somewhat vague "co-ordinating" 
powers of the Governor-General are not enough. The Governor-General usually 
only gets to hear of the trouble (I am quoting Sir R. Hone) when it has already 
been clogging the wheels for several months. 
(c) Financial. It is hard to be specific on this point, but it has been said on good 
authority that Singapore cannot stand financially on its own feet. At the very least, 
the maintenance of two actively separate machines of Government is a waste of 
money. 
3 See 112. 4 ie furious. 
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For all these reasons, then, but principally for the first, I think we need to consider 
the inclusion of Singapore in the Federation very seriously at the same time as we 
consider Sir E. Gent's recommendations on the Federation proposals.5 We have none 
too much time, and I suggest we might send a brief personal telegram from Sir T. 
Lloyd to the Governor-General on the lines of the second draft submitted herewith. 6 
H.T.B. 
8.3.47 
5 While in favour of fusion, Bourdillon's seniors stressed that timing and local advice were all important. 
When Creech Jones raised the matter with the prime minister he agreed that the priority was to clear up 
the Malayan problem before embarking on merger. CO 537/2141, minute by Creech Jones, 18 Mar 1947. 
6 Not printed. 
116 CO 537/2151, no 1 24 Feb 1947 
[Malay extremism and API]: despatch no 1 from SirE Gent to Mr 
Creech Jones 
[The government's concern about Malay extremism and its connections with the 
Indonesian revolution focused upon Ahmad Boestamam's API. Boestamam's Testament 
Politik API led to his conviction on a charge of sedition in April1947. Having paid the fine 
he resumed the leadership of API which was proscribed on 17 July 1947 (see also 94, note 
2).] 
I have the honour to forward for your information a list of the resolutions passed at 
the first congress of the Angkatan Pemuda Insaaf (API) held on the 22nd, 23rd and 
24th December, 1946, at Malacca and attended by 70 delegates from all States in 
Malaya. 
1. The API demands a democratic government of the people and an open 
declaration of the sovereignty of the Malay people. 
2. The API demands that the Malay Regiment should replace the present British 
and Indian soldiers in Malaya. 
2. The API demands that the open door policy in Malaya should be abolished. 
4. The API demands the quitting of all Dutch forces in Malaya. 
5. Japanese prisoners of war should be repatriated. 
6. The API supports the Indonesian struggle for independence. 
7. The API will contact the Federation of Democratic Youth. 
2. The Angkatan Pemuda Insaaf, an organisation confined to Malays, first came to 
notice in February, 1946, when the SUARA RAYAT (Voice of the People) of lpoh 
announced its information and appealed for members. The announcement stated 
that at a meeting at the Malay Nationalist Party Headquarters it had been decided to 
inaugurate an "entirely new movement", and published the following particulars:-
Name. Angkatan Pemuda Insaaf. Literally, the name means "Youth Movement for 
Justice". What is possibly more to the point and is certainly easier to mouth, is 
that "API", formed by its initials, means in the Malay language "Fire" or "Flame" 
and may be presumed to describe the ardent nationalism which its organisers hope 
to inspire in their recruits. 
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Establishment. A branch of the Malay Nationalist Party. 
Policy. Nationalisation based on self-determination. 
Objects. (i) To organise patriotic youth in a united front. 
(ii) To promote and develop patriotism. 
(iii) To give training in politics, culture and religion. 
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(iv) To rebuild and develop Malaya in line with the true democratic 
principles on the basis of the People's Right. Membership to be open to 
youths between the ages of 18 and 35, preference being given to 
members of the Malay Nationalist Party and those with previous 
military training. 
The financial resources of the organisation are believed to be considerable and to 
have been contributed in part by ex-members of the Indian National Army, including 
Sikhs, and by extreme leftist sections of the Chinese Communist Party. 
3. The present policy of A.P.I. as set out in a brochure entitled "A.P.I's 
POLITICAL TESTAMENT" distributed by the API congress at Malacca on the 
22nd-24th December 1946 is said to be as follows:-
(a) To unite and organise all awakened youths. 
(b) To strengthen the fighting front of the nation and motherland. 
(c) To give training, political, physical and spiritual, to its youths in order that 
they may be prepared to lead whenever required. 
(d) To build Malaya on democratic lines. 
(e) To obtain the right of representation in the Malayan Government. 
In the same pamphlet it is declared that API will struggle for the achievement of 
na.tional independence by all available means- gently if possible but by force if 
necessary. In this connection it is interesting to note that in addition to the objects 
quoted above a sixth has also been clearly stated, namely, the training of men to 
assist the Indonesians in their struggle for independence in order to obtain help from 
Indonesia to secure independence in this country at a later date. This is in keeping 
with API's "Asia for the Asiatics" objective inherited from the Japanese. API sees two 
ways open to it:-
(1) revolution 
(2) evolution 
API has confidence only in the first way. The ideology of API is set forth under three 
headings:-
(1) Political. API is directed towards the founding of an independent state based 
on true democracy. 
(2) Economic. API wants a planned economy not for the benefit of one or two 
sections of the people but for the masses. "A planned economy cannot possibly be 
set up in a state where imperialism is still predominant or when the governing 
power is not in our hands." 
(3) Social. API wants social justice in which there shall be complete absence of 
social discrimination between one section of the people and another. At present a 
disorganised society is responsible for the existence of at least two prominent 
classes of people, namely the capitalists and proletariat. 
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API's preparations for the achievement of independence are divided into two, internal 
and external. Internal training to fit youths for the responsibilities of leadership 
when the present leaders have gone includes the development of patriotism, political 
science and economics, and training in gymnastics, drill, sports and warfare. In fact, 
API's most obvious and disturbing public activity is reported to be the holding of 
public parades at which drilling in military formation is practised. External training 
is directed towards the formation of relationships with similar organisations outside 
the country. API declares that it will affiliate with the World Federation of 
Democratic Youth. In keeping with the military nature of API's internal training was 
the proposal put forward at API's Malacca congress that "every member of API must 
maintain in a condition of readiness weapons such as sharpened bamboos, parangs 
and krises", and a report from Malacca states that 30 youths, seen going to the 
training area, were armed with sharpened bamboo poles. 
4. The present President of the Organisation is AHMAD BOESTAMEN, an 
Indonesian whose real name is ABDULLA SANI bin RAJA KECHIL. He was born in 
Perak but is of Sumatran origin. He is well educated in Malay and English and has 
had journalistic experience. During the Japanese campaign in Malaya he was arrested 
as a suspected Fifth Columnist but was released when the Japanese entered 
Singapore. During the Japanese occupation he attended the school founded for the 
training of Malay officers in military propaganda. In fact, most of the leading figures 
in API, as in the Malay Nationalist Party, were notably pro-Japanese during the 
occupation. 
5. At the celebration of the first anniversary of the Malay Nationalist Party at 
Kuala Lumpur on the 17th October, 1946, Ahmad Boestamen announced that API 
had been in existence for 8 months and that its members were prepared to sacrifice 
their lives and liberty in the cause of freedom. API believed that independence could 
not be gained without bloodshed but the day for this had not yet arrived. Imperialism 
would not be tolerated and independence was possible only through revolution. Our 
national cry is 'merdeka' (independence), the API cry is 'darah' (blood)". API in fact is 
primarily an Indonesian sponsored organisation, with Malay Nationalist Party and 
Malayan Communist Party backing, and strong affiliations with the Indonesian 
Youth Movements in Java and Sumatra. The present strength of the organisation is 
said to be some 2,500 men, most of whom appear to belong to Perak, Malacca and 
Pahang. The latest information indicates that API is strong in all States except Perlis, 
Trengganu and Johore but the type of follower it succeeds in attracting is more 
frequently than not the unemployed loafer between the ages of 18 and 30. Boestamen 
has emphasised that a huge membership is not required and claims that 5,000 
persons were enough to make the revolution in Ireland a success. Similarly, it is 
stated, Lenin had only about 6,000 members of the Communist Party to support him 
in revolution against the Czar of Russia. In "API's Political Testament" it is stated 
that API intends to support the Representative Assembly of All Asiatic Races proposed 
recently by Pandit Nehru, which is taken to be an allusion to the Inter-Asian 
Congress to be held at Delhi in March, 1947. 
6. An assessment of API would not be complete without reference to the support 
it received from the parallel women's organisation known as Angkatan Wanita Sedar 
(Women's Progressive Corps) whose membership is said to number some 600 Malay 
women and whose aims are reported to be as follows:-
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(1) To unite all Malay women for Malaya's independence. 
(2) The abolition of conservative customs regarding the social position of Malay 
women. 
(3) The abolition of forced marriage. 
(4) The support of API. 
(5) The formation of Red Cross Units. 
There can be no doubt that extremism amongst the young men of API is encouraged 
by such speeches as that made by the leader of the AWS when she declared that 
youths "should not die in their beds but must die in the battle for Malaya's freedom". 
The joint purpose of the Angkatan Wanita Sedar and API has been symbolised 
recently by a marriage between their respective leaders. 
7. Another disturbing feature of API's activities that has just come to light is the 
penetration of its propaganda into the schools. Reports from Malacca and Johore 
indicate that some Malay school teachers are spreading the gospel of API amongst 
their pupils, and school children who succumb to the influence of API are known as 
"semut api" or "fire ants." In Perak, the symbol is preserved by the designation "bara" 
which means "hot cinders". It is noteworthy that the influence exerted by API on 
Malay vernacular school teachers has been facilitated by the wide following amongst 
them commanded by the Malay Nationalist Party. I am considering the proper form 
of deterrent action that should be taken to restrain such extra-curricular activities on 
the part of school teachers paid by Government. 
8. There is reason to believe that Boestamen and his extremist policy is proving 
an embarrassment to the more moderate Malay Nationalist Party leaders and this 
belief is strengthened by the decision that API should hold a separate congress, at 
which a member of the Malay Nationalist Party pointed out that API is no longer 
under the control of MNP. Boestamen also declared that API would watch the course 
of the MNP closely and break away completely "if 11ecessary". By the words "if 
necessary" Boestamen clearly means if MNP is too moderate. This breach between 
API and its parent body is in keeping with recent suggestions that UMNO, which 
represents moderate Malay opinion, and MNP are coming closer together. Apart from 
political differences, however, a consideration which is likely to weigh heavily with 
MNP is that, in the event of a rapproachement with UMNO, the Party would lose the 
financial support which it is said to be receiving at present from certain sections of 
the Chinese. 
9. While API undoubtedly owes much of what vitality it has to the legacy of the 
Japanese occupation and to infection with the political ferment in the Netherlands 
East Indies, it is fortunately true that until now it has been more remarkable for the 
fire-eating, and at times allegedly subversive, speeches of its leader Boestamen than 
for any positive political activities, but as there are features of its avowed programme 
which suggest that it contains an element which in certain circumstances might be 
provocative to other communities and prejudicial to the well-being and security of 
society, I am considering what measures, such as the banning of political uniforms, 
might properly be taken to discourage its more irresponsible tendencies. 
10. I am sending copies of this despatch to the Governor-General and the 
Governor of Singapore. 
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117 CO 537/2166, ff 8-12 11 Mar 1947 
'The labour problem': minute 3 of the 6th governor-general's confer-
ence in Singapore on 11 March [Extract] 
[The MCP fomented labour unrest through the General Labour Union. There had been a 
twenty-four-hour general strike at the end of Jan 1946. A second general strike set for 15 
Feb 1946, the anniversary of the British surrender to the Japanese, had been thwarted by 
a show of force. From Feb 1947 violence, intimidation and lawlessness was increasingly 
reported in mines, on estates and in labour relations elsewhere; riots in Kedah were a 
notable instance.) 
At this stage of the meeting, Mr. J.A. Brazier, 1 Trades Union Adviser, and Mr. R.P. 
Bingham, 2 Commissioner for Labour were present. 
The Governor-General said this was a most important question and it was 
necessary to keep the position constantly under review. A situation had now arisen in 
regard to the action required in relation to strikes. The Governor of Singapore had 
sent a telegram to the Secretary of State in which:-
1. he said the F.T.U. would not be registered in Singapore; 
2. he asked for freedom of action in the use of the Banishment Ordinance in cases 
where he considered it necessary; 
3. he proposed in the case of banishment to publish simultaneously a general 
statement on the Government's labour policy with a view to gaining the support of 
the public. 
The Governor of the Malayan Union, on the other hand, had sent a telegram to the 
Secretary of State in which he had stated:-
1. that action had not been taken in the Malayan Union to refuse registration to 
the F.T.U. nor was it intended to do so; 
2. he did not consider banishment by itself a complete answer to the problem. It 
might exacerbate the situation. 
The Governor of the Malayan Union said that if it were made impossible for the 
F.T.U. to register as a lawful body, we thereby forced them into the position of 
becoming a lawless body and subject to banishment. 
The Governor-General then suggested that the discussion should be split into 
three component parts:-
(a) The question of banishment. 
(b) The question of F.T.U. registration. 
(c) Other necessary action to deal with the situation. 
He considered the best way to start would be to examine the Governor of Singapore's 
proposal to the Secretary of State that he should be given authority to banish without 
further reference to the Secretary of State, rather than detain intended banishees 
while awaiting confirmation from the Secretary of State. 
1 J A Brazier, trade union adviser, Malaya, 1946-1956. 
2 R p Bingham, entered MCS, 1926; interned, 1942-1945; commissioner for labour, Singapore, 1946-
1951; secretary for Chinese affairs, Malaya, 1951-1952; resident commissioner, Penang, 1952-1958. 
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The Governor of Singapore said that banishment was a common feature of the 
administration before the war and the public were unable to understand why it had 
now been discontinued. The particular persons concerned were nearly all non-
British subjects whose loyalties lie elsewhere and they were preventing the growth of 
healthy trade unionism. They were also suspected to be members of a Branch of the 
Communist Party and therefore opposed to democratic policy of Government. 
The Governor-General said he had an open mind regarding the registration of the 
F.T.U. but considered that Singapore's proposals regarding banishment were 
absolutely essential in Singapore even if not in the Malayan Union. The Governor 
might not have to act but if action was taken it must be immediate without any 
reference to London. It was necessary to try to persuade the Secretary of State to let 
Singapore have that authority, whether it was used or not. Everything that he had 
heard lately confirmed this view. 
The Governor of Singapore said that if this is not approved it might lead to the 
wholesale resignation of his Advisory Council. 
The Governor-General said that as an interesting side-light on this matter, he had 
had a talk with United Kingdom and American pressmen a week ago, and they were 
quite unable to understand why the weapon of banishment was not used. The "News 
Chronicle" correspondent and Tiltman of the "Daily Herald"-both very Leftist 
papers-said exactly the same thing and the latter had warned his paper privately 
that a very dangerous position was arising here. He said that he was convinced that 
without banishment we could not get to the root of the trouble. 
The Governor of the Malayan Union said that the terms of the Singapore telegram 
were that G.L.U. leaders as such should be liable to banishment. He said the Malayan 
Union already had powers to banish criminals, such as extortioners, intimidators 
etc., but he did not agree with the request for the Secretary of State's approval that 
G.L.U. leaders as such should be liable to banishment for organizing strikes. 
Banishment was a very serious penalty and one which was outside any appeal to the 
Courts, and mere membership of the G.L.U. or participation in strikes was no 
justification. 
The Governor-General replied that it would be made clear that intimidation was 
involved. 
The Chief Secretary, Malayan Union, said that powers were already given to 
banish criminal intimidators. 
The Governor-General asked if all the intended banishees in Singapore fell within 
that qualification. He said it was not necessary to say with which Society they were 
associated, but merely that they were associated with an intimidating section within 
a Society. 
The Governor of the Malayan Union said that when we have a show-down we must 
be sure that we deal with the chief figures and have a cast iron case. It might well 
cause a general strike and questions in Parliament. A statement would have to be 
given as to the grounds on which the man is banished and which gang he belonged to 
etc. 
The Governor-General said he would have thought it would suffice to say that 
inside some trade union organizations in Singapore there were some sections going 
in for a policy of intimidation, and that Government was satisfied that the men 
concerned were members of these sections. 
The Governor of the Malayan Union thought that we should have an enquiry on 
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the responsibility of the particular individuals and not a general allegation against a 
large and powerful labour organization. 
The Governor-General said he would not mind that if action had already been 
taken. Although there would be questions and some uneasiness in the House of 
Commons, the Secretary of State would have the large support of the evidence of a 
number of press correspondents who had been in this part of the world and from 
whom news was infiltrating to newspapers of all shades of political opinion in 
London. In Singapore, the public were so ready to back this action that we should 
have an overwhelming body of opinion, including labour opinion, supporting the 
Government. The public here were not so ready to question things as they were in 
Britain, and the risk of awkward questions in London was far less than the risk of a 
disastrous state of affairs here. He asked whether he was right in supposing that all 
the intended banishees were known to be associated with the intimidation school of 
thought. 
The Colonial Secretary said there was evidence that the people concerned were 
responsible for intimidation. If they could be picked up they could be banished. If the 
body could be proved to be responsible for initimidating labour then the leaders 
could be banished as being actively concerned and responsible for the intimidation 
going on now. 
The Governor-General then asked Mr. Brazier for his opinion. 
Mr. Brazier said it was the policy of His Majesty's Government to assist in the 
development of democratic Trade Unionism in Malaya. He said he had been directed 
to give certain ideas to the members themselves. He was not concerned whether an 
individual was anti-government or not. He had tried to build up the idea of Trade 
Unionism on a democratic basis, he had concentrated on compulsory registration 
and there had never been any complaints about this. Mr. Brazier went on to say that 
if he was to give his advice now, he must first give a little of the background and 
history of his work during the past sixteen months as Trade Union Adviser. Up till the 
February, 1946, incident, in which Mr. Brazier said he was actively concerned, 
undoubtedly labour was being organized by the Communist Party as a political 
weapon. He saw nothing wrong with that, and was not surprised, but he did wish to 
know what was the purpose behind it. If there was any restriction on the right of free 
association in this country, it was from Communist controlled associations in this 
country. He said he had expected it but in Singapore during the first six or seven 
months, he had carried out his policy with a degree of success. 
His policy had been to insulate certain key industries and employees of Public 
Services, but the G.L.U's next step was infiltration and this was quite cleverly done. 
The position in Singapore now was worse then in February 1946, as everything now 
was under the control of the G.L.U. That was not the case in the Malayan Union since 
the G.L.U. infiltrated there only in July 1946. In the Malayan Union he had carried 
out the same policy as in Singapore concentrating on large Unions such as the 
Railways etc., since the country was too large for him to tackle small units. The time 
had now come when the Trade Unions were asking for protection from the G.L.U. 
who were block voting at their meetings and generally interfering. The positions in 
Singapore and Malayan Union were not yet comparable, though it is the policy of the 
Communist Party to control directly or indirectly all labour in this country in order 
to embarrass Government. He said it was clear to him now that in Singapore the 
ground was impossible even for him to work on. His problem now was to stop things 
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happening in the Malayan Union as they had in Singapore. He knew of the list of 21 
'bad hats' and what they were working for. Singapore labour is controlled by the 
Communist Party and firm action was required since it would be unwise to 
under-estimate the Communist organization. These particular men on the list are 
the small-fry and it would be very difficult to get the big ones. They know now that 
Government is going to get tough. In the last six weeks there have been deliberate 
attempts to resist arbitration etc., Most of these 21 men have anticipated banishment 
and were probably now in the Malayan Union. 
Mr. Brazier went on to say that he had inside information that the Singapore 
F.T.U. was going out of existence as they now have full control anyhow and the 
organization was going to be run in the future from Kuala Lumpur. The P.M.F.T.U. 
office was now in K.L. He was already getting complaints from Trade Unions in the 
Malayan Union, such as the Electrical Union and the Railway Union, both good 
Unions, which are being rapidly undermined by the Selangor F.T.U. The problem 
now was what could be done apart from banishment. The first period had been one of 
experiment, registration was now over and we should soon know how many Unions 
wanted to be registered. The policy agreed in the Malayan Union and in principle in 
Singapore was that we must have an effective inspectorate to see that the provisions 
of the Trade Union Legislation are complied with. Obviously the G.L.U. would not 
agree that Mr. Brazier himself was a proper person to advise on the democratic forms 
of Trade Unionism, but all these Trade Unions have got to be trained in the 
provisions of the Trade Union Legislation and how to comply with their own rules 
and regulations. He felt sure that there were a number of Trade Union officials who 
would attend week-end schools, but he would require one or two extra officers to 
help him. Sooner or later, the Trade Unions would develop and it was essential to 
avoid the mistakes made in Ceylon and the West Indian Colonies which had tried to 
keep the Trade Unions working in a political vacuum. The Trade Unions required our 
protection and he said that he would be quite ruthless in regard to banishment of 
dangerous and subversive elements from Singapore, but in the Malayan Union he 
considered that he would be able to stop the rot. 
In the Malayan Union it was considered that by bringing in a Gazette Notification 
as to how much can be subscribed by way of affiliation fees and by restricting 
unlawful expenditure, we should be able to exercise control. These affiliation fees 
should be limited and should not come out of T.U. Provident funds. The F.T.U. must 
also be compelled to register or take the consequences. It was too late to do this in 
Singapore, where in any case he thought the F.T.U. would shortly be out of 
existence. The Singapore F.T.U. got a lot of their money from levies on shop-keepers 
apart from affiliation fees . 
Mr. Brazier stressed that the problems of Singapore and the Malayan Union should 
be treated separately ... . 
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118 CAB 2111955, F 615116151161 (enclosure) 12 Apr 1947 
'South-East Asia: work of the Special Commission during 1946': 
despatch no 119 from Lord Killearn to Mr Bevin 
[Killearn's despatch, received on 6 May, was later printed by the FO for 'secret' 
circulation.) 
Establishment of the Special Commission 
I arrived in Singapore on 16th March, 1946, to take up the newly created post of 
Special Commissioner in South-East Asia. Mr. Scott1 and Mr. Empson2 accompanied 
me as political and economic advisers. Mr. Wright3 joined me as my deputy on 13th 
April. 
2. Among the reasons which led to the appointment of the mission were the 
following. Before the war no adequate regional machinery existed for co-ordination 
between British service and civilian authorities in South-East Asia or for local 
consideration of British interests throughout the area as a whole. The appointment 
of Viscount Mountbatten as Supreme Allied Commander, South-East Asia, more 
than filled this deficiency so long as his command remained in existence. But the 
South-East Asia Command was already preparing for its termination at the end of 
1946. Some alternative was necessary unless there was to be merely a return to the 
pre-war system of watertight compartments, which had proved inadequate to meet 
the strain of war. At the same time South-East Asia was threatened with imminent 
famine owing to the scarcity of supplies of food, in particular of rice, and of the 
difficulty of re-establishing methods of distribution. For this reason also co-
ordinating machinery was required. A further task laid upon the mission was the 
furnishing of political advice to the Supreme Allied Commander during the last 
phase of his work. 
3. Simultaneously it was decided to appoint a Governor-General, who would be 
concerned with the general supervision and co-ordination of policy in Malaya and the 
British Borneo territories. 
Directives of the special commissioner 
4. The directives of the Special Commissioner were in general terms to advise His 
Majesty's Government and the local colonial Governments on problems concerned 
with Foreign Affairs in South-East Asia; to take all possible steps for the alleviation of 
the food crisis by the increase of food production in producing areas, and the final 
distribution to deficit areas of the food produced; and to examine the co-ordination of 
economic machinery in the area. 
5. For this purpose the term "South-East Asia" was defined as comprising Burma, 
Ceylon, Malaya, Borneo, French Indo-China, Siam, Netherlands East Indies and 
Hong Kong; with close liaison with the Government of India, and the maintenance of 
close contact with Dominion representatives at Singapore and with the United 
1 Released from internment, Robert H Scott served on Kill earn's staff until 1948 when he was transferred 
to the FO. 
2 Charles Empson, minister (economic) Special Commission in SE Asia, 1946-1947; previously commer-
cial counsellor, Cairo, 1939-1946. 
3 Michael Wright, Special Commission SE Asia, 1946-1947; previously served in Cairo, 1940-1943, and 
Washington, 19H-1946. 
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Kingdom High Commissioners in Australia and New Zealand. 
6. The Special Commissioner was, therefore, entrusted with wide responsibili-
ties, but with no executive authority. 
Co-operation with the governor-general and with the services 
7. In my despatch No. 32 of 25th January, 1947, I tried to express something of 
my appreciation and gratitude for the help and encouragement given to the mission 
by Viscount Mountbatten and his staff. During the period of military administration 
in South-East Asia the political and economic reconstruction of the area had been 
started under his direction. Without the knowledge and experience of himself and of 
his staff, and without their unfailing and generous assistance, the problems 
encountered by the mission at the outset would have proved insurmountable. 
8. I wish here to express my equally warm appreciation and gratitude to the 
Governor-General. Progress inevitably depends upon day-to-day collaboration be-
tween the Governor-General, the services and the Special Commissioner. Mr. 
MacDonald's support has been unstinting. 
9. It was obvious that the necessary degree of co-operation could only be achieved 
if the offices of the respective authorities concerned and of their staffs were 
adjoining. Adjacent floors of the Cathay Building were accordingly secured for this 
purpose. So long as the Supreme Allied Command remained in being a system of 
joint and interlocking committees was devised, and the integration of the work of the 
Supreme Allied Command and of the Special Commissioner's Offices was developed 
to a high pitch. It was recognised that virtually every problem in South-East Asia had 
both a service and a civilian aspect, and they were treated accordingly. 
10. The Supreme Allied Commander, the Governor-General and the Special 
Commissioner all represented to London in the strongest terms the desirability of 
maintaining a Supreme Allied Commander in peace-time. This combined recom-
mendation was not, however, accepted. After the termination of the Supreme Allied 
Command the British Defence Committee in South-East Asia included the 
commanders-in-chief of the three services in addition to the Governor-General and 
the Special Commissioner. Under this main committee an attempt has been made to 
set up machinery which will minimise the formidable difficulties of maintaining 
co-ordination between the services and the civilian authorities, and of obtaining joint 
recommendations and decisions, after the reversion to the system of three separate 
and independent service commanders. A Joint Inter-Service Secretariat has been 
established which works side by side with the offices of the Governor-General and the 
Special Commissioner, and parallel machinery for the co-ordination of service and 
civilian intelligence has been established in the same building. The Joint Intelligence 
Committee, Far East, for which the Special Commissioner provides the chairman, 
meets once a fortnight. 
11. A Political Committee was also created, consisting of the Governor-General 
and the Special Commissioner, to consider all matters of common concern to both, 
and this committee has an economic sub-committee consisting of the Economic 
Adviser to the Governor-General and the Economic Counsellor to the Special 
Commissioner. 
Food 
12. I reported fully in my despatch No. 32 of 24th August, 1946, on the activities 
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of this mission as regards the food situation and the various measures taken to 
alleviate it up to the end of July 1946. The following paragraphs contain a 
recapitulation of the work accomplished during that period and a brief account of the 
main developments on the food front for the remainder of the year, on which I have 
reported separately in my despatches Nos. 53, 82 and 115 of 1946, and No. 35 of 
1947. 
13. On arrival in Singapore I found that I was expected to take over from the 
Supreme Commander the co-ordination of all economic functions hitherto exercised 
by him (distribution of food, transportation, coal supplies, economic intelligence, 
&c.), which he could not pass to any one individual Governor. Thanks to his 
co-operation and assistance we were able to do this without any major dislocation 
occurring, although staffing difficulties and accommodation problems hampered us 
in our work in the beginning stages. 
Short term 
14. My first preoccupation was to get to grips with the food situation in 
South-East Asia and to help in the fair distribution of rice supplies in this area in 
accordance with the allocations made by the Combined Food Board (later superseded 
by the International Emergency Food Council) in Washington. After three and a half 
years of enemy occupation and the dislocation caused to the food supplies of the 
whole area first by Japanese depredations and then finally by the suddenness of the 
enemy surrender, rice deficit territories in South-East Asia were on the brink of 
starvation. 
15. Of the rice exporting countries Burma had been fought over and ravaged for 
two years and the acreage under food cultivation had accordingly suffered very 
severely. French Indo-China was in a state of political upheaval strongly prejudicial 
to the production of rice. Siam alone had preserved her territory almost unscathed 
throughout the war; yet even in her case the peace terms imposed upon the Siamese 
Government, the cupidity of the Chinese rice merchants and other internal factors 
had an adverse effect on the procurement of rice. 
16. Thus from a pre-war combined total of rice available for export from Burma, 
Siam and French Indo-China of 6 million tons a year the prospects of the exportable 
surplus from these three countries for 1946 had sunk to less than 2 million tons. 
After deducting the shares allocated by the International Board to India, China and 
other claimants outside South-East Asia, there was very little left on which to keep 
the peoples of Borneo, Ceylon, Hong Kong, Malaya and the Allied controlled areas in 
the Netherlands East Indies fed above starvation level. Before the war India alone 
imported on an average about 1 t million tons of rice a year and China half a million 
or more. Malaya and Ceylon, too, imported on an average over half a million tons 
each. Moreover, the populations of India and China, if not of the other territories in 
the Far East, were increasing at an alarming rate so that there was the constant 
problem to be faced of more mouths to feed that before the war with far less food 
available to do it. 
17. There was, therefore, a compelling urgency to tackle the problem at its roots 
and to devise ways and means of averting widespread starvation and malnutrition 
through the deficit territories of South-East Asia. My first task was to call two food 
conferences in Singapore: the first in March at a technical level, and the second in 
April, a high level conference which was attended by the Governors of all the British 
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territories concerned, and the Supreme Allied Commander in person. At these 
conferences plans were made for concerted action in regard to increased production 
and controlled consumption of foodstuffs . I also flew personally to Bangkok on 29th 
April, as His Majesty's Minister at Bangkok had been unable to attend the main Food 
Conference of Governors, and conferred with the Siamese Prime Minister, who 
expressed his determination to see that the maximum quantity of rice was shipped 
from Siam. 
18. To follow up the lines of action laid down at the main food conferences it was 
decided that I should call monthly meetings in Singapore of representatives of all the 
territories with which I was concerned, British and foreign, who would act generally 
as "liaison officers" with this mission. These meetings have since been held regularly 
under the chairmanship of Mr. Empson . I think I may say that they have not only 
proved successful in their primary duty, namely, fair distribution of the available rice 
supplies of South-East Asia in accordance with the international allocations, but 
have also provided a valuable forum for the solution of food and connected problems 
confronting the various territories in the area. 
19. A Special Food Drive Committee for Malaya met at the end of May and made a 
number of practical recommendations for increasing food production and regulating 
food consumption in Malaya. Many of the committee's recommendations have since 
been acted upon in the Malayan Union and Singapore. 
20. Nutrition Conference.-Closely allied with the provision of food was the 
problem of safeguarding the peoples' health in South-East Asia through adequate 
and scientifically balanced diets . A Nutrition Conference was therefore convened 
between 13th- 16th May at which delegates were present from Australia, Burma, 
British Borneo, Ceylon, French Indo-China, Hong Kong, India and Malaya to discuss 
methods of warding off malnutrition and educating the public generally to supple-
ment their meagre cereal rations with wholesome substitute food-stuffs which would 
bring the calorie content of their diet to a level sufficient to keep them in good 
health. In this way the foundations were laid for immediate action in the event of a 
threat of localised or widespread malnutrition or famine due to failure of or further 
serious decline in staple food supplies. At the conference various far-reaching 
recommendations were made many of which have borne fruit. 
l.E.F. C. Sub-Committee 
21. In October the arrangements for distribution of South-East Asia rice operated 
by this mission were brought within the direct orbit of the I.E.F.C. with the 
appointment of an I.E.F.C. sub-committee on rice in Singapore, consisting initially 
of delegates from China, French Indo-China, India, Netherlands East Indies, 
Philippines, the United Kingdom and the United States and later in the year of a 
delegate from Burma who was granted full voting rights. At the first meeting on 
22nd October, Mr. Empson was elected chairman of the sub-committee fo r a year 
and at the request of the sub-committee the organisation for rice distribution already 
operated by me was put at their disposal. Mrs. Russell, Cereals and Rice Assistant to 
this mission, was appointed acting secretary. Meetings of the sub-committee were by 
common consent arranged to take place immediately after the monthly liaison 
officers' meetings so that the programme for rice shipments prepared at these 
meetings might conveniently be reviewed by the sub-committee and approved or 
amended as necessary. 
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22. Throughout the year we had to suffer many bitter disappointments in the 
fight against famine. On many occasions with the availabilities of rice at our disposal 
for distribution it was touch and go whether even the pitifully small rations could be 
maintained on which the population were then existing. In October, for instance, we 
touched our lowest depth when we were only able to arrange a supply programme on 
a basis of 55 per cent. of the I.E.F.C. allocation. In December the situation was 
temporarily restored and improved supplies from Burma and Siam made it possible 
for us to raise the entitlement for the second half of 1946 to 83 per cent, of the 
I.E.F.C. allocations. No territory in South-East Asia, however, was able to increase its 
total average cereal ration beyond 9 oz. per head per day or 5 oz. of rice during the 
second half of the year and some territories (e.g. , Malaya and North Borneo) went 
well below that for their rationed populations. An average cereal ration of 12 oz. is 
generally speaking considered just sufficient to keep the population in reasonable 
health, so that during the year the gap between theory and practice remained all too 
great. 
Long term 
23. It was reasonably clear from the outset that the dislocation caused by the war 
to rice production in South-East Asia would be of lengthy duration and that even a 
return to normal pre-war production, when it eventually came, would not solve the 
problem of feeding a constantly increasing population. Apart therefore from the 
principal exporting territories, Burma, Siam and French Indo-China, which are 
doing everything possible to return and even expand normal production, importing 
territories were also asked to consider with every sense of urgency the question of 
long-term food production and whether they could increase the land under 
cultivation with a view to relying less on outside imports of food. I repeatedly 
stressed to governors the importance of increased internal food yields and drew their 
attention to the various factors contributing to the critical food situation in 1946 
and, as I saw it, in the years to come. There was, indeed, a general awareness of what 
lay ahead and a readiness to take all possible measures to deal with the problem. That 
there were large additional tracts of land in South-East Asia which might be brought 
under cultivation was never questioned, and it was only shortage of equipment, 
man-power and financial and technical resources that prevented any appreciable 
expansion of cultivation in 1946. There are, however, prospects of increased 
cultivation in importing territories in 1947-50, particularly in Malaya and Borneo, 
although labour shortage will continue to present serious difficulties. 
Advisers 
24. When I left Cairo I had with me Dr. Clyde as principal adviser on food matters 
and Major-General Russell joined me in India to advise on all matters connected with 
transport. I also acquired from headquarters, S.A.C.S.E.A., in April the services of a 
technical coal adviser, Lieutenant-Colonel Day. Later Mr. F.W. South joined the 
mission 1;)-S agricultural adviser and Dr. Lucius Nicholls as nutrition adviser. In 
September Dr. and Mrs. Bentley and Mr. Gracie, disinfestation advisers, arrived to 
look into the very serious question of the destruction and deterioration of padi and 
also of rice and flour stocks in South-East Asia territories caused by rats and insect 
pests. And in October a statistical expert, Miss E. Tanburn, was appointed. 
25. The personal help and advice of these advisers have at all time been freely and 
unreservedly at the disposal of all territories concerned. 
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Economic Intelligence Section 
26. In May I took over from the Supreme Allied Commander the functions of 
co-ordinating economic intelligence throughout the area and established in my 
mission an Economic Intelligence Section headed by Lieutenant-Colonel Kerr, who 
had been performing the same duties at headquarters, S.A.C.S.E.A. Among the 
various other duties carried out by this section (such as the general dissemination of 
economic intelligence) was the production of a monthly Economic Bulletin, the first 
issue of which was published in September and which was designed primarily to keep 
local territories informed of each other's economic position and to give a compre-
hensive picture of the economic activities of the area. The Bulletin proved to be a 
success and was much appreciated by the recipients in South-East Asia for the 
information and statistical tables which it contained. Delegates to the Liaison 
Officers' Conference were asked at each meeting for contributions and for any ideas 
they might have with a view to improving it. 
South-East Asia Freight Movement Committee 
27. A further commitment which I took over from the Supreme Commander 
soon after my arrival as the result of the general reversion to civil administration in 
South-East Asia was the Freight Movement Committee set up in accordance with a 
Cabinet Office instruction to ensure the most economic use of shipping in this area 
and to establish priorities for all types of cargoes, according to availabilities of 
shipping space, being carried between United Kingdom, Indian, Middle East and 
South-East Asia ports. In course of time relaxation of control of ports became 
possible as their loading and unloading capacity increased (e.g., Rangoon and Hong 
Kong) and a number of foreign ports (i.e., Saigon, Bangkok and Batavia) reverted to 
their own Government control. During the last quarter of the year the committee 
was only controlling cargoes coming into and leaving the ports of Singapore, Port 
Swettenham and Penang. Although all types of cargo came under the jurisdiction of 
the committee, the setting up of ships to carry out the rice shipping programmes 
agreed by the liaison officers' meetings and later by the I.E.F.C. Sub-Committee 
covered a large part of its activities. 
Transportation 
28. The proper organisation of transport of all kinds, particularly rail and sea 
transport, and the rehabilitation of ports were of course essential to the smooth 
distribution and marshalling of food supplies and more generally to the economic 
reconstruction of the territories in South-East Asia. In addition to the activities of 
the South-East Asia Freight Movement Committee in all matters connected with sea 
transport the expert advice of my transport adviser, who had had great experience of 
this work as D.Q.M.G. (movements and transportation) in India, was constantly at 
the disposal of territories. Heavy-lift ships were in continuous use throughout the 
year bringing locomotives, rolling stock, tugs, &c., to Borneo, Burma, Malaya and 
Siam to assist in the rehabilitation of these countries and to expedite the assemblage 
and transportation of badly needed rice. 
Coal 
29. The distribution of coal supplies throughout the area was another commit-
ment which I took over from the Supreme Commander. It was decided that such 
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distribution could best be discussed and agreed on by the delegates from the various 
territories at the monthly liaison officers' meetings. 
30. The part that coal, already in world short supply, was destined to play in the 
rehabilitation of South-East Asia and in the working of essential transport services 
made the continued planned control of available supplies a paramount necessity. 
This mission accordingly undertook to assemble demands for coal from Burma, 
Hong Kong, Malaya, and later the Netherlands East Indies . Long-term forecasts of 
requirements on a six months' basis were submitted to us by these territories, and 
after deducting quantities available to us within South-East Asia we tried to make 
good our deficiencies from India in the first place and the London Coal Committee, 
which dealt with supplies from Canada, South Africa and the United States, in the 
second place. Our provisional programmes of shipments were then tabled at the 
liaison officers' meetings. 
31. Throughout the year our supplies for all purposes were extremely thin, and 
on several occasions we had only one or two days' supply available for bunkering 
ships at our major ports. Fortunately, however, we managed to survive every 
threatened crisis, and no instance actually occurred of any ship being refused 
bunkers due to lack of coal. Strikes, both in the Malayan Union collieries and in the 
United States, added to our difficulties, however, and made an already precarious 
situation even more precarious. Meanwhile, in view of the acute world coal shortage, 
the possibilities of increasing indigenous coal supplies from resources within the 
area were being urgently explored, but lack of machinery prevented further 
exploitation and development of known resources. Prospects of increasing local 
production will, of course, improve as mining equipment and machinery become 
available from the United Kingdom. 
Health Intelligence Section 
32. On 7th May 1946, I took over from the Supreme Allied Commander the Health 
Intelligence Section which had been set up within the Medical Section of his 
headquarters. This section was created to carry out work which before the war was 
undertaken by the Far Eastern Bureau of the League of Nations; and to meet an 
urgent need resulting from the large-scale movements of displaced persons and high 
incidence of infectious diseases throughout the area which were an aftermath of war. 
Its main function is the collection and dissemination of information regarding the 
major infectious diseases throughout the sea and air ports of the Far Eastern area. 
Reports of outbreaks of infectious diseases are received by weekly cables and by 
returns and quarantine notes; from these reports tables of epidemiological informa-
tion are compiled and sent to the chief health authorities of the Far Eastern 
countries, London, Paris, Washington and Alexandria. In addition, in order to ensure 
early dissemination of vital information broadcast services have been arranged 
through the R.N. WIT Station, Krangi, over a network which included Labuan, 
Saigon, Shanghai, Hong Kong and Tokyo. It has been agreed that on 1st April, 194 7, 
the Health Intelligence Section will be taken over by the newly formed World Health 
Organisation. 
Visits 
33. On my way to Singapore in March I visited the Viceroy at Delhi and the 
Governor of Burma. In April I spent a few days at Bangkok as the guest of the 
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Siamese Government. In June I visited Nanking on the invitation of Dr. T.V. Soong, 
and Hong Kong at the invitation of the Governor. On 4th July I represented His 
Majesty's Government in Manila at the proclamation of Philippine Independence. I 
had accepted an invitation from the High Commissioner, Admiral D'Argenlieu, to 
visit Saigon in September. As I was prevented from leaving by an infected foot, Mr. 
Wright represented me. Mr. Wright also paid a visit to Bangkok and to Sumatra, and 
two visits to Rangoon. Other members of the staff have repeatedly visited neighbour-
ing territories. Between September and the end of November I was almost 
continuously in Batavia with Mr. Wright for the political negotiations. 
Political 
34. Up to the end of the year a large proportion of the work of the mission was 
concerned with advice to the Supreme Allied Commander on political aspects of the 
last phase of South-East Asia Command. These particularly affected the Netherlands 
East Indies, French Indo-China and Siam. 
Netherlands East Indies 
35. When I arrived in Singapore in March, Lord Inverchapel was on the point of 
leaving South-East Asia for The Hague with the Dutch and Indonesian representa-
tives to discuss the tentative proposals which had been worked out in Batavia for a 
political agreement between the Dutch and the Indonesians. Lord Inverchapel 
proceeded shortly afterwards to take up his appointment as His Majesty's Ambassador 
at Washington and I was instructed to take over his responsibilities as regards the 
Netherlands East Indies. 
36. No decision was reached at The Hague upon the March proposals and, with 
the disappointment of the hopes which had been aroused, tension between the Dutch 
and the Indonesians increased. Meanwhile the Supreme Allied Commander was 
proceeding with the task of disarming and repatriating Japanese surrendered 
personnel and rescuing Allied prisoners of war and internees. It had been anticipated 
that shipping to complete the former task would not be available until the end of 
1947. But in April General MacArthur made available a sufficient number of liberty 
ships to enable the operation to be completed by the middle of 1946. An agreement 
was made with the Indonesian authorities for the progressive evacuation of Allied 
prisoners of war and internees, and it appeared possible that this second task might 
be completed by the end of the second or third quarter of 1946. The question, 
therefore, arose how much longer British forces should remain in Netherlands East 
Indies. 
37. The decision was eventually taken in August that the last British forces 
should leave Netherlands East Indies by 30th November, 1946, and the Dutch and 
the Indonesians were so informed. This decision had a most important bearing on 
political events, since it became increasingly obvious that unless a political 
agreement were reached by the time British forces withdrew it would be difficult to 
prevent the outbreak of general hostilities between the Dutch and the Indonesians. 
38. In May a new Government was formed at The Hague following the holding of 
general elections, and it was decided to send a Commission-General to Batavia for 
the resumption of political negotiations. At the end of August I went to Batavia with 
Mr. Wright and paid a visit of a few hours to Djogjakarta, where I met Mr. Sjahrir and 
his Cabinet. I urged upon them the importance of their showing themselves on their 
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side willing and prepared for negotiations with the Commission-General on their 
arrival, and added that, in my view, the conclusion of the truce was an almost 
essential prelude to successful talks. The Indonesian Cabinet agreed in principle on 
both points, and also undertook to proceed with arrangements for the evacuation of 
Allied prisoners of war and internees which had recently been interrupted. 
39. The Commission-General arrived in Batavia on 18th September, and I went 
back there again from Singapore on 21st September. The Indonesians at first raised 
objections (which in Djogjakarta they had agreed to waive) to proceeding with a 
truce unless the despatch of reinforcements from Holland were halted, and for some 
time difficult discussions over the truce and over political matters proceeded 
simultaneously. Both delegations invited me to preside at the first meeting of the 
political talks, but while the Indonesians desired a British representative to take part 
at subsequent meetings, the Dutch wished them to be bi-partite. A compromise was 
reached under which I should preside over periodic formal meetings of the Political 
Conference, but actual negotiations should take place direct between the two 
delegations in the intervals between the formal meetings. 
40. On 14th October a truce was signed by the Dutch and Indonesian leaders and 
myself, and by the Allied Commander-in-Chief. 
41. After many crises and disappointments the political talks were transferred to 
Linggadjati, near Cheribon, on 12th November (so as to permit of consultation with 
Dr. Soekarno), and the two delegations there reached agreement on a draft 
document which was initialled at Batavia on 15th November. It had been hoped to 
proceed with immediate signature, but the Commission-General found it necessary 
to return to Holland first. There the Linggadjati Agreement was approved by the 
Dutch Parliament, but an interpretation was given by Dr. Jonkman, the Minister of 
Overseas Territories, which the Dutch Government wished the Indonesians to 
accept. This led to further delays, and it was not until 25th March, 1947, that the 
agreement was finally signed at Batavia, on the basis that the Indonesians recognised 
that the Dutch placed the Jonkman interpretation on Linggadjati, but themselves 
were bound only by their signature of the agreement itself. Meanwhile the last 
British forces had left the Netherlands East Indies on 30th November. 
42. I wish here to record again my high appreciation of the assistance and 
support of the Allied Commander-in-Chief, Lieut.-General Mansergh, and of his 
Chief of Staff, Major-General Forman, during the period leading up to the departure 
of the last British forces on 30th November. 
French Indo-China 
43. It is unnecessary to rehearse here the course of events in French Indo-China 
during the past year, since this mission was not called upon to participate directly . 
44. What happened in French Indo-China had, of course, a decided influence on 
what happened elsewhere in this region. Both the Dutch and the Indonesians 
watched the situation closely, and their respective policies and tactics could not but 
be affected accordingly. On the other hand, the position in French Indo-China, 
though superficially similar to that in the Netherlands East Indies, was in many ways 
quite dissimilar. In the Netherlands East Indies a Government of moderate 
character, which steadily increased its authority, represented a broad-based national-
ist movement covering the whole of Java and Sumatra. In French Indo-China, on the 
other hand, although the general awakening of a desire for freedom amongst the 
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peoples of the East had not by-passed the country, there were many factors which 
weakened the translation of this desire into united and forceful expression; there was 
the opposition to the Annamites, with their Republican system and the strong 
Communist leanings of their principal leaders, on the part of the racially different 
populations of Cambodia and Laos, with their monarchical systems and their 
irredentist claims against Siam, both of which tended to cause them to look to 
France for support; there was the fact that the French had, until March 1945, been in 
a position to maintain their suppressive measures against nationalist movements, 
which had resulted in the formation of a large number of small and local parties 
which subsequently had difficulty in combining forces; and there was the artificial 
division of French Indo-China into two parts, the northern, conh:olled by the 
Chinese occupation forces, and the southern, by the British and French. The 
problem of dealing with nationalist opposition in Indo-China, therefore (although it 
still remains), constituted an entirely different problem to that in the Netherlands 
East Indies. 
45. Moreover, from the British point of view, our relations with the colonial 
Power in French In do-China were not strained, as they were in the Netherlands East 
Indies by the prolongation of our military responsibility for the occupation, the main 
body of British occupation forces having been withdrawn from French Indo-China at 
the beginning of 1946. 
46. The attitude of the French authorities in Indo-China has been coloured by 
their appreciation of the part played by His Majesty's Government in the return of the 
.French to Indo-China (General Gracie4 [sic] is remembered with particular affection, 
and Mr. Meiklereid5 has been most successful in cultivating friendly relations), and 
they have shown a desire to co-operate with us in all fields. While I have endeavoured 
to avoid giving the impression of wishing to back the French in a reactionary policy, I 
have done my best to reciprocate their goodwill with the aim of building up friendly 
contacts with the French, which it is to be hoped will in due course extend to 
co-operation with a new State in Indo-China involving some form of French-Asiatic 
partnership. 
Relations with neighbouring foreign countries 
4 7. The Supreme Allied Commander expressed the emphatic view that Malaya 
was untenable in the event of war with a major Power unless protected by an outer 
ring of airfields in neighbouring countries, and, indeed, without their active or 
passive co-operation. In peace-time it is no less necessary that there should be the 
closest co-operation between British and foreign territories. The view I formed at the 
outset, and which I still believe to be sound, is that the best method of achieving a 
solid and durable system of regional co-operation or association is to build up 
gradually step by step, starting with the practice of working together in technical and 
practical fields and encouraging more formal association as habit grows. 
48. In the case of the Netherlands East Indies a political agreement between the 
Dutch and the Indonesians was necessary before much progress could be made, but 
now that Linggadjati has been signed we may hope to make some advance. The seeds 
have already been sown. In the case of Indo-China I have done my best during the 
4 General Douglas Gracey, commander Allied Land Forces, French Indo-China, 1945-1946. 
5 E W Meiklereid, consul-general, Saigon, 1945-1947. 
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past year to cultivate friendly contacts with the French. If, as there is now a prospect, 
political negotiations between the French and Indo-Chinese are to be resumed, 
further progress may become possible here also. In the case of Siam the outstanding 
progress made is, of course, entirely the reward of the work of His Majesty's 
Ambassador, Mr. Thompson, to which I should like to pay a special tribute. 
49. Apart from individual contacts and exchanges of visits, the holding, firstly, of 
monthly food liaison conferences in Singapore, and, secondly, of nutrition and 
fisheries conferences, to be followed soon, I hope, by a social welfare conference, has 
proved a valuable method of putting our aims into practice. Representatives, 
European and Asiatic, of all territories concerned have begun to acquire the habit of 
a common approach to regional problems, and we should foster this development as 
opportunity offers. Equally valuable in its way is the work of the various special 
advisers in building up contacts, each in his own field, with the experts in 
neighbouring countries. 
Australia, New Zealand and other regional contacts 
50. It has been my warm desire from the outset that His Majesty's Governments 
in Australia and New Zealand should associate themselves fully with all activities in 
South-East Asia. The Australian Commissioner for Malaya in Singapore, Mr. Claude 
Massey, takes part in the work of all committees in Singapore, and his presence and 
advice have been invaluable. For a number of months a representative of the 
Department of External Affairs at Canberra, Mr. Henry Stokes, was specially 
appointed to Singapore for liaison with this mission, and his presence was much 
appreciated. In the case of the Defence Committee, Mr. Massey attends as an 
observer. 
51. I may add that I am leaving Singapore on 14th April for a visit to Australia and 
New Zealand at the invitation of those Governments. I hope to be able to explore 
further while I am there the association of Australia and New Zealand with the 
problems of South-East Asia. 
52. It is also desirable that the United States should be associated as closely as 
possible with activities in South-East Asia. The United States Consul-General in 
Singapore attends the monthly Food Liaison Conference as an observer, and close 
contacts are maintained with him in other matters. It has been represented to the 
United States Government that it would be of advantage if there were some United 
States officer in South-East Asia authorised to keep in touch with this mission on the 
affairs of South-East Asia as a whole, but the State Department have not so far gone 
beyond explaining the difficulties of arranging this in practice, and suggesting that 
the United States Ambassador at Bangkok might perhaps be given some special 
functions on these lines. 
53. So long as South-East Asia Command remained in existence, American, 
Dutch and French service missions and liaison officers were attached to headquarters 
in Singapore. Following the termination of South-East Asia Command, it is now 
proposed that such officers, some of whom have a valuable function to perform in 
maintaining liaison on intelligence and other matters, should be attached to their 
respective consulates-general in Singapore. 
Conclusion 
54. I trust that this report has given a sufficiently clear account of the diverse 
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activities of the commission, of the problems which have arisen and the way in which 
they have been tackled. Perhaps I may end by quoting an apt sentence from the 
Secretary of State's speech at the signature of the Anglo-French Treaty at Dunkirk: "I 
would rather take longer, exercise patience, but design and build well, than I would 
be impatient and make a mistake." 
119 CO 537/2203, no 2 23 Apr 1947 
'Special commissioner in South-East Asia': memorandum by M E 
Dening on the future of the office 
Lord Killearn was appointed as Special Commissioner in South East Asia in March 
1946-provisionally for a period of two years, which would therefore terminate in 
March next year. His functions are:-firstly to advise the Secretary of State on 
problems affecting the conduct of foreign affairs in South East Asia; secondly to cope 
with food shortages "and related matters"; and thirdly to consider coordination and 
cooperation between the different territories particularly in economic and social 
welfare matters. 
2. Lord Killearn's organisation is admitted to have been of considerable use and 
value. Despite the partial failure of sources of rice supplies to meet the allocations by 
the I.E.F.C., he has by his control of shipping and monthly consultations with 
representatives of the various territories, been able to ensure an agreed and equitable 
distribution of food, and of other scarce commodities. On political questions, his 
work in connexion with the Netherlands-Indonesian dispute contributed greatly to 
the agreement which was recently signed. So long therefore as the international 
control of food and conditions of economic scarcity exist, and so long as major 
political problems are liable to recur in South East Asia, it will remain important to 
have an organisation on the lines of the Special Commissioner's in Singapore; and 
some organisation of the kind to deal with economic coordination throughout the 
area will be of permanent value. 
3. There are other important functions which the Special Commissioner's 
organisation does, or can, perform. It is a focal point for the radiation of British 
influence throughout South East Asia; and a vital link in the South East Asia Defence 
Organisation which necessarily raises a number of "foreign" problems. Then there 
are the plans for a South East Asia Regional Commission, to which impetus was 
recently given by Dr. Evatt. 1 Singapore has also been recommended as the regional 
centre for certain international bodies such as the International Health Bureau and 
the International Labour Office. Finally the Special Commissioner's organisation is a 
useful adjunct to the newly established Economic Commission for Asia and the Far 
East.2 
4. There is clearly a case for the continuance of Lord Killearn's functions in 
respect of food supplies well into 1948, while some permanent arrangement for 
coordination in South East Asia is considered desirable. The question then arises 
1 Herbert V ere Evatt (1894--1965); attorney-general and minister of External Affairs in the governments of 
the Australian Labor Party, 1941-1949. On 26 Feb 1947 Evatt had called for a 'regional instrumentality' . 
2 The Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE) was set up by the United Nations on 18 
Mar 1947. 
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whether these functions can be performed more economically than at present. Lord 
Killearn himself has suggested a number of reductions which will, however, still 
leave his organisation on the 1st July of this year as shown in the attached list.3 
5. Further reductions in Lord Killearn's present organisation should be possible, 
and if the civilian element in Singapore can now live as ordinary citizens, it may be 
practicable to cut down the considerable administrative staff at present held on Lord 
Killearn's establishment. 
6. There is, however, the possibility of a further economy being effected through 
the merger of the functions of Lord Killearn and of the Governor-General. Such a 
merger would depend to a considerable extent upon constitutional developments in 
Malaya, but it is understood from the Colonial Office that both the title and the 
functions of the Governor-General are likely to be altered. While there are objections 
to a British Governor-General exercising functions in respect of foreign territories, if 
Mr. Macdonald [sic] were to discard this title and assume that of Special Commis-
sioner together with the functions of that office, he would then in fact be a 
coordinator for both British and foreign territories. In such an event it should be 
possible, in consultation with the Colonial Office, to effect a considerable economy in 
staff. 
3 Not printed. 
120 CO 537/2203, no 7 24Apr 1947 
[Special commissioner in South-East Asia]: Treasury note of an 
inter-departmental meeting with FO and CO 
The meeting1 had before it a note by the Foreign Office, describing the functions and 
organisation of the Special Commissioner, and drawing attention to the possibility of 
effecting economies in the latter by merging the Office of Special Commissioner with 
that of the Governor-General, Malaya (Mr. Malcolm MacDonald). It was agreed that 
the duties performed by the Special Commissioner were of the highest importance 
and should on no account be discontinued. On the other hand, Sir Edward Bridges 
said that even the reduced establishment proposed for July, 1947, (as set out in the 
Foreign Office note) was unjustifiably large. He therefore saw every advantage in the 
proposed "merger" and the meeting agreed. 
2. The following points emerged in discussion:-
(a) The Foreign Office representatives pointed out that Lord Killearn had been 
appointed in March, 1946, provisionally for two years. The appointment would not 
therefore terminate, in any case, until March, 1948. It was agreed that, though the 
actual merger could not perhaps take place until that date, all possible cutting 
down of the Special Commissioner's staff and preliminary merging of the two 
organisations should be undertaken in the meanwhile. It was pointed out that the 
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs would wish to be assured that the merger 
would not involve any abandonment of the policy of co-ordinating economic, 
1 Present: Sir E Bridges, Sir W Eady and Sir L N Helsby (Treasury); Sir 0 Sargent and M E Dening (FO); 
and G F See! and HT Bourdillon (CO) . The FO note referred to is not printed. 
:I 
:I 
, I 
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320 MALAYAN UNION TO FEDERATION [120] 
political and cultural affairs throughout South-East Asia and other matters at 
present being undertaken by Lord Killearn, to which he attached great import-
ance. It was agreed that these functions would continue in spite of the merger. 
(b) It was agreed to recommend that Mr. Malcolm MacDonald should be offered 
the new combined post. His present appointment extended only until May, 1949, 
and he would therefore have to be offered a new appointment extending beyond 
that date. Terms could be agreed between the Foreign Office and the Colonial 
Office. In his new capacity, Mr. MacDonald would doubtless function with a small 
"colonial" staff, and a small "diplomatic" staff, working side by side. 
(c) The Colonial Office representatives pointed out the relevance of present 
constitutional developments in Malaya. It was likely that the new Federation of 
Malaya, replacing the Malayan Union, would come into being in a matter of 
months. Singapore might be expected to join the Federation later, though possibly 
not for a year or two. In that event, the Governor-General's duties (which at 
present consisted largely of co-ordinating policy as between Singapore and the 
Malayan Union) would become less onerous in that they would only involve 
co-ordination as between Malaya as a whole on the one hand, and British 
territories in Borneo on the other. This would make it easier for Mr. MacDonald to 
take on additional functions, as was now proposed. 
(d) The Foreign Office representatives said that there would be political objec-
tions to an officer with the title of "Governor-General" exercising the present 
functions of the Special Commissioner. It was agreed that the title "Special 
Commissioner", to cover the duties of the combined post, would probably be most 
suitable (the title "High Commissioner" was ruled out, since this would involve 
confusion with the High Commissioner for the Federation of Malaya.) 
(e) It was agreed that the appointment, in due course, of a successor to Mr. 
MacDonald should be a matter for consultation and agreement between the 
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and the Secretary of State for the Colonies. 
(f) The Colonial Office representatives said that the merger would, incidentally, 
solve Mr. MacDonald's present accommodation problem. He was now perforce 
living in Singapore, but if the merger took place he would doubtless be able to take 
over the residence in Johore Bahru now occupied by Lord Killearn, and this would 
have the great advantage that he would not be residing in the same place as any of 
the Governors within his sphere of authority.2 
(g) It was agreed that Sir E. Bridges would circulate a minute to be agreed with 
the Foreign Office and the Colonial Office. This would then be submitted to 
Ministers, and ultimately to the Prime Minister. If the Prime Minister concurred, 
he thought that Lord Killearn and Mr. Malcolm MacDonald should be informed of 
the decision as having been reached by H.M.G. When the decision was final an 
inspector should be sent out to Singapore to examine the position and steps 
should be taken at once to bring about the merger, which should be completed by 
March, 1948.3 
2 Shortage of accommodation for high officials had provoked considerable sparring between them and also 
with the Sultan of Johore. MacDonald eventually moved into Bukit Serene, one of lbrahim's palaces. 
3 On 31 May 1947 Attlee agreed to a joint minute from Bevin and Creech Jones proposing the 
amalgamation of the functions of the two offices under MacDonald when Kill earn's term ended in Mar 
1948, see CO 537/2203, PM/47/89, 28 May 1947. 
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121 CO 537/2142, no 97 28Apr 1947 
[Closer association of Malaya and Singapore]: inward telegram no 123 
from Mr M J MacDonald to Mr Creech Jones 
[The Cheeseman Consultative Committee reported to the governor, Malayan Union, in 
late Mar and, as regards the possible inclusion of Singapore, recommended no action 
until such time as Singapore should ask for admission. Document 121 follows up a 
telegram from MacDonald in which he had reported that the hardening of Malay opinion 
prevented an early announcement about merger (see CO 537/2141, no 64, 9 Apr 1947). 
Consequently, on 18 June the secretary of state made a non-committal comment on the 
issue in reply to a parliamentary question while the White Paper published the next 
month more or less reiterated the brief statement of intent regarding closer association 
contained in the White Paper of Jan 1946. See Federation of Malaya: Summary of Revised 
Constitutional Proposals (Cmd 7171, July 1947).] 
1. My telegram No. 102. 
Governors and I have now considered what you might say in Parliament about the 
possibility of Singapore joining the Federation of Malaya. Position is as follows:-
2. We believe it desirable that Singapore should be included sooner or later, by 
mutual agreement, in the Federation. In Gimson's view the sooner this happens the 
better, and I agree with him, subject to, of course, what is said in paragraph 5 below. 
There are however difficulties mostly political and economic, which make it 
necessary that the problem should be handled carefully. In Singapore opinion is 
freely held that Singapore and the Peninsula cannot properly be administered 
separately. Propaganda in the Colony in favour of inclusion of Singapore is already 
considerable and will, no doubt, increase. Singapore leaders in all communities 
regard the present division as having been imposed on the Colony without its 
consent and they are becoming increasingly impatient at what they feel to be 
difficulties contributable to the division. From this point of view the sooner a 
Government statement is made, proposing means by which the matter can be 
examined on its merits, the better. 
3. On the other hand, general opinion in Malayan Union, on both political and 
economic grounds, is not attuned to any reversion to the pre-war predominant 
influence of Singapore in Malayan policy and business, and in Gent's view would 
require full safeguards against this contingency as condition of agreement to 
inclusion of Singapore in the Federation. This would, no doubt, mean that Singapore 
should be federated as one settlement in group of twelve units, but would have as far 
as concerns local self Government for local settlement of affairs, such constitution as 
Singapore may desire within the limits of Federal constitution. Gimson reserves his 
position on this aspect of the problem feeling that Singapore's prestige and 
outstanding economic importance in South East Asia can be used to great advantage 
of the Federation, if it is the political capital of the Federation. This is, of course, a 
matter which can be left for discussion and settlement if and when negotiations take 
place. 
4. The most important political consideration in the Union is the view of the 
Malays. As you know they look at everything from the point of view of preventing 
their future position in the government of the Peninsula being swamped by or 
subordinated to non Malays, particularly the Chinese, either politically or economi-
cally and they are nervous at the prospect of the large Chinese population of 
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Singapore having an increased influence in the Government of their native land. It 
would be fatal to force this issue against their wishes. However, Malay opinion is not 
necessarily fixed in the matter. Some sections of non-Malay opinion in the Union are 
favourable to Singapore joining the Federation on conditions outlined in paragraph 3 
above. 
5. Our approach to the question needs, therefore, to be cautious and conciliatory. 
Your statement should be sufficiently encouraging to make such public opinion as is 
favourable to the inclusion of Singapore in the Federation feel that the Government 
is ready to have the matter considered on its merits at a reasonably early date. At the 
same time, it should make it clear that there is no question of forcing a solution on 
an unwilling Federation. In any case, it would be a mistake for any practical steps to 
be taken to have the matter actively considered on formal basis before the 
inauguration of the new Federal constitution and the inauguration of the new 
constitution in Singapore at the beginning of next year. 
6. Cheeseman Committee considered the matter. It was not strictly within their 
terms of reference, but they received various representations for and against 
Singapore's inclusion, many of them from Chinese organisations or individuals in 
the Union favourable to the proposal. They dealt with the matter briefly in their 
report and in effect made the following suggestions:-
(a) The matter should not be considered unless and until Singapore applies for 
inclusion in the Federation. 
(b) The Federal Council in Kuala Lumpur should then consider this application. 
7. (a) above would appear to make Singapore a suppliant. It would seem wiser to 
propose that either Government can take the initiative in the matter. (b) is open to 
the criticism that it might mean that the Federal Council could turn down 
Singapore's supplication out of hand. If proposal for inclusion of Singapore put 
forward by either party were dismissed without adequate consultation between them 
friction between the two territories would increase and the prospects of cooperation, 
let alone of Singapore joining the Federation would be seriously prejudiced. No 
doubt, in practice, full consultation and negotiation between them would be 
arranged before any final views were recorded, and this should be expressly assumed 
in any statement you may make. It will (?group omitted) to be borne in mind that 
present draft Federation Agreement (Clause 3) requires agreement of the Rulers to 
admission of additional territories into the Federation. 
8. In the light of these considerations, we suggest the following points for 
statement by you:-
(a) As expressly stated in the White Paper1 and in Parliament with reference to 
Union constitution, it is recognised that there were and will be close ties between 
Singapore and the mainland and it is no part of the policy of His Majesty's 
Government to preclude or prejudice in any way the fusion of Singapore and 
Malayan Union in a wider Union at a later date, should it be considered that such a 
course were desirable. 
(b) During the next few months new constitutions are being prepared both for 
Federation and the States and Settlements of Penang and Malacca and for the 
1 Malayan Union and Singapore: Statement of Policy on Future Constitution (Cmd 6742, Jan 1946). 
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Colony of Singapore. It would be mistake for inauguration of any of these to be 
postponed pending consideration of this other question. The introduction of these 
constitutions will, nevertheless, be without prejudice to the possibility of the 
Federation being extended to include Singapore later on. 
(c) If at any time after these constitutions have been started either the Federal 
Government or the Governments of any States or Settlements in the Federation, 
or the Singapore Government, wishes to propose that Singapore joins the 
Federation they are free to make such proposals and to request its formal 
consideration. 
(d) It would be a matter for the Governments concerned then to agree upon the 
appropriate means of examining the proposal. No doubt joint consultation 
machinery would be devised for necessary negotiations. 
(e) We strongly advise that in your statement you should make it clear that the 
inclusion of Singapore in the Federation would not be decided without the consent 
of both the Federation and Singapore. 
9. If you agree to these general lines we shall prepare a draft statement for your 
consideration should you desire this. Alternatively, we shall gladly consider any draft 
that you like to send us. 
122 CO 537/2 171 5-6 May 1947 
[Labour policies in the Malayan Union and Singapore]: minutes by 
0 H Morris and H T Bourdillon 
[One aspect of the divergence between the governments of the Malayan Union and 
Singapore, which had not been resolved at the governor-general's conference on 11 Mar 
(see 117), was their differing approaches to growing labour unrest. On 10 May, after these 
minutes by Morris and Bourdillon had been submitted to Creech Jones, a telegram was 
despatched to MacDonald requesting 'with least possible delay, a report on the 
co-ordinated policy which it is proposed to pursue in the Malayan Union and Singapore 
regarding problems of labour unrest in general and the so-called Federation of Trade 
Unions in particular'. MacDonald replied on 22 May (see 125).) 
Mr. Bourdillon 
In this minute I attempt to set out some factors in the present labour situation in the 
Malayan Union and Singapore. I have placed on the files copies of two recent 
telegrams (Nos. 72 and 73) which are registered on 52754/2-Unrest among Estate 
Labour, now in urgent circulation, and, at 72a, a group of press cuttings which, with 
a copy of this minute, should be transferred when convenient to that file. 
1. Labour unrest on estates 
(a) The South Kedah disturbances. Last autumn there were strikes on a number 
of rubber estates in Kedah. From 28th February to 3rd March there was an outbreak 
of violence-in which one Indian labourer was killed-on two estates in South 
Kedah. The Governor's report-a summary of which has been placed in the Library 
of the House-is at (20) on 52754/2). Now the Governor reports that on 28th April a 
crowd of some 300 Chinese and Indian labourers on the Dublin Estate in South 
Kedah attacked 30 Police who had unsuccessfully tried to restore the position after 
labourers had intervened to prevent a constable from arresting an agitator-a visitor 
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not employed on the estate-who was making an inflammatory speech. Seven shots 
were fired, one labourer was killed and five injured: three Chinese and seven Indians 
were arrested the following day on a charge of rioting: the situation that morning 
(29th) was reported quiet, with the labour force at work. Enquiries will be held. The 
Governor does not connect this incident with the February-March disturbances in 
Kedah. 
(b) A threatened new strike. At 72A are three press cuttings which refer to a 
threatened strike. 
(i) on 240 estates in Selangor, (cutting A) 
(ii) on 250 estates in Perak (cutting C) 
The men's leaders in Selangor, at any event, threaten to strike on lOth May if six 
demands (including a 100% wage increase) are not met: these were recently rejected 
by the Estate managers, and the "Central Committee of the Unions concerned" is 
apparently negotiating now with the United Planting Association of Malaya (A). The 
Perak leaders are said (C) to have put forward similar demands. 
While these reports are not to be neglected, the fact that the Governor has so far 
given no information on this development suggests that they may be somewhat 
exaggerated. It is worth adding however that a Representative of the Malayan Indian 
Congress at Singapore has announced the party's intention to take greater interest in 
labour disputes in order to convince Trade Unions of its sincere desire to further the 
cause of Indian workers. (SEALF ISUM No. 261 - (36) on 55217/8/1), while Mr. 
Chettur1 is reported as saying after a recent tour of Pahang that Labour unrest was 
due to the lack of a living wage for Indian workers. There are also some signs of 
greater cohesion among the planting interests. The implications of a major and 
prolonged strike in the rubber estates are manifold. There would be great scope for 
unscrupulous agitators, and risk of incidents such as those in Kedah at the end of 
February. The Governor is now better equipped to deal with such troubles by:-
(1) the Public Order Ordinance-by which he can take action against drilling and 
wearing of uniforms. 
(2) The Criminal Procedure (Amendment) Ordinance-offence of criminal in-
timidation made non-bailable. 
(3) The Societies Ordinance-under which societies may be required to register. 
(4) The Trade Unions Ordinance-discussed below. 
2. The Perak hydro-electric strike. 
I have noted briefly the progress of this strike in minutes of 14/4 and 22/4 above. One 
fifth of the workers were reported back at work on 29th April (SEALF ISUM 261). It is 
only worth remarking here that any interruption of power transmission (now 
maintained by Government and Army technicians) to the tin mines would further 
impede the slow rehabilitation of the industry. (The strike at Batu Arang earlier this 
year of course affected the supply of coal to tin undertakings dependent on coal.) 
3. Registration of societies, and registration of trade unions. 
With some misgivings, the Governors have been allowed to follow divergent paths in 
this matter. 
1 Representative in Malaya of the government of India. 
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(a) While the Malayan Union Government enacted a "liberal" measure which:-
(a) allowed Societies to register but did not require them to do so, 
(b) empowered Government to require Societies thought to be of an undesirable 
nature to register, 
Singapore has brought back into use the old Societies Ordinance, enacted in 1909, 
which requires Societies to register and prescribes penalties against Societies which 
do not. Accordingly in Singapore all societies which are still in existence and which 
were registered or exempted under the Ordinance before 30th April 1941 have to 
notify the Registrar not later than 15th May of their continued existence: and 
similarly societies which have changed their names must inform the Registrar. 
Societies formed since 1st May 1941 have to apply for registration or exemption by 
15th May. The question of societies registration is not as intimately connected with 
labour developments as that of Trade Union registration. Nevertheless, it is worth 
noting that something very like a trial of strength seems to be taking place on this 
issue in Singapore: Mr. Chang Ming Ching, a representative of the Malayan 
Communist Party, declared recently that "the M.C.P. will not apply for registration 
unless the Government abolishes the existing Banishment and Sedition Laws" but he 
added that the M.C.P. would apply for recognition as a legal political organisation (9 
on 52241 at p. 3). (The H.Q. of the M.C.P. moved to Kuala Lumpur before Christmas 
last.) 
(b) Distinct from these measures are those requiring Trade Unions to register:-
Straits Settlements 
(now in force in Singapore) 
F.M.S./Malayan Union 
Trade Unions Ordinance, 1940 
(No. 3 of 1940) 
Trade Unions Enactment, 1940 
(No. 11 of 1940) 
Trade Unions Ordinance, 1946 
(No. 12 of 1946) 
These provide for the registration of all Unions by a date to be appointed. Owing to 
the war, this date was not fixed, until, after the liberation, 1st April and 1st May were 
appointed in the Malayan Union and Singapore respectively. Unfortunately, on the 
question of the registration of a Federation of Trades Unions, the policies of the two 
territories again diverge. We learn from the most recent S.E.A.L.F. Intelligence 
Summary that in "Malaya" (presumably the Malayan Union is meant) 
"Registration of the Federation of Trades Unions (is) to be accepted provided 
that all Unions represented by the Federation are themselves registered." 
The Federation is of course the old G.L.U. , now the Pan Malayan Federation of Trades 
Unions (PMFTU). The history of the registration questions is as follows. On 2nd 
March the Governor of Singapore reported in a telegram (38 on 52754) of great 
importance that registration of the Singapore F. T. U. ( = G .L. U.) was being refused. 
The main issue in that telegram was banishment: the Governor of Singapore makes 
it clear that in his opinion the F.T.U. in Singapore was a subversive body, and a 
menace to public order. Three days later the Governor of the Malayan Union, who 
had received a copy of No. 38, joined issue with Sir F. Gimson not only on the subject 
of banishment, but on registration of the F.T.U. (in its "Pan-Malayan" manifestation) 
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as well (44 on 52754). "[I]t appears to have been decided", he says, "that the F.T.U. 
cannot be registered as a Trade Union in Singapore, in spite of similar provisions in 
the F.M.S. and S.S. T.U. Legislation (noted above) enabling the federation of 2 or 
more Unions to register itself as a Trade Union. Application of the Federation in the 
Malayan Union is under active discussion by the Registrar of Trades Unions with the 
Unions concerned, and no similar decision of rejection has been taken in the Malayan 
Union". 
It was hoped (and so the Governors were told, 46 on 52754) that the Governor 
General's Conference on 11th March would result in some uniform policy: but, as on 
banishment, no agreement was forthcoming on registration of the Federation. Both 
Sir E. Gent and Mr. Brazier were of the view that things had not gone so far in the 
Malayan Union as they had in Singapore, and that much might be achieved by 
guiding the F.T.U. into legal channels. It seems to be hoped that a careful 
surveillance over the F.T.U.'s accounts, and over the contributions of member 
unions-not to exceed 10% of their monthly income per month-would have a 
salutary effect. It should be interposed here that there are reports, in the press and 
elsewhere, of one instance at least of sound and co-operative union activity in the 
case of the State Federations, components of the F.T.U. In the Governor's 
Conference (the discussion on F.T.U. registration is sidelined on pp. 9, 12 and 13 of 
the minutes on 52738/2) the divergence is shown as one of legal interpretation, and 
the Governor General then urged that the respective legal advisers should "get 
together and see if they could offer combined advice", but it seems clear that the 
difference is at bottom a fundamental difference of policy. 
After the conference, in acceding to Sir F. Gimson's request for powers of 
banishment without prior reference to the Secretary of State, the Secretary of State 
asked again (tel. to the Governor General, 54-6 on 52754) "for an early indication of 
the co-ordinated policy which it is proposed to _ pursue in the two territories 
regarding problems of Labour unrest in general and the so-called F.T.U. in 
particular. I can readily understand that exactly similar procedure in the Malayan 
Union and in Singapore is neither necessary nor desirable, but I regard it as essential 
that there should be no fundamental divergence of policy"-and the telegram went 
on to refer to the paragraph of Sir E. Gent's telegram of 5th March which I have 
quoted above (44 on 52754) . 
However, the Governor of Singapore declared at a press conference on 15th March 
("Straits Budget" 20th March p. 13): "Government is determined to take firm action 
against any organisation which has not brought itself within the law"-by 1st May: 
and presumably in Singapore the F.T.U. will now be illegal, while in the peninsula-
the P.M.F.T.U. H.Q. moved to Kuala Lumpur early this year-it will be registered 
and legal. The danger is, of course, that the G.L.U. will now operate "underground" 
in Singapore from its Kuala Lumpur H.Q. 
Thus in 3 cases, all more or less closely connected with labour unrest, policies in 
Singapore and the Malayan Union diverge: banishment, societies registration, and 
Trade Union registration. In every case Sir F. Gimson and Sir E. Gent have pointed to 
reasons, undoubtedly valid, which call for differing treatment in the two territories, 
and the point has been conceded by the Secretary of State that uniformity, though 
desirable, is not absolutely essential. Advantage was taken of a despatch to the 
Governor General (71), in reply to a petition from a group of European employers of 
estate labour, to call a third time for 
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"an indication of the co-ordinated policy regarding labour unrest which it is 
intended to pursue in the Malayan Union and Singapore". 
but it may be that the position is serious enough to send yet another reminder. What 
we should want to know is, firstly, whether there is any prospect of a satisfactory 
wages policy: this will depend largely on the success of the attempts now being made 
to settle the salaries of government employees, whether European or Asiatic, and 
involves (probably) as a corollary a satisfactory cost of living index. (It is of course 
true that stable wages and prices are difficult to achieve in a country so dependent on 
imported food and consumer goods.) Again, the progress which has been made in 
setting up and operating a Joint Advisory Board for Labour should be known: in 
Singapore, there are press reports of a vigorous start to their Advisory Board, which 
is to tackle the outstanding tasks of revising the Labour Code and preparing a 
Factories Ordinance. Lastly, we should, I think, wish to know whether the 
development of sound Unionism in Singapore can proceed with the G.L.U., under 
whatever name, established in Kuala Lumpur but "underground" in the Colony. I 
submit a draft telegram2 which should, I think, go to the Governor-General, and not 
(as we thought on first impression) to Sir E. Gent. 
O.H.M. 
5.5.47 
I have already stated, in submitting the file about labour unrest in Kedah, that Mr. 
Morris was undertaking a general review of the labour situation in the Malayan 
Union and Singapore. The result is to be seen in the immediately preceding minute, 
which seems to me to be a particularly useful piece of work. 
I do not think we can be entirely satisfied with the position as revealed. As Mr. 
Morris has recalled, the Secretary of State has acquiesced in the pursuit of different 
policies in the two territories both as regards Societies Legislation and as regards 
recourse to banishment. It now appears (though we cannot say for certain) that we 
are faced with a similar divergence in a third related matter-the registration of the 
so-called "Federation of Trade Unions" (alias the General Labour Union) as a Trade 
Union. There is no reason why the policies of the two Governments should in all 
respects be identical, and it is quite possible, provided the whole thing has been 
thoroughly thrashed out and co-ordinated, that variations in the treatment of the 
"Federation of Trade Unions", as between the two territories, are justified and even 
demanded. Unfortunately, we are not in a position to say whether this co-ordination 
has taken place. When the Secretary of State asked the Governor General (in No. 54 
on this file) for an early indication of the co-ordinated policy to be pursued in the two 
territories, he had in mind this particular question of the treatment of the Federation 
of Trade Unions. There has been no reply to that telegram, which was sent six weeks 
ago, and we have been left to glean such information as we can from information 
summaries and minutes of conferences. 
There is another feature in the present situation which I find very obscure. During 
March, the Governor of Singapore sent us, with the Governor-General's support and 
with every indication of extreme urgency, a request that he should be allowed to use 
his powers of banishment more freely. The representations were very strong, and 
2 Not printed. 
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were promptly acceded to by the Secretary of State (in the telegram at No. 54 on the 
file, to which I have already referred). Thereupon, the governor sent us (in No. 61) 
the draft of a long statement which he proposed to make whenever he decided to take 
banishment action in accordance with the permission now granted him. Our 
comments on this draft statement were sent over a month ago (see No. 62), but since 
then we have heard nothing. We have not been told that banishment action has been 
taken, but on the other hand we have not been told that the situation has improved. 
In view of the almost sensational urgency of the Governor's original requests (see 
Nos. 38 and 52), I find this silence a little mystifying. 
I do not think we can allow this matter to rest. The labour situation both in the 
Malayan Union and in Singapore is explosive. There was a fresh incident on a Kedah 
estate at the end of last month (see No. 72 and 73), and there has been press reports 
(No. 72A) of threatened rubber strikes on a very wide scale. The "Federation of Trade 
Unions" lurks, or is reported to lurk, at the back of all these troubles, and the 
Secretary of State therefore has every right to assure himself that a co-ordinated 
policy is being pursued, and to know what that policy is. It is true that one reminder 
has already been sent (in the last paragraph of No. 71), but that reminder was in very 
general terms and was at the end of a despatch on different, though related matters. I 
hope it will be found possible to telegraph to the Governor-General on the lines of 
the attached draft. 
H.T.B. 
6.5.47 
123 CO 537/2142, no 103 11 May 1947 
[Federation proposals]: despatch no 119 from Sir E Gent to Mr Creech 
Jones 
[The first seven paragraphs provide background to the Cheeseman Consultative Commit-
tee, whose report was published on 31 Mar and discussed by various Anglo-Malay bodies 
in Apr. On 11 May, having spent 'my days and nights' on preparing the material for 
London, Gent completed two despatches: a long confidential one (reproduced here) 
containing detailed constitutional proposals, and a shorter secret one providing a gloss on 
aspects of the other (124). In a covering letter to Bourdillon dated 10 May, he stressed 
that 'if H.M.G. can bring themselves to agree with the recommendations I am putting in, 
we may build a solid British core surrounded by an anti-British China, India and 
Indonesia, with a tolerably free trade for the Indians, Chinese and Americans to make 
their money here (and we shall take some of it from them in the process) and I have little 
doubt that it will accrue to British influence and British trade if we keep the friendship of 
the Malays.' Gent's two despatches were followed up on 29 May by a telegram from 
MacDonald (126) and answered by the secretary of state on 11 June (127).] 
I have the honour to submit to you my report on the outcome of the discussions on 
the Constitutional Proposals which were contained in the draft Federation of Malaya 
Agreement and the model State Agreement. 
2. The report of the Constitutional Working Committee in December 1946 which 
contained those proposed forms of Agreement was published in Malaya on the 24th 
December, 1946 under cover of a Note in the following terms:-
"Today there is published for the consideration of all interested people in 
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Malaya a report containing fresh constitutional proposals for the territories in 
the Malayan Union. 
These proposals have been submitted for scrutiny by His Majesty's 
Government with the result that the Secretary of State has stated that their 
essential features appear to His Majesty's Government to be calculated to 
achieve those fundamental objectives in Malaya for which His Majesty's 
Government have always striven, namely, the establishment of a strong 
central government with control over all matters of importance to the 
progress and welfare of the country as a whole and the creation of a form of 
citizenship which will be extended to all those who regard Malaya as their real 
home and the object of their loyalty. 
But His Majesty's Government have declared that there can be no question 
of their reaching any final decisions on any matters involved until all the 
interested communities in Malaya have had full and free opportunity of 
expressing their views. The conditional approval expressed by His Majesty's 
Government has reference only to the present proposals as such-that is, the 
draft Federation Agreement with its schedules and the model State Agree-
ment and is not to be regarded as extending to all the recommendations in 
the Working Committee's report, many of which are of a long-term character 
and will require detailed consideration at the appropriate time. 
His Majesty's Government must also reserve all judgment on State 
Constitutions until detailed proposals are available for their consideration." 
3. In order to implement the intention of His Majesty's Government that all 
interested communities in Malaya should have full and free opportunity of expressing 
their views before His Majesty's Government reached any final decisions, I appointed 
a Consultative Committee with the following terms of reference:-
"To invite the opinion of all interested individuals, communities and groups 
in Malaya on the Constitutional Proposals which have been published as a 
result of consultation between the Government and Malay representatives; to 
hold such public or private sessions as may be necessary to give the fullest 
opportunity of expressing their views, whether orally or in writing, in 
accordance with the undertaking given by His Majesty's Government: and to 
collate the views so expressed and to report their substance to the Governor of 
the Malayan Union for consideration in the Advisory Council with such 
comments and recommendations as the Committee may see fit." 
4. The Committee was comprised of 4 representative Members of the Advisory 
Council and 4 other gentlemen chosen from the principal non-Malay communities 
who were not themselves Members of the Advisory Council, and I nominated also Mr. 
H.A.R. Cheeseman, C.M.G., Director of Education, whom the Committee then 
proceeded to appoint as their Chairman. 
5. The report of this Committee was published on the 31st March, 1947, and laid 
on the table of the Advisory Council on that date. On the lOth April the Advisory 
Council debated the report on the following resolution:-
"That this Council records its appreciation of the work of the Consultative 
Committee on the Constitutional Proposals for Malaya and, being of opinion 
that the pledge of His Majesty's Government that all interested communities 
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in Malaya should have a full and free opportunity of expressing their views has 
thus been fulfilled, 
RESOLVES that the Report of the Consultative Committee be transmitted 
to the Secretary of State and to Their Highnesses the Malay Rulers for their 
consideration." 
The resolution received the unanimous approval of the Council. 
6. Since the original draft Agreements had resulted from discussions between 
representatives of the Government, of the United Malays National Organisation, and 
Their Highnesses the Rulers, and Their Highnesses would be signatories to the 
Agreements in the terms to be finally settled, a further meeting of the Constitutional 
Working Committee and of the Plenary Conference, in the latter of which Their 
Highnesses themselves and the Governor-General took part, was convened to 
consider proposed amendments of the draft Federation Agreement and the model 
State Agreement. The Constitutional Working Committee accordingly reassembled 
on the 17th of April and presented its report to the Plenary Conference on the 24th of 
April. A copy of the report is annexed to this despatch. 1 
7. It is recommended that certain modifications should be made in the draft 
Agreements, and the full list of these is appended to the Annex to this despatch. 
Some of these amendments are more important than others and I propose in the 
following paragraphs of this despatch to discuss seriatim those which are of 
substantial importance. 
References in this despatch to the clauses of the draft Federation Agreement are 
references to the clauses as numbered in the printed Report of the Working 
Committee of December, 1946. 
8. Additional recital in the federation agreement 
The Plenary Conference recommended that to the opening recitals in the draft 
Federation Agreement there should be added a further recital which should set out 
the intentions of His Majesty the King and Their Highnesses the Rulers to provide for 
eventual self-government of the Federation of Malaya and that, as a first step to that 
end, they had agreed that, as soon as circumstances and local conditions permitted, 
legislation should be introduced for the election of members to the several 
legislatures to be established in pursuance of the Federation Agreement. This 
expressed declaration is designed to meet certain sections of opinion which have 
criticised the proposed constitutional arrangements on the ground that the draft 
Agreement contains no sufficient expression of purpose to promote democratic 
development towards self-government on the lines of election of representatives to 
the legislatures. 
9. Federal Executive Council 
An increase of Unofficial membership from 5 to 7 as recommended by the 
Consultative Committee was acceptable to the Plenary Conference, but they 
recommend that the numbers should be expressed as not less than 5 or more than 7, 
and they consider that, if in fact more than 5 Unofficial Members are appointed to the 
Executive Council, there should be an increase in the Malay Unofficial membership 
to not less than 3. This condition follows upon the proposal in the December report 
of the Working Committee that, in a Council comprising 5 Unofficial Members, not 
1 Annexes not printed. 
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less than 2 should be Malays. If, as I recommend, the present amended provision for 
Unofficial membership is adopted by His Majesty's Government, it would be 
reasonable that there should be not less than 3 Malay Unofficial Members. 
10. Legislative Council 
The changes in the Federation Agreement in the matter of the composition of the 
Legislative Council, which have been proposed by the Consultative Committee and in 
the main adopted by the Plenary Conference, raise issues of the first importance to 
all communities in Malaya and to none more than the Malays themselves. The social, 
economic and political life of Malaya is unquestionably based in the present phase on 
racial alignments, and in this phase any scheme of composition of the Legislative 
Council, which could claim to have a representative character, in whatever degree, 
must necessarily reflect this racial consciousness. To the Malays who comprise much 
the largest racial group of those who can claim Malaya as their motherland, the 
picture presents itself principally as one in which they are faced with the risk of being 
outnumbered in their own country by immigrant peoples and thus eventually ousted 
from political control in the internal affairs of the country and falling into 
impoverishment in the face of economic competition from the ever increasing 
numbers of the immigrant races with their greater resources, more highly developed 
organisatiion, and higher standard of technical skill. 
11. In the inauguration, ' therefore, of democratic institutions in Malaya on a 
pan-Malayan basis, it is natural that the Malays should insist that their undoubted 
position as the largest group of people in Malaya whose homes and loyalties are, and 
can be nowhere else than, in this country should be reflected in the composition of 
the Legislative Council. Many political and economic questions of first-rate import-
ance which will face the legislature from the beginning, such as immigration policy 
and the enactment of an electoral law, serve to stress in the Malay view the vital 
importance to them of agreeing only to a constitutional scheme for Federation which 
will accord to them security against the risk of being outvoted in the legislature, 
apart from the ex-officio and Official vote. 
12. It is to be hoped that in years to come the course of social and economic 
developments in Malaya may tend to weaken and lower the racial barriers which are 
so apparent in the present phase, and it is right to search for any supplementary 
system of representation which can be encouraged as a factor, already existing to 
some extent and likely to grow in the future, and serving to qualify a purely racial 
system of representation. In the December report of the Constitutional Working 
Committee and also in the report of the Consultative Committee and now in the 
current recommendations of the Plenary Conference, such a supplementary system 
is shown to exist on a functional or occupational basis, but in the recommendations 
which I make for the consideration of His Majesty's Government in this vital matter, 
I must explain that in this phase the composition of the Council will in fact be judged 
by the racial representation which it provides and that any adjustments of functional 
representation will necessarily be judged from the point of view of any racial 
redistribution which such adjustments entail. 
13. The Malay claim in respect of their representation in the Legislative Council 
is justified on the ground of their considerable numerical superiority in the 
domiciled population of Malaya. The estimated population figures of 1941 were as 
follows for the whole country excluding Singapore:-
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Indians 
Europeans 
Eurasians 
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2,199,931 
1,781,333 
684,364 
16,181 
11,009 
48,909 
4,741,727 
Some dislocation has taken place during the war but it has riot been possible to frame 
any useful estimate of the immediate post-war population figures. A census, as you 
are aware, is to be held this year but it is unlikely that even preliminary figures 
sufficiently precise will be available before decisions have to be reached on the 
present constitutional proposals. It is unlikely, however, that there has been any 
such considerable change in the population ratios as to affect materially the 
immediate pre-war picture. But the above figures relate to the total resident 
population and it will be borne in mind that an element, and probably a considerable 
element, of the non-Malay communities are not domiciled in the country and could 
not reasonably claim to qualify for Citizenship. So far as it has been possible to form 
any opinion of the extent to which the immigrant communities will qualify for, or 
desire, Malayan Citizenship, it appears likely that a very considerable percentage 
would not so qualify, and it is also thought likely that a considerable number of 
Chinese, Indians, and Ceylonese will choose not to risk any form of disqualification 
in the country of their, or their parents', origin by committing themselves to a 
declaration of permanent settlement in Malaya. It is safe, therefore, to assume that 
the Malays' claim to a substantial majority position in Malaya is justified. 
It is significant that in the last complete census in 1931 the Malays born and 
resident in the territories now forming the Malayan Union outnumbered the 
combined Chinese and Indians locally born and resident by more than 3 to 1. 
14. Before considering in any detail the composition of the Legislative Council it 
is desirable to deal with the position of the 11 State and Settlement representatives 
for whom provision was included in the December report of the Constitutional 
Working Committee and accepted by the Consultative Committee. The latter 
Committee, however, met the criticism that this group could not properly be deemed 
an Unofficial group in the ordinary sense by transferring the 9 State representatives 
to the category of Official Members. This classification however is also incorrect 
since in fact it has always been expressly intended that these Members should have 
the freedom of Unofficial Members in the proceedings of the Legislative Council. The 
Constitutional Working Committee have accordingly recommended the solution 
that the whole group of 11 should be classified in a new category as State and 
Settlement representatives who would be expected in practice to take up a middle 
position independent both of the Official and Unofficial blocs. The Council would 
then consist of 4 categories of members viz. ex officio, State and Settlement 
representatives, Official and Unofficial Members. 
15. The Consultative Committee recommended a considerable increase in the 
number of Unofficial Members of the Legislative Council as compared with the 
membership recommended in the December report of the Working Committee. This 
increase is in principle acceptable to the Plenary Conference but with the important 
qualification that the membership should be so adjusted as to ensure that the Malays 
should not be in a minority amongst the members other than ex officio and Official. 
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The Plenary Conference considered a proposal that this should be achieved by 
increasing the 50 Unofficial Members recommended by the Consultative Committee 
by additional Malay membership under the occupational category of "Agriculture" as 
defined in the April report of the Working Committee. At that stage of their work and 
before they came to consider the vital issue of Immigration policy, it appeared that 
the Malay representatives in the Conference would accept a position of equality in the 
Unofficial (including State and Settlement representatives) voting strength, but, as 
explained in paragraph 23 of this despatch, later consideration of the subject of 
Immigration showed that they could not be content with anything less than an 
assured majority, unless a special constitutional provision were conceded by His 
Majesty's Government which would secure the acceptance of Malay views in the 
matter of Immigration. 
16. It is unlikely that on every important issue the Malays will find themselves 
faced with a solid opposition vote from the non-Malay Unofficial Members, nor would 
they themselves ordinarily expect any such situation, but they insist that insofar as it 
is possible on issues vital to their community they must be free from dependence on 
the chance support of one or more representatives of other communities. My own 
opinion is that the Malay apprehensions are exaggerated in this matter, but, 
nevertheless, I cannot fail to appreciate that, in the interests of the majority of the 
people of the country whom they represent they do not feel justified in agreeing to 
accept any risk whatever in that matter. There are leaders in the Malay and 
non-Malay communities who are not backward in appreciating the importance of 
compromise and the promotion of a patriotic feeling of an all-Malaya character, as 
essential if political and social progress is to be well based in this country, and I do 
not myself fear that to concede a Malay majority of the Unofficial voting strength in 
the Legislative Council will mean that the power will be misused. But in the absence 
of such an assured position I can only foresee the likelihood of a very rigid attitude on 
the part of the Malay members in policies and problems which would not ordinarily 
be regarded as involving issues vital to the Malay community. 
17. On a balance of all the factors, therefore, my recommendation is that the 
numbers and distribution of seats in the Legislative Council recommended in the 
April report of the Working Committee and endorsed by the Plenary Conference 
should be adopted with the modification that two additional Malay members should 
be appointed under the category of "Agriculture and Husbandry". 
18. Before leaving the question of representation, I should refer to a specific plea 
made in the Advisory Council on the lOth of April by the Honourable Dr. (Miss) Soo 
Kim Lan in which she commented on the absence of adequate provision for women 
to play their role in the proposed Federal Legislative Council. She asked that women 
should be allocated at least 8 seats in the proposed Council, namely, 2 as Official and 
6 as Unofficial Members. It is certainly my hope that the scheme of representation 
will leave the High Commissioner free to nominate suitably representative women to 
the Council, but I do not believe that it would contribute to a solution of this 
sufficiently difficult problem if special reservation of seats were made for women 
members; rather should it be left to the High Commissioner to use his discretion to 
select women equally with men where they could be suitably representative of 
important interests. 
19. Immigration 
Of all the policy problems facing the Government in Malaya immigration is probably 
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the one which raises in the most acute form a difference of opinion, each in respect 
of the interests of their own community, between the Malays on the one hand, and 
the Chinese, and to a lesser degree the Indians, on the other hand. It is also a 
problem in which employers of immigrant labour are seriously concerned. For some 
years before the war there was, as you are aware, a quota system governing the 
immigration of Chinese unskilled labour into Malaya; and in respect of Indians the 
Government of India itself immediately before the war had placed an embargo on the 
immigration of Indian labour to Malaya. Since the end of the war, in the case of 
Indians the Government of India's policy has been maintained: and in the case of 
Chinese no immigration has been authorised save for a few individuals joining 
relatives already resident in Malaya. In the period between the two wars a very 
considerable flow of immigration had taken place with results which caused 
increasing apprehension to the Malays. Provision was made in the draft Federation 
Agreement (Clause 75 (3)) to the effect that the Immigration policy of the Federal 
Government, and particularly any proposal for a major change in such policy, should 
be matters in regard to which a particular duty was laid on the High Commissioner 
to consult the Conference of Rulers and that, in the event of disagreement between 
the majority of the Rulers and the High Commissioner, the difference should be 
referred to the Secretary of State for his decision. 
20. The Consultative Committee have stated (Section 8(3) of their report) that 
fears had been expressed to them that this provision might mean that major changes 
in the Immigration policy of the Federal Government might be made without 
reference to the Federal Legislative Council, and the Consultative Committee have 
recommended that the Federal Legislative Council should be consulted before any 
major change is introduced. 
21. The Chinese community's interest in the question is a very obvious one, and 
the strong objection expressed, for instance, in the memorandum of the Selangor 
Chinese Chamber of Commerce, which is annexed to the Consultative Committee's 
report, may be taken as commonly shared by Chinese opinion in Malaya. The 
strength, however, of the Malay case for an assurance that Malay opinion should be a 
determining factor in Immigration policy rests on the position that they have no 
other homeland but Malaya, and that they are in danger of being outnumbered and 
outmatched in this homeland of theirs by immigrant peoples unless they are in an 
unquestionable position to control the volume and nature of such immigration. 
22. Since the issue of the December report of the Constitutional Working 
Committee there has been a hardening of Malay opinion in respect of the 
completeness of the assurance they seek in this matter, and this is attributable in 
part to their acceptance of a scheme of Citizenship which would give political rights 
in Malaya to numbers of non-Malay people who have become well established in the 
country and who have transferred their homes and loyalties to it, and partly to the far 
wider claims which have been publicly expressed both to the Consultative Committee 
and elsewhere by Chinese and Indian residents in this country. Recent strengthening 
of Malay opinion showed itself in the April report of the Working Committee which, 
while responding to the criticism that the Legislative Council should have a voice in 
Immigration policy, nevertheless was no longer content that the Secretary of State 
should have the final decision in the event of any local disagreement with the Malay 
view, as expressed by the majority of the Conference of Rulers, on any Immigration 
issue. At the Plenary Conference it was very clearly explained on behalf of the Malays 
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that they regarded the power to control immigration as a matter of life and death to 
the Malay people and that no solution could be acceptable to them which did not 
exclude the possibility of decisions being taken on Immigration policy which were 
contrary to the Malay views. It was proposed on their behalf that if any disagreement 
with the Conference of Rulers were to be remitted to the Secretary of State for his 
decision it should be only on an express assurance from the Secretary of State that he 
would take no decision which would require the adoption or continuance of an 
immigration policy to which the Malays objected. 
23. An alternative proposal introduced into the discussion at the Working 
Committee was that the decision should be left to the High Commissioner and the 
Conference of Rulers provided that there should be no exercise of the power of 
"Advice" to the Rulers should they not be willing to accept the policy advocated by 
the High Commissioner. 
24. Failing either of these two lines of solution, a third suggestion was that the 
determining factor in decisions on Immigration policy should be the vote of the 
Legislative Council excluding ex official and Official Members. On that basis the 
Malays would not be content with anything less than an assured majority of such 
voting members of the Legislative Council. 
25. I and my advisers have carefully considered this difficult and important issue 
and we advise that the intense Malay concern in it should receive due recognition. 
26. It is highly inadvisable that Their Highnesses the Rulers should themselves 
be involved in the dust of the arena in such a first-class political contest as this 
subject may on any occasion involve. It also is inadvisable, in our view, that if 
provision were made in the Constitution for a reference to the Secretary of State for 
his decision, he should have been previously bound to give a decision in a particular 
sense, and especially so if that sense proved to be contrary to the opinion of the 
Legislative Council. 
27. It is also, in our view, inadvisable that the power of "Advice" to Their 
Highnesses should be qualified in any particular matter other than in respect of 
matters relating to the Muslim religion or the custom of the Malays. 
28. It is, therefore, our recommendation that the reasonable claim of the Malays 
should be met by agreeing to their having an assured majority in the Legislative 
Council (apart from ex-officio and Official Members) which, as explained in 
paragraph 13, is justified by their numerical predominance in the list of future 
Federal Citizens, and equally by their vital concern to control the flow of future 
immigration into Malaya. It appears to us that not only is the Legislative Council the 
rightful representative body in which all policies of domestic importance should be 
debated and determined, but that it would be appropriate in such a highly 
controversial matter as Immigration policy that the determining factor as far as the 
Council is concerned should exclude the ex officio and Official votes. At the same 
time, the power of His Majesty or the High Commissioner to implement any 
particular policy, involving Immigration, which might be necessitated by His 
Majesty's responsibility for Defence and External Affairs would need to be safe-
guarded. If this recommendation is accepted by His Majesty's Government, it will be 
a consequence that further provision should be made for two Malay members to be 
nominated by the High Commissioner to the Legislative Council (see paragraph 17 of 
this despatch), and the necessary amendment of Clause 75(3) of the draft Federation 
Agreement should be in the following terms:-
336 MALAYAN UNION TO FEDERATION [123] 
"75 (3) It shall be the particular duty of the High Commissioner to consult 
the Conference of Rulers from time to time upon the Immigration policy of 
the Federal Government and, in particular, when any major change in policy 
is contemplated. If such policy or major change in policy is objected to by a 
majority of Their Highnesses the Rulers, the point of difference shall be 
determined by resolution of the Legislative Council. Upon any such resolu-
tion the ex officio and Official Members of the Council may speak, but shall 
not vote." 
29. Electorallaw 
There has been some criticism expressed locally as to a genuine early intention to 
introduce a system of elections to the Federal Legislative Council, but with the 
present provision in Clauses 69 and 113 of the draft Federation Agreement and the 
addition to the Recital Clause proposed in paragraph 8 of this despatch (which will 
equally apply to the Settlements of Penang and Malacca), this criticism should be 
satisfied and it will rest with the future Legislative Council of the Federation to 
proceed as soon as it is ready to do so with the preparation of an appropriate Federal 
electoral law. 
30. Citizenship 
In the conclusion provisionally reached in December by His Majesty's Government 
on the draft Federation Agreement, the Citizenship proposals there contained were 
an essential feature which appeared to His Majesty's Government to be calculated to 
achieve the fundamental objective of the creation of a form of Citizenship which 
would be extended to all those who regard Malaya as their real home and the object of 
their loyalty. Further, in a reply to Mr. Rees-Williams in the House of Commons on 
29th January you stated that the Constitutional Proposals contained revised 
provisions for Federal Citizenship which had been framed in an endeavour to open 
the doors of Citizenship to those, and only those, who genuinely regard Malaya as 
their home and as the object of their loyalty-a definition which of course included, 
besides the Malays, the very considerable number of Chinese, Indians and others who 
were firmly rooted in the country. 
31. This part of the draft Federation Agreement naturally figured with prominen-
ce amongst the comments and criticisms received by the Consultative Committee. 
The subject divides itself into two sections: 
(a) acquisition of Federal Citizenship by operation of law; 
(b) acquisition of Federal Citizenship by application. 
The Consultative Committee recorded their conclusions in paragraphs 12 and 13 of 
Part III.A. of their report. 
32. As regards acquisition of Citizenship by operation of law, two Chinese 
members of the Committee recommended that the provisions should be widened so 
as to enable Citizenship to be acquired by operation of law by any British subject or 
Protected Person born in either of the Settlements or any of the Malay States or any 
other British territories whether before on or after the appointed day who is 
permanently resident in the Settlements or any of the Malay States. The conclusion 
of the other 7 members of the Committee, after prolonged consideration and 
discussion of the representations received, was, however, in favour of accepting the 
provisions of the draft Federation Agreement (Clause 128). 
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The Constitutional Working Committee discussed at length the question of 
widening the provisions in the draft Federation Agreement and their conclusion was 
that they could not recommend the adoption of the considerable extension advocated 
by the 2 Chinese members of the Consultative Committee. In view, however, of the 
fact that a number of British subjects born in the Settlements of Penang and Malacca 
having become permanently resident not in the Settlements but in a Malay State, 
provision should be made for them to acquire Citizenship by operation of law and the 
necessary amendment should be made to Clause 128(1)(b) of the draft Federation 
Agreement which would thus give Federal Citizenship by operation of law to "any 
British subject born in either of the Settlements whether before, on or after the 
appointed day who is permanently resident in the territories now to be comprised in 
the Federation." This amendment was acceptable to the Plenary Conference and a 
consequential amendment will be needed in Clause 128(3)(c) of the draft Federation 
Agreement. I recommend this modification to His Majesty 's Government for their 
approval. 
33. As regards acquisition of Federal Citizenship by application, the Consultative 
Committee endorsed the provisions in the draft Federation Agreement, except that 
they considered the qualifying period under Clause 129(1) (a) to be over-long, and 
they recommended that an application for Federal Citizenship should be able to be 
considered if the applicant had been born in any of the territories of the Federation 
and had been resident for 5 out of the 10 years preceding his application (instead of 
10 out of 15 years), and that in the case of an applicant who had not been born in the 
Federation it should be sufficient that he had been resident for 8 out of the 15 years 
preceding his application (instead of 15 out of 20 years). 
On the recommendation of the Working Committee, the Plenary Conference was 
not willing to cut the residence qualification so far, but they agreed to reduce to 8 
out of 12 years the qualifying period necessary for applicants born in the Federation. 
This modification in favour of those who were born in the Federal territory seems to 
myself and my advisers a fair and reasonable one and we agree also that in the case of 
those born elsewhere, 15 out of 20 years is not an undue period of residence for 
testing the genuine nature of claims that homes and loyalties have been permanently 
transferred to Malaya. 
34. Two further points affecting the Citizenship proposals were discussed at the 
Plenary Conference, and are recommended for His Majesty's Government's accept-
ance, namely 
(I) that provision should be made for applicants to be not less than 18 years of age 
at the time of their application; and 
(2) that the provision, recommended in the Consultative Committee's report, that 
applicants of not less than 45 years of age, who have had 20 years residence in 
Malaya and who apply within 2 years of the inauguration of the new Constitution, 
should be exempted from the language qualification. 
35. Official languages 
There is a keen and growing desire on the part of Their Highnesses and the Malay 
representatives that the Malay language should be recognised as having an equal 
status with English in a Federal Constitution. This feeling was fully appreciated both 
in the Working Committee and in the Plenary Conference itself, but it was also 
recognised that considerable administrative inconvenience and delay would be 
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caused if every Council document had to be printed in two languages. It was 
therefore considered that both in the case of the Federal Executive Council (Clause 
35 of the draft Federation Agreement) and the Legislative Council (Clause 66) the 
present provision should be altered to read that the official languages should be 
English and Malay provided that anything which is required to be printed or reduced 
into writing should be expressed in the English language. At the same time the 
Working Committee drew attention to Clause 60 under which the Council would 
have power to regulate its own proceedings, and it was agreed that this clause could 
be invoked for the purpose of making regulations regarding the use of either 
language in the Legislative Council and for the translation of documents. I 
recommend that these amendments of Clauses 35 and 66 should be accepted. 
36. District judges 
The reorganisation of the Courts system which has been effected since the liberation 
of Malaya included the institution of District Courts, with limited jurisdiction, as 
part of the judicial system of the Malayan Union and the District Judges were 
required to have professional legal qualifications. At the same time the pre-war 
system of First Class and Second Class Magistrates (without legal qualifications) was 
discontinued in favour of a single class of magistrates with jurisdiction more limited 
than that of District Judges and with powers 
(a) in civil cases corresponding to those of First Class Magistrates 
(b) in criminal cases less than the pre-war First Class but more than the pre-war 
Second Class Magistrates. 
37. This decision has been much criticised on the Malay part on the ground that 
few Malays in the present phase had been able to acquire full legal qualifications and, 
secondly, that the restriction of the sphere of the magistrates has had a directly 
adverse effect on the eligibility of Malays for higher judicial appointments, since the 
First Class magistracies have been discontinued and the District Judgeships require 
full legal qualifications. Further, they point out that the magistrates were before the 
war State Officers appointed by the Ruler of the State, whereas District Judges are 
part of the central Judiciary and appointed by the Governor, so that, in addition to 
the complaint of lack of opportunity for Malays for higher judicial appointments, the 
change has raised a political question of importance as affecting the Ruler's authority 
as the fount of justice in his own State. These views were exhaustively considered by 
the Constitutional Working Committee without however their being able to agree on 
any satisfactory solution; but in the Plenary Conference further analysis of the 
position revealed a possible solution on the lines of making a marked distinction 
between what are now known as District Judges on the one hand and the Magistrates 
on the other. A solution on these lines would involve a reconstruction of the present 
judicial system in the following respects. 
38. There would be First and Second Class Magistrates with the pre-war powers 
provided under the Courts Enactment of the Federated Malay States, and such 
Magistrates would be appointed by the Ruler of the State and would not need to 
possess legal qualifications. The Federal Judiciary would consist of Judges of the 
Supreme Court with powers of punishment limited by law only, and another class of 
Judges, who for the sake of clarity may for this purpose be referred to as "Sessions 
Judges", with jurisdiction up to 7 years and powers of punishment up to 3 years. The 
"Sessions Judges" would be appointed by the High Commissioner and together with 
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the Chief Justice and Supreme Court Judges would form the Federal Judiciary. The 
"Sessions Judges", if this solution were to meet the present Malayan objections, 
would need to carry out their functions separately from the State magisterial system 
and to sit elsewhere than in the Magistrates' Court and to be provided with their own 
necessary subordinate staffs. 
39. I have discussed these proposals with the Chief Justice who is prepared to 
accept them with certain modifications. In the light of these proposals the judicial 
system recommended by the Chief Justice is briefly as follows:-
(A) A Federal Judicial Department consisting of the Supreme Court, District 
Courts (in the Federation to be known as "State Courts" in the Malay States and as 
"Settlement Courts" in the Settlement of Penang and Malacca), and First Class 
Magistrates' Courts. 
The Judges of the Supreme Court, District Judges (in the Federation to be called 
"Presidents of State or Settlement Courts", as the case may be) and First Class 
Magistrates to be under the control of the Chief Justice as head of the Judiciary. 
Supreme Court Judges and Presidents of State or Settlement Courts to be 
appointed by the High Commissioner; full-time First Class Magistrates to be 
appointed by the High Commissioner on the advice of the Chief Justice in the 
Settlements and by the Ruler on the advice of the Chief Justice in each Malay 
State. 
This would have the advantage that, full-time First Class Magistrates would 
partake fully of the independence of the judiciary by reason of the authority which 
the Chief Justice would exercise in respect of their functions. 
In addition to the full-time First Class Magistrates, all District Officers shall be 
ex-officio First Class Magistrates but they will not form part of the Judicial 
Department. 
(B) The jurisdiction of State and Settlement Courts to be:-
(a) Civil:-Not exceeding 1,000 dollars as at present. 
(b) Criminal:-Power to try offences where the maximum imprisonment does 
not exceed 7 years or which are punishable with fine only, as opposed to the 
present jurisdiction to try offences where the maximum imprisonment does not 
exceed 4 years or which are punishable with fine only. Powers of punishment, as 
regards imprisonment to be increased from 2 years, as at present, to 3 years. 
(C) The jurisdiction of First Class Magistrates' Courts to be:-
(a) Civil:-Not exceeding 500 dollars. 
(b) Criminal:-Power to try offences where the maximum imprisonment does 
not exceed 3 years or which are punishable with fine only, as opposed to the 
present jurisdiction of Magistrates to try offences where the maximum impris-
onment does not exceed 1 year or which are punishable with fine only. Powers of 
punishment, as regards imprisonment, to be increased from 6 months, as at 
present, to 12 months. 
Note:-This jurisdiction accords with the pre-war jurisdiction of First Class 
Magistrates in the Federated Malay States. 
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(D) The jurisdiction of Second Class Magistrates' Courts to be:-
(a) Civil:-Not exceeding 250 dollars. 
(b) Criminal:-Power to try offences where the maximum imprisonment does 
not exceed 12 months or which are punishable with fine only, which is the 
present jurisdiction of Magistrates. Powers of punishment, as regards imprison-
ment, to be reduced from 6 months, the present powers of the Magistrates, to 3 
months. 
Note:-This jurisdiction accords with the pre-war jurisdiction of Second Class 
Magistrates in the Federated Malay States. 
agree with the scheme outlined by the Chief Justice and recommend its 
acceptance. I attach considerable importance to full-time First Class Magistrates 
coming under his control and thus being independent of the Executive. Moreover 
this scheme presents the special advantage that it would provide clear opportunities 
for Malay officers with a bent for law to qualify for promotion in the ladder of 
full-time judicial appointments up to the Supreme Court Bench itself. 
Accordingly I seek permission to place this scheme before Their Highnesses the 
Rulers for their acceptance. 
I might add that it is a matter of agreement between Their Highnesses and the 
Malay leaders and this Government, and a view shared by the Chief Justice, that 
means should be devised to facilitate legal studies by promising Malay officers, so 
that they may acquire in increasing numbers those full professional qualifications 
which are necessary to preside in Courts of more extensive jurisdiction. 
40. Interpretation of the federation agreement 
Local criticisms have been expressed that the Interpretation Tribunal to be set up 
under Clause 158 of the draft Federation Agreement might consist of two laymen 
under the chairmanship of the Chief Justice (or presiding Judge). As the decision was 
to be by majority, it would, therefore, be possible for the Chief Justice (or presiding 
Judge) to be outvoted by laymen on a point of law. It was also objected that there was 
no appeal from decisions of the Tribunal. It was suggested by one of the Bar 
Associations that the members of the Tribunal should be Judges of the Supreme 
Court and that there should be provision for appeals. 
41. The Working Committee considered these objections and maintained its 
previous view that to provide for appeals from the decisions of the Interpretation 
Tribunal would not be desirable as tending to uncertainty and delay. With regard to 
the other objection, the Working Committee considered that there were occasions 
when laymen might usefully be appointed to the Tribunal and that to confine the 
membership in all cases to Judges of the Supreme Court would be unduly restrictive, 
besides involving serious inroads upon judicial time. The Working Committee had 
little doubt that lay members would, in practice, take their law from the Chief Justice 
or presiding Judge. After discussion the Working Committee decided to recommend, 
by way of compromise, that the Tribunal to decide any question of interpretation of 
the Constitution arising in Court proceedings and referred to the Tribunal under 
sub-clause (3) of the clause, should consist of the Chief Justice (or a Judge of the 
Supreme Court to be appointed by him) as Chairman and two members who should 
either be Judges of the Supreme Court or possess the qualifications required by law 
to be possessed by a Judge of the Supreme Court, and that in other respects the 
clause should remain as drawn. 
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This solution was endorsed by the Plenary Conference and has my support. 
42. Powers reserved to His Majesty and sovereignty and jurisdiction of Their 
Highnesses the Rulers 
Clause 159 of the Federation Agreement reads as follows:-
"Power reserved 
to His Majesty 
159. Nothing in this Agreement shall affect the power of 
His Majesty or the Imperial Parliament to make laws 
from time to time relating to the defence or external 
affairs of the Federation or shall affect His Majesty's 
sovereignty and jurisdiction in and over the Settle-
ments." 
In the discussions in the Working Committee the Malay representatives proposed 
that this clause be amended by adding the words:-
"and nothing in this Agreement shall prejudice the sovereignty and independ-
ence of the Rulers of the Malay States." 
Their view was that the clause as it stood was one-sided in that it preserved His 
Majesty's powers, but not those of the Rulers: if His Majesty had powers, so had the 
Rulers and they also should be mentioned. 
It was pointed out by the iegal members of the Committee that the powers of His 
Majesty as the Protecting Power and of the Imperial Parliament to make laws relating 
to the defence and external affairs of the Federation were admitted, and that the 
object of saving His Majesty's sovereignty and jurisdiction in and over the Settle-
ments was to enable His Majesty to continue to legislate for the Settlements by Order 
in Council, notwithstanding any delegation which might have been, or might be, 
made in setting up Constitutional arrangements in the Settlements. As regards the 
powers of the Rulers, the amendment as put forward was unacceptable, because the 
Federation Agreement would, in fact, necessarily affect the sovereignty and inde-
pendence of the Rulers of the Malay States. 
After considerable discussion, it was agreed to leave Clause 159 of the Federation 
Agreement as drawn and, subject to the reservation mentioned below, to insert a new 
Clause 160 in the following terms:-
"Sovereignty and juris-
diction of Their High-
nesses the Rulers. 
160. Save as expressed herein, nothing in this 
Agreement shall affect the sovereignty and juris-
diction of Their Highnesses the Rulers in their 
several States." 
The position of the Government representatives with regard to this amendment 
was reserved and it was expressly stated that, as important questions of constitution-
al law and practice were involved, the suggested amendment would require to be 
considered by yourself and your Legal Adviser in London. 
43. Appointment of high commissioner 
As drawn, the draft Federation Agreement (Clause 7) provides for the appointment of 
the High Commissioner to be made by Commission under His Majesty's Sign Manual 
and Signet. The Malay representatives asked that an amendment be made by adding 
the words "with the concurrence of Their Highnesses the Rulers" . The reason 
advanced for the suggestion was that, as the proposed Federation would be a 
partnership between His Majesty and Their Highnesses the Rulers and as each would 
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delegate powers to the High Commissioner who was, therefore, the representative of 
all, each should concur in appointment the joint representative. In reply it was 
pointed out that it was universal practice throughout His Majesty's dominions, 
Protectorates and Protected States to leave His Majesty's prerogative in the 
appointment of His representative unfettered, that this was a matter which affected 
His Majesty's prerogative as the Protecting Power and that the proposal could not be 
adopted without affecting His Majesty's prerogative which was everywhere unim-
paired: the difficulty was that the person of the High Commissioner could not be split 
and it was difficult to see how so considerable a constitutional innovation could be 
accepted by His Majesty's Government. 
I am advised that having regard to the constitutional significance of this matter I 
can do no more than transmit the proposal for your consideration. 
44. On the revenue and financial aspects of the draft Federation Agreement there 
has been no local expression of criticism, but an amendment to the second schedule 
of that Agreement (matters with respect to which the Federal Legislative Council has 
power to pass laws) was reviewed in the Constitutional Working Committee and is 
recommended for adoption viz. that Item 137 in that schedule should be expanded to 
read:-
"Exchange control; control of capital issues; taxes on remittances abroad." 
The intention in thus expanding this item was simply to define the authority which 
would be empowered, if it were at any time necessary after the Federation had come 
into operation, to legislate in the field of those matters, for instance, in an 
emergency for the defence of sterling; the amendment is not to be taken as itself 
indicating a present intention to adopt any particular fresh policies. 
45. An amendment of the third schedule of the draft Federation Agreement 
(sources of revenue of States and Settlements) is considered to be necessary in 
respect of Item 7. The revenues of Municipalities established under the Municipal 
Ordinance in Penang and Malacca accrue to the Municipal Commissioners and not to 
Government and it is not intended that this system should be altered. Accordingly 
Item 7 in that schedule should be amended to read:-
"Revenues of Town Boards, Rural Boards and similar local authorities, other 
than Municipalities established under any Municipal Ordinance." 
46. Provision is made in the Federation Agreement whereby State and Settlement 
Constitutions shall be framed in conformity with that Agreement. The main details 
of the State Constitutions are in process of being considered with a view to 
formulation in full as soon as His Majesty's Government decide to approve the 
Federation scheme as now recommended. Proposals for constitutional arrangements 
for the Settlements of Penang and Malacca are also under consideration; to a large 
extent these arrangements would be based on Part VII of the Malayan Union Order in 
Council, 1946, adapted to conform with the Federation scheme. 
47. It remains for me to express my sense of indebtedness to those who have 
given their skill and overtime and patience to the delicate task of working out these 
constitutional proposals in circumstances of strain and dislocated conditions in this 
country. A spirit of compromise and political reality has animated the discussions of 
the Constitutional Working Committee and of the Consultative Committee, and it is 
not a mean feat that general agreement has been reached over so wide an area of the 
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Federation scheme in the findings of those two committees. There has become more 
and more apparent in these last few months an appreciation amongst all communi-
ties that the most important need is that decisions should be taken and a substantive 
Constitution established with the least possible delay, so that Malaya could pass on 
from the present transitional phase of constitutional arrangements. I may, for 
instance, refer to the resolution of the Penang Settlement Advisory Council on the 
17th April, 1947, following upon their consideration of the report of the Consultative 
Committee on the Constitutional Proposals for Malaya. The Council's resolution was 
in the following terms:-
"That this Council is unanimously in favour of accepting the Constitutional 
Proposals in order to facilitate the early establishment of a stable Govern-
ment." 
It is generally recognised that the Constitution will need amendment from time to 
time in the future to meet the developing conditions of a progressive society, and 
that it must fall to the Federal, State and Settlement authorities to show themselves 
responsive to the will of the people as those developments require. The wide field of 
operation of the Federal Legislature under the scheme now proposed will ensure the 
strong central authority which is one of the fundamental objectives of His Majesty's 
Government and is no less appreciated to be necessary by Their Highnesses the 
Rulers and the leaders of all sections of the people in Malaya. The considerable part 
which Unofficial Members will take in the Federal Legislature should ensure that 
lively and progressive policies will be followed. 
124 CO 537/2142, no 104 11 May 1947 
[Federation proposals]: despatch no 11 from SirE Gent to Mr Creech 
Jones 
With reference to my Confidential despatch of even date1 in which I have submitted 
to you my report on the outcome of the discussions on the Constitutional Proposals 
for a Federation of Malaya, I have the honour to inform you that I have drafted that 
despatch with the possibility in mind that you may in due course decide that it 
should be p~blished at some time. Accordingly I think it as well to transmit also to 
you along with it this Secret despatch in which I may throw light on certain features 
of the Confidential despatch and of the proposed Constitutional scheme in general. 
2. First, I annex a copy of the record of the Plenary Conference at King's House 
on the 24th of April.2 That Plenary Conference, attended by His Excellency the 
Governor-General, Their Highnesses the Malay Rulers, their advisers and the 
members of the Constitutional Working Committee, received and considered the 
April report of the Constitutional Working Committee, a copy of which is annexed to 
my Confidential despatch of even date, and in the main the Conference endorsed 
those recommendations and discussed certain additional points which arose in the 
course of the examination of the Working Committee's report. 
3. In my Confidential despatch I have explained how basic is the racial factor of 
1 See 123. 2 Annexes not printed. 
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the present social and political organisation of Malaya, and it is regrettably the case 
in present conditions that both on the side of the Malay and non-Malay communities 
the whole stress is in fact on community representation. In the hope that it will be 
possible to weaken this feeling and convert it into channels more beneficial to the 
future development of the country I have recommended that His Majesty's Govern-
ment should admit the conception of occupational representation which will tend to 
deflect the attention of all communities from a straight system of racial representa-
tion. 
4. In the case of the Malays the racial feeling is particularly sensitive in respect of 
Chinese, and to a slightly lesser extent Indians; their feeling is not so strong vis-a-vis 
Europeans and Eurasians, but, nevertheless, it is clear that they will place no 
reliance on a European or Eurasian vote in a future Legislative Council in matters 
which they regard as of vital interest to them such as Immigration and a future 
electoral system. It will be necessary, therefore, to bear in mind that any adjustment 
of the non-Malay figures in the proposed composition of the Legislative Council 
would be closely scrutinised by them from the point of view of racial representation 
and, for instance, an increase of Chinese or Indian membership at the expense of 
European or Eurasian would not find acceptance as far as the Malays are concerned. 
5. The Malay majority amongst the Unofficial membership of the Council which I 
have brought myself to recommend is designed to include not less than 2 Malay 
Labour Members who, it is generally supposed, would be sought in the ranks of the 
Malay Nationalist Party. That Party, as you will be aware; has an uncertain 
association with Indonesian Nationalist and Chinese extreme left-wing groups in 
Malaya and is not regarded by the majority of Malays as reliably supporting true 
Malay interests, and the Malay representatives of the Working Committee and the 
Plenary Conference have therefore pressed for a clear majority in the Council which 
would not include the 2 members if selected from Malay Nationalist Party circles to 
represent Malay labour. Nevertheless, I and my advisers feel that sufficient weight 
will have been given to Malay claims if a simple Malay majority is provided and that 
the Malay Nationalist Party Wing of Malay opinion, small and possibly extreme as it 
may be at present, cannot reasonably be accounted otherwise than as part of the 
Malay representation; and indeed it is not improbable, or wholly undesirable, that 
that section of Malay opinion may acquire increased support in the months and years 
to come amongst the Malay peoples. 
6. The Consultative Committee in Section A (iii), paragraph 16, of their Report 
made a recommendation in respect of the equal eligibility of Federal Citizens for 
employment in the services of the Federal Government. This is, of course, a subject 
of great delicacy and the recommendation was not unskilfully evaded in the April 
report of the Working Committee (paragraph 29). It is possible to adopt the line 
which the Working Committee recommended and which in effect would mean to 
defer the question for the consideration in relation to the various branches of the 
Service; and in all the circumstances this solution would indeed avoid some at least 
of the difficulties which are raised by the general issue. At present it is a fact that in 
some Departments, and particularly the professional and technical Departments, 
there is a majority of non-Malay officers; but on the other hand, if the Malays had any 
reason to suppose that in the Administrative Service, in particular, there was likely to 
be any considerable admission of Federal Citizens of Chinese or Indian race, it would 
be likely to compromise seriously the prospect of their accepting the present 
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proposals. I therefore strongly advise that the matter should be left by His Majesty's 
Government as recommended by the Working Committee, and that no comprehen-
sive promise should be given that all Federal Citizens would be equally eligible for 
admission to all Public Services of the Federation. 
7. In paragraph 39 of my confidential despatch I referred to the issue of the 
District Judge system and to certain modifications of the proposals made at the 
Plenary Conference which I have recommended in agreement with the Chief Justice 
and my advisers. I attach to this despatch a memorandum by the Chief Justice setting 
out the recommended scheme in greater detail and the arguments in support of it. I 
include this memorandum in this Secret despatch, rather than in my Confidential 
despatch, as it would in certain respects be inadvisable to make it public should a 
decision be taken to publish the latter. 
8. In your telegram 1719 of the 28th November, 1946, you referred to the present 
Naturalisation Enactment of the Federated Malay States and its relation to the 
Citizenship scheme for the proposed Federation of Malaya. The distinction between 
national status and Citizenship has been maintained throughout the discussions on 
the Federation proposals. The act of obtaining naturalisation as the subject of a Ruler 
would under the present Constitutional proposals carry with it the status of 
Citizenship. This facility is, of course, under the Enactment open to persons of any 
racial origin, and it may be considered not unreasonable that a person complying 
with the provisions of the Enactment, including the taking of an oath of allegiance to 
the State Ruler, should thus qualify for Citizenship after a shorter period of residence 
than one who has not chosen to acquire such national status in the country. The 
distinction between a person naturalised as the subject of a Malay Ruler and a person 
naturalised in one of the Settlements as a British subject is in my view justified by 
the fact that the latter is not thereby committing himself, as is the former, to a 
national status particularly related to, and confined to, Malaya, but to the wider 
concept of British nationality. Subject to your instructions, therefore, I do not 
propose that the provisions of the Naturalisation Enactment should . be specially 
amended in connection with the Citizenship proposals. 
9. The question of the eventual incorporation of Singapore in the proposed 
Federation has been the subject of telegraphic communication between yourself and 
His Excellency the Governor-General-see your telegram to him repeated to me as 
No. 596. The policy agreed upon for recommendation to you in respect of the method 
and timing of investigating the question was set out in the Governor-General's 
telegram to you No. G.G. 123 of 28th April;3 I feel that at this juncture I cannot 
usefully add to the views expressed in that telegram, and I note that you will consider 
the matter further in the light of the Constitutional arrangements for the proposed 
Federation which I am now submitting to you. 
10. The question referred to in paragraph 41 of my despatch led to a consequent 
issue being raised in the Working Committee and later in the Plenary Conference, 
namely, the question of expressly restoring the prerogatives of each Ruler in his 
State. I am advised that at any rate it will be desirable, and perhaps essential, 
expressly to restore sufficient prerogative to each Ruler to enable him to promulgate 
the Constitution of his State; and it will probably be desirable expressly to restore to 
each Ruler the prerogatives, power and jurisdiction which the Ruler of the State 
3 See 121. 
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possessed on, say, the 1st of December, 1941 viz. before the Japanese occupation and 
the MacMichael Agreements. This could probably best be effected by inserting a 
Clause in the Model State Agreement on the following lines:-
"Sovereignty of the 
Ruler. 
2. The prerogatives, power and jurisdiction of 
His Highness within the State of . . . shall be 
those which he (or his predecessor where there 
has been a change) possessed on the first day of 
December, 1941, subject nevertheless to the pro-
visions of this Agreement and of the Federation 
Agreement." 
11. Finally, I would refer to the important matter of the order of procedure in 
which these Constitutional Proposals would be put into effect if they are found to be 
acceptable by His Majesty's Government. In paragraph 24 of the December report of 
the Constitutional Working Committee and paragraph 24 of the Legal Report by the 
Attorney-General of the 14th November, 1946 (see my secret despatch 162 of the 
14th November, 1946), the order of events proposed was there set out, and I am 
advised that there is nothing in the revision of the proposals which would require 
that order to be modified. 
125 CO 537/2171, no 85 22 May 1947 
[Labour policies in the Malayan Union and Singapore]: inward 
savingram no 6 from Mr M J MacDonald to Mr Creech Jones1 
Reference your secret telegram 230 on the subject of Labour Policy, following is the 
report promised in para. 1 of my secret telegram 154 of the 21st. May:-
1. Subsequent to Governor-General's Conference of 11th. March action was taken 
on the Governor-General's instructions (see Page 13 of conference minutes) to 
endeavour to reconcile the conflicting views of the legal officers of the two 
administrations as to the eligibility of Federations of Trade Unions to be registered 
themselves as Trade Unions. The result of these discussions is summarized in 
attached copy of a minute by Attorney-General, Singapore.2 
2. The Singapore Government accepted the advice of the Attorney-General and 
the way then became clear for federations to be registered in the Colony in the same 
way as they were already being accepted for registration in the Malayan Union. 
Uniformity of legal interpretation in this important matter was thereby secured. 
3. At the same time the two Governments agreed to follow a uniform policy in 
administering the law in so far as it related to the registration of federations by 
agreeing to insist that before federations can qualify for registration the Registrar 
must be satisfied that the Unions wishing to federate are themselves already 
registered Unions and have passed resolutions recording their decision to form a 
federation or affiliate with an existing federation . A copy of the official statement of 
the Singapore Government's policy in this matter is attached. This statement was 
issued on 23rd. April. Incidentally an order has now been issued whereby Trade 
Unions can legally contribute to a Federation. 
1 cf 122; also 117. 2 Annexes not printed. 
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4. In the Malayan Union the Registrar of Trade Unions informed all Trade Unions 
between the 24th. of January and the 15th. of February that it would be necessary for 
him to be satisfied that individual registered Trade Unions had resolved to join a 
Federation by the majority ballot vote and that their rules permitted a contribution 
to be made to such a Federation. Pending such action by individual Trade Unions, 
the applications made by 11 State Federation of Trade Unions for Registration were 
allowed to stand on the Registrar's books. The draft rules and regulations of the 
Pan-Malayan Federation of Trade Unions provided for a Federation of State 
Federations none of which have yet completed the formalities required for registra-
tion. 
5. In Singapore representatives of the Singapore Federation of Trade Unions 
(whose application for registration in its existing form has been rejected, pending its 
reorganisation to enable it to comply with the conditions stated above) are now 
discussing with the Registrar ways and means of effecting this reorganisation. They 
are being given a reasonable time to put their house in order and negotiations with 
the Registrar are at present proceeding in a friendly spirit. 
6. Provided that a certain amount of "face" can be saved there is no reason at the 
moment to suppose that they will not comply with the conditions imposed which will 
result in the formation of a normal federation consisting entirely of legally registered 
Trade Unions. ' 
7. If on the other hand the present negotiations were to break down or if the 
present Singapore Federation of Trade Unions were to interfere actively in any trade 
dispute in defiance of Section 18 of the Trade Unions Ordinance, then a serious 
situation would arise in that it might be necessary to prosecute the organisation as 
an illegal Trade Union. 
8. The question of "saving face" does not arise in the Malayan Union as 
Federations were never left in doubt of the fact that they themselves would have to 
register as soon as Trade Unions wishing to federate to them had themselves 
registered. 
9. After the incidents in Kedah and, on a minor scale, incidents in Selangor, the 
firm action by the Police resulted in an increase in public confidence which was 
shown by the number of idividuals who came forward and laid information leading to 
prosecution for intimdation. The Federation of Trade Unions are taking all possible 
measures to complete their registration and the present calm may be attributed to 
this fact. The possibility, however, of a recrudescence of strikes in the future is not to 
be overlooked. 
126 CO 537/2142, no 110 29 May 1947 
[Federation proposals]: inward telegram no 160 from Mr M J MacDo-
nald to Mr Creech Jones 
1. I have been in touch with Sir Edward Gent throughout the discussions of the 
last few months on constitutional proposals and, as you know, attended the Plenary 
Conference with Malay Rulers and leaders on 26th April. I discussed with Gent the 
general terms of his confidential despatch No. 1191 and secret despatch of 11th May2 
1 See 123. 2 See 124. 
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before these were drafted. I agree with his recommendations with the solitary 
exception of that concerning numerical representation of the various communities 
in the Legislative Council. On that I should like to put forward a slightly different 
alternative suggestion. This is referred to in paragraph 4 below. 
2. I would also like to make comments on two other points. First, it is desirable 
that, following the long discussions which have taken place, final decisions should 
now be taken as early as possible. I need not labour the point, for the desirability of it 
is obvious and most members of all communities here are anxious for the matter to 
be settled and action to be taken very soon to put the new constitution into effect. In 
the Plenary Conference, Dato Onn expressed some apprehension on this point, 
fearing His Majesty's Government and Parliament might not take the decisions 
before Parliament rises for the summer recess. You will see from the minutes that 
Gent and I assured him that Parliamentary debate was likely to take place well before 
that. 
3. Second point concerns Malay request that, before a High Commissioner is 
appointed, the Rulers should concur in his appointment. I agree that this is a matter 
touching the King's Prerogative, on which we should not and cannot formally meet 
them. But they feel the point strongly and I think there is some (?group omitted) in 
their contention that, as the new proposals envisage a partnership in some respects 
between His Majesty and their Highnesses, and as the High Commissioner is to be 
the Rulers' representative in many matters and is to have powers delegated to him by 
the Rulers, they should have something, somehow to do with his appointment. I 
venture to suggest that we might go some way to show recognition of all this by 
assuring them, in whatever is the appropriate way, that before a High Commission-
er's name is submitted to the King for appointment, it shall be communicated 
informally to the Rulers, so as to make sure that they have no positive objection to 
the man. I believe that some such practice is followed when a new United Kingdom 
Ambassador is about to be appointed to a foreign state. This presumably does not 
involve any infringement of the King's Prerogative in appointing his Ambassador. I 
realise that the cases are not parallel, but cannot as a layman in these matters detect 
any practical objection to the proposal. Rulers and U.M.N.O. leaders will not be 
wholly satisfied with it, but it will to some extent please them. 
4. Point on which I should like to suggest a possible alternative to Gent's 
recommendations is the following. He recommends in paragraph 17 of his confiden-
tial despatch that "The number and distribution of the seats in the Legislative 
Council recommended in the April Report of the Working Committee and endorsed 
by the Plenary Conference should be adopted with the modification that two 
additional Malay members should be appointed under the categories of agriculture 
and husbandry". I suggest that only one additional Malay member should be 
appointed and that the number of unofficial Europeans should be reduced by one. 
This would reduce the European representation to the number recommended by the 
Cheeseman Committee. 
5. My reasons for this suggestion are as follows :-
(a) We shall be criticised by our critics in some of the domiciled communities, 
especially the Chinese, for our proposals about the distribution of seats amongst 
the various communities in the Legislative Council. The closer we stick to the 
Cheeseman recommendations, the less effective criticism will be. I maintain that 
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we shall open ourselves to rather unfortunate criticism if our deviation from the 
Cheeseman recommendations consists of bumping up the Malay representation by 
two and the European by one whilst reducing the Chinese. Critics will claim that 
this is indeed an unholy alliance of British and Malays against the other 
communities. They will add that it is a British trick to maintain British Imperialist 
domination in Malaya. I do not wish to exaggerate the importance of this, for we 
shall get that sort of criticism from extremists in any case. But I fear that the 
proposal under reference will give them ammunition on this point which they can 
shoot off quite effectively. 
(b) In any case, I think that the European representation is too high. We should 
remember that, in addition to unofficial Europeans, there will be a considerable 
representation of ex-officio and official European members. 
(c) My suggestion, like Gent's retains a situation in which Malay representatives 
have a clear majority over all other members excluding ex-officio and official 
representatives. I firmly support Gent's arguments and recommendations con-
cerning this. 
6. There is much to be said for the figures suggested by Gent. In particular, it 
should be pointed out that it was the Malays, not ourselves, who suggested the 
additional European members. But on balance, I personally favour the figures 
suggested in paragraph 4 above. I have shown this telegram to Gent, who concurs in 
my sending it for your consideration and who fully agrees with the points made in 
paragraphs 2 and 3 above. But he does not agree with my proposal in paragraph 4, 
although he appreciates my supporting reasons. In particular, he feels that European 
unofficial interests are of sufficient importance to warrant what he has recom-
mended, and are or should be in no way represented particularly by official or 
ex-officio members. He agrees with me as to the likely criticism on the part of the 
Chinese and Indians, but feels that my proposed reduction of Malay and European 
representation will not appease that criticism to the extent that it will provoke Malay 
and European criticism also. 
Gent and I are meeting in ten days time. In the meantime, we are preparing a 
telegram giving our appreciation of the likely effect on public opinion in Malaya of 
the revised constitutional proposals, if they are adopted. We are sending you this as 
soon as we have completed it, probably on 9th June. 
127 CO 537/2142, nos 111-112 11 June 1947 
[Federation proposals]: outward telegram no 738 from Mr Creech 
Jones to SirE Gent 
Your despatch No. 119 Confidential, and your despatch No. 11 Secret. See also 
Governor-General's telegram addressed to me as No. 160.1 
Constitutional proposals. 
I am most grateful for the full and clear manner in which you have set out the 
results of your latest consultations with the Malay Rulers and representatives, and I 
wish to congratulate you and all those associated with you on the manner in which 
1 See 123, 124, 126. 
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you have reconciled the need for some demonstrable advance as a result of the 
Cheeseman Committee's activities with a not always easy and sometimes intransi-
gent Malay attitude. Naturally I cannot say in advance what the views of my 
colleagues will be, but I see no reason to suppose that they will react unfavourably to 
a scheme on the lines which you now recommend, and I would propose to submit the 
proposals to them with the least possible delay. Before I do so, however, I should be 
grateful for your observations ~n the following points of major importance:-
(a) Appointment of high commissioner. See paragraph 43 of your despatch No. 
119 Confidential, and paragraph 5 of Record of Plenary Conference enclosed in 
your despatch No. 11 Secret. It appears to me that Malay representatives, in 
maintaining in spite of your explanation their insistence that Conference of Rulers 
should be consulted about appointment of High Commissioner, have not fully 
understood the position, and that if they had done so they would readily appreciate 
impossibility of their request. In the first place, High Commissioner will be His 
Majesty's representative not only in the Malay States but in the British Settlements 
of Penang and Malacca, and it is inconceivable that His Majesty should be bound to 
consult any third party in appointing his representative in territories within his 
own dominions. In the second place, while it is no doubt true that the High 
Commissioner will in some measure exercise powers delegated by both His 
Majesty and the Rulers he will nonetheless remain, in a fundamental sense, in 
relation to the Malay States the representative of His Majesty and His Majesty 
alone-namely, for the purpose of carrying out His Majesty's obligation to protect 
those States. This is an obligation undertaken at the request of the Malays 
themselves. There is thus no question of "dictation", as contended by Dato Onn at 
Plenary Conference. The Malays cannot on the one hand ask His Majesty to 
continue to protect their country while denying him, on the other hand, the power 
to choose, at his own discretion, the representative lo whom he will entrust this 
task. I hope that you will be able to inform me that the Malays, in the light of these 
further explanations, have dropped their request. 
I have noted Governor-General's suggestion in paragraph 3 of his telegram No. 
160, which may have to be considered in the last resort if the Malays remain 
obdurate. I should be most reluctant, however, to grant any concession at all in 
this matter. 
(b) Immigration. I note from paragraph 19 to 28 of your despatch No. 119 
Confidential that the Malay attitude on this subject has hardened, and that the 
Malay representatives now regard power to control immigration as a matter of life 
and death to the Malay people. I have considerable sympathy with the Malay 
apprehensions on this subject, but the recommendations in paragraph 28 of your 
Confidential despatch require elucidation. In the first place I assume intention is 
to grant the Malays a simple power of veto, to be exercised through a majority in 
the Legislative Council only in the last resort, over proposed changes in 
immigration policy, and not repeat not a power of initiating changes unhampered 
by the normal safeguards (e.g. High Commissioner's assent, High Commissioner's 
Reserved Power, His Majesty's Power of disallowance). If this is indeed the 
intention, wording of proposed amendment to Clause 75(3) of draft Federation 
Agreement would have to be clarified so as to prevent Conference of Rulers from 
putting forward positive proposals under the guise of "objecting" to Government 
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policy, and then claiming that future of these proposals must be determined by 
unofficial members of Legislative Council. Also unofficial members of Legislative 
Council would have to be prevented from injecting positive proposals into their 
resolutions. Moreover, I am not clear how suggested machinery would work in the 
various categories of cases which might arise. Any proposed changes in immigra-
tion policy will fall into two classes:-
(a) those involving administrative action, 
(b) those involving legislation. 
In cases where the Conference of Rulers agrees to the proposed change, 
presumably no difficulty will arise in relation to either of these classes. Adminis-
trative action or legislation, as the case may be, will proceed in the normal 
manner. Similarly, procedure seems fairly clear as regards proposed changes in 
class (a) above to which Conference of Rulers has objected. Resolution of unofficial 
members of Legislative Council will either confirm objection of Conference of 
Rulers (in which case proposals will be dropped), or uphold the High Commission 
(in which case administrative action will proceed). But what about proposals 
involving legislation, to which Conference of Rulers have objected? I assume it is 
not contemplated that legislation would nonetheless be introduced into Legisla-
tive Council, unofficial members alone voting upon it, and that their vote without 
any of usual safeguards would finally determine what this law was to be. This 
would surely be open to grave objections. Proposal is, I take it, that the unofficial 
members would first pass a simple resolution in effect approving or disapproving 
the introduction of a Bill to implement the High Commissioner's policy, and that 
the High Commissioner, if upheld, would thereafter introduce legislation, in the 
normal way and with all the normal safeguards maintained. 
In the second place, while you state that the power of His Majesty or the High 
Commissioner to implement any particular policy involving immigration which 
might be necessitated by His Majesty's responsibility for defence and external 
affairs would need to be safeguarded, you appear to make no actual suggestion how 
this essential point should be met. I should welcome your views on this . 
(c) Composition of Legislative Council. I see great force in the suggestion made 
by the Governor-General in his telegram No. 160 that the number of European 
unofficials should be reduced by one, and that only one additional Malay member 
should be added to the number recommended in the April Report of the Working 
Committee. I note that you have hitherto disagreed with this suggestion, but I 
should be grateful if you would consider it further and hope that on reflection you 
will feel able to accept it. 
(d) Citizenship by naturalisation as a subject of a ruler. See paragraph 8 of your 
despatch No. 11 Secret. Although, as you say, it is technically open to persons of 
any racial origin to become naturalised as subjects of a Malay Ruler, it cannot in 
fact be expected of Chinese, if only on account of religious scruples, that they 
should take this step. Nor can it be assumed that their application would be readily 
granted. Practical effects of continuance of present position would therefore be 
that Chinese, unless born in Malaya, must reside in the country for 15 years before 
they can hope to acquire citizenship, whereas certain others (e.g. immigrants 
from Indonesia) could acquire citizenship after 5 years' residence only. When 
Newboult and O'Connor were here last Christmas, I was given to understand that 
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there should be little difficulty in securing agreement of Rulers to necessary 
extension of qualifying period under F.M.S. naturalisation law, and I still regard it 
as important that this should be done. I think this will actually be in the interests 
of the Malays. There is bound in any case to be criticism to the effect that the 
Federation scheme unduly favours the Malays at the expense of the other 
communities. By and large such criticism has no (repeat no) justificiation, but 
failure to remove irritants of this kind will surely excite anti-Malay feeling and 
breed racial discord. 
(e) Status of British protected persons. This is not mentioned in your despatches, 
but I mention since it figured in conversation with Colonel Lee when he was 
recently in this country. As you know, it was the past practice of Malayan 
Government to treat all Chinese born in the Malay States as British Protected 
Persons for the purpose of granting passports. It is understood that this privilege 
was highly prized by Chinese, who would now be correspondingly alarmed if it 
were decided that privilege in question could only be granted to those possessing 
the much more rigorous qualifications required for Malayan citizenship. I should 
be glad if you would confirm or otherwise from your own knowledge Colonel Lee's 
impression that this factor will weigh largely with stable elements of Chinese 
population in accepting or rejecting citizenship proposals and indeed Federation 
scheme as a whole. 
2. My Legal Advisers are still considering memorandum by Chief Justice enclosed 
in your despatch No. 11 Secret, and comments will be sent as soon as possible. There 
are also a number of drafting points, of varying importance, whieh arise on proposals 
in their latest form, and on which I shall address you separately. In the meanwhile, I 
should be grateful for earliest possible comments on the five major points discussed 
above. 
128 CAB 129/19, CP(47)187 28 June 1947 
'Malayan policy': Cabinet memorandum by Mr Creech Jones. Annex: 
citizenship proposals 
On 5th December, 1946, my colleagues gave their provisional approval (C.M. (46) 
103rd Conclusions), to certain revised proposals (C.P. (46) 439)1 for a new Malayan 
Constitution, on "Federal" lines, which had resulted from the discussions of a local 
Working Committee representing the Malayan Union Government, the Malay Rulers 
and the principal Malay Political group (the United Malays National Organisation) . 
2. In conveying this provisional approval to the Governor of the Malayan Union, I 
made it clear that there was no question of His Majesty's Government giving their 
final approval to any proposals along these lines until all interested communities in 
the peninsula had been given full and free opportunity to express their views. 
Accordingly, in December 1946, the Governor appointed a Consultative Committee 
1 cf 109 and llO. 
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composed mainly of influential representatives of the non-Malay communities, 
which was instructed to hold meetings throughout the peninsula, to receive oral and 
written representations, to collate the evidence submitted to it, and to report the 
substance of this evidence to him with such comments and recommendations as they 
should think tit. 
3. After a series of meetings in various centres, the Consultative Committee 
presented its report to the Governor at the end of March 1947. It was not to be 
expected that the Federation proposals would escape all criticism, and in fact there 
sprang up from the outset a small but vocal section of opinion which rejected the 
proposals outright and which refused even to lay its views before the Consultative 
Committee. I am satisfied, however, that these elements, in spite of their extravagant 
claims, never represented more than a noisy minority amongst the population, and 
that the Consultative Committee, in recommending that the basis of the Federation 
proposals should be maintained (though with substantial modifications), spoke for 
the great bulk of the people, whose firm desire is to see the early establishment of a 
stable system of Government. It is noteworthy that the Governor's Advisory Council, 
in resolving early in April that the Consultative Committee's Report should be 
submitted for the consideration of the Malay Rulers and His Majesty's Government, 
expressed the unanimous view that the Committee had fulfilled His Majesty's 
Government's pledge of full and free consultation with all interested parties. 
4. The final stage in the local consultations-the consideration of the Consulta-
tive Committee's Report by the Malay Rulers and Representatives-duly took place in 
the latter part of April, and the Governor's comprehensive recommendations were 
submitted to me in May. Before describing briefly the main features of these 
recommendations, I should say a word about the political background against which 
the Governor has had to work. There has been no doubt that the Malay attitude, 
partly owing to the mere fact of enforced inactivity while the other communities 
were being consulted and partly owing to the more extreme Chinese and Indian 
points of view which were expressed during that consultation, hardened considerably 
during the early months of this year; and I therefore regard it as all the more 
remarkable that the Governor and those who have assisted him should have been 
able, by dint of patient persuasion, not only to hold their ground but to secure the 
agreement of the Malays to several notable advances on the earlier proposals. 
5. These earlier proposals, as my colleagues will recall, provided for a "Federation 
of Malaya" with a strong Central Government, having control over all matters of 
importance to the progress and welfare of the country as a whole, and for a form of 
common citizenship whose object was to afford political rights to all those, of 
whatever race or colour, who might fairly be held to regard Malaya as their true 
home and as the object of their loyalty. There has been no departure from these two 
fundamental principles of constitutional cohesion and common citizenship (which 
have throughout, of course, represented the basic objectives of His Majesty's 
Government in their whole Malayan policy), and this fact alone should, I think, 
influence us greatly in favour of accepting the scheme in its latest form. Having 
emphasised this general point, I have the following comments on matters of greater 
detail:-
(a) Introduction of an electoral system.- The original Federation proposals did 
not provide for the immediate introduction of elections, either in the Central 
Legislature or in the Legislatures of the individual States and Settlements. I accepted 
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this position in view of the practical difficulties in the way of the immediate 
establishment of an electoral system; but whereas the original proposals merely 
spoke in non-committal terms of the introduction of elections at a later date, there is 
now to be a firm undertaking that, as soon as circumstances and local conditions will 
permit, legislation should be introduced for the election of members both to the 
Central Legislature and to the State and Settlement Councils. I regard this as a 
welcome advance. 
(b) Citizenship.-The Consultative Committee recommended no fundamental 
change in the Citizenship provisions as set out in the original Federation proposals 
and as provisionally approved by my colleagues last December, but suggested that 
certain comparatively minor modifications should be effected, and in particular that 
the terms of application for citizenship, as opposed to automatic acquisition, should 
be made less onerous. The Malays have now gone some way, though not the whole 
way, towards meeting the Consultative Committee's suggestion. As the matter is 
inevitably somewhat complicated, I attach a brief tabular summary as an Annex to 
this memorandum. I regard it as particularly satisfactory that the Governor should 
have secured some modification, however slight, in the Malay attitude on this matter 
which they consider to be absolutely fundamental to their interests, and I am 
confident that the citizenship provisions, in the form in which they now stand, are 
designed to achieve the essential objective of common citizenship in Malaya as 
throughout upheld by His Majesty's Government. 
(c) Composition of central legislature.- The original "Federation" proposals 
envisaged a Central Legislature of forty-eight members, with an unofficial majority. 
On the unofficial side, the seats were to be so arranged that the Malay Representa-
tives (including the nine Malay Chief Ministers from the individual States, who 
would attend in virtue of their official State position but would nonetheless rank, at 
least for some purposes, as unofficials on the Central Legislature) would outnumber 
all other representatives by a small margin. The Consultative Committee recom-
mended a large increase in the size of the Council and in the preponderance of 
unofficial over official members, coupled with a slight readjustment in the balance of 
Malay and non-Malay representatives which would deprive the former of their base 
majority on the unofficial side of the Council. The Malays have now accepted the 
conception of a larger Council (numbering nearly eighty members) and a large 
unofficial majority, but have again insisted that the Malay representatives amongst 
the unofficial members should slightly outnumber all the rest. The Governor has 
recommended the acceptance of the Mal ay point of view in this matter, and I support 
his recommendation. The increase in the unofficial majority is an undoubted 
advance, and as regards the balance between Malay and non-Malay representatives, I 
do not consider that the Malays are asking more than is justified by their essential 
position in the country. In the absence of recent census figures, it cannot be said 
whether the Malays form an absolute majority of the population in the territories 
now comprising the Malayan Union; but there is no doubt that they form an absolute 
majority amongst those who really belong to the country, who will qualify for 
citizenship, and who are justified in demanding a stake in the country's future. 
My support for the Governor's recommendations is very closely linked, however, 
with the proposals for the early introduction of elections. In formulating his latest 
proposals for the basis of nomination of unofficial members of the Central 
Legislature, the Governor has been able to steer away from an overtly racial system. 
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That is to say, members will not be nominated as representing Malays, Chinese or . 
Indians, but as representing certain functions or interests. The fact remains, 
however, that these functions and interests have been chosen with the avowed object 
of producing certain fixed proportions as between races, and I can only accept this 
system, which is obviously far from ideal, provided it begins to give place in the near 
future to a system of elections whereby representation is demonstrably based upon 
the will of the people. I do not think the Malays have anything to fear from the 
introduction of elections, and I propose, with my colleagues' approval, to make clear 
to the Governor my views on this point. 
(d) Immigration policy.-It is in this connection that the recent hardening of the 
Malay attitude has been most apparent. At the time when the original "Federation" 
proposals were formulated, the Malays were content with a provision which laid it 
down that the High Commissioner should consult the Conference of Rulers about 
immigration policy and that differences of opinion between himself and the 
Conference should be referred to the Secretary of State for a decision. Now, however, 
they will be content with nothing less than a provision which enables the Malays, in 
the last resort, effectively to block any immigration policy which they regard as 
inimical to their own interests. I must say at once that I have some sympathy with 
the Malay point of view on this matter, though it must be confessed that the degree 
of economic prosperity depended in large part on the immigration into Malaya of 
other races . Their present precarious numerical position in their own country is 
mainly due to immigration policy in the past, over which they had no control, and I 
think it would be both wrong and fruitless to try to deny them the substance of their 
claim. The Governor's recommendation, however, is based on a proposal that in 
matters of immigration policy the final decision should rest with the unofficial 
members of the Central Legislature (on which, as we have seen, there is to be an 
absolute Malay majority); and it appeared to me that this proposal, as it originally 
reached me, might enable the Malays not merely, in the last resort, to block changes 
in immigration policy which they did not like, but also to introduce innovations in 
such policy which would not be subject to the normal checks and safeguards. I 
pointed this out to the Governor, who has now submitted a revised recommendation 
which in my view obviates the danger. Put briefly, the recommendation is that the 
High Commissioner shall discuss with the Conference of Rulers any important 
changes in immigration policy which he proposes to introduce, and that if the 
Conference cannot be brought to agree any particular change, the matter shall 
become the subject of a resolution by the unofficial members of the Legislative 
Council. If this resolution sustains the objections of the Conference of Rulers, no 
further action will be taken (whether by legislation or administrativeaction), unless 
the High Commissioner can certify that such action is essential in connection with 
the external affairs or defence of the "Federation"-matters on which His Majesty 
will continue to exercise jurisdiction. The Governor points out, however, that this 
revised recommendation has not been put to the Malays and that their reaction to it 
cannot be guaranteed.2 
6. Such, then, is the essence of the Malayan constitutional proposals in their 
latest form. I consider that the governor has achieved a remarkable measure of 
2 When it considered this proposal on 3 July, Cabinet called for modifications to the provisions on 
immigration. 
356 MALAYAN UNION TO FEDERATION [128] 
success in evolving proposals so satisfactory, in the face of a difficult and sometimes 
intransigent Malay attitude, and I am satisfied that the scheme, as a starting point, 
meets the real needs of the country and its various communities. The Governor-
General, Mr. Malcolm MacDonald, has throughout been closely associated with the 
discussions and gives his full support to the Governor's recommendations, being 
convinced that the essential need is the early establishment of a staple [sic] form of 
Government. Before proceeding to my recommendations, however, I wish to draw 
attention to the following further points:-
(a) the Malays have pressed that the Malay Rulers should in future have the right 
of concurrence in the appointment of successive High Commissioners. Besides 
constituting a most dangerous precedent, this is a point touching on His Majesty's 
prerogative, and I have fully explained to the Governor the reasons why the Malay 
demand cannot be granted. He has advised me, however, that it would be unwise 
to re-open this individual point with the Malays in advance of the settlement on 
the whole range of the proposals. He recommends, in fact, that His Majesty's 
Government's negative decision on this point should be conveyed together with 
their acceptance of the proposals as a whole. I propose to act accordingly.3 
(b) It is proposed that, at the outset, the "Federation of Malaya" should consist, as 
does the present Malayan Union, of the nine Malay States and the British 
Settlements of Penang and Malacca, and should exclude Singapore. The immedi-
ate Union of Singapore with the rest of Malaya has been one of the demands most 
loudly reiterated by that section of local opinion which has flatly opposed the 
Federation proposals, and there is no doubt that there are many links between the 
mainland and Singapore which may render desirable the early inclusion of 
Singapore in the "Federation." But after fully considering this problem in 
consultation with the two Governors, the Governor-General has recommended to 
me that any reorganisation on these lines should only be further considered after 
the "Federation" has been safely established. I agre'e with the Governor-General, 
and I would now propose, with the approval of my colleagues, to inform the 
Governor of the Malayan Union that His Majesty's Government have decided in 
this sense. 
(c) As I have indicated above, the Governor's latest proposal regarding immigra-
tion policy has not yet been put to the Malays. In propose now to invite him to do 
so, and to urge him to advise them most strongly to accept the proposal, on the 
grounds that it meets their essential point of view and that it is coupled with the 
general acceptance of a scheme which is largely of their own making. 
7. I now recommend that my colleagues should authorise me to inform the 
Governor, subject to points (a), (b) and (c) paragraph 6 above, and subject to the 
necessary emphasis being placed on the early introduction of an electoral system (see 
paragraph 5 (c) above), that the proposals are approved by His Majesty's Government. 
3 At the same meeting, Cabinet refused the request that the rulers should have the right of concurrence in 
the appointment of the high commissioner. Consequently, the rulers' views were not taken into account at 
the time of Gurney 's appointment in 1948, but, in response to their protests and after the matter had been 
taken to the prime minister and Buckingham Palace, the principle of informal consultation was conceded, 
see part I! of this volume, 165 and CO 537/3760. Lyttelton, the Conservative colonial secretary, was 
. punctilious in keeping them abreast of prospective changes at the top during his visit to Malaya in Dec 
1951. 
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If, as I greatly hope, the Governor is able to tell me in the near future that he has 
secured Malay agreement on all outstanding points. I would propose to take an early 
opportunity of announcing His Majesty's Government's decision in Parliament and of 
publishing a summary of the proposals in their final shape, in the form of a 
Command Paper. Thereafter, an Order in Council would have to be made providing 
for the establishment of the Federation of Malaya in place of the Malayan Union, and 
the necessary new agreements would have to be signed with the Malay Rulers. With 
these formalities completed, it is hoped that it will be possible to establish the 
"Federation" early next year.4 
Annex to 128 
Original "Federation" Proposals 
(Working Committee, December 1946) 
Citizenship. (Principle of a common citi· 
zenship established to include those who 
make Malaya their home and the object of 
their loyalty.) 
1. AuTOMATIC AcQUISITION 
A. Qualification by birth in the "Feder· 
ation"-
(a) Malays to have automatic qualifi· 
cation by birth alone 
(b) British subjects born in either of the 
Settlements, to qualify automatically if 
they are permanently resident in the 
Settlements 
(c) British subjects born anywhere in 
the "Federation" whose fathers were 
either born in the "Federation" or 
resident for a continuous period of 15 
years 
(d) Others born in the "Federation" 
both of whose parents were born in and 
have been resident on the "Federation" 
for a continuous period of 15 years. 
B. Qualification by descent-
Any person whose father is a citizen at the 
date of that person's birth 
Amendments, etc., Proposed 
by the Consultative Committee 
(January--March 1947) 
Governor's Present 
Recommendations, May, 1947 
(In both cases, general policy maintained and principle of a 
common citizenship accepted.) 
No change; but the two Chinese 
members wished to substitute 
for (b), (c) and (d) simply that 
any person who is a British 
subject, or any person born in 
any of the States, who is 
permanently resident any-
where in the "Federation," 
would become a citizen auto-
matically 
No change 
As proposed in December, but 
in the case of (b) the sub-
mission of the Chinese 
members of the Consultative 
Committee is so far followed 
as to permit British Subjects 
born in either of the Settle-
ments to acquire citizenship 
by operation of law if they are 
permanently resident any-
where in the "Federation." 
No change. 
4 In presenting this paper to the Cabinet on 3 July, Creech Jones referred to its earlier approval of revised 
constitutional proposals (see 110, note 2) and stressed: 'It had not been necessary to suggest any departure 
from the basic aim of creating a strong central government with a common citizenship open to all who 
had adopted Malaya as their home' . Cabinet authorised the substance of the recommendations (though see 
notes 2 and 3 above) . The proposals were then referred back to the rulers and UMNO before being 
published on 21 July in London and on 24 July in Kuala Lumpur. Creech Jones informed parliament 
during the debate on colonial estimates on 29 July. See CAB 128/10, CM 59(47)3, 3 July 1947; Federation 
of Malaya: Summary of Revised Constitutional Proposals (Cmd 7171, July 1947); Federation of Malaya: 
Summary of Revised Constitutional Proposals Accepted by His Majesty's Government, 24 July 1947 
(Kuala Lumpur, 1947); H of C Debs, vol 441, col 269, 29 July 1947. 
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Original "Federation" Proposals 
(Working Committee, December 1946) 
2. AcQUISITION BY APPLICATION 
Amendments, etc., Proposed Governor's Present 
by the Consultative Committee Recommendations, May, 1947 
(January-March 1947) 
(a) Any person naturalized as the sub- No change No change. 
ject of a Ruler becomes also a citizen of 
the "Federation" 
(b) The High Commissioner to have 
discretion to confer citizenship on any 
applicant, and his minor children, who 
satisfied him that either:-
(i) He was born in the "Federation" Resident for 5 years out of the Resident for 8 out of 12 years. 
and has resided there for 10 out of 15 last 10 years 
years preceding his application 
or 
(ii) he has resided in the "Federa-
tion" for 15 out of the preceding 20 
years; 
and 
(i) he is of good character 
(ii) has an adequate knowledge of 
Malay or English 
(iii) makes a declaration of perma-
nent settlement 
(iv) takes the citizenship oath 
Resident for 8 out of the pre- Follows December propsals-
ceding 15 15 out of 20. 
No change 
In the case of a person over the 
age of 45, and resident in the 
"Federation" for 20 years, and 
applies within 2 years for 
citizenship, the language qual-
ification should be waived 
No change 
No change 
No change. 
Consultative Committee's pro-
posal accepted. 
In addition an applicant for 
citizenship is to be of the age of 
18 or over. 
129 CO 537/2208, no 16 30 Sept 1947 
[Serious crime and the governor's powers of banishment]: despatch no 
19 from SirE Gent to Mr Creech Jones. Minute by H T Bourdillon 
I have the honour to refer to your secret telegram No_ 139 dated the 3rd of February, 
1947, in which you conveyed your approval of my proceeding under Banishment 
legislation against ceretain classes of aliens. These powers have been used sparingly 
and, in the case of persons falling in the second category in paragraph 2 of my secret 
telegram No. 57 of the 17th January, 194 7, only on the production at the banishment 
enquiry of evidence of guilt which the person concerned is unable to rebut. Since the 
receipt of your telegram I have approved a total of 47 Orders of Banishment in all. 
2. The incidence of serious crime continues to be very high and the necessity for 
retaining banishment as one of the most important weapons in the armoury of the 
Government for maintaining law and order is at least as great as it was at the 
beginning of the year. The most serious obstacle to the administration of justice in 
Malaya today is the extent to which sections of the public have been intimidated by 
gangs of one kind or another. These gangs fall into two categories:-(a) gangs 
composed of Chinese who are, for the most part, successors to the resistance 
movement organised originally against the Japanese and who now continue activities 
such as banditry, abduction, armed robbery and extortion from a profit motive; and 
(b) semi-disciplined organisations of Indian estate labourers, such as the "Thondar 
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Padai" or Youth Corps in Kedah mentioned in the report sent under cover of my 
secret despatch No. 8 of 8th April, 1947. 
3. The Chinese gangs falling within category (a) are well armed with firearms, 
including Sten guns and grenades. The "Thondar Padai" are not armed with 
firearms; but, as a semi-disciplined force, have succeeded from time to time in 
intimidating very completely the easily frightened Indian labourers on estates. 
4. Administration of justice by the Courts is crippled if witnesses are too 
frightened to give evidence or if the public are afraid to inform the police of the 
actions and whereabouts of criminals. As an example of the fate which befell one 
informer I enclose a portion of a record of a recent banishment enquiry .1 The 
informer's house was burnt down, he himself was dangerously stabbed, but escaped. 
His brother, his brother's wife and two nephews were stabbed while his wife, child, 
mother, father and niece were killed and their bodies burned and charred. In face of 
such reprisals, the reluctance of witnesses to give evidence in open court is 
understandable, and banishment is the only weapon available to deliver sections of 
the public from the terror caused by these gangs. There is a strong and insistent 
public opinion, manifest amongst Asiatics no less than Europeans, in favour of a 
freer use of the banishment weapon for the purpose of ridding the country of 
criminals and undesirables against whom the ordinary processes of justice cannot, 
for the reasons given, be invoked. 
5. In the special circumstances which obtain at present in this territory I propose 
the following modifications of the categories mentioned in paragraph 2 of my 
telegram No. 57, viz.:-
(a) deletion from category One of any limitation as to period of residence. It is 
shown to be necessary to have the power to expel an alien convicted of violent 
crime notwithstanding a long period of residence in Malaya. It is also found to be 
necessary to have the power to expel aliens who are convicted of possession or 
carrying of firearms or grenades, or who are habitual criminals, if the crimes are of 
a serious nature. Inclusion of such persons in this category is recommended. 
(b) inclusion in category Two of persons who engage in violent crime. 
I should be grateful for your approval of these proposals. 
6. As regards organisations such as "Thondar Padai" their activities have been 
considerably curtailed by the enactment of the Public Order Ordinance, 1947 and by 
police action; but intimidation among estate labourers is still a most serious problem 
and a substantial impediment to the rapid rehabilitation of the country. The 
intimidation is usually organised by Communist or other agitators who are not 
actuated by concern for the welfare of the labourers. In many cases the ring-leaders 
are Indian British subjects. 
7. It is not, at present, the policy to banish British subjects; but experience has 
shown that it is highly desirable that the pre-war system under which British 
subjects were not immune from banishment from the Malay States should again be 
invoked, and I recommend this course. As you are aware, the banishment Enact-
ments of the Federated and Unfederated Malay States do not, as does the Banishment 
Ordinance of the Straits Settlements, contain an exception in favour of British 
subjects and it has been expressly held by the Supreme Court of the Federated Malay 
1 Not printed. 
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States that a British subject is not immune from banishment (Yap Hon Chin v Parry 
(1911) 2 F.M.S.L.R.(P.C.) 70). It does not appear that the scope of the existing 
Banishment Enactments were necessarily curtailed by the creation of the Malayan 
Union. 
8. The encouragement and support given by the Japanese during the occupation 
to such organisations as the Indian National Army and the Indian Independence 
League,2 and to their anti-British tenets, has left as its legacy a substantial number of 
Indians in this country who engage in such activities as intimidation, extortion, 
blackmail and other serious forms of crime, including murder. 
9. As an instance of the type of case for which banishment would provide the only 
possible remedy, I would refer you to that of that of the person named in paragraph 4 
'Of my telegram No. 256 of the 6th March, 1947, in connection with the riots in 
Kedah earlier this year. Shortly after those riots this person disappeared. He has now 
reappeared and is steadily reinstating himself in his former influential position. 
There is evidence that he was one of the ring-leaders of a gang of estate labourers 
who, as the Japanese were approaching in December, 1941, beat to death and buried, 
probably while still alive, the senior conductor on the estate and had the body thrown 
into a river the next day; and that in 1946, he was, with the help of his "Thondar 
Padai" concerned in two cases of criminal intimidation, one of which might have 
resulted in the suicide of an intimidated girl. In none of these cases is there any 
likelihood of persuading the witnesses to give evidence in open court owing to their 
fears of the consequences. The report on the disturbances in Kedah, which was 
forwarded under cover of my secret despatch No. 8 of the 8th April, 1947, provides 
abundant evidence of the extent to which intimidation is practised amongst Indians 
and of the necessity for having powers of banishment of Indian British subjects 
available as the only remedy which can have any hope of being enforced. 
10. A difficulty which at once suggests itself is that the Government of India or of 
Pakistan, as the case may be, may not always agree to accept Indians whom this 
Government proposes to banish from Malaya. In the case of the Government of India 
at least, any application made by this Government would undoubtedly be referred for 
advice to the Representative of the Government of India in Malaya and the close 
connections of the present Representative, Mr. Thivy, with the l.N.A., and more 
especially the Indian Independence League during the occupation, might lead him to 
recommend his Government to refuse the application. I am of the opinion, however, 
that, provided satisfactory evidence was forthcoming that the person whom it was 
proposed to banish was born in India or Pakistan, it should not be essential to obtain 
in advance the concurrence of the Government concerned. The categories of British 
subjects, which I recommend should be eligible for banishment, would be identical 
with those for aliens. 
11. I am also considering the enactment of legislation on the lines of the Aliens 
Order, 1920, of the United Kingdom. The present Enactments dealing with aliens are 
unsatisfactory in various respects and it would be much better to supersede them by 
legislation on the lines of the Aliens Order, 1920. A provision corresponding to 
Article 12 of that Order would be of the utmost assistance in present circumstances. 
2 The Indian Independence League was formed by Rash Behari Bose, under Japanese auspices, to muster 
support amongst overseas Indians for the liberation of India from Britain; the Indian National Army was a 
parallel military force led by Subhas Chandra Bose. 
[129] SEPT 1947 361 
Proceedings for deportation could be taken under it in many cases which now have to 
be dealt with under the banishment enactments. Similar safeguards as in the case of 
banishment, e.g., enquiries by a responsible officer, would be observed, but 
deportation under an Aliens Ordinance would have the advantage of disarming 
criticism in England, because it would not be termed "banishment" and it would be 
effected under powers which have their counterpart in the United Kingdom and have 
been in force there for twenty-seven years. The proposed Ordinance would not apply 
to British subjects or British Protected Persons in which latter category would be 
included every person born in any of the Malay States. The legislation could be made 
renewable annually, if desired. I should be grateful for approval of this proposal. 
12. I should appreciate a very early reply to this despatch by telegram. The 
recommendations made have the strongest possible support of the Attorney-General3 
and the Commissioner of Police4 and their acceptance would undoubtedly be 
welcomed by all law-abiding sections of the public. The procedure by which 
banishment orders will only be made after most careful enquiries by competent 
officers would be continued. 
Minute on 129 
During the past month there have been repeated and very serious cases of violent 
crime-armed robbery, savage reprisals against informers and the like- in the Malay 
States, particularly in Johore. We have been told that the situation in Singapore, on 
the other hand, has recently shown a remarkable improvement, and Mr. Pierpoint (a 
planter who came and saw me recently about the Johore troubles) expressed the view 
that a number of ringleaders had crossed into the mainland. Be that as it may, the 
recent outbreaks in the Malayan Union have been extremely alarming, and as soon as 
we saw reports of them in the Press, we asked Sir Edward Gent for a report (see No. 
12). The reply to this enquiry is in the telegram at No. 21, and it will be seen that the 
information given is to a certain extent reassuring. Seen in perspective against the 
whole of 1947 and the whole of the Malayan Union, the trouble is apparently not so 
serious as might have been feared. The police are doing their work well and are 
gaining control. There has indeed been a recrudescence of lawlessness, but it has 
occurred in outlying areas where the police are thin on the ground. In the big 
centres, the menace has already been largely defeated. 
Nevertheless, Sir Edward Gent does not minimise the danger, and in his despatch 
at No. 16 (sent before the telegram at 21) he proposes certain remedies, all of them 
connected with the freer use of his powers under the Banishment Legislation. Before 
I proceed to discuss these proposed remedies, I should remark that paragraphs 2, 3 
and 4 of the despatch give further sensational evidence of the horrible nature of the 
crimes being committed, as well as describing the origins of the two principal classes 
of criminals. The instance, given in paragraph 4, of the reprisals against the family of 
one informer is by itself enough to explain the outburst of public indignation (and 
criticism of Government) which has apparently taken place in the Malayan Union. I 
do not think it is an exaggeration to describe in these terms the local interest which 
the whole matter appears to have aroused. In paragraph 4 of the despatch, Sir 
3 K K O'Connor. 4 H B Langworthy. 
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Edward Gent refers to the "strong and insistent public opinion, manifest amongst 
Asiatics no less than Europeans, in favour of a freer use of the "banishment weapon", 
and the press cuttings sent to Mr. Rees-Williams by the Straits Times Press (see No. 
22) leave no doubt about the tone of local comment. It is very ugly indeed. Sir 
Edward Gent is bitterly accused of not having used the banishment weapon with 
enough resolution in the past, and the accusation is freely extended to the Colonial 
Office and to the Secretary of State himself. Indeed, it is suggested that the Secretary 
of State is the real cause of the whole trouble. 
Sir Edward Gent's proposed remedies are given in paragraphs 5, 7 and 11 of his 
despatch. The two latter proposals (banishment, in certain circumstances, of British 
subjects and the enactment of legislation on the lines of the United Kingdom Aliens 
Order) obviously require close consideration, and the former in particular may give 
rise to grave difficulties. These suggestions, however, are not of first rate urgency, 
and the file can be recirculated for their further consideration. The matter 
demanding instant attention is Sir Edward Gent's main recommendation, in 
paragraph 5 of his despatch, in which he asks for immediate authority to extend in 
certain respects the use of the banishment weapon against criminal aliens. I attempt 
to show, in the top draft opposite,5 the line which I think should be taken in reply to 
this recommendation. The draft, as will be seen, does not give Sir Edward Gent the 
authority for which he asks. It goes further. It tells him that he already has this 
authority and more. I go into a certain amount of historical detail on this point, 
because I think, it is important that Sir Edward Gent should know, beyond a shadow 
of doubt, that we are firmly behind him in any action which he deems necessary 
against criminal gangsters. I need not repeat here the recapitulation given in the 
draft, but I have long felt uneasy lest Sir Edward Gent might be staying his hand, 
perhaps to a degree which justifies some of the local criticisms, in the belief that we 
at this end were far more nervous about the use of the banishment weapon than is in 
fact the case. See for instance my minute of 23/1147, 1n which I commented on his 
previous request of this type. There has in fact never been any suggestion from this 
end (except as regards political agitators) that the Secretary of State wished to 
impose restrictions on the Governor's discretion in the use of the banishment 
weapon. It has merely been stipulated, for obvious reasons, that the whole matter 
shall be reviewed after a certain period. This stipulation is repeated in the draft 
opposite, and Sir Edward Gent is also requested to give us full, up-to-date and 
accurate information on action taken .... 
I spoke earlier in this minute of a visit from a Mr. Pierpoint. He is the President of 
the Johore Branch of the United Planters Association, and he has a good knowledge 
of this part of the country-including, incidentally, a considerable insight into 
Johore politics and a close personal acquaintance with Dato Onn. He expressed to me 
the extreme concern of the Johore planters at the recent outbreaks of lawlessness 
(there has been one example of a European clubbed to death and robbed before the 
eyes of his wife), and he has just rung me up to acquaint me with the terms of a 
resolution by his Association. It is couched in the strongest possible terms, and calls 
for the immediate replacement of the Governor. This particular manifestation need 
not perhaps be taken tragically, but in my view there is no doubt whatever that the 
menace is really grave and that local opinion, Asiatic and European, is really stirred. 
5 Not printed but the final version is at 130. 
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This is not a case of the Governor or the Secretary of State imposing repressive 
measures against the will of the people. It is a case of popular demand. I feel sure that 
we must go as far as is proposed in the draft telegram, and that we must act without 
delay. 
130 CO 537/2208, no 24 
H.T.B. 
15.10.47 
18 Oct 1947 
[Violence and the governor's powers of banishment]: outward tele-
gram (reply) no 1305 from Mr Creech Jones to Sir Edward Gent 
Your despatch No. 19 Secret. 1 Banishment. 
I fully share your anxiety over continued prevalence of violent crime as described 
in your paragraph 2, 3, and 4, and you may rest assured that your efforts to control 
the situation will not be needlessly obstructed from this end. In this connection, I 
think it is essential that I should begin by making clear my whole attitude regarding 
banishment from Malaya of criminals of the "gangster" type. In your paragraph 4 you 
speak of a strong and insistent public opinion in favour of a freer use of the 
banishment weapon. The existence of this public opinion, particularly since the 
latest outrages in Johore, has been forcibly brought to my notice from more than one 
quarter, and I am disturbed to see that there is apparently a widespread belief that an 
over-cautious policy is being imposed, possibly against the wishes of your Govern-
ment from Whitehall. There are, of course, no grounds for such a belief, but I feel it 
is important that I should remove any possibility of misunderstanding between us. 
2. In my telegram No. 1545 of 1946, I approved your proposal to banish certain 
leading members of the Ang Bin Hoey Society.2 In doing so, I drew your attention to 
a distinction which had been made in the case of Singapore between criminal 
gangsterdom pure and simple and certain activities of a political nature, and I invited 
you (as I had already invited the Governor of Singapore) to consult me before taking 
banishment action in cases falling within the latter (repeat latter) category. It was 
not my intention, either then or later, to circumscribe in any way your freedom of 
action, subject only to the limitations imposed by the law itself and by your own 
discretion in applying it, in proceeding against undesirable aliens whose activities 
were not (repeat not) of a political character. Even as regards political ringleaders I 
have always been, as you know, ready to reconsider the position in the light of 
changing local circumstances. In my telegram of the 27th March last addressed to 
the Governor-General as No. 156 and repeated to you as No. 407, I gave authority to 
the Governor of Singapore, in response to his urgent representations, to use powers 
of banishment against political agitators without prior reference to me. Similar 
authority was not conveyed to yourself because you had stated that you did not 
require it. I naturally do not wish to force upon you a freedom of action which you do 
not require, and the position as regards political agitators in the Malayan Union 
therefore remains the same as before. That is to say, you should continue (pending 
my consideration of any representations from yourself on the lines already made by 
1 See 129. 2 Ang Bin Hoey was a pro-KMT Triad society. 
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Singapore) to consult me in each individual case before taking banishment action 
against persons in this category. As stated above, however, there is no (repeat no) 
restriction imposed from here on your use of banishment powers against violent 
criminals pure and simple. In cases of persons who have been resident in Malaya for a 
considerable period, however, you should use these powers with the utmost 
circumspection and only where you are convinced that action is necessary for the 
good of the country. I would ask you to provide me periodically (say at monthly 
intervals) with up-to-date information on action taken, and that you would send me 
prompt and full answers to any enquiries which I may make on specific cases. You 
will appreciate that this whole subject is liable to excite Parliamentary interest and 
that I must be fortified with the full facts. 
3. The above recapitulation clearly affects the recommendations in paragraph 5 
of your despatch. As I see it, you are still proposing to limit, though not to the same 
extent as hitherto, the categories of persons within the "gangster" class to whom 
action under the banishment legislation would be applicable. If you wish to impose 
such limits yourself, and if you are convinced that the menace can be effectively 
checked by action within these limits, I would naturally have no objection, but so far 
as I am concerned you have full authority, as described above, for action against 
undesirable aliens other than political agitators. The position, however, should be 
reviewed in a year from now. In my telegram No. 139 I requested that a review 
should be taken a year after that date, but in view of your latest information I am 
content to extend the period. 
4. Your further suggestions regarding the possible banishment of British subjects 
and the enactment of legislation on the lines of the United Kingdom Aliens' Order are 
still being considered here. I· see much to commend the latter suggestion, but the 
former may raise difficulties. Further telegram will be sent as soon as possible, and in 
the meanwhile I trust that the explanations given above will help you in your present 
difficulties, in which you have my full sympathy. 
5. Please send Governor Singapore and Governor-General copies of your de-
spatch under reference, unless you have already done so.3 
3 Replying to the secretary of state on 22 Nov 1947, Gent commented: 'I have had no reason to consider 
the banishment of any alien for political activities and I note your instructions in such circumstances 
should I have occasion to consider banishment in the future.' See CO 537/2208, no 34. 
131 CO 537/2144, no 264 8 Nov 1947 
[Chinese demand for constitutional review]: inward telegram no 367 
from Mr M J MacDonald to Mr Creech Jones 
[After the publication of the revised constitutional proposals in July 1947, the Associated 
Chinese Chambers of Commerce joined the AMCJA-PUTERA coalition in staging a 
countrywide 'hartal' (or work stoppage) on 20 Oct. While MacDonald appeared to 
sympathize with the Chinese demand for a Royal Commission, Gent, who was pushing 
hard to inaugurate the Federation on 1 Jan 1948, would not entertain any suggestion that 
threatened to stand in the way of immediate implementation of the new constitution (see 
132).] 
Following personal for Secretary of State from Governor-General. Begins. 
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1. You will have seen letter dated 26th October sent to you by Lee Kong Chian1 
on behalf of Associated Chinese Chambers of Commerce in Malaya. This telegram 
gives part of the background to it and touches upon the question of your reply. 
2. Some leading members of Chinese Chambers of Commerce, including Lee, 
made informal approaches to me arising out of my two broadcast speeches and 
following hartal of 20th October. I have had conversations with several of them 
(corrupt group)2 they sought any indication that I could give them that the hartal 
might lead the Government to modify its policy in relation to the Constitutions for 
the Federation and Singapore. They said that my speeches had had considerable 
influence for good on Chinese opinion, but that the community in general are still 
seriously critical of certain aspects of the Constitutions. 
3. I made it clear that the hartal could and would have no influence. I said that no 
change whatever would be made in the Constitutions and that they would be 
introduced in their present form early next year. I added that they would be amended 
in due course, but that they must be given fair trial first to see where they needed 
improvement and when further constitutional advances could wisely be made. Lee 
Kong Chian and his moderate colleagues now fully understand this position and I 
believe that they are prepared to conciliate it. On the other hand the more extreme 
Chinese element, led by Tan Cheng Lock, are seeking to create further immediate 
difficulties. They are pressing Lee and Associated Chinese Chambers of Commerce to 
continue the controversy and put new pressure on the Government for changes in 
the Constitution of the Federation. They have allies in this cause in the Council of 
Joint Action and associated bodies. Lee and his moderate friends are endeavouring to 
check the spread of rival influence amongst the Chinese. They are pursuing delaying 
tactics. Amongst other things they are using Lee's letter to you as a factor in these 
tactics. In response to pressure from the more extreme elements, Lee has written 
this letter on behalf of the Associated Chambers and they must await your reply. He 
tells me that he does not expect reply for three or four weeks 
4. I understand that he and a group of his moderate colleagues drafted the letter 
carefully after their talks with me. They did not tell me at the time that they proposed 
writing to you and I had no knowledge of what action they intended to take. But Lee 
has since told me that the terms of the letter were influenced by our conversations. 
You will note the following points in it:-
(1) It does not ask for any early or specific change in either the Constitution of the 
Federation or the Constitution of Singapore. 
(2) It merely suggests that a Royal Commission should review the Constitutional 
(?group omitted).3 
(3) It is indefinite as to when this review should be made and does not suggest 
that it should take place before the Constitutions are inaugurated. 
5. This is deliberate. Lee states that there is good chance that he and his friends 
could persuade all moderate Chinese opinion to accept the position if you indicate in 
your reply that Constitution will be impartially reviewed in a few years' time. In 
conversations Lee suggested in three years' time. I discouraged any idea that the 
Government would make a commitment about any particular period of years and he 
1 Lee Kong Chian, a pre-war supporter of the KMT, was president of the Singapore Chinese Chamber of 
Commerce. 2 & 3 ie phrase garbled in transmission. 
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and his friends accept this. They are anxious for an "impartial enquiry". Their 
strongest remaining fears arising out of the present Constitutions are that:-
(1) the power which Malay Rulers have to veto changes in Federal Constitution 
will prevent the process of constitutional evolution which I described in my 
broadcasts, and that Constitution will therefore remain fixed indefinitely in its 
present form; 
(2) the Malays will use their power to control immigration policy in a way which 
will be unfair to Chinese and will prevent the economic development of Malaya. 
I have done my best to reassure them on these points, but they remain sceptical. 
Therefore, they do not wish the revision of the Constitution to rest wholly with His 
Majesty's Government on one side, and Malay Rulers and Malay Unofficial majority in 
the Legislature on the other. That is why they urge a Royal Commission. Lee tells me 
that an answer from you, promising a Royal Commission in a few years' time, would 
remove the apprehensions of a great majority of those Chinese who feel strongly on 
this matter and he and others of his friends have told me that this would enable them 
to accept for some time to come the present constitutional proposals and to detach a 
great deal of Chinese support from Tan Cheng Lock. 
6. I have expressed to Lee informally the following general opinions on this 
matter:-
(1) We must abide by the provisions of the Agreements with the Malay Rulers 
giving them certain powers in connection with revisions of the Constitution. 
(2) I do not think that Rulers will be rigid. They will be greatly influenced by 
opinions of their Malay subjects and of His Majesty's Government and to a minor 
extent by non-Malay public opinion in Malaya. Constitutional (?stagnation) is 
unthinkable and Malay Rulers could not be allowed to secure this. The Chinese can 
influence them by closer co-operation with Malay leaders and by convincing these 
Malay leaders of any injustices to the Chinese community or any obstacles to 
Malayan development which may exist. If such things do turn out to exist, His 
Majesty's Government will use its influence to help them. 
(3) I personally would not rule out the possibility of need for commission assisting 
His Majesty's Government, the Malay Rulers and Malay peoples to work out a 
revision of the Constitution when the time for that comes some years hence. This 
would not necessarily be a Royal Commission. For example, it might be a 
commission of Members of Parliament. On the other hand a commission may not 
(repeat not) be necessary. The best solution will be if the Malay and Chinese 
leaders in Malaya can in due course agree with the local Administration on 
desirable changes. Therefore it would be unwise at the present time to commit 
ourselves positively to a commission. Moreover, if we were to do so now, that 
would be the best guarantee that no such commission could ever function in 
Malaya. An announcement that such a commission would come to Malaya later on 
to consider constitutional changes might well arouse suspicion and hostility of 
Malays, ensuring that they would oppose any such plan. 
(4) Nevertheless I agree that we should make clear that the Constitutions could 
not be (?could be intended) reviewed in due course, so that constitutional advance 
is wisely planned. I am prepared to consider the possibility of our announcing that, 
if it seems desirable at the time when a review takes place, a Parliamentary or 
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other commission from the U.K. might visit Malaya to help the Rulers and peoples 
of Malaya, as well as Parliament, to decide what changes should take place. 
7. Lee seems ready to accept the arguments in 6 (2) and (3) above. He nurses the 
hope that your answer to his letter of 25th October will take the line in 6 (4). 
8. My appreciation of the position is that great mass of the Chinese in the 
Country are not (repeat not) interested in this issue. Nevertheless, the section of 
educated Chinese opinion which has become politically conscious about the 
constitutional problem almost wholly shares the dissatisfaction and apprehension of 
Lee and his Chamber of Commerce colleagues about Federal Constitution. This is as 
true, for example, of moderate professional and commercial Chinese in Penang and 
Singapore as of the irresponsible ones in Malacca. They are the Chinese who count 
most in these matters, and, though they are a small minority, they are the leaders of 
the community as a whole and exert widespread influence. If they are seriously 
dissatisfied they can not only embarrass the Administration quite a lot, but they will 
also feel less disposed to seek a reconciliation and accept compromises with Malays. 
Moreover, the moderate Chinese in that case would be inclined to suppose that they 
have no alternative but to associate themselves with Tan Cheng Lock and some of the 
more extreme political factions in the Country. In my opinion it is important that we 
should do anything that we properly can to conciliate the moderate Chinese now. If 
we can, for example, meet them sufficiently on the issue raised in Lee's letter to you 
we shall probably greatly weaken Tan Cheng Lock's and the Council of Joint Action's 
appeal to the Chinese. 
9. There are indications that the Council of Joint Action's and P.U.T.E.R.A.'s 
policy may be not only to boycott the Singapore elections4 but also attempt to induce 
representatives of the Chinese and other domiciled communities to refuse nomina-
tion to the Federal Legislature in Kuala Lumpur. It would be serious if the Associated 
Chinese Chambers of Commerce adopted this line. I believe they will not (repeat not) 
do so if we can satisfy them sufficiently on the present issue. Lee Kong Chian tells me 
that apart from the question of separation of Singapore from the Federation, the 
Chinese have no quarrel at all with the Singapore Constitution. The Singapore 
Chinese Chamber of Commerce has done its best to encourage registration of voters, 
and will do all that it can to get those who have registered to cast votes next year. I 
believe that he and like-minded Chinese throughout Malaya will also be ready to 
co-operate in working the Constitution for the Federation. But whether they will do 
so depends to a considerable extent, I think, on the terms of your answer to Lee Kong 
Chian's letter. 
IO. In all this it is, of course, extremely important that we should do nothing to 
alienate the Malays. I shall consult Gent and Gimson immediately on this matter, 
with the purpose of sending for your consideration a draft reply to Lee Kong Chian's 
letter. 
Ends. 
4 In Mar 1948 elections were held returning a minority of six members to Singapore's new Legislative 
Council. 
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132 CO 537/2144, no 267 8 Nov 1947 
[Chinese demand for constitutional review]: inward telegram no 1185 
from SirE Gent to Sir T Lloyd [Extract] 
Following personal for Lloyd from Gent. 
Begins. 
1. I have received from the Governor-General copy of his personal telegram to 
the Secretary of.State No. 367,1 and I expect that the Governor-General had not 
received copy of my savingram to the Secretary of State No. 46 before he sent his 
personal telegram. 
2. I feel it absolutely necessary to send you my advice without delay that the 
whole issue of the successful conclusion of the Federation Agreement would be 
jeopardised at this juncture, if the Malays received any impression from action by His 
Majesty's Government that the intention of the latter was to revise Federal 
Constitution in the next few years by means of decision to send out Commission or 
otherwise in order to conciliate present local Chinese opposition. 
3. Core of present Chinese opposition is concerned substantially with separation 
of Singapore and is centred in Singapore. This basic attitude is less strong in Penang 
and much less strong amongst Chinese in the Malay States. As soon as they are 
convinced that His Majesty's Government's determination to implement the Federa-
tion proposals, finally and inflexibility, I do not expect influential Chinese opinion in 
general in Malayan Union (apart from the extreme Left Wing) to indulge in 
non-co-operation on any serious scale, if at all. As long as they are not convinced of 
this by reasons of waiting on the debate in Parliament, or if they receive qualified 
answer from the Secretary of State to the letter of (?25th October) from the 
Associated Chinese Chambers of Commerce, they will continue to stage public 
opposition and gravely exacerbate Malay relations .-with both Chinese and the 
Government. ... 
1 See 131. 
133 CO 537/2144, no 271 12 Nov 1947 
[Chinese demand for constitutional review]: outward telegram (reply) 
no 652 from Mr Creech Jones to Mr M J MacDonald 
Your telegram G.G. No. 367.1 
I am most grateful for this full and lucid exposition, and for your patient and 
statesman-like attempts to work upon moderate Chinese opinion. 
2. I have now seen letter from Lee Kong Chian to which you refer, and also Gent's 
savingram No. 47. Before I reach a final view on this matter, I must await result of 
your consultations with Gent and Gimson. Nevertheless, it may help if I give you at 
once my preliminary reactions to your telegram. 
3. I appreciate that opposition amongst Chinese in Malaya appears to have 
1 See 131. 
[134] DEC 1947 369 
become more widespread and deep-seated than we had previously hoped, and that 
this, in spite of all your efforts, may cause considerable embarrassment in the future. 
Nevertheless, I should have thought that any statement by myself or His Majesty's 
Government at the present juncture, to the effect that the Constitution so recently 
decided upon will be specifically reviewed a few years hence either by a Commission 
or by any other method, would at once exacerbate all that suspicion and irritation 
amongst the Malays which we have tried so long and patiently to allay, but which the 
recent hartal has evidently, in some measure, aroused again. In this connection, 
please see my telegram No. 1406 to the Malayan Union, repeated to you as No. 651. I 
still feel, subject to your views and those of Gent, that arranged Parliamentary 
Question and Answer on lines I have proposed may be very necessary. It might, 
however, go some way to meet the situation described in your telegram under 
reference if I were to add to the Parliamentary reply something to the effect that it 
has always been agreed that the new Constitution is merely a beginning, that the 
conception is dynamic and not static, and that the whole purpose of His Majesty's 
Government is to allow all those who belong to Malaya, of whatever race, to guide the 
Constitution in future development on lines of democracy and toleration. 
My reply to Lee Kong Chian's letter might be on the same lines, if it is to be fuller 
than Gent suggests in his savingram No. 46. 
4. You will doubtless take the above into consideration in your consultations with 
Gent and Gimson. I feel sure that anything which would risk alienating Malays at the 
present moment would be absolutely fatal. I have just seen Gent's telegram No. 
1185,2 which further confirms this view. 
2 See 132. 
134 CO 537/2144, no 317 12 Dec 1947 
[Chinese demand for constitutional review]: inward savingram no 28 
from Mr M 1 MacDonald to Mr Creech Jones 
Following for Secretary of State from Governor-General. 
My telegram No. 422 . (handed to Mr. Lee about 10 days ago your letter in reply to 
communication from Associated Chinese Chambers of Commerce. When he read it 
through he said that he wished to express to you his thanks for the friendly and 
courteous tone of the note. This, he felt sure, would impress his colleagues, who had 
been disappointed at the tone of your earlier letter to them. He added, however, that 
beyond that the reply would give no satisfaction to the Chinese. It amounted to a 
complete rejection of the substance of their representations and request to you. He 
said that in their letter they had deliberately avoided making any proposals for 
changes in the constitution of the Federation and had only sought an assurance that 
at some time in the future an impartial enquiry into the working of the Constitution 
would be held. He said that even a general reference to the possibility of something 
in the nature of a Royal Commission would meet the needs of the moderate Chinese 
in their effort to keep the Chinese disappointment about the Federal Constitution 
within reasonable bounds. 
2. I told him that it was impossible to include any such reference in your letter. I 
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emphasised that the letter indicated that Constitutional development in Malaya 
would be evolutionary, and agreed that the Chinese could influence that evolution 
through the proper Constitutional channels. I thought it wise to tell him also that 2 
or 3 days later you would make a statement in Parliament that the new Federal 
Constitution in its present form would be inaugurated on January 1st or as soon as 
possible after that. I did not want him o r his colleagues to be taken by surprise by 
that statement. 
3. He said that he fully understood that the Constitution would come into 
operation at an early date, and emphasised that the Chinese would be willing to 
co-operate in working the Constitution if they felt assured that any defects or 
injustices embodied in it would come under review by some impartial body in due 
course. Without such an assurance he was apprehensive that the Chinese might not 
feel able to co-operate. We discussed this matter at some length. I urged that the 
Chinese should (a) now accept the present position, and (b) agree to the High 
Commissioner's nomination of Chinese representatives to sit on the Legislative 
Council, where those representatives could raise any questions on which the Chinese 
community felt dissatisfied. At the end of our talk he assured me that he personally 
would do his best to persuade his colleagues that this was the wise course for them to 
take. He told me that he would circulate the text of your reply immediately to the 
Chinese Chambers of Commerce, so that its contents were known to them before 
your Parliamentary answer appeared in the Press. They would all meet to discuss the 
situation a few days later. 
4. Two or three days after that Mr. Lee telephoned to ask me whether I would be 
willing to receive him and 4 or 5 of his friends to discuss the matter. He told me that 
it would be helpful if I would urge on them the policy which I had urged on him. I 
said that I would be delighted to receive them. When he brought the party on 
Sunday, December 7th, it turned out to consist of ten leading representatives of the 
Chinese Chambers of Commerce in Singapore and various places in the Malayan 
Union. Colonel H.S. Lee was amongst them, and Mr. Tan Cheng Lock was also there. 
They represented to me strongly their dissatisfaction with various points in the 
Federal Constitution. I replied to their points one by one. They then expressed their 
dissatisfaction with your letter on the grounds that it did not promise an impartial 
review of the Constitution after it had been working for a few years. I replied to them 
also on this point. They then asked whether I would give you a personal account 
when I visited London of their strong feel ings in the matter. I promised to inform 
you on the subject faithfully and objectively. They then indicated that they would 
consider later what further action they should take to impress the Government with 
the strength of their views. I urged that the proper course was for them to co-operate 
in working the Constitution. It provided means by which a considerable number of 
Chinese representatives could present their feelings on any matter in the Legislative 
Council. I used all the obvious arguments in favour of their doing this and against 
their standing aside from the Legislative Council. I stressed in particular the vital 
importance of their not repeat not alienating the Malays, but working in a 
co-operative spirit with them. They listened carefully to what I said, but did not make 
any comments beyond agreeing in general with the principle of inter-racial 
co-operation. 
5. I understand that they spent the rest of the day trying to decide what their 
policy should be. At the moment of dictating this savingram in Hong Kong I do not 
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know what their final decision will be. Before I left Singapore one of my Chinese 
friends told me that Mr. Lee Kiang Chen [Lee Kong Chian) proposed to send a 
personal letter to all the Chinese Chambers of Commerce urging that they should 
co-operate with the Government in the nomination of Chinese representatives for 
the Legislative Council. His letter will suggest that when they do this they should 
take the opportunity to make one more formal protest against the Constitution. My 
informant told me that opinion amongst the leading members of the Chinese 
Chambers of Commerce is divided on this matter, and that neither Mr. Lee nor 
anyone else yet knows what the response to his letter will be. There may have been 
further developments in Malaya since I left Singapore four days ago. 
135 CO 537/2144, no 318 17 Dec 1947 
[Dato Onn]: inward savingram no 52 from SirE Gent to Mr Creech 
Jones 
1. My telegram 1305. Following appreciation of Dato Onn's present general 
attitude may be of interest to you. 
2. Dato Onn has throughout held political leadership amongst Malays, and 
UMNO was his original creation to organise and maintain Malay political hostility to 
Union constitution and MacMichael Treaties. He has never flagged in his efforts to 
remove as completely as possible any surviving relics of Malayan Union in new 
Federal constitution, and to restore Johore Constitution as completely as existence of 
Federation Agreement permits. 
3; He is not pure Malay but mother was Circassian and his character, thought 
and speech are of keener and more restless nature than customary to Malays. Good 
demagogic speaker, apt to speak and write rudely and thoughtlessly, and is 
inherently distrustful and suspicious. 
3. As final stage of Federation negotiations is reached his temperamental 
qualities are subject to exceptional strain in face of increased Chinese propaganda 
against Federation scheme and their more and more overt claim to political 
predominance. At the same time within Malay ranks there is a natural movement on 
one hand to exact up to the last moment highest possible terms for Malay general 
interest and for each State interests. There is also in Malay ranks sign of a 
development in direction of a more liberal policy in UMNO which involves a 
resistance to full control hitherto by right wing Malay leaders many of whom will 
now become Mentri Besars and State Secretaries. This also adds to Dato Onn's 
problems and his personal aggressive qualities do not naturally serve to attract 
fr iendship or spirit of comradeship even amongst Malays. In Kedah particularly 
Sultan and his leading Malay advisers are increasingly resentful of Onn's methods 
and manners and his interference in internal State affairs of Kedah. 
4. Finally Sultan of Johore's return has to some extent created a complication for 
Dato Onn in his immediate Johore position in which he has needed to go more 
warily. 1 
1 Dato Onn swung in and out of royal favour. An adopted son of the Sultan who had been educated with 
Johore princes in England, in the 1930s he had written critical press articles that incurred lbrahim's 
displeasure. Nonetheless, he played an important part in defusing the so-called 'conspiracy' to dethrone 
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Ibrahim in early 1946 and was appointed mentri besar (chief minister) of Johore later that year. Towards 
the end of 1947 Ibrahim returned from London for the final stage of the federal negotiations and, while 
mentri besar and Sultan combined in their defence of Johore rights, their relationship soon suffered. Onn 
increasingly questioned the role of the rulers in modern Malaya while Ibrahim claimed that Onn's political 
activities interfered with his obligations as chief minister. After many rumours and threats, Onn resigned 
as mentri besar on 1 Oct 1949. See CO 537/4790. 
136 CO 537/3671, no 28 22 Jan 1948 
[Signing the State and Federation Agreements]: letter from SirE Gent 
to H T Bourdillon 
[The inauguration of the Federation was postponed from 1 Jan 1948 because of Malay 
opposition-especially from Dato Onn and Sultan lbrahim-to provisions for Britain's 
power of advice in the states and her control over their external affairs and defence. 
Although regarded as crucial, even more important than these matters to the British was 
an end to constitutional negotiations and they decided not to hold things up any longer. 
At the Plenary Conference on 20--21 Jan Gent (for the King) and their Highnesses signed 
the nine State Agreements, revoking the MacMichael treaties, and the Federal Agreement 
which were to come into effect on 1 Feb. An Order-in-Council gave the agreements legal 
force from the side of the Crown while state enactments confirmed them from the side of 
the rulers.) 
We had tremendous fun and games here yesterday with the signing of the State and 
Federation Agreements-no less than about 50 signatures required-and it took 
about two hours with everyone dressed up to the nines and the Malays looking most 
magnificent and myself a picture of purity in my white uniform. The whole show was 
accompanied by a Hollywood atmosphere of brilliant lights and movie-cameras. I 
expect our Information Department will be sending a set of the pictures. The Sultan 
of Johore's gout, which prevented him from being in the party, was not, as one would 
expect, diplomatic. I got a doctor's certificate (a Government doctor) to certify that 
he was immobilised. We had to hurry the signing of all these documents on in order 
to get Linehan and Dato Onn off by air in daylight to Johore with the signed 
documents for completion by his signature and all that was duly organised with 
numbers of the Secretariat people in charge of various sets of documents to see that 
they were pushed along to the next person without undue delay. 
The temperature in the room here at King's House finally was about 150 degrees, 
what with the filming lights and the natural atmosphere in this part of the world in 
the afternoon. The previous day, when we had our last Plenary Conference in order 
to clear up all the dozens of little drafting points, we all had our fingers crossed in 
case Dato Onn, who had not been at the final meeting of the Working Committee, 
should turn sour on any particular point which might have made the signing 
impossible on the following day. However, it went with a swing and before he had 
time to raise his usual series of grouses, we closed the formal meeting and 
despatched the drafts for the all-night working of the Printing Department and then 
we were able to listen to him in an informal gathering. It is quite surprising how he 
maintains a barracking on every conceivable action of this Government, mostly 
fruitless and childish, but he is very alert for any possible ground for offence. 
We deeply appreciate the Secretary of State's message of appreciation which 
reached me on the morning of the signing day and I made full use of it in my 
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harangue on that occasion. I hope he will agree to send us a message for the opening 
meeting of the new Legislative Council in the middle of February and I have been so 
bold as to ask for a message from His Majesty for the first meeting of the Conference 
of Rulers, a few days earlier. 
Last night we had an enormous dinner party before all the Rulers and their 
entourages dispersed, which both have now done. There was a slight restlessness on 
the part of the Sultan of Perak that we did not have the signing in the morning. The 
straight answer to that was that we could not have possibly got the documents 
printed by that time. But it subsequently occurred to me that his real trouble was 
that he had a horse running at Kuala Lumpur in the 5.30 and rightly guessed that he 
would not be free to go and see it lose by that hour. The hardest worked man, these 
last few months, has been O'Connor and he is about at the end of his tether. He 
insists, however, on carrying on at the same tempo until early February when he will 
consider having a week's holiday at Fraser's Hill. 
I am immensely indebted to you and See! and Roberts-Wray and Lloyd and 
Secretary of State for giving me a final discretion on any points which might 
threaten to come up and wreck the whole procedure. In fact there were none but it 
was a great relief to know that I had a bit of room to spare in case of necessity. 
My grateful thanks and good wishes. 
137 CO 537/2177 23 Jan 1948 
[Indonesian influences in Malaya]: minute by H T Bourdillon record-
ing the views of Mr M J MacDonald 
[In Jan 1948 MacDonald returned to Britain on leave. One of the subjects he discussed at 
the CO was the extent of Indonesian influences in Malaya against which the Malayan 
Security Service under J D Dalley was ever vigilant. In June 1947 Dalley produced a paper 
on 'Indonesian Influences in Malaya', which was issued as a supplement to the fortnightly 
Political Intelligence Journal, MSS/PIJ no 10/47, 30 June 1947. In June the following year 
supplement 5, issued with MSS/PIJ no 11/48, 15 June 1948, dealt with 'Malay and 
Indonesian Communists' (see CO 537/3752 and CO 537/3753).) 
This is the file dealing with attempts by Indonesian influences to gain a foothold in 
the Malay Peninsula, and with the repercussions in Malaya of the troubles between 
the Indonesians and the Dutch. As shown in Sir Thomas Lloyd's letter to the 
Governor-General of 18th November last (No. 6 on the file), this is a subject which in 
our view requires constant watching. It therefore figures prominently in the Agenda 
of our departmental discussions with Mr. MacDonald, and has in fact been fully 
discussed with him since his arrival. 
Our reasons for keeping the question under review have been rather to guard 
against an inflammable situation in the future than to deal with one now. Indeed, it 
has always seemed to us that hitherto, in spite of the geographical propinquity of the 
two territories and the racial connections between them, Indonesian affairs have had 
remarkably little effect in Malaya. We asked Mr. MacDonald whether this impression 
was correct, and whether the underlying reason was to be found, as we have 
supposed, in the fact that the Malays of the Peninsula tend to regard themselves as a 
cut above the Indonesians and to resent attempts to drag them into Indonesian 
politics. Mr. MacDonald confirmed all this, but told us a great deal more which is of 
'• 
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immense value in completing the picture. He gave us, in particular, a most 
interesting account of relevant developments in Malaya since the Dutch "police 
action" .1 When that event took place, we at this end were anxious lest the existing 
quiescence in Malaya vis-a-vis the Indonesian problem might now be replaced by a 
strong and emotional partisan feeling, accompanied by greater bitterness against the 
Dutch in which it would be difficult for the British not to become involved. This 
anxiety was evidently shared in Singapore, and when the Indonesians began to make 
broadcast appeals for help in sending Red Cross supplies, the Governor-General, after 
urgently consulting H.M.G., had been quick to respond. He and Mrs. MacDonald had 
headed the list of subscribers, and their names had been followed by those of the two 
Governors. And there the matter stopped, no more subscriptions being forthcoming! 
The whole thing, in fact, fell as flat as a pancake, and the interest which was so 
signally lacking then has been equally lacking ever since. Mr. MacDonald attributes 
this partly to the reasons which we ourselves have imagined, partly to the fact that 
news of Indonesian atrocities aginst [sic] Chinese nationals quickly alienated any 
sympathy which the Chinese in Malaya might otherwise have felt, and partly to the 
simple fact that the Indonesians, from the beginning of the Dutch police action, 
made such a very poor showing. Mr. MacDonald has said that he himself was 
surprised at this . He expected and in many ways hoped that the Indonesians would do 
better. But in the event they did conspicuously badly. The Dutch had no difficulty in 
quickly achieving the objectives they had set for themselves, and the much heralded 
guerilla activity against them was a serious flop. Moreover, they succeeded in 
winning over not only a number of puppet leaders whose support meant nothing but 
a few highly respected Indonesian figures whose support, in public estimation 
throughout Indonesia, meant a great deal. As against this, the Indonesian resisters , 
were manifestly in very imperfect control of their own side and were incapable of 
effective cohesion. In short, it was obvious that there was "something wrong with the 
Republic of Indonesia", and this was not lost upon the -Malays of the Peninsula, who 
tended to thank their stars that they were under British (as opposed to Dutch) 
protection and thus safely out of the way. 
Not that Mr. MacDonald is out of sympathy with the Indonesians. On the contrary, 
he made it clear to us that he definitely favours the aspirations of the more moderate 
and responsible Indonesian leaders. This fact is apparently recognised and appreci-
ated by the Indonesian leaders themselves, who understand on the one hand that we 
cannot take sides with them against the Dutch but regard Lord Killearn and Mr. 
MacDonald himself, on the other hand, as "their best friends in Asia". What the 
Governor-General told us about the attitude of Mr. Shahrifl is particularly impor-
tant. Mr. Shahrir does not want to involve Malaya in the Indonesian struggle.3 
Indeed, his attitude is quite the contrary. He has met Dato Onn a number of times 
under Mr. MacDonald's roof, and his advice to Dato Onn has always been to remain 
in friendship with the British and to "build up his own show". 
1 The Linggajati Agreement (Nov 1946) between Indonesian republicans and the Dutch collapsed in June 
1947 and the Dutch launched their first 'police action' in which some 150,000 troops were deployed. In 
Jan 1948 another conference culminated in the Renville Agreement which was similarly shortlived being 
followed by the second 'police action' in Dec 1948. 
2 Sutan Sjahrir was prime minister of the republic from Nov 1945 to July 1947. 
3 At this point in his minute Bourdillon added the following comment in the margin: 'There are, ofcourse, 
many Indonesian extremists who do, but that is another matter .' 
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(On his side, Dato Onn apparently thinks of a future "Federation" of Malaya and 
British Borneo under British protection, which can develop in contra-distinction 
though not in opposition to Indonesia and would only merge with the latter, if at all, 
in the distant future.) 
Mr. MacDonald went on from this point to make some more general remarks. He 
thought it was very important that H.M.G., and above all the local representatives of 
H.M.G. should be sympathetic towards the moderate nationalist movements in Asia. 
He said that there was much promising material in these movements, and he felt 
that the whole future of Britain in Asia might depend on the attitude we adopted 
towards them. At the moment we were not at all regarded as the reactionary 
Imperialist power, bent on maintaining European domination in the East at all costs. 
On the contrary, our reputation, as a result of the developments in India, Ceylon and 
Burma, stood very high, and it was most important that this position should be 
maintained. Whilst, therefore, we must obviously maintain a friendly attitude 
towards the French and the Dutch in the Far East, and whilst Mr. MacDonald was in 
favour of much day-to-day contact with French and Dutch officials at technical 
levels, 4 he was insistent that we must not lay ourselves open to the charge of 
"ganging up" with the other European powers in the Far East at the expense of 
"native aspirations". (It seems very important that we should bear all this in mind in 
considering the developmeiits, within our spehere, of the new Western European 
policy announced by Mr. Bevin yesterday.)5 
Mr. MacDonald said he thought it was very important from the Indonesian point of 
view that they should now come to terms with the Dutch. He also said that, in the 
long term, this was very important from the Dutch point of view. He was afraid the 
Dutch were now in an ugly mood. Vindictiveness, however, would not suit their real 
interests. The Indonesians might fail this time, but next time they would succeed. 
I have noted this subject for further discussion with Ministers at the meeting 
which is to take place at 10.30 next Tuesday morning. I now send the papers forward 
urgently in advance of the meeting. 
(The original of No. 9 hereon is the I.R.D. papers. Mr. Galsworthy is putting up a 
draft reply on those papers.) 
P.S. I should perhaps add as a postscript (it is not relevant on this file) that Mr. 
MacDonald told us that events in Indo-China have had no effect in Malaya whatever. 
4 Sir T Lloyd underlined the words 'at technical levels' and commented in the margin that they were 'the 
all important limiting factors'. 
5 In the Commons foreign affairs debate on 22 Jan, Bevin proposed a 'Western Union' which, with 'the 
closest possible collaboration with the Commonwealth and with oversea territories', would aid economic 
recovery and hamper Soviet expansionism. 
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[Inauguration of the Federation of Malaya]: letter from H T Bourdil-
lon to Sir E Gent 
Very many thanks for your letter of the 22nd of January, 1 in which you describe the 
1 See 136. 
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ceremony of the signature of the Federation and State Agreements at Kuala Lumpur 
on the previous day. We have since received a series of photographs of the event, and 
we can imagine what a colourful and animated spectacle it must have been. We in the 
Office, unfortunately, could provide nothing comparable on the great day! 
We all feel that the successful conclusion of these negotiations, in so cordial an 
atmosphere, is a great triumph for yourself and your advisers . The inauguration of 
the Federation on the 1st February, with so few dissident voices, and the emergence 
of Ceylon as a Dominion2 are two very significant manifestations of the solidarity of 
the British family of nations which it is good for the world in general to see in these 
troubled times. 
We are very impressed by the cordiality of the final stages of the settlement, in 
spite of the occasional acerbities from Dato Onn. This is the more remarkaole in view 
of the severe shaking which Malay confidence had both in the debacle of 194112 and 
after MacMichael, and in comparison with the bitterness and distrust which had 
marked the negotiations in Indonesia it is very reassuring. We shall try to emphasise 
this cordiality, which of course says much for British administration, past and 
present, and I am writing to Sabben-Clare3 at Washington to draw his attention to it 
and to suggest to him that it could be unobtrusively pointed out to the more 
responsible of American writers on political subjects. We should also like to show 
some evidence-press cuttings, speeches by Malays, etc. in favour of the 
Federation-to demonstrate the welcome given to the new Constitution by the Malay 
population: "harta]s" get into the papers, but Malay rejoicings don't! 
2 Ceylon achieved independence within the Commonwealth on 4 Feb 1948. 
3 E E Sabben-Clare, colonial attache to the British embassy in Washington, 1947-1950. 
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